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 ďƐƚƌĂĐƚ 
The idea of evidence-based policy has gained increasing prominence. Much research 
exists on the subject, particularly tackling the evidence-based policy turn and, 
subsequently, its critique. A plethora of studies have identified the shortcomings of the 
evidence-based policy ideal and challenged its supposed linearity. This project aims to 
provide an understanding of the way in which evidence is utilized in policy, and 
contribute to this debate by enacting an innovative research design. I am proposing a 
2x2 comparative approach, which looks at the use of evidence across two domains, 
drug and prostitution policy, across two countries, Australia and the UK. A case-based 
qualitative comparative approach has the potential to offer a certain depth while at the 
same time providing the opportunity for analytic generalisation. I argue that evidence 
can be a prime focus for analysis of the policy process, and that through its lenses one 
can appraise deeper theoretical and epistemological questions about the state in late 
modern capitalism, the relationship between knowledge and ideology, science and 
politics, science and values, reason and emotion. The labelling of prostitution and drug 
policy as morality policies exposes the nature of these domains as morally and politically 
antagonistic, whilst providing opportunity to reflect on the role of morality in filtering 
understandings of evidence and shaping policy positions.  
 >ŝƐƚŽĨďďƌĞǀŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ 
ACF Advocacy Coalition Framework 
AIVL Australian Injecting & Illicit Drug Users League 
APPG All Party Parliamentary Group 
BBV Blood Borne Virus 
DCRs Drug Consumption Rooms 
DPMP Drug Policy Modelling Programme 
EBP Evidence-Based Policy 
ECP English Collective of Prostitutes 
HASC Home Affairs Select Committee 
HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
IDU Injecting Drug Users 
INPUD International Network of People who Use Drugs 
KU Knowledge Utilisation 
LEC Land and Environment Court 
MSIC Medically Supervised Injecting Centre 
NICE National Institute of Clinical Excellence 
NHMRC National Health and Medical Research Council  
NSW New South Wales 
NTE Night Time Economy 
NUAA New South Wales Users & Aids Association 
PCC Policing and Crime Commissioner 
PLA Prostitution Licensing Authority 
QCA Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
RCTs Randomised Controlled Trials 
SWOP Sex Workers Outreach Project 
STS Science and Technology Studies 
UKNSWP UK Network of Sex Work Projects 
WHO World Health Organisation 
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Chapter 1  
/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ 
1.1 The purpose of the project 
The purpose of this project is to study the use of evidence in the policy process, via a 
comparative study of two policy interventions GUXJFRQVXPSWLRQURRPVDQGEURWKHOV·
regulation) in two regions (England, UK and New South Wales, Australia) and two 
areas of policy (drugs and prostitution). The project started because of an increased 
interest in the idea and value of using evidence to inform policy. Whilst there was 
always implicit value in this ideal, it has become increasingly made explicit in policy and 
scientific circles, which has led to an interest in, and pursuit of, the systematization of 
research knowledge for the purposes of policy-making. Academics approached this 
apparent shift in rhetoric and practice with some ambivalence; on the one hand, this 
was positively welcomed by sections of the academic community, in the hope that 
DFDGHPLF UHVHDUFK·V SUDFWLFDO XVH FRXOG EH IXUWKHU extended into policy (Nutley et al, 
2007; Young et al, 2002; Leigh, 2009). On the other hand, this sparked a growing debate 
in regards to both the limits of this approach to policy-making, which was often seen as 
merely rhetorical in character, and the underlying political changes that contributed to 
this shift (Davies, 2004; Sanderson, 2002; Packwood, 2002; Parsons, 2002; Byrne, 2011; 
Monaghan, 2011; Smith, 2013; Stevens, 2007a).  
A whole body of literature has proposed a number of competing models of the policy 
process and of the use of evidence within it. These models provide quite contrasting 
accounts, depending on their epistemological assumptions as well as on those aspects 
they choose to emphasise. Models have been extensively used as heuristics in the 
literature. Some have been criticized for putting forward new models (i.e. Stevens, 
2007a; Monaghan, 2011). By focusing on the use of evidence in policy-making, I reflect 
RQPRGHOV·DVVXPSWLRQV LQ UHODWLRQ WRPXOWLSOHFDVHVWXGLHVDQGDVVHVV VLPLODULWLHs and 
differences between different policy domains, political and institutional frameworks. 
Most comparative studies focus on the same area of policy in two countries (e.g. Hajer, 
1995), or two areas of policy within the same country (e.g. Kingdon, 2003). Not many 
studies focus on morality policy issues, so there is a need for a comparative design that 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
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looks at different countries and different areas of policy, especially those that have been 
neglected in the evidence-policy literature, like prostitution. This particular comparative 
design is appropriate given the aims and theoretical approach adopted because it 
examines the similarities and differences in the way evidence is used, understood, and 
applied to inform policy interventions cross countries and cross sectors. 
Sociological theories on the nature of the state have emphasised changes toward a New 
Managerialism in public policy and administration, characterised by post-ideological 
politics. Evidence has been identified as an essential tool in the process of neutralising 
political debates and ridding them from their ideological taint. Late modern capitalism 
exhibits certain distinguishing features, where consumption-based economies rely on 
the expansion of leisure, which has serious implications for developments in both these 
policy domains. The incongruence between the glorification of leisure and pleasure on 
the one hand, and the moralisation and prohibition of drugs and prostitution through 
the criminal law on the other, calls for an investigation of the relationship between 
ideology, politics, and morality.  
 
1.2 Research Question 
The main research question is: How is evidence used in policy? 
%HLQJ D ´KRZµ TXHVWLRQ LWV XWLOLW\ LV WZR-fold: on the one hand, it opens up the 
possibility to assess existing explanations on the use of evidence in policy; on the other 
hand, it is open enough to re-define and reassess these on the basis of new data 
garnered from the case studies. There are a number of related questions, each of which 
are relevant to the development of the research design, initial hypotheses and the 
process of analysis. The following questions will guide the research focus:  
x What counts as evidence? 
x How is evidence deployed in policy arguments? 
x Which of the existing models of the use of evidence in policy best explains this 
process? 
x Is it necessary and/or possible to test existing models and or create new 
models? 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
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x What are the similarities and differences in the use of evidence between 
government departments, stakeholder culture and policy areas? 
What are the similarities and differences in the use of evidence between the UK 
and Australia? 
x How does the use of evidence in policy relate to sociological theories on the 
nature of the state in late modern capitalism?? 
Specifically in relation to evidence and morality I ask: 
Can evidence neutralise morality? 
x How does morality affect understandings and uses of evidence? 
x How are the values and beliefs of stakeholders RSHUDWLQJWRILOWHUSROLF\DFWRUV·
understandings and uses of evidence? 
x Can classic political cleavages aid understandings of evidence use in policy? 
x How do these relate to consumption-based economies on the one hand, and 
moral and legal prohibitions on the other? 
1.3 Evidence in Drug and Prostitution Policy in the UK and Australia 
Drug and prostitution policy are regarded as complex policy issues. They may be 
variously characterised as morality policies (Euchner et al, 2013; Meier, 1994), as 
unstructured problems (Hoppe, 2011), as wicked problems (Rittel and Webber, 1973), 
and as highly politicised (Monaghan, 2011). All areas of policy are necessarily 
politicized, and the greater or lesser presence of evidence does not automatically 
translate into more or less politicization. However, there is some indication that both 
drug and prostitution policies are, at the very least, difficult political subjects. They 
explicitly enter the realm of morality. Thus, it becomes relevant to question the extent 
to which these areas are in fact more inherently politicized, and how morality, politics 
and evidence interact in these domains. The assumption that the greater or lesser 
presence of evidence determines whether an area of policy is more or less politicized is 
simplistic, purporting that evidence is non-political, neutral and value-free, and that its 
prominence implies a less politicised policy area. I will argue that there is a 
misconception in the belief that politics and policy-making and evidence-making are 
fundamentally different in nature, or that evidence-making happens in a political 
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vacuum. Maintaining the assumption that evidence is value-free and policy/politics is 
value-laden risks painting a skewed picture.  
Drug and prostitution policy are interesting fields of study, and comparison, precisely 
because of their value-laden nature, whereby it is difficult to disentangle the moral from 
the political and the scientific. I will argue that there is significant analytic potential in 
comparing drug and prostitution policy, by outlining their contrasts and similarities. 
There has been no study to date that explicitly looks at the role of evidence in 
prostitution policy, which warrants interest to study this particular topic. In addition, 
both these policy fields present the legality/illegality conundrum. Drugs and 
prostitution can be seen to be, in many ways, similarly regulated. In the UK, and in all 
Australian states until recently,1 they have been subject to control from similar agencies, 
and they are often entwined with issues of poverty, inequality, social exclusion, 
addiction, illicit trade/trafficking, and public nuisance (Home Office, 2008: 8, Home 
Office, 2010: 2; Rogan Report, 1986). They are subject to high levels of moralisation 
and stigmatisation, and their role in society is often misunderstood and misrepresented.  
In the UK and Australia, many of the activities associated with drugs and prostitution 
are illicit. The type of regulation that has been built around them has so far been 
primarily moved by a prohibitionist sentiment. Tackling these issues and the perceived 
problems associated with them involves similar agencies in both countries, including 
police, health authorities, legal and political authorities, local and national 
administrations and organized constituents' groups. There are similarities between these 
two fields across countries, but there are also significant contrasts. The laws on 
prostitution in Australia differ quite considerably from state to state, whereas in 
England, these tend to be harmonized across regions even if different interventions are 
pursued at the local and regional levels (Home Office; 2010: 16, 21). In the UK, the 
extent to which health authorities are involved in the regulation of prostitution is 
minimal when compared to their role in drug regulation. In Australia, the role of health 
and local authorities in regulating prostitution in those states that have decriminalised or 
legalised it is paramount. In this respect, it is relevant to question whether the lesser 
presence of health authorities results in the exclusion or quasi-exclusion of the EBP 
discourse from policy debates. This is especially important because the evidence-based 
policy discourse originated in medicine (Chapters 2 and 4). Stakeholder group culture 
                                                 
1 Some Australian states have decriminalised or legalised prostitution 
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matters in the way they understand evidence and this is represented and institutionalised 
in policy sectors, departments and disciplines. This has been previously discussed in the 
literature (e.g. Nutley et al, 2007). What appears to be missing is a discussion on the 
H[WHQW WR ZKLFK WKH GRPLQDQFH RI D ´KHDOWK UHVHDUFK FXOWXUHµ ZKLFK WHQGV WR EH
naturally married to some policy sectors more than others because of the level of health 
DJHQF\ LQYROYHPHQW ZLOO GHWHUPLQH WKH W\SH RI ´HYLGHQFH FXOWXUHµ DQG WKHUHIRUH
understandings of evidence informing stakeholders as well as policy practice. The 
comparison across policy domains allows exploration of whether this is the case. 
There is a significant difference in the way prostitution is regulated in different 
Australian states. New South Wales, for instance, has adopted a decriminalised model, 
which allows for all sex-work related industry to operate like any other business. The 
regulating authority has passed from police and criminal justice to the department of 
planning and local councils. New South Wales has also passed legislation which 
decriminalised the possession and self-administration of controlled substances within 
the confines of the Sydney Medically Supervised Injecting Centre (Drug Misuse and 
Trafficking Act 1985 amendment, part 2A). This might indicate that the logic of 
decriminalisation has penetrated more strongly in New South Wales, and calls for an 
assessment of the extent of policy diffusion across different policy sectors. However, 
this could also be seen as political expediency, in that this intervention, now in place for 
over ten years, was not followed by a political and legal pursuit of decriminalising drug 
possession, or indeed its adoption in other parts of New South Wales or Australia. 
Although it will not be feasible to look at each individual Australian state, their 
differences, as well as differences between the two countries, are taken into account and 
help generate greater understanding about the impact of institutional political structures 
on the relationship between evidence and policy.  
Being an ex-British colony which has retained relatively close ties with the UK up to 
this day, there is a shared cultural heritage between these two nations, including the key 
elements of language and the similarities in their legal system, which Australia inherited 
from the UK. However, what attract attention are the potential contrasts which may 
emerge from the diversity in the structure of their respective political systems. 
Australian federalism is well rooted in the country's political structure; similarly, the 
centralism of UK politics, despite more recent steps toward devolution and localism, is 
still predominant. Australia is characterized by a 'Westminster-inspired' model that 
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shares with the UK what Lijphart terms the 'executives-parties dimension', but differs 
on the 'federal-unitary dimension' (1999: 314). This essentially means that the degree of 
majoritarianism is higher in the UK than in Australia, where the level of consensual 
power-sharing is higher. The federalist structure of Australian democracy may be an 
important factor influencing the processes of policy-making. At this time, with the UK 
undergoing structural changes, with increasingly devolved powers to its constituent 
parts, this discussion becomes even more relevant. This entails the possibility of 
assessing propositions around the relative independence of localities to pursue policies 
which deviate from national and international directives or for the possibility of 
´ERWWRP-XSµLQLWLDWLYHVWREHFRPHHVWDEOLVKHG 
The next section details key concepts and provides brief definitions that will be used in 
the thesis (which are dealt with more fully in the extended glossary of working concept 
in appendix 1).  
1.4 Key Concepts 
Evidence is differently categorised as scientific, jurisprudential, anecdotal and 
experiential. Policy is variously used to refer to a subsystem (i.e. drug and prostitution 
policy) or an intervention (i.e. drug consumption rooms). Policy is also distinguished 
WKURXJK +DOO·V WHUPLQRORJ\ RI SDUDGLJP DQG LQVWUXPHQW ZKHUHE\ D SDUDGLJP LV
regarded as defining the boundaries of views, understandings, and possibilities within a 
particular system and instruments operate within and respond to the given paradigm. 
Prohibitionism, abolitionism, and legalisation are regarded as relevant policy paradigms. 
Prohibitionism implies the use of criminal penalties with the aim to prohibit a particular 
activity; in drug and prostitution policy, it may target the whole trade, or it may only 
target either supply or demand. Abolitionism is a normative position which calls for the 
abolishment of activities considered wrong in principle; related with prostitution in 
particular, but also drugs (abstinence), abolitionism is about ridding society of such 
practices. Legalisation implies legal reform with the aim to make licit the supply and 
demand for drugs and prostitution. Arguments for (and practices of) legalisation take 
on different, politically diverse forms, which range from extreme commercialisation to 
strict state regulation. Criminalisation and decriminalisation (legal short hands related to 
the above paradigms) are regarded as relevant policy ideas. Criminalisation involves a 
punitive approach toward the sale and/or purchase of drugs and prostitution. 
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Decriminalisation entails the end of criminal sanctions for the possession and 
consumption of drugs and for the sale of sex.  
Values are broadly defined as abstract, goal-oriented, deliberative and evaluative tools. 
Beliefs are broadly defined as concrete, action-oriented, practice-led evaluative and 
deliberative tools. Affect is defined as an emotional response. Ideology is used in three 
separate yet interconnected ways in this thesis: in the critical Marxist sense, it is 
understood as a dominant set of values, beliefs and ideas; in a political/motivational 
sense, it is understood as a necessary system for organising positions; in a 
morphological sense, it is understood as a loose and contradictory construct of concepts 
which are both logically and culturally adjacent (Freeden, 1994). Morality is understood 
as the rules that enable to distinguish right from wrong, which are founded upon values, 
beliefs, ideas, group belonging, culture, politics, and social ordering (Fisher, 2004; 
Douglas, 1966). Liberal morality and conservative morality are observed as distinct 
types (Haidt, 2012), as each is made up of different affective, cognitive and ideational 
components (Williams, 1979). Instrumental rationality is distinguished from bounded 
rationality, where the former is regarded as empirical problem solving grounded in 
positivism and the latter is regarded as time, space, group, culture and belief bound 
reasoning (Sanderson, 2009; Baumgartner and Jones, 2009). Boundary work (Gieryn, 
1983) is defined as the process of demarcation of science from non-science, which 
HQWDLOVWKHGHILQLWLRQRIVFLHQFH·VLGHQWLW\DQG the organisation of science as an ideology 
LQWKHFULWLFDO0DU[LVWVHQVH%\H[WHQVLRQWKLVLPSDFWVRQWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIVFLHQWLVWV·
identity and their understanding of science. Epistemic cultures (Knorr Cetina, 2007) 
imply the diversity of knowledge and knowledge generation within science that is bound 
to discipline, ontology, epistemology, terminology and methodology.  
The next section provides an outline of the thesis structure, briefly summarising each 
FKDSWHUV·FRQWHQW 
1.5 Thesis Structure 
In Chapter Two I review the literature dealing with the relationship between evidence 
and policy, identifying certain trends that range from positivist, to normative, to critical, 
to interpretive approaches. I distinguish between three frames of reference: knowledge 
utilisation, evidence-based policy, and science/policy studies, which are associated with 
different countries, traditions and epistemologies. I discuss the evidence hierarchy, its 
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origin and purpose. I outline principal models of the use of evidence in policy and 
SURYLGHDQDOWHUQDWLYH UHDGLQJRIPRGHOV LQIRUPHGE\+RSSH·V FULWLTXH , WKHQ
FRQVLGHUWKHFRQWULEXWLRQRIWKHFRQFHSWRIERXQGDU\ZRUNLQWKHPDNLQJRIVFLHQFH·V
identity, concluding with a reflection on the relationship between researchers, evidence 
and advocacy. 
In Chapter Three I review the literature on theories of the policy process, providing 
brief outlines of the theories and frameworks regarded as foundational to the field 
(incrementalism, punctuated equilibriums, the advocacy coalition framework, policy 
paradigm and learning, multiple streams, and discourse coalitions). I discuss the latest 
trend toward complexity, which entails using multiple insights from different theories to 
inform analysis, as formalised by Cairney (2013). I discuss examples of work which use 
insights from multiple theories with a focus on ideas (Beland, 2005; Smith, 2013). I 
argue that the role of values in the policy process is under-theorised, and propose a 
synthesis, making use of tools and insights from Hall·V  SROLF\ SDUDGLJP DQG
6DEDWLHU·VDGYRFDF\FRDOLWLRQIUDPHZRUNWRLQIRUPDQDO\VLV7KLVIROORZV6XUHO·V
(2000) contention that these approaches are unique in placing emphasis on what he 
WHUPV ¶QRUPDWLYHDQGFRJQLWLYH IUDPHV·ZKLFKSURYLGHFRnceptual space for assessing 
the role of values, beliefs and affect in the policy process. 
In Chapter Four, I identify and critique the epistemological foundation of the concept 
of evidence-based policy. I begin with critical realism (Archer et al, 1998), moving 
through critical theory (Habermas, 1976) and science and technology studies (Knorr 
Cetina, 2007) to expose the limitations of postitivist notions of evidence, embedding 
epistemological discussions in focused critiques through the work of Pawson (2002), 
Sanderson (2009) and Majone (1989). I then discuss the contribution of feminist 
philosophy of science (Longino, 1990) and critical realism (Sayer, 2011) on the 
relationship between science and values. I conclude by discussing the contribution that 
a study of the interplay of values and beliefs, defined with the aid of classic literature in 
social psychology (Rokeach, 1979) can bring to the project.  
In Chapter Five, I argue that values and beliefs are foundational to morality, and that 
morality is useful as a working concept. Starting from the premise that drug and 
prostitution policies have been characterised as morality policies, I critically review the 
literature on morality policy and outline both its strengths and shortcomings. I argue 
that an important contribution from this literature is the emphasis placed on framing, 
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and particularly the distinction made between latent and manifest moral framing. In 
order to move beyond a notion of morality as singular, present in the morality policy 
literature, I review relevant literature in moral and cognitive psychology which stresses 
classic political cleavages as influential in moral politics. I adopt the liberal/conservative 
typology (which have a differential affective basis where the first is primarily moved by 
empathy whereas the latter more strongly relies on fear) to understand morality as plural 
and competitive. I also consider the contribution of political science literature studying 
long term shifts in societal level values from authoritarian to libertarian as tied with 
economic, social and cultural changes (Inglehart, 1997; Flanaghan and Lee, 2003). I then 
move on to classic sociological accounts, DQGSDUWLFXODUO\+DEHUPDV·) insight on 
WKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ ODZ DQG PRUDOLW\ DQG 'RXJODV· 6) argument on the 
necessity of purity and danger categories for social ordering practices and their reliance 
on affective reactions, such as disgust. The relationship between law, morality and 
ideology, and particularly the extent to which the law produces and reproduces a 
dominant morality that is ideologically supported, calls for a more nuanced 
understanding of ideology, which is provided in the conclusive discussion on three 
traditions in the study of ideology (critical Marxist; psychology/motivational; ideological 
morphology). I propose an explanatory model which takes into account the interplay 
between moralities, ideology and affect. 
In Chapter Six, I outline the advantages of a comparative case-based qualitative 
approach. These include the possibility for analytic generalisation. I trace the 
development of thinking about case study research, and particularly systematic multiple-
case design, focusing on the principle of relational embeddedness as central for this project. 
I outline the reasoning behind case selection, beginning from issues of comparability 
fundamentally understood as contrast and similarity, and provide some information 
about the process of case-selection and the case studies under scrutiny. The principal 
data collection strategy, semi-structured interviews, involved the purposive sampling of 
38 stakeholders with varied professional and disciplinary backgrounds and relevant 
experience in both policy areas and case studies in both countries. I describe the 
principles of adaptive theory (Layder, 1998) to provide the rationale for the analytical 
approach, which followed adaptive coding. A list of provisional codes (derived from 
existing theories and literature) is provided, but the main focus is placed on morality, 
values and beliefs as emerging categories and the way these have been analysed. Starting 
from considerations on the sample of participants, I reflect on ways to systematically 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
20 
EULQJ WRJHWKHUSDUWLFLSDQWV· DWWULEXWHVDQGQDUUDWLYHV I propose an analytical approach 
that joins the logic of qualitative comparative analysis with the instruments of network 
DQDO\VLV WR YLVXDOLVH FRQQHFWLRQV EHWZHHQ YDOXHV DQG EHOLHIV IRU HDFK RI WKH GHVLJQ·V
comparative dimensions.  
,Q&KDSWHU6HYHQ ,EHJLQDQDO\VLQJSDUWLFLSDQWV·QDUUDWLYHV ,RXWOLQH the gap between 
theory and practice of evidence use by comparing answers to abstract questions (i.e. 
what do you think counts as evidence) with narratives about evidence use in real life 
policy examples. I reflect on the differences between countries, policy areas and 
stakeholder background. I find that participants in drug policy, and particularly those 
who have a scientific background, are altogether more likely to acknowledge and respect 
hierarchical notions of evidence compared to those in prostitution policy. I also find 
that the evidence hierarchy produces hierarchies of stakeholders in such a way as to 
lessen the credibility of certain stakeholders (primarily those who advocate for affected 
communities) whose evidence is mostly anecdotal and experiential, rather than 
scientific.  
In Chapter Eight, I analyse the interplay between professional background, 
predominant values and belief commitments in the sample of participants. I establish 
relevant values and beliefs inductively and use network analysis software to visualise 
values and beliefs constellations in the sample of participants, by country and by policy 
domain. This allows establishing which values and beliefs are more likely to occur 
concurrently and prompts reflection on the manner in which they may influence policy 
positions. Differences are found predominantly between policy areas, with different 
values and beliefs being more strongly present and connected in either domain and 
within prostitution policy in particular, where different advocacy coalitions (radical and 
liberal feminists) are seen as supported by different sets of values and beliefs.  
In Chapter Nine, I discuss the decriminalisation paradigm in relation to each of the 
comparative dimensions (Australia, UK, drugs and prostitution) and the two case 
VWXGLHV GUXJ FRQVXPSWLRQ URRPV DQG EURWKHOV· UHJXODWLRQ , EXLOG RQ ILQGLQJV IURP
previous chapters and turn the focus to the interplay between morality, evidence, and 
policy change. I construct ideal types of relevant advocacy coalitions and discuss their 
foundational moralities. Making use of the liberal/conservative typologies outlined in 
the literature, I analyse a sample of debates in the public domain to make manifest the 
interaction between conservative/liberal moralities and evidence. I concentrate on the 
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incommensurability of views that stems from the selection and filtering of the evidence 
through pre-held moral and political positions.  
In Chapter Ten, I reflect on the implications of the findings by relating them to more 
general considerations about current political, economic and ideological positions of 
advanced liberal states and their effects on these policy domains. I focus on the impact 
of the politics of austerity and the dismantling of welfare states and its effects on the 
rights-based politics of solidarity which characterise advocacy for change in these policy 
domains. I argue that any demand for change based on labour rights (prostitution) or 
the right to pleasure (drugs) and self-determination is unlikely to receive support or 
generate consensus given the contentious nature of drug use and sex work and their 
ambiguous moral standing as well as their potential to threaten the moral order, and 
particularly gender and class hierarchies. It is in fact those who sit at the bottom of the 
social, economic and moral hierarchies, the most visible and most disadvantaged, such 
as homeless drug users and street sex workers, who are more often the objects of 
moralising and regulatory efforts. I also reflect on the issue of framing, and particularly 
on which frames are more likely to compete, or coalesce and succeed in supporting or 
resisting policy change. I then discuss the contradictions inherent in neo-liberal ideology 
which allow competing advocacy coalitions to find supportive elements within it. 
Finally, I outline how opportunities for change are both supported and curtailed by the 
interaction between ideology, morality, coalitions and evidence.  
In Chapter Eleven, I conclude by addressing each of the research questions in turn, 
joining together the insights from key findings and discussion. 
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Chapter 2  
dŚĞƵƐĞŽĨĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŝŶƉŽůŝĐǇ 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive yet targeted review of the 
literature on the use of evidence in policy. In order to tackle an extensive and complex 
field, this literature is broken down into distinctive literatures relating to three main 
frames of reference: knowledge utilisation (KU), science and policy studies, and 
evidence-based policy (EBP). These frames of reference are often indicative of the 
countries in which they were produced. Knowledge utilisation in policy ² dates back to 
1960s, and is associated with the US (Weiss; 1979; Havelock, 1969; Caplan, 1979; Rich, 
1991; Dunn, 1982). This relies upon a broad definition of knowledge which 
encompasses information that lies outside the scientific realm. In continental Europe, 
terms of reference tend to gravitate toward the notions of science/policy or 
science/politics. Studies which utilise this binary notion are influenced by 
epistemological and theoretical underpinnings originating from poststructuralism and 
science and technology studies (STS) (Hoppe, 1999; 2005; Gieryn, 1983). In the UK, 
studies more often include the word evidence, or explicitly refer to the notion of 
evidence-based policy, principally because this notion became part and parcel of the 
New Labour government strategy at the turn of the century (Cabinet Office, 1999). 
CUXFLDOO\PRVW8.VWXGLHVKDYHWDNHQ:HLVV·W\SRORJ\IURPWKH.8WUDGLWLRQ
as a starting point. It is important throughout to note that commentators might use 
frames of reference interchangeably, and apply these terms to contexts which lie outside 
their original sources. In Australia, for instance, commentators have used evidence-
based policy (Leigh, 2009b; Head, 2008); feminist STS (Valentine, 2009) and research 
utilisation (Ritter, 2009) as terms of reference, implying different epistemological bases, 
and different kinds of analyses.  
The purpose of these categorisations ² other than to organise and make amenable what 
is an otherwise vast and complex literature ² is to highlight how scholarly context and 
the adoption of different epistemological positions might influence the way knowledge 
and evidence are viewed, and subsequently operationalized, in studies of the policy 
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process. There is a clear nexus between epistemology, theorising and modelling, on the 
one hand, and the type of normative, positive and empirical work produced by scholars 
in the field, on the other.  
2.2 Knowledge Utilisation  
7KH OLWHUDWXUH JURXSHGXQGHU WKH ODEHO ¶NQRZOHGJHXWLOLVDWLRQ·PDUNV WKHEHJLQQLQJRI
explicit scholarly interest in the use of evidence for policy. Formally theorising the 
use/knowledge nexus in the context of public policy, many ideas emerging in this field 
were subsequently picked up by commentators outside the US as a point of departure. 
Specifically, models of knowledge utilisation, previously reserved to organisational 
theories in compartmentalised fields were linked specifically to policy-making by 
commentators such as Havelock and Weiss, among others. This tradition has spread to 
a variety of fields of specialisation, and is now labelled K* to include different forms of 
knowledge utilisation (translation, mediation, brokering, management, mobilisation, 
transfer, exchange).1 The KU tradition is broad, spanning six decades and prefiguring 
much of the work carried out in both the EBP literature and the science/policy 
tradition. In an article reflecting on the contributions made by scholars in the field of 
knowledge utilisation since the 1960s, Rich argued that this field remained marginal in 
academia and beyond, and that there is little recognition of its historical roots and its 
embeddedness in other mainstream social scientific and organisational theories (1991: 
320). Despite the fact that mainstream social science theories, such as rational choice, 
H[SOLFLWO\GHDOZLWKLQIRUPDWLRQLWZDVDUJXHGWKDWWKHQDWXUHRIWKLV´LQIRUPDWLRQµLWV
production and uses, remained under-theorised (1991: 322). It appears that a linear or 
problem solving model of information use was assumed in mainstream theories that did 
not critically focus on knowledge utilisation.  
Certain dated studies in the classic KU tradition remain of relevance up to this day. 
+DYHORFN·V paper (1974) ² focusing on innovation in US schools ² details three models 
of knowledge utilisation for innovation in practice: the problem-solving model, the 
research, development and diffusion model and the social interaction model. Based on 
factor analysis of survey data from a national sample of US school districts, alongside a 
review of the theoretical contributions to innovation processes, Havelock argues that 
each of these models highlights potentially significant aspects of the innovation process 
                                                 
1 http://inweh.unu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/KStar_ConceptPaper_FINAL_Oct29_WEBsmaller.pdf 
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and that no model should be discounted, making the case for complexity and 
underlying the futility of seeking a single model which universally applies. He writes that 
¶FRPSHWLQJ LGHRORJLHVRI FKDQJH VKRXOGHDFKEH VHHQDVHOXFLGDWLQJHTXDOO\ LPSRUWDQW
but dLVWLQFWDVSHFWVRIDWRWDOUHDOLW\·:HLVV·SDSHUGHWDLOVVL[PRGHOV
of research utilisation: the knowledge-driven model, the problem solving model, the 
interactive model, the tactical model, the political model, and the enlightenment model. 
Like Havelock, Weiss argues that these models are as imperfect as they are useful 
EHFDXVHHDFKPD\DSSO\WRGLIIHUHQWFRQWH[WVDQGFLUFXPVWDQFHV ¶SUREDEO\DOORIWKHP
DUH DSSOLFDEOH LQ VRPH VLWXDWLRQV· DQG ¶FHUWDLQO\ QRQH RI WKHP UHSUHVHQWV D IXOO\
satisfactory answer to the question of how a polity best mobilizes its research resources 
tRLQIRUPSXEOLFDFWLRQ·:HLVV·FRQFOXGHVZLWKDFDOOIRUVRFLDOVFLHQWLVWVWR
pay more attention to policy-making so as to consciously make a contribution to 
social/public policy through research (ibid). Weiss ultimately believes that research is 
the most important intellectual pursuit of society, firmly placing social science in 
FRQWH[W DORQJVLGHSROLF\:HLVV· UHIOHFWLRQV VWLOO UHVRQDWH LQ WKHFRQWH[WRI the rise of 
the evidence-based policy discourse. This paper prefigured increasing scholarly interest 
in this area; the models outlined in it functioned as a basis for scholars to engage with 
decades later. Yet, some scholars appear to have adopted these models almost 
prescriptively, without systematic comparative testing. The question remains as to 
whether we have moved much further in developing more complex and sophisticated 
modes for studying knowledge, and research, utilisation in policy. 
A widely used concept in current literature on the relationship between evidence and 
SROLF\ LV WKH LGHDRIWKH ¶WZR-communiWLHV·&DSODQ·V ZRUNDLPHG to investigate 
WKH YDOLGLW\ RI WKH ¶WZR-FRPPXQLWLHV· WKHRU\ ZKLFK SURYLGHV DQ H[SODQDWLRQ RI WKH
incommensurability between science and policy. This theory is founded upon the 
FRQYLFWLRQ¶WKDWVRFLDOVFLHQWLVWVDQGSROLF\PDNHUVOLYHLQVHSDUDWHZRUOGVZLWKGLIIHUHQW
DQGRIWHQ FRQIOLFWLQJYDOXHV GLIIHUHQW UHZDUG V\VWHPV DQGGLIIHUHQW ODQJXDJHV· 
459). Whereas some put more emphasis on diverging values and the cultural gap 
between these worlds, others stress diverging interests in their explanation. Rich (1991) 
summarises the findings of this literature by identifying five principal aspects of this 
gap: antagonism and distrust; competing reward systems; different languages; 
FRQFHSWLRQVRIWLPHGLYHUJLQJQHHGVDQGUHVHDUFKHUV·ODFNRIFRQFHUQRUXQGHUVWDQGLQJ
of the needs of government (1991: 323-,Q5LFK·VYLHZ6QRZ·VFODVVLFDFFRXQW
RI WKH ¶WZRFXOWXUHV·ZKLFK LQVSLUHGZRUN LQ WKLVDUHDKDVEHHQPLVLQWHUSUHWHG WR WKH
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extent that any structural hindrance to collaboration is underemphasised in favour of 
stressing cultural divergence. Recently, Jewell and Bero (2008) found that systemic and 
institutional hindrances, including lack of training, accessibility, lack of resources and 
funding, and the competition of powerful interest groups, all acted against opportunities 
for collaboration. Dunn (1980), albeit acknowledging the power of the two 
communitiHV·WKHRU\GLVSXWHVWKHXVHIXOQHVVRIVXFKPHWDSKRUJLYHQLWVEURDGQHVVDQG
simplification, which borders reductionism. Yet, this powerful idea is still very much 
present in contemporary accounts of the relationship between researchers and policy-
makers (section 2.4).  
'XQQ·V  ZRUN RQ NQRZOHGJH XWLOLVDWLRQ LV LQWHUHVWLQJ LQ WKDW LW HQWLUHO\ GHSDUWV
from a conceptualisation of knowledge as separate from the social and political world, 
embedding knowledge into social, cultural, rhetorical and symbolic structures. His 
arguments walk the line between instrumental and symbolic understanding. By referring 
to the scientific community, he notes how this homogenous ideal type does not reflect 
the practices of diverse stakeholders. He notes how ¶GLYHUVHVWDQGDUGVRIDSSUDLVDO·H[LVW
WRPHGLDWHNQRZOHGJHDQGKRZWKHVHVWDQGDUGVDUH¶XQHYHQO\GLVWULEXWHG·'XQQ
299). He notes the tension between the values of science and the ultimate inability to 
DFFHSWUHVXOWV¶WKDWUXQFRXQWHUWR>«@SUHIHUHQFHV·1982: 300): 
¶6RFLDO WKHRULHV XQOLNH SK\VLFDO RQHV DUH GLIILFXOW WR IDOVLI\ ZLWK H[SHULPHQWDO
data because the interpretation of such data is mediated by the assumptions, 
frames of reference, and ideologies of social scientists and other stakeholders in 
reform.·ibid) 
In this way, he anticipates much of the subsequent literature which critiques the direct 
transfer of the scientific method from natural onto social science, and from EBM onto 
EBP, as well as highlighting the nexus between epistemological and theoretical 
underpinnings, political and world views, and favoured policy positions (Chapter 4). 
Interestingly, he uses jurisprudence as a metaphor to justify his view of evidence as both 




court. Conflicts among stakeholders are analogous to cases in law where 
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disputes are settled by invoking standards appropriatH WR GLIIHUHQW FRQWH[WV·
(1982: 303) 
Through this analogy, he recognises the rhetorical and competitive aspect of political 
debate, and even one imbued by evidence, as well as the relative place of evidence as 
part of a political argument. He notes how, in order to make a successful claim in a 
MXULVSUXGHQWLDO VHWWLQJ WKH ¶VWDQGDUGV RI DSSUDLVDO HPSOR\HG WR LQWHUSUHW GDWD· DUH ¶D
IXQGDPHQWDO SDUW RI WKH QHJRWLDWLQJ DQG XQGHUVWDQGLQJ SURFHVV· ,Q his view, applied 
VRFLDO VFLHQFH GRHV QRW SURYLGH FRQFOXVLYH DQVZHUV EXW UDWKHU ¶LQFRQFOXVLYH HYLGHQFH
DQGDUJXPHQW·EHFDXVH¶DUJXPHQWDWLRQLV>«@DVRFLDOSURFHVVZKHUHDOOGDWDRUHYLGHQFH
iVV\PEROLFDOO\PHGLDWHG·1982: 303). He concludes by emphasising the argumentative, 
competitive process of advocacy which evidence is embedded in (1982: 304).  
This adversarial model (Hoppe, 2005, section 2.6) is relevant here and, in a sense, ahead 
of its time because it openly admits WKDW¶NQRZOHGJHLVQRW´H[FKDQJHGµ´WUDQVODWHGµRU
´WUDQVIHUUHGµ· ¶EXW WUDQVDFWHG E\ QHJRWLDWLQJ WKH WUXWK UHOHYDQFH DQG FRJHQF\ RI
NQRZOHGJH FODLPV· 'XQQ   7KLV WUDQVDFWLRQ KDSSHQV ZLWKLQ SUH-existing 
institutional structures already shaped by historically dominant and competing 
FRQFHSWLRQVRIWUXWKDQGNQRZOHGJHWKDWVKLIWRYHUWLPH'XQQ·VZRUNanticipates some 
of the work carried out by those in the science/policy tradition. His jurisprudential 
metaphor highlights how a legal modus operandi was embedded in and extended by the 
VWDWH·VH[LVWLQJGHFLVLRQ-making structures (Chapter 7).  
2.3 Turning a critical eye onto science: science/policy and boundary work 
The main issue with much of the work outside of the science/policy tradition is that it 
is sharper in its analysis of the policy/politics side of the binary, but not dedicated to 
pursuing a self-FULWLFDO VWDQFH WRZDUGV DFDGHPLF SUDFWLFHV 7KH ´IULFWLRQµEHWZHHQ WKH
two communities is unlikely to subside unless the scientific community is able to turn a 
critical eye onto its own practices of knowledge construction. In their article on visual 
evidence, based on ethnography of a study in molecular genetics, Amann and Knorr 
Cetina (1988) discuss the difference between data and evidence. They describe the 
process by which scientists create data, subsequently translate data into evidence, which 
is only turned into data again when it becomes subject to external questioning, by an 
audience for instance. We find a familiar pattern whereby: 
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¶ZKDW FRXQWV DV DSSURSULDWH HYLGHQFH LQ D WKHoretical controversy is itself 
negotiated during the controversy, hence evidence cannot serve as an 
LQGHSHQGHQWDUELWHURIVFLHQWLILFEHOLHI·$PDQQDQG.QRUU&HWLQD 
Furthermore, ¶WKHQRWLRQRIHYLGHQFHLVEXLOWXSRQWKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQZKDW one can 
VHHDQGZKDWRQHPD\WKLQNRUKDYHKHDUGRUEHOLHYH·LELG7KH\EHJLQIURP.XKQ·V
(1962) analysis, which highlights commitment to different research traditions and 
epistemologies as the principal definer of scientific consensus and disagreement within 
competing paradigms. Yet, they go further in arguing that,  
¶MXVW DV VFLHQWLILF IDFWV DUH WKH HQG SURGXFW RI FRPSOH[ SURFHVVHV RI EHOLHI
IL[DWLRQVRYLVXDO´VHQVHGDWDµ² just what it is that scientists see when they look 
at the outcome of an experiment ² are the end product of socially organised 
SURFHGXUHVRIHYLGHQFHIL[DWLRQ· 
The process of translation from data into evidence they describe is interesting because, 
given that evidence implies a decision-making process of inclusion and exclusion, for 
Ammann and Knorr Cetina, evidence is  
¶WKH GDWD DFWXDOO\ LQFOXGHG LQ VFLHQWLILF SDSHUV RU VKRZQ LQ RUDO SUHVHQWDWLRQV
Data become evidence only after they have undergone elaborate processes of 
VHOHFWLRQDQGWUDQVIRUPDWLRQ· 
AddLWLRQDOO\ ZKDW WKH DXWKRUV QRWH LV WKDW ¶QHDUO\ DOO SXEOLVKHG LPDJHV DUH FDUHIXOO\
HGLWHGPRQWDJHV·ILJXUHVWKDWDUHVHOI-evident are hard to come by, and if they are it is 
usually because they have already undergone a process of translation from data into 
evidence. This account resonates with later work which emphasised the narrative aspect 
of evidence-making in a further selection process, after the data is turned into evidence, 
as the evidence is further selected and simplified for consumption and made politically 
SDODWDEOH 0DMRQH  6WHYHQV·  HWKQRJUDSKLF DQDO\VLV KLJKOLJKWV WKLV YHU\
process of inclusion/exclusion. He describes the manufacturing of certainty through the 
XVHRI¶NLOOHUFKDUWV·DYLVXDOLQVWUXPHQWZKLFKFDQVSHDNIRULWVHOI through the apparent 
FODULW\JLYHQE\WKHHOLPLQDWLRQRIFDYHDWVDQGKLGLQJWKH¶SURFHVVRIFRQVWUXFWLRQ·WKDW
lies beneath.  
*LHU\Q·V XVH RI WKH FRQFHSW RI ERXQGDU\ ZRUN SURYLGHV D XVHIXO PHWDSKRU IRU
problematizing the relationship between science and policy. He begins from the premise 
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that science defines itself against its opposite by engaging in a process of distinction to 
separate itself away from non-science. He argues that the 
¶FRQVWUXFWLRQ RI D ERXQGDU\ EHWZHHQ VFLHQFH DQG YDULHWLHV RI QRQ-science is 
useful for scientists' pursuit of professional goals: acquisition of intellectual 
authority and career opportunities; denial of these resources to 
"pseudoscientists"; and protection of the autonomy of scientific research from 
political interference. "Boundary-work" escribes an ideological style found in 
scientists' attempts to create a public image for science by contrasting it 
favorably to non-VFLHQWLILFLQWHOOHFWXDORUWHFKQLFDODFWLYLWLHV· 
He identifies a series of criteria which have been put forward by scientists in order to 
demarcate science from non-VFLHQFHZKLFKLQFOXGH&RPWH·VUHDVRQLQJDQGREVHUYDWLRQ
3RSSHU·V IDOVLILDELOLW\DQG0HUWRQ·VFHUWLILHGNQRZOHGJH WKURXJK LQVWLWXWLRQDOLVDWLRQRI
norms, or organised scepticism. Scientists therefore make efforts to distinguish their 
work from non-science, engaging in boundary work to defend both their 
authoritativeness and the resources granted to them. Gieryn goes on to equate science 
with ideology, by using ideas garnered from critical theory.  
¶IRU +DEHUPDV WKH IRUP RI VFLHQWLILF NQRZOHGJH HPERGLHV LWV RZQ YDOXHV RI
prediction and control, and thus may substitute for "the demolished bourgeois 
LGHRORJ\LQOHJLWLPDWLQJVWUXFWXUHVRIGRPLQDWLRQDQGUHSUHVVLRQ· (1983: 783) 
Gieryn argues thDWE\UHO\LQJRQ¶FXOWXUDOUHSHUWRLUHV·VFLHQWLVWVPD\OD\ ¶FODLPVWRWKH
utility of science for advancing technology, winning wars, or deciding policy in an 
LPSDUWLDOZD\·,QRUGHUWRLOOXVWUDWHWKHVHFODLPV*LHU\Quses the example 
of Victorian England. +H UHIHUV WR -RKQ 7\QGDOO·V ERXQGDU\ ZRUN ZKLFK HQWDLOHG
efforts to distinguish science from both religion and engineering. In doing so, he places 
positivism in its cultural and historical context by noting the reasons why some of its 
stubborn precepts became common currency in understandings of science. He argues 
WKDW LW ZDV E\ WKLV YHU\ SURFHVV WKDW ¶VFLHQFH ZRQ DXWKRULW\ DQG UHVRXUFHV RYHU RWKHU
competing non-VFLHQWLILF LQWHOOHFWXDO DFWLYLWLHV· (1983: 784). By attributing particular 
characteristics to science, Tyndall successfully distinguished it from non-science, 
winning over authority, validation and funding.  
Interestingly, the need for science to distinguish itself from religion was identified as the 
principal reason why science antagonised emotion and called for value freedom in its 
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approach. The legitimation of science through boundary work is a culturally-bound 
process which supported the creation of myths underpinning positivism. Since these 
opposing forces to science have not currently been defeated, there is perhaps still a need 
to validate science in relation to its others, including politics, which further supports a 
SRVLWLYLVWHSLVWHPRORJ\,Q*LHU\Q·VFRQFOXVLRQ 
¶'HPDUFDWLRQ LV DV PXFK D SUDFWLFDO SUREOHP IRU VFLHQWLVWV DV Dn analytical 
problem for sociologists and philosophers. Descriptions of science as 
distinctively truthful, useful, objective or rational may best be analysed as 
ideologies: incomplete and ambiguous images of science are nevertheless useful 
for scientists' pursuit of authority anGPDWHULDOUHVRXUFHV·1983: 793) 
+RSSH·V ZRUN UHIHUV WR D PXWXDOO\ IRUPLQJ ¶VFLHQWLILFDWLRQ RI SROLWLFVSROLF\· DQG
¶SROLWLFLVDWLRQRIVFLHQFH·ZKLFKH[SRVHVDOHYHORIFRPSOH[LW\LQDWWHPSWLQJ
to deconstruct the science/politics binary. In the Anglo literature on evidence and 
policy, policy is often portrayed as a neutral entity, whereas politics is used in a loaded 
and often negative manner (section 2.3&RQYHUVHO\LQ+RSSH·VZRUNSROLF\LVVHHQDV
part of a political SURFHVV DV LV VFLHQFH )RU +RSSH DW OHDVW UKHWRULFDOO\ ¶UHIHUHQFH WR
VFLHQWLILF ¶YDOLGDWLRQ· GRHV SURYLGH SROLWLFLDQV SXEOLF RIILFLDOV DQG FLWL]HQV DOLNH ZLWK
VRPH VRUW RI FRPSDVV LQ DQ LGHRORJLFDO XQLYHUVH LQ GLVDUUD\·   It was the 
claims of academics, and specifically their neo-positivist convictions, which led to the 
establishment of a discipline specifically targeted at policy-making in the US:  
¶%HWWHU NQRZOHGJH RI FDXVDWLRQ DQG NQRZ-how about the application of 
scientific logic in decision-making were the dominant claims on which the 
schools of public policy were erected in one after another American university, 
DQGODWHULQPDQ\(XURSHDQFRXQWULHV·+RSSH 
Although by no means homogenous, the discipline of public policy was established with 
the dual, and potentially conflicting, aim of critical detachment and interventionism. 
Indeed, some contextual distinction is also necessary, because the history and politics 
which surrounded the birth of public policy as a discipline in the US are different from 
the UK and broader European context, where social policy is strongly and inextricably 
linked with the welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1996).  
+RSSH GLVWLQJXLVKHV EHWZHHQ WKUHH VHSDUDWH ´WUDGLWLRQVµ LQ SXEOLF SROLF\ WKURXJK WKH 
following typologies: analycentrism, neo-positivism, and critical rationalism.  
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x ¶$QDO\FHQWULF SROLF\DQDO\VLV· LQFOXGHVSUDFWLFHVVXFKDV ¶FRVW-effectiveness analysis, 
cost²benefit analysis, statistical decision theory, and planning²programming²
budgeting.·,WDLPVDWQHXWUDODSSUDLVDODQGWHFKQLFDOMXGJHPHQWDQG
is unable to understand itself as a political undertaking. 
x ¶1HR-SRVLWLYLVW SROLF\ DQDO\VLV· centres on causality, through a conviction that 
¶NQRZOHGJHRIVFLHQWLILFODZVLQWHFKQLFDO²instrumental fashion, may be applied 
to the explanation of the emergence of policy problems and the prediction of 
LPSDFWVRIFHUWDLQSROLF\LQWHUYHQWLRQV·LELG 
x ¶&ULWLFDO²rationalist policy analysis also centres on causality, or at least a superior 
knowleGJHFODLP WR LW ¶KRZHYHU LW VWURQJO\GLIIHUV LQKRZ WRDFTXLUH LW LQ WKH
real world. In this respect, critical²rational policy analysis means an enormous 
VWHSWRZDUGVDIDOOLELOLVWDQGOHDUQLQJFRQFHSWRIUDWLRQDOLW\·LELG 
The literature on evidence in policy discussed in the next section could be arranged by 
these categories. In science and in policy-making, these positions are likely to compete, 
yet they are also unlikely to exist in their pure form when confronted with complex 
realities (Hoppe, 1999: 204-5).  
The presence of diverse and competing:  
¶WKLQNLQJVW\OHVGLYHUJLQJLQWHUSUHWDWLYHIUDPHVFRPSHWLQJSROLF\EHOLHIV\VWHPV
various ideologies, alternative professional paradigms, different world views, 
contrasting images of man and nature, multLSOHSHUVSHFWLYHV·1999: 207), 
is a normal feature of any endeavour, including the field of public policy. It is crucial to 
recognise this diversity in order to gauge the underlying values and beliefs, the cognitive 
frames and experiential biases that forP ¶WKH ODQJXDJHV DQG FXOWXUHV RI ´WULEHV RI
H[SHUWVµ· LELG). By playing with the binary science/politics, using the concept of 
ERXQGDU\ZRUN+RSSHH[SRVHVDNH\SUREOHPGRHV¶SROLF\VFLHQFH·VHUYH
democracy and the interests of the public, oUGRHVLWVHUYHWKH¶SROLF\-making elite of the 
DGPLQLVWUDWLYH VWDWH· RU ERWK" In his line of argument, the realisation of existing 
incommensurability of views, underpinned by competing value and belief systems and 
cognitive frames is a point of departure for any research in the field.  
Chapter 2 The use of evidence in policy 
31 
2.4 The rise of evidence-based policy and its critics 
Politically, there has been an interest in espousing the idea of evidence-based policy in 
advanced liberal states. This is seen as part of a broader trend which followed a desire to 
de-politicize politics and policy-making by pursuing apparently neutral, scientific 
answers to policy questions. The idea of evidence-based policy appears related to other 
WUHQGVLQFRQWHPSRUDU\IRUPVRIJRYHUQPHQWLQFOXGLQJDPRYHWRZDUGV¶7KLUG:D\·RU
post-ideological politics (Freeden, 2006; Byrne, 2011); the rise of New Public 
Management (Barzeley, 2001); the tension between democratic and technocratic policy 
practices (Radaelli, 1999), and the formalisation of long-standing governmental practices 
of classification, (ac)counting, and resource optimisation ² alongside theoretical and 
methodological developments in science and medicine (Foucault, 2002; Rose and Miller, 
2008).  
The issue of evidence in social and public policy has taken a more prominent role in 
both political and academic debates. In the UK, the New Labour government 
committed itself to the use of evidence in policy-making (Cabinet Office, 1999), 
famously championing the centrality of sound scientific evidence to the Economic and 
Social Research Council in 2000, directly addressing the Social Science community 
(Naughton; 2005: 51). Although the Australian federal government made no explicit or 
coordinated commitment to evidence-based policy, there are indications that both 
federal and state-level governments increasingly address politics in the terms established 
by the evidence-based policy discourse (Marston and Watts, 2003: 149; Productivity 
Commission, 2009).  
The Evidence-based Medicine paradigm has established a hierarchy of evidence enshrined in 
the Cochrane collaboration to inform practice (see http://www.cochrane.org/). The 
latter serves as an exchange platform, gathering evidence on best practice and providing 
access to a large database that privileges meta-analyses and systematic reviews of 
randomized controlled trials. This approach was adapted to social policy through the 
Campbell collaboration (see http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/). In the 1960s, 
$PHULFDQH[SHULPHQWDOSV\FKRORJLVW&DPSEHOOFDOOHGIRU´WUXHµH[SHULPHQWation to be 
applied to social problems; rather than experimentation in a broad sense, he was 
referring to the adoption of randomised controlled experiments for the evaluation of 
social interventions, as was already becoming common practice in medicine (Dehue, 
2001). This particular view of experimentation currently appears to dominate the 
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imagery of evidence-based interventions. In medicine, the type of research conducted is 
often characterised by precepts and circumstances that do not necessarily recognise the 
mutability of the social. This is because it tends to be confined to physical changes that 
can be monitored and assessed within closed, experimental settings where external 
factors are assumed to have little or no bearing (Black, 2001; Chapter 4).  
2.4.1 The Evidence Hierarchy: one size fits all? 




The idea of a hierarchy of evidence originated in the medical field and subsequently 
spread to other fields as providing a basis for informing decision-making (Black, 2001; 
Greenhalgh and Russell, 2006; Borgerson, 2009). The ideal of a single hierarchy is 
powerful because it proposes a universal standard. Evans (2003) suggests that evidence 
hierarchies have mostly been constructed through an exclusive focus on effectiveness of 
an intervention. Most hierarchies tend to converge by placing systematic reviews of 
Randomized Controlled Trials at the top of the pyramid. However, Cartwright and 
Munro (2010), Byrne (2011) and others, have argued that RCTs have serious limitations 
even in demonstrating efficacy of an intervention, and that an evidence-base has to be 
much richer and varied in order to sustain a claim to its validity. Despite the fact that a 
variety of research methodologies can ² or might ² provide valid information, and that 
the choice of research methodologies should depend on the types of questions asked, 
                                                 
2 (source: DSS Australia http://www.dss.gov.au/our-responsibilities/families-and-children/publications-
articles/evaluation-framework-for-new-income-management-nim?HTML) 
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RCTs have come to dominate the imagery of evidence-based interventions. In fact, it is 
systematic reviews that figure at the top of the evidence hierarchy, yet RCTs are 
advocated as the most desirable means of policy evaluation (Goldacre, 2013; Roberts et 
al, 2012; Leigh, 2009a).  
With an exponentially growing body of research, ranking is perhaps a necessary tool for 
making sense of the quality of the research available. Nonetheless, the act of relying on 
a single set of selection criteria that applies across a range of fields fails to take into 
account the variety of existing methodologies that respond to field-specific and 
question-specific requirements (Greenhalgh, 1999; Byrne, 2011). Different hierarchies 
have been produced to suit specific fields. For example, in the field of crime and crime 
prevention, the Maryland Scale was to set the standard for research ranking. Yet in the 
Maryland Scale, RCTs still figure at the top of the pyramid (Farrington et al, 2002). 
Leigh (2009a) argues that policy-makers should seek to carry out more randomised 
controlled trials because they can provide a much higher level of certainty when 
compared to other methods of evaluation. Though he acknowledges the importance of 
other methods, he claims that randomised policy trials are worth pursuing in spite of 
WKHLU OLPLWDWLRQV+HKLJKOLJKWVWKHSUREOHPRIVFDOLQJLH ¶VFDOLQJXS·JHQHUDOLVDELOLW\
and transferability oI ILQGLQJV DQG ¶VSLOO RYHU· DFNQRZOHGJLQJ WKDW ERWK FRQWH[W DQG
scales pose significant limitations in terms of external validity (Leigh, 2009a: 36; Evans, 
2003: 80). The recommended alternatives are often found slightly lower down the 
hierarchy, with both experiments and before-after studies ranked above other methods 
of evaluation ² and especially above qualitative methods. The first assumption is that 
the higher in the hierarchy, the least biased the evidence might be. The second 
assumption is that gold standard methods provide an internally valid proof of causality 
(Borgerson, 2014). Thus, internal validity is privileged over external validity. 
The concept of evidence-based policy is tied to the evidence hierarchy by its 
epistemological and practical assumptions. EBP assumes a direct transfer of evidence 
from research to policy application. It is possible to identify certain trends in the 
literature which define the evidence-policy relationship. First, there are those studies 
that champion the use of certain types of evidence in policy-making, whose producers 
often belong to a research institute or departments, either inside government or within 
government-funded organisations. These usually imply that the more rigorous the 
evidence, the better the policy outcome. Thus, they uphold the hierarchical evidence 
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paradigm and their accounts are rather prescriptive. Hoppe (2005) would term this 
analycentric and/or neopositivist. Second, there is the critical/theoretical approach, which is 
often also normative and prescriptive in character but recognizes the more contested 
nature of evidence and its relation with policy (critical rationalism) (i.e. Stevens, 2007a; 
Monaghan, 2011; Sanderson, 2009). Third, there are few studies which offer a 
significant level of empirical insight into the processes, the reasoning, the politics and 
the mechanisms of policy-making work. They do this without proposing a rigorous 
WKHRUHWLFDOPRGHOLQVWHDGSURYLGLQJDYLHZ´EHKLQGWKHFXUWDLQVµLH6WHYHQVDQG
Ritter, 2009; Valentine, 2009).  
2.4.2 Positivist/prescriptive, Critical/normative and Empirical/interpretive 
perspectives on the use of evidence in policy 
An increasing number of studies deal with proposing and critiquing different models of 
evidence-based policy (see, for example, Monaghan: 2011, Stevens: 2007a, Black: 2001, 
Valentine: 2009). The current dominant models of evidence-based policy are, at best, 
limiting, because they often assume that good (i.e. systematically reviewed) evidence 
almost automatically produces good policy outcomes (Leigh, 2009a; Young et al, 2002, 
Packwood, 2002). Although these studies never explicitly argue for a linear relationship, 
by focusing almost exclusively on the production of good evidence, rather than on the 
way it is understood and utilised in policy-making, they run the risk of implanting this 
underlying assumption into their argument. For instance, when discussing the need to 
avoid the practice of 'cherry-picking' among policy-makers, Leigh (2009a: 28) argues for 
the established evidence hierarchy as the only means to produce 'higher quality studies' 
and therefore provide acceptable evidence. Young et al argue literature reviews are 
incomplete narratives, lacking 'selection criteria', whilst making the case that systematic 
reviews constitXWH WKH ¶SURSHU· VFLHQWLILF ZD\ WR VHOHFW JRRG HYLGHQFH  -20). 
Packwood (2002: 269) uncomplicatedly claims that, in order to implement EBP, 
research evidence should be made more widely available to professionals.  
If a linear relationship is assumed between evidence and policy production, then much 
of what actually happens in the policy arena is taken out of the picture (including 
politics itself). This notwithstanding the fact that evidence, even when systematically 
reviewed, is always contested (Burnett and Duncan, 2008; Glasby and Beresford, 2006). 
Ritter reminds us that 'policy makers are not just reviewing the evidence when making 
decisions but also the political viability, degree of community support and other non-
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evidentiary aspects of decision-making' (2009: 72). Most critical studies on the nature of 
the evidence-policy relationship acknowledge this. Therefore, it does not necessarily 
IROORZ WKDW WKH DUJXPHQW IRU ´EHWWHUµ TXDOLW\ RI HYLGHQFH HTXDWHV ZLWK WKH OLQHDU
DUJXPHQWRI´EHWWHUHYLGHQFHEHWWHUSROLF\µ ,WDSSHDUVDV LITXHVWLRQVRIYDOLGLW\DQG
rigour in the production of evidence can obscure the more vital questions of good 
practice in policy-making and 'service provision' (Glasby and Beresford; 2006:278). This 
is addressed by critical/normative and empirical/interpretive studies. The former are 
focused on producing normative accounts of the use of evidence in policy-making ² or 
rather, how evidence should be made and used ² in a specific field of interest 
(Sanderson; 2002, Macintyre; 2003, Valentine; 2009, Glasby and Beresford; 2006). For 
instance, Sanderson (2002), adopting a realist perspective, calls for a more 'theory-based' 
policy, and increased use of tools such as pilot studies and impact assessment for testing 
and monitoring long-term policy implementation.  
One of the hurdles which academics point to in dealing with policy-makers is the 
frustration of not being heard or taken seriously during the policy-making process. For 
example, Naughton (2005) describes the poor consultation process prior to the 2003 
Criminal Justice Act with disillusionment, arguing that the promises that evidence-based 
policy entails have not been delivered. On the other hand, Duncan (2008) ² a chief 
government social researcher at the time ² argued there is a tendency for academics to 
entrench themselves away from the public eye for fear of being 'misquoted' or 
misunderstood, hindering collaboration between government and academia. It is often 
recognized that the agenda setting and time frames of policy-makers does not 
correspond to that of academic research (Burnett and Duncan, 2008; Ritter, 2009; 
Stevens, 2011). $VKLJKOLJKWHGLQWKH¶WZRFRPPXQLWLHV·PHWDSKRUFRPPHQWDWRUV
note the gap between researchers and policy-makers (Ritter, 2009; Stevens, 2011). This 
should be viewed in the context of increasing pressure on academics to deliver 
impactful research (Bastow, Dunleavy and Tinkler, 2014). 
Despite some disagreement between academic and non-academic researchers on the 
surface, an emerging shared commitment toward increased understanding and 
cooperation between researchers, academics and policy-makers is consolidating (Barnett 
and Duncan, 2008; Stevens, 2007a; Black, 2001). There is a perceived need for more 
empirical research designs, which address policy-makers directly in order to gain an 
inside view of their decision-making. Yet, evidence is at times defined in a narrow way, 
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both by academics and politicians, because despite claims to the contrary, it is often 
intended as a synonym for research evidence, which, according to both Duncan (2008) 
and Ritter (2009), is a misconception. Stevens reminds us that 'what counts as evidence 
is in itself a politically loaded discussion' (2011: 2). When evidence is called upon, it may 
be misleading to understand it as a monolithic concept: its boundaries will depend on 
the range of positions taken by individual stakeholders, as well as the institutions they 
belong to (6 et al, 2007). For instance, both Duncan and Davies, the UK government's 
chief social research officers in 2008 and 2004 respectively, believe that government 
understands evidence in much broader terms than academics' narrower view (Davies, 
2004; Duncan, 2008). However, there are models produced by academics which 
accommodate factors other than research evidence, which suggests that academic views 
are not always narrow in scope (Ritter, 2009: 71). 
Monaghan argued that 'established models of evidence-based policy operate at a high 
OHYHO RI DEVWUDFWLRQ DQGSD\ VFDQW DWWHQWLRQ WR >«@ WKH ´FRQWHQW RI WKH QHJRWLDWLRQVµ
(2010: 8). This does not mean that such models fail to provide valid critiques and 
reflections, but it does mean that they cannot fully account for the processes by which 
evidence is understood, chosen, presented, and used. There appears to be a move 
toward more qualitative, ethnographic studies on the mechanisms, actors and agencies 
involved in the making of policy. Although some empirical work involving a degree of 
¶LQVLGHU
VNQRZOHGJH·KDVEHHQFDUULHGRXW6WHYHQV5LWWHU9DOentine, 2009; 
Pearce, Wesselink and Colebatch (eds.), 2014), these studies tend to be country specific 
and/or field specific. According to Black, cultural specificity and locales can be 
determining factors in the interpreting of evidence by policy-makers (2001: 276). Thus, 
it becomes necessary to note any significant changes in the way different governments 
over time and across borders deal with evidence and the evidence-policy nexus.  
2.5 The interpretive turn: broadening the evidence 
:LOOLDPV DQG *ODVE\·V 10) paper eloquently summarises many of the issues 
highlighted in the evidence/policy literature and proposes solutions to overcome the 
dominance of narrow conceptualisations of evidence stressing the need for a broader, 
more inclusive conceptualisation (WLOOLDPV DQG *ODVE\   ,Q +RSSH·V WHUPV
 FULWLFDO UHVHDUFKHUV· FRQVHQVXV VHHPV WR EH PRYLQJ DZD\ IURP VHUving the 
elitist/administrative policy-making machine towards more democratic and 
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participatory decision-making. A three-tiered typology of evidence which goes beyond 
the empirical to include theoretical and experiential dimensions, aims to replace 
narrower definitions. Empirical evidence, which is more closely associated with medical 
research, is appealing because it offers ¶WKHSURPLVHRf simpler decision-making marked 
E\FOHDUO\GHILQHG UXOHV DQGERXQGDULHV· :LOOLDPVDQG*ODVE\ Disciplinary 
and epistemological diversity entail a broad range of approaches that potentially lend 
themselves to a variety of issues and furnish case appropriate evidence: 
¶ZLWK VLJQLILFDQW FRQWULEXWLRQV PDGH E\ FRQWHQW DQDO\VLV %D\HVLDQ WKLQNLQJ
cross-design synthesis, grounded theory, meta-ethnography, comparative case 
VWXG\UHDOLVW V\QWKHVLVQDUUDWLYHV\QWKHVLVDQGPDQ\PRUHDSSURDFKHVEHVLGHV· 
(ibid). 
The most useful reflection provided by Williams and Glasby centres on identifying the 
lack of frameworks to combine diverse knowledge-bases, and in particular the difficulty 
in validating and formalising tacit knowledge (or experiential evidence). Since 
H[SHULHQWLDO HYLGHQFHH[LVWV LQSUDFWLFH \HW ODFNV IRUPDOLVDWLRQ DQG FRGLILFDWLRQ LW ¶FDQ
only be passed on through processes such as mentoring, shared experience and 
VWRU\WHOOLQJ·   )XUWKHUPRUH WKH FRQWH[W-dependent nature of experiential 
evidence makes it hard to access, grasp and penetrate by those who live outside that 
context. However, the same could be said for theoretical and empirical evidence, since 
the lack of academic or analytical skills might make these types of knowledge 
impenetrable for generalist policy-makers. Consequently, one could argue that any form 
of evidence is context-dependent, whilst understanding it depends on relevant training 
and skills.  
2.5.1 Evidence and meaning 
Some of the latest empirically focused studies emphasise the importance of meaning-
making, by recognising that evidence is always contested. They also highlight that a 
hierarchical structure that places value on certain types of evidence to the detriment of 
other evidence endows power asymmetries that risk undermining certain valid 
knowledge (i.e. situated, local, lay, experiential, anecdotal and qualitative). This 
capitalises on the shift away from positivism and critical rationalism toward standpoint 
epistemologies more influenced by feminism, STS, and Foucauldian readings.  
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In a special issue of Evidence & Policy¶(YLGHQFHDQG0HDQLQJLQ3ROLF\0DNLQJ·
YDULRXV FRPPHQWDWRUV DUJXH IRU DQ ¶LQWHUSUHWLYH WXUQ· LQ WKH VWXG\RI HYLGHQFHXVH LQ
SROLF\7KHDXWKRUVUHFRJQLVHWKDW¶DFWRUVPD\FRQWHVWZKDWLVPHDQWE\¶HYLGHQFH·DVD
IDFWRULQWKHSROLF\SURFHVV·3HDUFHHWDO7KHFRQWHVWHGQDWXUHRIHYLGHQFH
and its meaning for actors, is the main focus of all papers in this issue. Lennon (2014) 
QRWHV KRZ WKH ¶SUHYDLOLQJ RUGHU· RI WKH HYLGHQFH KLHUDUFK\ LV LQIOXHQFHG E\ DFWRUV·
relations and power relations. Looking at environmental infrastructure policy in Ireland, 
the author notes how qualitative and local knowledges are often marginalised in favour 
of quantitative universal standards, resulting in a general lack of attention to local 
context. He argues that actors can use diverse strategies to legitimise their knowledge 
claims and espouse a particular language to increase the persuasiveness and legitimacy 
of their positions.  
In a similar veiQ %ORPNDPS  H[SORUHV ORFDO JRYHUQPHQWV· VWUXJJOHV WR DFFHSW
qualitative data as legitimate. She argues quantitative evidence allows standard 
accountability mechanisms to be established, ensuring that accountability exercises are 
repeated at regular intervals. Yet, these do not necessarily result in policy learning. 
Instances of successful use of qualitative data do not result in extended trust in such 
methods as it appears that officials continue seeking quantitative support for their 
programmes. Focusing on Paraguayan forest governance, Elgert (2014) argues that the 
dominant ontology, which supports the separation of nature and society, results in the 
implementation of conservation schemes which ignore local cultural, social, political 
and economic dimensions. She shows that quantitative data propels universal 
environmental standards, and values, leaving out local knowledge. In response to this 
general marginalisation of local knowledge, Epstein et al (2014) argue for opening up 
the narrow view of evidence to the opportunities of increasingly digitised 
communication, which can increase potential for democratic decision-making. Focusing 
RQ ¶5HJXODWLRQ 5RRP· ² a programme which supports the move toward open 
government and participatory democracy ² they argue that the use of narrative evidence 
garnered from civic engagement can increase the legitimacy of situated knowledge.  
Pearce (2014) argues that policy proposals in the field of carbon emissions gain traction 
only if they are in tune with both the EBP paradigm and the global discourse on 
emissions. This has prompted local authorities to treat emissions data as evidence, and 
XWLOLVHQDWLRQDOGDWDRQHPLVVLRQVH[FOXGLQJ ¶ORFDONQRZOHGJHDERXWERWK WKHFRQWH[WV
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for such emissions and the ability of local authorities to exercise control over the 
VRXUFHVRIVXFKHPLVVLRQV· 6WUDVVKHLPDQG.HWWXQHQFRQWUDVW(%3
with policy-based evidence, questioning the neutral status of EBP from a science and 
WHFKQRORJ\VWXGLHV·SHUVSHFWLYH7KH\DUJXHWKat inclusion-exclusion criteria make EBP 
LQKHUHQWO\FRQWHVWHGUDWKHUWKDQDQHXWUDOLQVWUXPHQW7KH\DOVRDUJXHWKDW´UHJXODWRU\
VFLHQFHµPDNHVVFLHQFHDQGSROLWLFVIXUWKHULQWHUWZLQHG 
One cross-cutting theme in this literature is the dominance of quantitative data to the 
GHWULPHQWRI´ORFDONQRZOHGJHµ 
¶(%3SULPDULO\GHPDQGVWHFKQLFDOTXDQWLWDWLYHGDWDZKLFKLVSHUFHLYHGWRIXOILO
demands for democratic accountability through managerial modes of 
governance. Such evidence is typically based on standardised methodologies 
which, while they ostensibly help to aid policy benchmarking, downplay the 
LPSRUWDQFHRIORFDONQRZOHGJH·3HDUFHHWDO 
The main issues which this literature raises are, firstly, concerned with meaning, or how 
different actRUVFRQFHLYHRIHYLGHQFH$FWRUV·XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIHYLGHQFHZLOOWRDODUJH
extent, influence the way they use it. Power relations, such as the relationship between 
central and local authorities, or that between authorities and citizens also appear to 
influence the manner in which evidence is utilised. This in turn is shaped by dominant 
discourses that legitimise certain evidence at the expense of other evidence. The 
evidence-based policy paradigm and its evidence hierarchy collide with certain 
authorities, disciplines and practices.  
Hierarchical notions of evidence obscure the fact that there is no simple answer or 
solution to policy problems, and that the best approach, and the best evidence, is 
context dependent and is tied to the types of questions asked as well as the general 
HWKRVZKLFKXQGHUSLQVSROLF\DQGVFLHQWLILFSUDFWLFHV7KXV LW LV LPSRUWDQW¶WRLGHQWLI\
the key areas of disagreement and to make sure that voices and contributions from less 
powerful groups are also included in debates about poOLF\FKDQJH·:LOOLDPVDQG*ODVE\
2010: 100). Efforts to synthesise, formalise and codify evidence are only useful to the 
extent that thorough consideration is given to the contested and contradictory nature of 
the evidence in context. This should reflect a diverse political process where 
disagreement is part of healthy politics and where groups who sit at the bottom of 
social, cultural and scientific hierarchies are able to participate in policy debates, 
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particularly when they are the very targets of policy interventions, as in drug and 
prostitution policy. The potential tensions between local knowledge and local policy 
implementation and national directives and top-down policy prescription need to be 
acknowledged and dealt with. This entails a normative quest for reducing power 
asymmetries whilst acknowledging the complex and contested nature of both evidence 
and the political process of policy-making. 
2.6 Models of the use of evidence in policy 
Here, a summary is provided of the features and limitations of different models of the 
use of evidence in policy. The table below focuses on a representation of models that 
DUHSRSXODULQWKH8.WDNHQIURP0RQDJKDQ·VZRUNEXWSUHVHQWLQRWKHUVWXGLHV
VHH<RXQJHWDO-RKQZKLFKWDNH:HLVV·Fategorisation as a point of 
departure. 






x Evidence as research (research utilization) 
x Direct transfer from evidence production to policy application 
x Derived from hard science and medicine 
x Research is either sought/commissioned to fill knowledge gaps or 
used when it pre-exists the emergence of a policy problem 
x Typical, instrumental rational understanding of the relationship 
between evidence and policy 
Problems: 
x Instrumentally rational 
x It is static and hyper-rational, one-size fits all 
x Does not take into account factors that hinder the linear 
transference, i.e. politics 
x Does not take into account that evidence is contested 
x Does not take into account that policy-making and evidence 
production have different, sometimes contrasting, requirements 






x Research utilization 
x Evidence is produced largely independently of the requirements of 
policy-makers 
x <ŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĨŽƌŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ?ƐƐĂŬĞ ?ŽĞƐŶŽƚŽŶůǇƐĞƌǀĞĂƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂů
purpose, but is cumulative of information which will sensitize policy-
makers and the public. Two-way process, raise awareness and can 
change political agenda. 
x ǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůůǇ “ƉĞƌĐŽůĂƚĞƐ ? ?ŶŽƚŽŶůǇŝŶƚŽƉŽůŝĐǇ ?ďƵƚ ĂůƐŽ
through to the public 
Problems: 
x Indirect diffusion can be negative (i.e. unintended, unplanned, thus 
can distort picture) 
x Long, unpredictable policy cycles, takes too long for evidence to 
reach policy, risk of becoming obsolete 
x Hard to distinguish between good and bad evidence as there is no 





x Research Utilization 
x Selection of evidence out of political/strategic interest 
x Positions are pre-determined by short-term needs and ideology 
x Research evidence can be ignored or disregarded if it does not fit 
the needs of policy-makers. 
x Policy-ŵĂŬĞƌƐƵƐĞĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĂƐ “ĂŵŵƵŶŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŽĚĞƚƌĂĐƚĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŽƌ
to justify inaction, procrastinating without appearing to. 
x Strategic use of research findings, i.e. blaming the evidence or those 
who produce it rather than taking responsibility 
Problems: 
x Instrumentally rational 
x No consideration of contested nature of evidence 
x Short-term 
x Offers a deterministic account of the evidence-policy connection 
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Interactive Model Features: 
x Pluralist 
x Research is not the only evidence 
x DĂŶǇĂĐƚŽƌƐŚĂǀĞĂŶŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶƉŽůŝĐǇ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ “ŵƵƚƵĂů
ĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?
x Takes into consideration the contested nature of research evidence 
x ZŽŽŵĨŽƌ “Ŭnowledge-ďƌŽŬĞƌƐ ?ƚŽƉƌŽŵŽƚĞƚŚĞŝƌƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ 
Problems: 
x No consideration of policy-makers interests or selection criteria 
x No discussion on the nature of research or other types of evidence 
that may be used/selected  
Evolutionary Model Features: 
x Critical 
x Evidence=Ideas, more than research 
x Attempts to explain the selection of evidence through the survival of 
the fittest 
x Identifies both structural conditions and the role of agency 
x /ĚĞĂƐŐŽƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂ “ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵŽĨƐĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?ĨŝƐŚŝŶŐĨŽƌĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ?
repetition (to justify the validity of the policy in which it is used); 
cherry-picking or farming, commissioning research and selecting the 
findings that support the policy; flak, or managing information that 
enters the public arena, the role of the media in shaping consensus 
or ridiculing a policy; strain, or cornering organizations that produce 
evidence seen as unhelpful to policy-makers, i.e. through funding 
x ůůŽǁƐĨŽƌƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ “ǁĞĂŬĞƌ ?ŐƌŽƵƉƐǁŚŽŵĂǇƚƵƌŶƚŚĞƐĞ
mechanisms in their favour. i.e. advocacy 
x Recognition that evidence needs a sponsor 
x Takes into consideration issues of power and power asymmetries 
Problems: 
x More needs to be said on what constitutes evidence as it is not 
equated with research 
x Assumes a direct, causal link between evidence that survives 
filtering and policy 
x Too little attention paid to process  






x Recognizes contested nature of research, i.e. research does not 
necessarily readily apply to policy and therefore cannot always be 
used 
x Dialogue is the main avenue through which research and policy may 
come to find fruitful collaboration 
x ZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚƐĞĞŶĂƐƉĂƌƚŽĨƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ƐŶŽƌŵĂůŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂůƉƵƌƐƵŝƚ 
x Research cannot be directly applied, it is constructed and mediated, 
and reconstructed to be applied in policy practice 
Problems: 
x Does not provide a way other than dialogue for evidence to enter 
into policy 
x No consideration on policy evaluation, but only focused on decision-
making process 
x Little consideration of how political interests may shape the 




x Evidence is part of the policy process 
x dŚĞĨŝůƚĞƌŝŶŐŽĨĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŝŶƚŽƉŽůŝĐǇŝƐŽƉĞŶďƵƚĂůƐŽ ‘ƵŶĞƋƵĂů ?ĂŶĚ
 ‘ƵŶƉƌĞĚŝĐƚĂďůĞ ? 
x EŽĚŝƌĞĐƚƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ?ŶŽ ‘ƐƚƌĂŝŐŚƚůŝŶĞ ? 
x Evolution is incomplete as an account, needs to be seen in its 
social/political context, i.e. instabilities and power shifts 
x WŽůŝĐŝĞƐĂƌĞ ‘ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇƌĞǀĞƌƐŝďůĞ ? 
x ^ĞĞƐĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĂŶĚƉŽůŝĐǇĂƐ ‘ŝŶĂĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚƐƚĂƚĞŽĨĨůƵǆ ? 
x Acknowledges ƚŚĞŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽĨ ‘ĚĞĞƉůǇŚĞůĚǀŝĞǁƐ ? ?ŝĚĞŽůŽŐǇ ? 
Problems: 
x Joining together enlightenment and evolutionary 
x If the relationship between evidence and policy is simply 
characterized as  ‘ƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ? ? ‘ƵŶƐƚĂďůĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƵŶƉƌĞĚŝĐƚĂďůĞ ? ?ƚŚĞŶƚŚĞ
model is inconclusive? How can it be applied in practice? 
2.6.1 A different reading of models  
Inspired by the concept of boundary work, Hoppe (2005) details the characteristics of 
eight models by explicitly focusing on the relationship between science and politics 
assumed in each. The main advantage of these is that they encourage a dialectical view 
of the science/politics binary. The eight models are grouped into four categories: those 
that highlight the primacy of science, those that stress the dominance of politics over 
science, those that favour dialogue and those that champion learning.  
x ¶(QOLJKWHQPHQW·DQG¶WHFKQRFUDF\·PRGHOVSULPDF\RIVFLHQFH 
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The Enlightenment model separates science from politics. Science is endowed with 
positive connotations, i.e. it is innovative, curiosity-driven, and independent. This view 
of science is both normative and aspirational. The concept of percolation is used to 
UHSUHVHQWVFLHQFH·VHQWU\LQWRSROLF\YLDDSURFHVVZKLFKFRXOGEHQDPHGWKH´DFFLGHQWDO
WULXPSKRI WUXWKµ (Weiss, 1979). In this model, scientists take no direct responsibility 
for advocating RULPSOHPHQWLQJWKHLUILQGLQJVLWLVHQWLUHO\WKHSROLWLFLDQV·UHVSRQVLELOLW\
to use or ignore science. Conversely, in the technocratic model, scientists virtually 
replace politicians in guiding society toward betterment; politics is depoliticised and 
science is apolitical, or at least science exists to clean-up politics and provide better 
answers to policy problems (Hoppe, 2005: 209). 
x ¶%XUHDXFUDWLF·DQG¶HQJLQHHULQJ·PRGHOVSULPDF\RISROLWLFV 
The bureaucratic model subjects scientific knowledge to strategizing and administrative 
tasks in such a way as to control and direct scientific effort; in this model, scientists are 
not free thinkers but public servants, and science exists in its administrative guise as a 
branch of government for instrumental purposes. Similarly to the bureaucratic model, in 
the engineering model knowledge is mobilised to serve the state, without the need to 
UHFUXLWDQGHPEHG¶NQRZOHGJHZRUNHUV· LQWRWKHDUPVDQGDSSDUDWXVRIWKHVWDWHLWVHOI
$VVXFK¶NQRZOHGJHHQJLQHHUV·0) follow specific and localised tasks, contrary 
to the generalised interests and pursuits of scientists, even if they exist outside the 
political bureaucratic elite. In this model, science exists to serve politics. 
x Advocacy models, favouring dialogue: 
The ¶DGYHUVDULDO· PRGHO LV EDVHG XSRQ D SOXUDOLVW HSLVWHPRORJ\ ,W UHFRJQLVHV WKDW
political pluralism, competition, and open contestation are foundational of a given 
polity. Science is used to legitimise arguments and pre-existing positions, through 
¶UHVHDUFh-as-DPPXQLWLRQ·7KLVPRGHODVVXPHVHTXDODQGGLVWULEXWHGDFFHVVWRH[SHUWLVH
which means that the debate is open and controversy is an inherent part of healthy 
SROLWLFDOGHEDWH7KH¶GLVSRVLWLRQDO·PRGHOIRFXVHVRQGLVFXUVLYHVWUXJJOHVPRUHWKDQWKH
adversarial model, it acknowledges the asymmetric distribution of power through the 
FRQFHSWRI ¶VWUXJJOHRYHUGLVFXUVLYHKHJHPRQ\· LH+DMHU ,W WDNHVGLVFRXUVHDV
competing stories or narratives of problem definition, stressing rhetorical style (Hoppe, 
 ¶'LVFXUVLYHEULGJHV· DFURVVHSLVWHPLFDQG LQWHUHVWJURXSVDUHSRVVLEOH DQG
¶GLVFRXUVH FRDOLWLRQV· PD\ DULVH )RU WKLV PRGHO VFLHQFH LV QHFHVVDU\ WR SURYLGH WKH






7KHPRGHORI ¶SXUH OHDUQLQJ· WUHDWV WKHSROLF\SURFHVVDVRQHRI research and enquiry 
where policy-makers look for causal relationships and link hypotheses with objectives. 
It also sees policy-making as experimental in that, through trial and error, the ultimate 
elimination of errors is a possibility. Pure learning presupposes that instrumental 
OHDUQLQJ DQG FRRSHUDWLRQ RFFXUV LQ WKH VDPH ¶DGYRFDF\ FRDOLWLRQ· ZKHUHDV OHDUQLQJ
across opposing coalitions is almost impossible (see Chapter 3). In the coping model, 
learning is not central: rather it is problem-coping which takes centre stage. Problem 
definition relies on common-sense, local and contingent knowledge bases. Trial and 
error occurs but, differently from the emphasis on experimental policy-making in the 
pure learning model, change here is incremental, and easily threatened by a potential 
SROLWLFDOLQDELOLW\WROHDUQ7KLVPRGHOVWUHVVHVERWK¶VHULDODGMXVWPHQWWKURXJKWLPH·DQG
¶SROLWLFDODQGVRFLDODGMXVWPHQWV·WRZKLFKSROLF\-makers are subjected due to sharing of 
scarce resources (Hoppe, 2005: 212).  
Hoppe stresseVWKDWWKHVHPRGHOVDUHQRWPXWXDOO\H[FOXVLYHDUJXLQJWKDWWKHVH¶VKRXOG
FHUWDLQO\QRWEHLQWHUSUHWHGDVVWDWLFLPDJHV>«@,WLV OLNHO\WKDWDSDUWLFXODUPRGHOZLOO
evolve into another one, and the resulting model may even evolve further into yet 
another RQH·ibid). He concludes by calling for more research on the conditions which 
facilitate or impede the dominance of a particular model, or combination thereof, which 
are likely to depend on both policy domain and country. He also highlights how 
particular institutions, their functioning, their rules and beliefs, might favour particular 
models; however, there might be an element of deception involved, in that latent 
practices which correspond more closely to one model might be disguised in the 
rhetoric of another. Hoppe concludes by calling for more research into the mechanisms 
by which these models interact: 
¶:HVKRXOGWU\WRGLVFRYHUWKHFRQGLWLRQVXQGHUZKLFKVRPHRIWKHVHPRGHOVRU
sequences and configurations of models, may claim greater verisimilitude. As a 
by-product, this may allow us to rethink the role of scientific expertise in 
policymaking and generate a contingency model that guides experts and 
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policymakers (and perhaps other stakeholders as well) in their day-to-day 
ERXQGDU\ZRUN· 
Ultimately, and similarly to the conclusions drawn in previous sections, the purpose of 
this exercise has been to highlight how any given model both illuminates and obscures, 
in the sense that it may emphasise particular aspects at the expense of others. No model 
is likely to apply in its pure form. It is probable that models operate in conjunction and 
differently in different settings, and vary according to context and domain as well as the 
beliefs, values, ideas, interests and understandings of the actors involved and the 
organisations and institutions they work for.  
2.7 Evidence, advocacy and values 
It becomes necessary at this point to discuss the attitudes of social scientists in relation 
to the way they perceive their role in policy-making. Are social scientists aware of their 
boundary work? Do they see themselves as advocates, offering better answers to policy 
questions, or do they see themselves as neutral arbiters, believing in the objective nature 
of scientific practice, or both? The answer to this question may GHSHQGRQVFLHQWLVWV·
epistemological positions, their interests, their values and beliefs. Weiss (1991) paper 
focuses on the relationship between ideas, arguments, advocacy and evidence. It was 
this line of work that contributed to a shift in focus from evidence to ideas which has 
inspired some recent work (i.e. Beland, 2005; Smith, 2013 and Pearce, 2014). Starting 
IURPWKHSUHPLVHWKDW¶DUHYLHZRIWKHDYDLODEOHHYLGHQFHVXJJHVWVWKDWLQVRPHVHWWLQJV
research has greater impact when it becomes part of an advocacy for a preferred 
SRVLWLRQ· :HLVV DVNVZKHWKHU UHVHDUFKHUVFDQEHDGYRFDWHVZKLOVW UHWDLQLQJ
the largest possible degree of objectivity and fairness given complexity, uncertainty, and 
bias in science. She discusses the possibility that advocacy is in fact an honest admission 
by researchers of their own limitations, and can potentially become a strength.  
¶,f researchers are more apt to have an influence on policy when they go beyond 
their traditional role of supplying empirical HYLGHQFH>«@LIWKH\XVHUHVHDUFKWR
advance policy values; will they forfeit their ticket of admission, which is based 
RQWKHDVVXPSWLRQVRIREMHFWLYHDQGFRPSHOOLQJNQRZOHGJH"· 
Weiss presents objectivity as a double-edged sword: on the one hand, objectivity may be 
seen as the very idea that allows researchers to participate in policy-making while, on the 
other hand, it may be seen as what stops researchers from advocating particular 
Chapter 2 The use of evidence in policy 
47 
positions that are necessarily political. Going back to GieryQ·V GLVFXVVLRQ  LW
appears that some of the arguments that were necessary to distinguish science from 
non-science had the adverse effect of creating a science that makes unrealistic promises. 
Whereas Weiss recognises that policy-makers are moved by ideologies and interests, she 
does not fully acknowledge their impact on scientists (1991: 38). What is missing from 
her account is how values and belief systems might interact with ideologies and 
interests. Policy issues clearly stretch across ideological and interest-based motivations 
through complex interactions which encompass values and emotional responses. Her 
critique mainly addresses a neo-positivist understanding of evidence, and therefore does 
not take into account different epistemological positions which explore subjectivity and 
advocacy in research practices.  
6RSKLVWLFDWHG SROLWLFDO DFWRUV DUH DZDUH RI VRFLDO VFLHQFH·V OLPLWDWLRQV LQ UHODWLRQ WR
REMHFWLYLW\ \HW ¶JRYHUQPHQWV FRQWLQXH WR LQYHVW VL]HDEOH VXPV RI PRQH\ LQ SROLF\
research conducted E\RXWVLGHUHVHDUFKRUJDQLVDWLRQV·:HLVV6RLIGHOLYHULQJ
objective science is not its principal aim, what is the role of policy research? Weiss 
argues that it becomes necessary to take into consideration the aims of policy 
researchers working in different settings with different institutional affiliations. In her 
survey, Weiss (1991: 45-IRXQG¶IRXUEDVLFPRWLYDWLRQV·DPRQJUHVHDUFKHUV 
1) ¶WR EH UHSXWDEOH VRFLDO VFLHQWLVWV· WR KROG KLJK VWDQGDUGV RI SUDFWLFH ERWK
theoretically and methodologically, so that their value can be acknowledged  
2) ¶WRPDNHDGLIIHUHQFH·IRUWKHLUUHVHDUFKWREHXWLOLVHG 
3) ¶WR DGYDQFH WKH FDXVH RI DQDO\WLFDOO\ EDVHG GHFLVLRQ-PDNLQJ· ZKLFK ZRXOG
increase the efficiency and rationality of policies 
4) ¶WRDGYRFDWHDSROLWLFDOSRVLWLRQ·PHDQLQJDGYRFDF\RISDUWLFXODUSROLWLFDOYLHZV
WKDWDUHLQOLQHZLWKUHVHDUFKHUV·LGHDVDQGWKHLUEHOLHIV\VWHP 
The first aim is the most popular, whereas the fourth is the least popular, and only 
scientists within academia mention it in her sample. Weiss argues that advocacy might 
not necessarily be a conscious goal for most. Whilst acknowledging their limitations in 
being value-driven, researchers also want to be regarded as striving toward objectivity 
(1991: 46). Rather than positivism being long gone, it seems as though there remains a 
fundamental contradiction, which affects most researchers, between objectivity and 
subjectivity, a struggle which involves credibility, legitimation, and the quest for human 
betterment.  
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Weiss (1991) proposes three frames: research as data; research as argument and research 
as ideas. She argues that policy researchers who work in advocacy are more likely to use 
research as argument; although they remain true to the principles of scientific research, 
i.e. by not deliberately distorting their findings, they accept that the research is produced 
in support of the advocacy. Conversely, policy researchers in government are more 
likely to emphasise objectivity as a cornerstone of their work (research as data). Those 
in research organisations that are nominally independent but funded by government will 
act in the interest of appearing neutral, though this may be dependent on the terms of 
their contract. University seems to be the place where researchers enjoy most freedom, 
SDUWLFXODUO\ DV :HLVV· VXUYH\ IRXQG WKDW 8QLYHUVLW\-based researchers felt more 
comfortable saying they aimed to advance particular political positions (pp. 47-48). The 
validity of this finding should be reviewed against the current climate, where acaGHPLFV·
IUHHGRP LV FRQWLQJHQW XSRQ IXQGLQJ GLUHFWLYHV DQG VXFFHVVLYH JRYHUQPHQWV· LPSDFW
agenda demand policy-relevant research that should be packaged in such a way as to 
serve established priorities (Bastow, Dunleavy and Tinkler, 2014). This brings up a 
VHFRQG PRUH JHQHUDO SRLQW DERXW :HLVV· DUJXPHQW QDPHO\ LWV LQKHUHQW SOXUDOLVP
Although ideology, values and interests are all given credit in building the complex web 
of policy-making, and the role of research in it, there is very little reflection on the 
power differentials and asymmetries that characterise their complex interplay, both 
outside and within science itself. Furthermore, to say that positivism is a thing of the 
past and that social science as a discipline enjoys a post-positivist consensus is 
overstating the case.  
Many commentators have stressed the determinant role of values as an obvious fact of 
life. Yet the role of values has not yet been explored in a detailed, systematic manner in 
this field, despite the fact that: 
¶E\WKHODWHWZHQWieth century there was widespread recognition of the inevitable 
intrusion of values into even the most objective, dispassionate research. Social 
scientists came to accept the fact that the political and philosophical stance of 
their work was influenced by their restricted theoretical vision, initial 
assumptions, methodological preferences, incomplete explanatory models, and 
RWKHULQHYLWDEOHREVWDFOHVWRWUXHREMHFWLYLW\·:HLVVS 
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Perhaps, with the renewed emphasis on the potential contribution of science to politics, 
exemplified by the evidence-based policy paradigm, some scientists have temporarily 
forgotten the impact of values on science, yet still remember that values affect politics.  
2.8 Conclusion 
The range of studies that have produced models to explain the use of evidence in policy 
are often rather instrumental, possibly because their main focus is on the use, rather than 
understanding and interpretation, of evidence (Young et al, 2002; Stevens, 2007a; 
Monaghan, 2010; Weiss, 1979; Leigh, 2009; Black, 2001). Ritter (2009), Stevens (2011) 
and others identify many different types of information which stakeholders refer to as 
HYLGHQFHZKLFKRIWHQODFNVWKHXVXDO´VFLHQWLILFEDVLVµIRUZKDWLVUHJDUGHGDVHYLGHQFH
Most studies fall short of acknowledging the role of values, particularly on the science 
side of the spectrum. The studies presented in the special issue of Evidence&Policy (2014) 
go some way in addressing the manner in which evidence, and particularly its ascribed 
meaning within the evidence-based policy narrative, reinforces existing power structures 
and asymmetries through inclusion and exclusion criteria, by providing legitimacy and 
credibility to certain actors at the expense of local, situated knowledge, anecdotal and 
experiential evidence. Hoppe (1999) referred to this shift in thinking as going from 
¶VSHDNLQJWUXWKWRSRZHU·WR¶PDNLQJVHQVHWRJHWKHU·+HQFHPRUHUHFHQWVWXGLHVVWUHVV
the need for shifting the focus from evidence to meaning, or the meaning that is 
ascribed to evidence by different stakeholders that participate in policy-making and, by 
extension, meaning-making, in a variety of contexts.  
There are two principal shortcomings in mainstream understandings of what evidence is 
or indeed should be, and its relationship with policy. Firstly, evidence is so closely tied 
to science that some scientists fall short of imagining other ways of conceptualising and 
operationalising it, failing to understand other contextual conceptions of it. This is 
identified in some literature, SDUWLFXODUO\WKHOLWHUDWXUHWKDWHPSKDVLVHVWKH¶LQWHUSUHWLYH·
RU¶DUJXPHQWDWLYH·WXUQ)LVFKHUDQG)RUHVWHUDQGWKHUHFHQWVKLIWLQIRFXVIURP
evidence to ideas (Smith, 2013). Related to this is the notion that evidence should be 
classified through a hierarchy that is absolute; that is, a hierarchy that applies regardless 
of the context. This supports a universal standard to judge evidence by, placing 
scientific evidence of a particular kind over and above qualitative, anecdotal and 
experiential evidence. This is underpinned by conceptions of evidence, and science, as 
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liberating public policy from any ideological taint. In other words, it fosters a dualistic 
conception by countering policy-making (dirty) with science (clean). It also fails to 
acknowledge that science is a political endeavour that is both value-laden and interest-
driven, and should not be divorced from its origin and history (Gieryn, 1983), the role 
its practitioners ascribe to it (Weiss, 1991) and the values and beliefs that guide it. Seeing 
evidence as embedded in the policy-making process, and understanding theories and 
frameworks that have attempted to explain this very process, will help elucidate the 
relative role of evidence in this context. The following chapters will place these 
discussions in a broader theoretical context in order to further unpack these debates, 
proposing further analytical tools to inform later discussion.  
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Chapter 3  
dŚĞƉŽůŝĐǇƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ PŚĞƵƌŝƐƚŝĐƐ ?ƐǇŶƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?ŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞĂŶĚ
ĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞĨƌĂŵĞƐ ?ĂŶĚŵŝƐƐŝŶŐǀĂůƵĞƐ 
3.1 Introduction 
This Chapter situates the literature discussed in Chapter Two within a wider theoretical 
context. A relationship between models of the use of evidence in policy and theories of 
the policy process is made explicit. A short overview of current theories of the policy 
process will be used to identify certain under-theorised areas. Theories are identified in 
relation to the intellectual fashion that was dominant at the time they were advanced. 
The cultural and case specificity of theories are noted according to country of origin 
(mostly US), dominant epistemologies and theories of power and the state (i.e. 
positivism, institutionalism, pluralism, post-structuralism). In summary, early positivist, 
institutionalist, and rationalist accounts of the policy process were followed by pluralist, 
critical and increasingly complex accounts between the 1950s and the 1980s as the 
discipline of public policy became well established. Since the late 1990s, more 
argumentative and discursive approaches to policy analysis have emerged stemming 
from a post-structuralist epistemology (Hajer, 1995; Fisher and Forrester, 1993; Fisher, 
2003; Hoppe, 1999).  
7KLV UHYLHZ VXJJHVWV WKH ODWHVW LQWHOOHFWXDO IDVKLRQ DSSHDUV WR EH DGRSWLQJ D ¶PXOWLSOH
WKHRULHV· DSSURDFK ZKHUHE\ HOHPHQWV Rf existing theories of policy change are 
synthesised, often in conjunction with theories from other literatures, and applied to 
cases in order to provide a richer explanation of the policy process. There are 
advantages and disadvantages to this approach (see Cairney, 2013 for further 
discussion): however, synthesis remains popular. The main issue with a synthesis 
approach is overcoming the epistemological and ontological differences between 
theories, as well as the potential pitfalls of combining approaches which, although 
similar in appearance, might use different units of analysis, different levels of generality, 
or use similar concepts to mean different things. Despite their limitations, synthetic 
approaches have produced some compelling accounts of the policy process. Some 
H[DPSOHVLQFOXGH%HODQG·VDQG6PLWK·VZRUN 
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In this chapter I argue that a combination of synthetic and contradictory logic (Cairney, 
2013), might allow the identification of useful theoretical instruments. I mostly focus on 
two theories which remain unique in placing sufficient emphasis on values by stressing 
WKH UROH RI ZKDW 6XUHO  FDOOV ¶FRJQLWLYH DQG QRUPDWLYH IUDPHV· +DOO·V SROLF\
SDUDGLJP DQG 6DEDWLHU·V $GYRFDF\ &RDOLWLRQ )UDPHZRUN $&) 7KH VLPLODULWLHV DQG
differences between these models are discussed in detail. Although cognitive and 
normative frames are essential in understanding the policy process, these frames need to 
be extended to systematically encompass the role of values in shaping beliefs and 
constructing paradigms.  
The emphasis on the role of ideas, ideology, interest and values in shaping policy has 
been a feature in theories of the policy process. Yet, whereas the formers have received 
further attention and analysis, becoming well integrated into existing contributions (see 
Weiss, 1991; John, 2003; Hall, 1993; Smith, 2013; Cairney, 2007; Beland, 2005), the role 
of the latter, though always acknowledged, is lesser developed. How do values affect 
policy? How do they facilitate or help resist policy change? What is the interplay of ideas 
and emotions in shaping values? How are dominant values sustained and challenged? It 
is important to question the distinction between values and ideas, because the 
boundaries between them are fuzzy. Ideas are often presented and understood in 
cognitive, ideological and/or discursive terms, to the detriment of their affective 
FRPSRQHQWV$FFRUGLQJ WR:LOOLDPV ¶YDOXHVPHUJHDIIHFWDQGFRQFHSW·  WKH
role of affect and emotions, which partly shapes particular allegiances to ideas according 
to predominant values, is not sufficiently addressed in the literature. The interplay 
EHWZHHQ YDOXHV DQG LGHDV DQG WKH UROH RI DIIHFW LQ VKDSLQJ LQGLYLGXDOV· DOOHJLDQFHV
should be subject to analysis. This thesis addresses such questions.  
3.2 Theories of the policy process: key approaches 
Smith and Katikireddi (2012: 2) have helpfully categorised theories of the policy process 
in a glossary. They distinguish between three types of theories: those based on the idea 
of policy inertia (historical institutionalism, path dependency); those focusing on incremental 
policy change (policy learning); and those emphasising significant policy shifts (punctuated 
equilibriums, policy windows and policy paradigms). There is value in each of these, because 
emphasis is placed on different, and at times contrasting, aspects of the policy process. 
Broadly speaking, accounts of policy inertia focus on resistance to change and 
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emphasise historical and institutional aspects which may cause inertia. Such accounts 
give considerable weight to the determining role of pre-existing structures and 
institutions. In contrast, models of incremental policy change stress the incremental 
learning that takes place through the policy process, whereby individual policy actors are 
able to build on knowledge and generate consensus through dialogue, placing emphasis 
on the ability of an agency to change the course of action based on learning and 
experience. Those accounts that focus on significant policy shifts are a direct outcome 
of the latter and highlight that, although policy change is incremental by nature, shifts 
may take place very quickly, often outside and beyond the incremental learning process, 
and may even be aided by contextual, circumstantial, ideological, and value-based 
factors. Any modelling of inertia, slow or rapid change in the policy process is limited to 
the extent that it entails a degree of simplification by determining which factors and 
which conditions are necessary or should be emphasised for a particular outcome to 
occur. These theories provide varied accounts of the policy process, dependant on their 
assumptions as well as the aspects they choose to emphasise. For example, most models 
that have been produced in the US usually present a pluralist understanding of the way 
the state operates (see Kingdon, 2003, Sabatier and Jenkins Smith, 1993). Conversely, 
models produced in the UK usually have a tendency to present a more critical 
understanding of the state in a Marxist tradition (see John, 2003). There is a clear 
trajectory in the development of these models that mirrors developments in social 
science in terms of context, shifting epistemologies and traditions (i.e. public policy and 
administration versus social policy).  
In his important work evaluating the concept of social learning in analysis of the policy 
process, Peter Hall (1993: 277) asks a series of important questions: 
¶KRZ VKRXOG ZH XQGHUVWDQG WKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ LGHDV DQG SROLF\PDNLQJ"
How do the ideas behind policy change course? Is the process of social learning 
UHODWLYHO\LQFUHPHQWDO>«@RUPDUNHGE\XSKHDYDODQGWKHNLQGRI´SXQFWXDWHG
HTXLOLEULXPµ WKDW RIWHQ DSSOLHV PRUH JHQHUDOO\ WR SROLWLFDO FKDQJH" $UH
bureaucrats the principal actors in social learning, or do politicians and societal 
RUJDQLVDWLRQVDOVRSOD\DUROH"· 
These questions have largely been addressed by the existing literature. Several theories 
have been put forward, reviewed and adapted, stressing disparate elements as they seek 
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to explain change and continuity in policy-making. Below is a table detailing some of 
the principal theories of the policy process. 
Table 2: Principal frameworks and theories of the policy process 
Name of Model/Author/First 
Publication 






Does not account for rapid change 
 









Lacks engagement with social and 










Places too much emphasis on 
exogenous factors 
Does not account for core belief 
changes 
Punctuated Equilibrium 







venues and venue shopping 
US specific  
Interest-focused 
Pluralist 




Lacks repeated systematic 
application 





Adversarial position, underplays 
role of values and beliefs 
The following sections briefly summarise certain aspects of each of these approaches, 
particularly focusing on their strengths and shortcomings and how they deal with values 
and ideas.  
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3.2.1 Incrementalism 
Lindblom posits that any view of policy change that stresses revolution rather than 
evolution is misconceived, and that commentators who claim otherwise are confusing 
LGHDOLVPZLWKUHDOLVP+HDUJXHVWKDW¶QHLWKHUUHYROXWLRQQRUGUDVWLFSROLF\FKDQJHQRU
even carefully planned big steSVDUHRUGLQDULO\SRVVLEOH·517). There are problems 
with this view: firstly, how can incrementalism explain relatively short term, 
revolutionary policy change? Lindblom acknowledges the complex nature of policy 
making, yet his analytical tools to tackle it appear rather linear. He proposes the method 
of disjointed incrementalism as a superior analytical tool, stressing a more reasonable 
objective that is not directly targeting abstract-ideal goals. In other words, Lindblom 
argues that when dealing with policy problems and instrumental policy objective, the 
concern with abstract ideals is remote: 
¶WKH\ DUH RIWHQ RQO\ GLVWDQWO\ DQG ORRVHO\ RSHUDWLYH LQ WKH VSHFLILF DQDO\VLV RI
policy problems. At best they can only be incompletely analysed ² held in the 
mind loosely where they are beset by internal contradictions. They do not 
represent, as has been suggested, a distant synoptic guidance of incremental 
analysis, for synopsis on values remains impossible. Perhaps they enter into our 
thinking most significantly through posing trade-off problems, in which 
incremental gDLQVRQRQHIURQWDUHWUDGHGDJDLQVWGHFUHPHQWVRQRWKHUV·
519)  
This statement implies that, in policy analysis, it is possible, and indeed desirable, to 
methodologically separate day-to-day policy problems and deliberations on them (i.e. 
cost benefit), from more abstract level, value-oriented thinking about policy objectives, 
though values analysis might occur in the trade-off process. 
If politics moves incrementally, Lindblom argues, this does not necessarily mean that it 
is reactionary or slow; iQVWHDG ¶D IDVW-moving sequence of small changes can more 
speedily accomplish a drastic alteration of the status quo than can an only infrequent 
PDMRUSROLF\FKDQJH·:KLOVWWKLVLVDVRXQGOLQHRIUHDVRQLQJWKHTXHVWLRQ
remains as to whether incrementalism is able to offer useful theoretical and conceptual 
tools to understand and analyse the complex system to which it refers. As a general idea, 
incrementalism is easily validated. Although one should not necessarily abandon 
incrementalist logic, there is an important difference between the latter and a systematic 
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framework for policy analysis. Furthermore, incrementalism tacitly implies both a 
certain degree of linearity, which runs counter to the acknowledgement of dealing with 
a complex system, and a more subtle separation between instruments and objectives, 
which implies the misconceived possibility of separating facts from values.  
3.2.2 Punctuated Equilibriums 
&RQWUDU\WR/LQGEORP%DXPJDUWQHUDQG-RQHV·FHQWUDOSUHPLVHLVWKDWWKHSROLF\
pURFHVV LV FKDUDFWHULVHG E\ ¶ORQJ SHULRGV RI VWDELOLW\ >«@ LQWHUUXSWHG E\ EXUVWV RI
IUHQHWLFSROLF\DFWLYLW\·[YLL7KHLGHDRISXQFWXDWHGHTXLOLEULXPLVXVHIXOEHFDXVH
it acknowledges continuity as well as sudden change. It also stresses the relative 
independence of policy subsystems, albeit without relating it to long-term societal level 
value shifts. Contrary to institutionalist approaches, which would stress the determining 
role of institutions in leading change and continuity, Baumgartner and Jones argue that 
¶LQVWLWXWLRQVDUHHPEHGGHGLQEURDGVRFLDODQGSROLWLFDOHQYLURQPHQWVDQGWKH\RSHUDWH
within the limits induced by human cognitive capacity·  [[. Institutional and 
societal change should thus be regarded as mutually reinforcing rather than as led by 
institutions. Baumgartner and Jones place considerable emphasis on agenda setting and 
framing as central mechanisms through which issues are brought to the forefront of 
formal policy debates; adopting framing and agenda setting as lenses has certain 
implications. Significantly, it stresses competition above asymmetrical resource 
distribution.  
%DXPJDUWQHU DQG -RQHV UHFRJQLVH WKH WHQVLRQ WKDW H[LVWV EHWZHHQ WKH ¶ERXQGHG
UDWLRQDOLW\·RILQVWLWXWLRQDOLVWDSSURDFKHVDQGORQJ-term change: 
¶VFKRlars recognised the role of bounded rationality in imposing stability on a 
potentially chaotic process. What they missed are the implications for longer-
run change: these systems were too stable, and were not capable of responding 
to changing social and economic realities by admitting emergent interests into 
WKHSURFHVV·[[LY 
However, they do not deal with the manner in which stability is maintained within a 
system over the long term in sufficient detail, perhaps because this was the central focus 
of prior competing approaches. A typical self-perpetuating policy cycle is identified 
through agenda setting and concentration of resources, whereby: 
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¶Dfter an initial period of increased media attention to a given issue official 
attention begins to rise. Policymakers hoping for greater governmental activity 
in the area take advantage of the momentary burst of public or media concern 
with the issue and push for new legislation. Generally speaking, this new 
legislation commits funds and creates new institutiRQV· 
Agenda setting takes precedence over other factors, which results in an analysis that is 
useful in identifying the self-perpetuating nature of institutions created to tackle 
identified problems alongside the creation of new ones. It identifies the manner in 
which problems are responded to and perpetuated, yet it lacks attention on how 
problems are created and responses legitimised, underplaying the fact that the solutions 
proposed by actors are themselves created out of dominant interests, ideas, values and 
H[LVWLQJ VRFLDO HFRQRPLF DQG FXOWXUDO SRZHU DV\PPHWULHV 7KLV DSSURDFK·V SOXUDOLVW
underpinning, and the emphasis on interests, rather than ideas and values, and framing, 
rather than narratives, is perhaps a limitation. Issue framing is a useful theoretical tool; 
however the problem with issue framing is that it too rigidly relies on interest and 
competition, which entails the substitution of one frame with another. This does not 
acknowledge that frames can accidentally cooperate, or one frame can nominally 
represent one view but latently disguise another (see Hajer, 1993; Chapter 5).  
3.2.3 The Advocacy Coalition Framework 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework emerged in direct response to previous models of 
policy change (i.e. stages heuristic models) that took little account of factors outside of 
top-GRZQ LQVWLWXWLRQDO ¶OHJDOLVWLF· SROLF\-PDNLQJ SURFHVV LH /LQGEORP DQG +HFOR·V
work) (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1994: 177). The ACF was first developed in 1988 
and based on a single case study, that of air pollution policy in the US, which limits the 
generalizability of the framework; however, it has been reviewed and revised since 
(Sabatier, 2011) and it has been used in a significant number of studies (Weible et al, 
2009). The primary assumptions of the framework are heavily based on Heclo's work 
(Sabatier, 1988: 130) and provide a complex model built on five premises, in which 
technical information (which can be used as a synonym for evidence) figures 
prominently. 
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Figure 2: Visual representation of the ACF (source: adapted from Weible et al, 2009) 
 
The principal elements under scrutiny are the identification of a problem, its causes, and 
estimated impact of proposed solutions, with a 'policy subsystem' as the main unit of 
DQDO\VLV6DEDWLHU$V-RKQSRLQWVRXW
WKHUHFDQEHQR´VWDJHVµPRGHORIWKH
political process to provide a simple map because of the multiple sources of causation, 
feedback, and the sheer complexity of what is going on' (2003: 483). One of the main 
advances of the ACF was to create a framework which acknowledges the influence of 
¶EHOLHI V\VWHPV· -HQNLQV-Smith and Sabatier, 1994: 178). The idea of conceptualizing 
policy systems as belief systems recognizes that empirical/instrumental elements may 
well enter and shape policy, but that there are also core/normative elements, beliefs, 
that play a major role (1994: 181). In the ACF, beliefs are divided into three levels: deep 
core beliefsZKLFKUHIHUWRDSHUVRQ·VYDOXHVDQGSKLORVRSK\policy core beliefs, which refer 
WR RQH·V SROLWLFDO DQG SROLF\ SRVLWLRQV secondary aspects, which relate to resources and 
policy implementation, as well as information supporting the process (Cairney, 2012: 
205). The deeper the level of belief, the harder it is tRDOWHUWKDWEHOLHI¶FRUHEHOLHIVVSDQ
PRVWSROLF\DUHDVDQGDUHWKHOHDVWVXVFHSWLEOHWRFKDQJH·LELG 
The ACF allows for changes to the policy core, but states these only seem to come 
about because of external forces such as 'macro-economic conditions or the rise of a 
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new systemic governing coalition' (Sabatier, 1988: 134). Change principally takes place 
DW WKH OHYHORIVHFRQGDU\DVSHFWVZKHQ ¶VSHFLILFSROLFLHVDUH UHILQHGDFFRUGLQJ WRQHZ
LQIRUPDWLRQJDWKHUHGGXULQJWKHSROLF\F\FOH·&DLUQH\206). According to John's 
interpretation of the ACF, shifts in policy, and coalitions, are adaptive: 'change comes 
from the ability of these ideas to adapt ² in their noncore aspect ² ranging around a 
ZKROHVHULHVRIRSHUDWLRQDOTXHVWLRQVDQG´ZKDWZRUNVµin any one time or place' (2003: 
490). One of the strengths of this approach is in acknowledging the political, value-
laden arena in which policy-making takes place; in this context, coalitions are seen as 
dynamic and changeable. The sharing of policy core-beliefs is crucial for the coalition to 
exist and to last (Sabatier, 2011: 105). Interestingly, the only factor that is given the 
SRWHQWLDO WR UDGLFDOO\ DOWHU SROLF\ RWKHU WKDQ D PDMRU SROLWLFDO VKLIW RU DQ ¶H[WHUQDO
VKRFN·ZKLFKHQWDLOVFKDQJHLQWKHpolicy core belief, is 'solid empirical evidence' (ibid). 
However, it is recognized that 'such evidence is more likely to be developed and 
accepted in fields where accepted quantitative data and consensual theories are available, 
in the natural sciences more than the social sciences' (p. 105). Sabatier posits that 
coalitions are primarily interest-driven, and that they use evidence in support of their 
existing beliefs: 
¶7KHIUDPHZRUNDVVXPHV>«@WKDWPHPEHUVRIYDULRXVFRDOLWLRQVVHHNWREHWWHU
understand the world in order to further their policy objectives. They will resist 
information suggesting that their basic beliefs may be invalid and/or 
unattainable, and they will use formal policy analyses primarily to buttress and 
elaborate those beliefs (or attack WKHLURSSRQHQWV
·6DEDWLHU 
7KH$&)DWWHPSWVWRVWULNHDEDODQFHEHWZHHQUDWLRQDOFKRLFHWKHRU\ZKHUH¶DFWRUVDUH
LQVWUXPHQWDOO\UDWLRQDO·DQGPRUHSV\FKR-social and social constructivist approaches. It 
should be noted here that beliefs are understood in both normative and cognitive terms: 
¶WKH$&)DVVXPHVWKDWJRDOVDUHXVXDOO\FRPSOH[DQGWKDWDQLQGLYLGXDO
VDELOLW\
to perceive the world and to process that information is affected by cognitive 
biases and constraints' (Sabatier, 2011: 108).  
Sabatier (2011: 115-16) recognised, in contrast to his early account of coalitions, that 
actors do not necessarily act 'in concert'. He makes a distinction between 'material 
groups', motivated by self-interest, and 'purposive groups', motivated by belief and 
collective welfare. This division, however, does not recognise overlap between the two 
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groups. Though the ACF recognises that a wide variety of actors participate in policy-
making, it leaves responsibility almost entirely with the actors themselves; in other 
words, it does not pay sufficient attention to systemic impediments that may hinder 
participation. As such, 'the political resources (or lack thereof) of many interest groups 
are slowly changing 'facts of life' which actors within a subsystem must take into 
account in formulating their strategies in the short or moderate term' (Sabatier, 1988: 
7KLVHVVHQWLDOO\SOXUDOLVWXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIUHVRXUFHV·GLVWULEXWLRQJORVVHVRYHUWKH
fact that certain coalitions are likely to remain better off because they are sustained by 
dominant interests and belief systems.  
The complex process which shapes human agents' beliefs, values, opinions and 
strategies is recognized, and it is assumed that this 'should be ascertained empirically' 
(2011: 109). There is no indication of any methodological reflection on how this could 
be best established, other than the systematic gathering of data 'on the belief and 
behaviour of actors' through 'surveys' and the development of 'techniques for 
systematically coding testimony at legislative and administrative hearings' (2011: 107-8). 
The process of belief formation and the interplay of values, beliefs, politics and ideology 
remain under-theorised in the framework. Qualitative research can address this, but this 
is not necessarily advocated by the ACF.  
3.2.4 Multiple streams 
Kingdon uses the idea of streams to give a sense of dynamism and flow to the policy 
SURFHVVUHMHFWLQJD¶VWDJHV·PRGHO+HLGHQWLILHVWKUHHVWUHDPV ² ¶SUREOHPV
SROLF\ SURSRVDOV DQG SROLWLFV· ² whicKHPHUJH IURP WKH ¶SROLF\ SULPHYDO VRXS· 
19). This 'soup' stands for the combination and confrontation of ideas within a 'policy 
community' (2003: 117). He argues that the encounter of any two of these three streams 
in conjunction with the opening oI ¶SROLF\ ZLQGRZV· RU RFFDVLRQDO ZLQGRZV RI
opportunity for change, may allow for a shift in policy to occur (2003: 20). Accordingly, 
¶VHSDUDWH VWUHDPV FRPH WRJHWKHU DW FULWLFDO WLPHV·   $OWKRXJK KH UHFRJQL]HV
that a variety of actors play an important role within the policy process, including those 
RXWVLGHRIJRYHUQPHQWKHJUDQWV DPRUHSURPLQHQW UROH WRJRYHUQPHQWRIILFLDOV ¶QR
one set of actors dominates the process, but elected politicians and their appointees 
FRPHFORVHUWKDQDQ\RWKHU·003: 44). He provides a detailed analysis backed by two 
empirical cases, health and transportation. For Kingdon, the focal question is why some 
issues are neglected while others are taken on board, setting the policy agenda. He 
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argues that issues that are alive at the level of specialised agendas can be virtually non-
existent in general agendas (2003: 196).  
A policy problem is defined through indicators coming from various governmental and 
non-governmental sources and techniques, including monitoring, data collection and 
statistics (2003: 91). Kingdon argues that in order for indicators to become evident, a 
'focusing event' is needed, which is a symbolic embodiment of the problem itself, like a 
crisis (2003: 94). Crises and disasters may be a more common occurrence in some fields 
of policy than others, and what determines the scope of the crisis is often dependent on 
many factors, including the role of the media and the level of 'aggregation' of the crisis 
(2003: 95). Focusing events act merely as reinforcing factors to a pre-existing and 
already identified problem. This way of viewing problems leaves room for the relative 
nature of problem definition, whereby one stakeholder may define a problem in such a 
way that the responsibility for its resolution falls outside of their remit. This is where the 
political comes in, entailing the question of values: 'problem definition and struggles 
over definition turn out to have important consequences' (2003: 110). Hence, 
depending on one's political belief or party allegiance, poverty may or may not be 
identified as a problem to be tackled by government intervention. When considering the 
role of values, Kingdon posits that specialists in the same policy fields often share 
similar values, with only classic political divisions, liberals versus conservatives, 
presenting significant differences (2003: 133).  
Kingdon states that 'the forces that drive the political stream and the forces that drive 
the policy stream are quite different: each has a life of its own, independent of the 
other.' (2003: 118) For a heuristic, it is useful to make categorical differentiations, but 
the extent to which these streams, policy, politics and problems, should be seen as 
separate and independent from one another is questionable. For instance, how is it 
possible for the problem stream and the political stream to be artificially separated if it 
is the very process of problem identification that leads a policy entrepreneur to 
advocate? (2003: 123). Specialists seem to be mainly responsible for the generation and 
exchange of ideas, but ideas remain vaguely defined (2003: 200). Kingdon recognizes 
that power distribution is uneven and favours certain groups over others; yet, he takes 
issue with the over-reliance of political science on concepts such as 'power, influence, 
pressure and strategy' (2003: 125); he argues that ideas and content should be the key 
focus of policy analysis. However, he seems not to pay enough attention to the 
Chapter 3 The policy process: heuristics, synthesis, normative and cognitive frames, and missing values 
62 
possibility that these factors contribute to the shaping of those very ideas. As John 
points out, 'one problem is that it is not clear exactly what ideas are' (2003: 487). 
Kingdon grants special powers to 'policy entrepreneurs' as agents of change; 
accordingly, they are almost single-handedly responsible for the 'coupling' of streams, 
and consequently for policy change opportunities (2003: 179). There is a fundamental 
problem with the idea that entrepreneurship alone is enough to create a successful 
advocate, namely that not all advocates or entrepreneurs will have success (and 
sufficient resources) to either couple streams or take advantage of open policy windows 
if there is a strong ideological consensus which holds policies still or against them. One 
advantage of Kingdon's model is that it takes into account the unintended ways in 
which certain ideas come to the fore: 'we still encounter considerable doses of 
messiness, accident, fortuitous coupling, and dumb luck', which essentially makes for 
unpredictable elements (p. 206).  
There are significant similarities between the streams model and the ACF, which partly 
stem from their pluralist understanding of power and knowledge distribution in the 
state. For instance, what Sabatier calls 'major socio-economic changes, such as 
economic dislocation or the rise of social movements' (2011: 103), is not far off from 
Kingdon's idea of problem recognition through 'focusing events', like a crisis or disaster 
(2003: 94). Although Kingdon recognises that power is unevenly spread, he only grants 
a passive voice to public opinion. The two frameworks seem to share an overwhelming 
level of optimism when it comes to the use of evidence in policy. The ACF stresses the 
idea of 'policy-oriented learning'. According to Sabatier, it is possible for coalitions to 
'gradually alter their belief systems over time, partially as a result of formal policy 
analyses and trial and error learning' (1988: 130). This leads one to assume that policy-
makers in all fields grant a vital role to processes of analysis, evaluation, and monitoring; 
however, the ACF does not necessarily provide the tools to respond to the fundamental 
question: to what extent is this actually the case? Similarly, the central mechanism for 
evaluation of existing programmes is identified by Kingdon as formal and informal 
feedback, but there is no analysis of the extent to which the structures in place, both 
deep and institutional, actually aid feedback mechanisms (2003: 101,102).  
3.2.5 ,Ăůů ?ƐWŽůŝĐǇƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵ 
In his article discussing the paradigm shift from Keynesianism to monetarism in the 
British context, Hall (1993: 278) explains the policy-making process as one that involves 
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¶WKUHHFHQWUDOYDULDEOHVWKHRYHUDUFKLQJJRDOVWKDWJXLGHSROLF\LQDSDUWLFXODUILHOGWKH
techniques or policy instruments used to attain those goals, and the precise setting of 
WKHVHLQVWUXPHQWV·. Hall uses the Kuhnian model of scientific paradigm shifts (1962) and 
adapts it to the study of public policy. He explains how policy actors operate within the 
confines of a set paradigm, which establishes meaning as well as the boundaries of 
possible practices: 
Politicians, officials, the spokesmen for social interests, and policy experts all 
operate within the terms of the political discourse that are current in the nation 
at a given time, and the terms of political discourse generally have a specific 
configuration that lends representative legitimacy to some social interests more 
than others, delineates the accepted boundaries of state action, associates 
contemporary political developments with particular interpretations of national 
history, and defines the context in which many issues will be understood (1993: 
289). 
Hall details a set of factors which influence the policy-making process: political and 
material resources, positional advantages within institutional framework, arguments of 
competing factions, exogenous factors. The level of authoritativeness of one set of 
actors over another, or of one science over another, is considered to be important. 
+DOO·V DFFRXQW OLNHQV VFLHQWLILF WR SROLF\ SDUDGLJPV LQ WKHLU WHQGHQF\ WR SUHVHQt 
anomalies which accumulate overtime, eventually undermining the cohesiveness of the 
paradigm itself, resulting in a visible failure. Crucially, this failure is thought to 
strengthen competing paradigms, or at least open up the field to competition. 
Hall recognises that the power structure, both discursive and institutional, establishes 
policy boundaries: in other words, it acknowledges that power is unequally distributed, 
and certain ideas, and beliefs, are more likely to enjoy broader consensus. This is largely 
due to the fact that 
¶SDUDGLJPVDUHE\GHILQLWLRQQHYHUIXOO\FRPPHQVXUDEOHLQVFLHQWLILFRUWHFKQLFDO
terms. Because each paradigm contains its own account of how the world facing 
policy-makers operates and each account is different, it is often impossible for 
the advocates of different paradigms to agree on a common body of data 
against which a technical judgement in favour of one paradigm over another 
PLJKWEHPDGH·1993: 280). 
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This also means that what counts as evidence for some will be different from others. In 
+DOO·VGHSLFWLRQWKHERXQGDULHVRIJLYHQDFWLRQVSUDFWLFHVDQGLQWHUYHQWLRQVDUHVHWE\D
dominant paradigm, because: 
¶HYHU\ SDUDGLJP FRQWDLQV D YLHZ RI KXPDQ QDWXUH D GHILQLWLRQ RI EDVLF DQG
proper forms of social relations among equals and among those in relationships 
of hierarchy, and a specification of relations among institutions as well as a 
stipulation of the role of such institutions. Thus, a societal paradigm is a 
PHDQLQJV\VWHPDVZHOODVDVHWRISUDFWLFHV·-HQVRQFLWHGin Surel, 2000: 499) 
The espousal of a certain paradigm shapes WKHDFWRUV·ERXQGDULHVDQGWKHLULPDJLQDWLRQ
to the point that opposing views are fundamentally incommensurable. There is 
VLJQLILFDQW RYHUODS EHWZHHQ +DOO·V QRWLRQ RI SDUDGLJP DQG +DMHU·V FRQFHption of 
discourse, discussed below.  
3.2.6 ,ĂũĞƌ ?ƐŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶƐ 
,Q D YROXPH WKDW VWUHVVHV WKH ¶DUJXPHQWDWLYH WXUQ· LQ SROLF\ DQDO\VLV )LVKHU DQG
Forrester, 1993) Marteen Hajer outlines the importance of focusing on discourse to study 
the policy process+HDUJXHVWKDW¶ZKHWKHURUQRWDVLWXDWLRQLVSHUFHLYHGDVDSROLWLFDO
SUREOHP GHSHQGV RQ WKH QDUUDWLYH LQ ZKLFK LW LV GLVFXVVHG·   ,Q D SRVW-
structuralist tradition, language loses its neutral status and becomes instead the principal 
conveyor of meaning, a medium through which actors construct the world around 
WKHP +HQFH ¶WKH VWXG\ RI GLVFRXUVH RSHQV QHZ SRVVLELOLWLHV WR VWXG\ WKH SROLWLFDO
process as mobilization of bias· 1993: 45). He highlights the necessity to move beyond 
technical diffeUHQFHV RI RSLQLRQ WR GLVFXVV WKH ¶GLVFXUVLYH SURGXFWLRQ RI UHDOLW\· LQ
relation to social and historical practices; this very relation is encapsulated in the 
FRQFHSWRI D ¶GLVFRXUVH FRDOLWLRQ· RU ¶D JURXSRI DFWRUVZKR VKDUH D VRFLDO FRQVWUXFW·
(1993: 45). This approach emphasises the centrality of the framing process, whereby 
certain actors push their views forward through mechanisms of debate, persuasion, 
manipulation and power. What is missing from existing accounts according to Hajer is 
the meaning-making function of discourse in defining problems through a re-
organisation of existing knowledge coupled with emerging ideas, concepts and 
categories. These discourses can vary from normative to analytic and can contain both 
¶KLVWRULFDO UHIHUHQFHV· DQG ¶P\WKV· +DMHU WHUPV WKH SURFHVV RI VROLGLILFDWLRQ RI D
GLVFRXUVH DV ¶VWUXFWXUDWLRQ·ZKHUHE\ DGLVFRXUVHEHFRPHVGRPLQDQW DQG VXEVHTXHQWO\
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¶LQVWLWXWLRQDOLVHG·   +DMHU·V FDVH VWXG\ ² acid rain ² provides grounds for 
reflection in relation to the interplay between scientific discourses and the formation of 
the discourse on acid rain; the primacy of scientific knowledge and ways of knowing is 
given by the dominance of science in this setting. Yet due to competing discourses, 
which span beyond the scientific to include economic, engineering, political and other 
discursive frames, there is no single dominant explanation of a given phenomenon 
(1993: 46). But can a discourse be considered as a synonym for a frame? To some 
extent, the idea of competing frames as discussed by Baumgartner and Jones (2009) 
already encompasses some of the reflections put forward by Hajer. However, there is a 
fundamental difference in the power ascribed to discourse delivered narratively and 
linguistically, as opposed to a more interest-driven and rationalised framing process. 
Contrary to a concept of frames that is often pluralistic because viewed on a 
competitive and interest-led basis, frames may come together, even unintentionally, 
through their potential affinities and therefore might not necessarily compete. For 
LQVWDQFHLQ+DMHU·VFKRVHQFDVHVWXG\PRUDOVFLHQWLILFDQGHFRQRPLFDUJXPHQWVVKDUH
significant affinities which end up supporting an overall discourse on sustainable 
development (1993: 47).  
Narratives are then the principal element of discourse sustenance. The power of 
narratives, or storylines, in supporting dominant discourses is dependent on specific 
conditions: firstly, it must be accepted by key actors (structuration) and, secondly, it 
PXVWEH¶LQVWLWXWLRQDOLVHG·E\EHFRPLQJHPEHGGHGLQH[LVWLQJLQVWLWXWLRQV 
¶WKHSROLWLFVRIGLVFRXUVHLVEHVWVHHQDVDFRQWLQXRXVSURFHVVRIJLYLQJPHDQLQJ
to the vague and ambiguous social world by means of story lines and the 
subsequent structuration of experience through the various social practices that 
FDQEHIRXQGLQDJLYHQILHOG· 
Advantages of this approach include moving beyond interest-based explanations; tying 
subsystems to their broader socio-historical discursive contexts; and moving beyond 
instrumental/rational explanations. According to Hajer, this approach: 
¶LOOXPLQDWHVKRZGLIIHUHQWDFWRUVDQGRUJDQLVDWLRQDOSUDFWLFHVKHOSWRUHSURGXFH
or fight a given bias without necessarily orchestrating or coordinating their actions or 
without necessarily sharing deep values·HPSKDVLVDGGHG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7KLVSURFHVVZLOOEHFRPHHYLGHQWLQ&KDSWHUV(LJKWDQG7HQ+DMHU·VDSSURDFKVSHDNV
directly to instrumental rational models of the policy process as well as those models 
that stress the centrality of belief systems in determining policy coalitions (Hall, 1993; 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993).  
The question remains as to whether these different approaches are as discordant as they 
may appear. Indeed, when putting forward a competing theory, one tends to focus on 
aspects that had been previously neglected to understand whether they may offer a 
better reading. Furthermore, there is an attempt to justify new readings by highlighting 
their superior explanatory power, targeting previously neglected aspects, compared to 
RWKHU WKHRULHV· VKRUWFRPLQJV )ROORZLQJ &DLUQH\·V DUJXPHQW  WKH LQFOLQDWLRQ RI
theoreticians to invalidate competing theories in order to justify their own is part of 
academic practice; yet, no theory starts in a vacuum.  
3.3 Using Multiple Lenses 
Theories are seldom systematically tested as encompassing frameworks (Cairney, 2013; 
Weible et al, 2009). Aside from a few exceptions (John et al, 2013; Weible et al, 2009), 
concepts and ideas have been borrowed from these theories with little concern for their 
ontological and epistemological assumptions or their claims to replicability. Thus these 
theories are more often utilised as lenses to construct a dominant narrative of change 
(Cairney, 2013), rather than being systematically and/or deductively tested as applying 
to multiple cases. In order to overcome the limitations which might stem from relying 
RQ D VLQJOH GRPLQDQW QDUUDWLYH RI FKDQJH &DLUQH\  SURSRVHV WR XVH ¶PXOWLSOH
OHQVHV· WR HQULFK DQDO\VLV E\ FRPELQLQJ LQVLJKWV IURP GLIIHUHQW WKHRUies and multiple 
narratives of change. In his later work (2013), he notes this may pose significant 
hindrances and identifies three ways of combining approaches, alongside noting their 
potential limitations:  
x Synthesis and super-synthesis: the production oI D VLQJOH WKHRU\ ¶EDVHG RQ
WKHLQVLJKWVRIPXOWLSOHWKHRULHV·S'HVSLWHRIIHULQJWKHSRVVLELOLW\IRUPRUH
SRZHUIXO H[SODQDWLRQV WKLV DSSURDFK LV OLPLWHG E\ WKH IDFW WKDW ¶WKHRULHV DQG
FRQFHSWV >«@ GUDZ RQ GLIIHUHQW LQWHOOHFWXDO WUDGLWLRQV DQG JLYH different 
PHDQLQJVWRWKHVDPHWHUPV·S 
x Complementary: the production of a range of explanations using a range of 
theories. This approach would be the most advantageous because it allows for 
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the use of models in full rather than the cherry-picking of elements that better 
suit the particular case, as is most likely to happen with a synthetic approach. 
However, the possibility of a complementary application is severely limited by 
the available resources of individual researchers. Most approaches have to make 
FRPSURPLVHV EHWZHHQ ¶WKHRUHWLFDO FRYHUDJH DQG HPSLULFDO GHSWK SURGXFLQJ
PXOWLSOH´OHQVHVµEXWVLQJXODUUHVHDUFKGHVLJQV·S 
x Contradictory: the comparison of different theories to select one with the most 
explanatory potential. This approach potentially offers the same advantages as 
the complementary approach, yet is less resource-intensive as it does not require 
GHYRWLQJ ¶FRQVLGHUDEOH UHVRXUFHV WR WKH UHVHDUFKPHWKRGVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKHDFK
WKHRU\·+RZHYHU LW ¶GRHVQRWSURYLGH DXQLYHUVDOO\ accepted way to combine 
WKHLUPHULWV·S 
Cairney (2013: 17) concludes it is possible to resolve the limitations of each of the 
DERYHE\FUHDWLQJFRPSHWLQJQDUUDWLYHVRISROLF\FKDQJHZKLFK¶PD\EHXVHGWRVXSSRUW
FRPSHWLQJ WKHRULHV· +LV DUJXPHQW Uests on the assumption that multiple lenses have 
further explanatory potential if combined with competing narratives. If a dominant 
narrative of change is selected, this needs to be justified satisfactorily. A synthetic 
approach must seek some epistemological and conceptual common ground in order to 
function in a non-contradictory manner. It is possible to pursue a multiple lenses 
approach which engages in some level of synthesis providing that the researcher is both 
transparent and reflexive in their practice.  
In CaiUQH\·VDQGRWKHUVDQDO\VLV:HLEOHHWDOWKHPDMRULW\RIVWXGLHV in the field 
make use of a synthetic approach. This is significant and it suggests that, despite its 
potential shortcomings, synthesis is central to theory generation. Without synthesis, 
studies would merely replicate and test existing theories and notions, rather than 
generating new ideas, concepts and frameworks that are both creative and responsive to 
the features of individual cases. As such, it can be concluded that the purpose of 
synthesis, contrary to complementary and contradictory approaches, is not simply to 
test existing theories, but to make new theories.  
3.4 Multiple lenses and Ideas 
I now turn to the work of Beland (2005) and Smith (2013) to acknowledge the 
significant insights which a focus on ideas has brought to policy analysis. Both these 
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works concentrate on the contributions that an explicit focus on ideas may bring, whilst 
DOVR UHSUHVHQWLQJ LQVWDQFHV RI XVLQJ PXOWLSOH OHQVHV %HODQG·V ZRUN H[HPSOLILHV WKH
borrowing of concepts from the variety of frameworks that offer theoretical tools to 
understand the policy process. He uses the notion of paradigms, yet his contentions go 
IXUWKHUWKDQ+DOO·VLQSODFLQJHPSKDVLVRQWKHSUDJPDWLFQDWXUHRIDSDUDGLJPDVZHOO as 
the existence of sectoral paradigms alongside generic ones.  
¶)DU IURP EHLQJ SXUHO\ FRJQLWLYH SDUDGLJPV DUH LQKHUHQWO\ QRUPDWLYH DQG
programmatic: they help policymakers decide how to reform existing programmes, 
RU WR FUHDWH QHZ RQHV ,I ´JHQHUDO SDUDGLJPVµ FRQFHUQLQJ JHQGHU UROHV RU
HFRQRPLFUHJXODWLRQLPSDFWRQSROLWLFDOGHFLVLRQVDFURVVSROLF\DUHDV´VHFWRUDO
SDUDGLJPVµEHORQJWRDVSHFLILFSROLF\DUHD·2005: 7) 
Beland stresses the role of political and institutional structures in reinforcing the 
boundaries of a given paradigm: 
¶3ROLF\ LGHDV DQG SROLWLFDO LQVWLWXWLRQV LQWHUDFW ZLWKLQ DQG RXWVLGH RI VWDWH
boundaries, and paradigms are institutionalised through policy implementation 
and formal social learning processes like commissions and expert panels. At a 
GHHSHUOHYHODFRXQWU\·VSROLWLFDOLQVWLWXWLRQVIRUH[DPSOHWKHOHYHORIWHUULWRULDO
decentralization) can also shape the way policy-makers construct, perceive and 
select debateGSROLF\DOWHUQDWLYHV·2005: 8) 
Not only does he give credit to political and institutional structures, he also notes the 
significance of international networks and coalitions which either reinforce or challenge 
given nation-bound paradigms, because  
¶SROLF\QHWZRUNVWUDQVFHQGQDWLRQDOERXQGDULHVZKLFKDOORZVSHFLILFalternatives 
and paradigms to spread at the international level. In order to understand the 
policy stream better, scholars should then take into account the international 
circulDWLRQRISROLF\LGHDV·2005: 9).  
+HUHKHXVHV.LQJGRQ·VFRQFHSWRIVWUHDPVand places it alongside existing literature 
on policy networks, policy transfer and multi-level governance (Dolowitz and Marsh, 
1996; 2000; Rhodes, 1997; Bache and Flinders, 2004). Another aspect that is further 
emphasised by Beland is that policy frames are distinct from ideas (2005: 11). Beland 
argues that the importance of framing for the purposes of communication and 
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legitimation should not be underestimated. This is reminiscent of Baumgartner and 
Jones, and different from Hajer, because founded upon an interest-based and 
instrumental type of framing. Framing, according to Beland, remains underdeveloped in 
ERWKWKH$&)DQG+DOO·VSDUDGLJPPRGHOV 
¶3ROLF\-makers can also frame policy alternatives in a manner that hides their 
actual departure from a well-accepted paradigm. Scholars have shown that 
´WKLUG-RUGHU FKDQJHµ FDQ RFFXU LI D SDUDGLJP VKLIW WDNHV SODFH >«@ LI WKH
accumulation of incremental reforms slowly alters the institutional logic of 
H[LVWLQJSROLFLHV>«@DQGRULISRZHU-holders are successful in constructing the 
need to reform that would legitimize path deparWLQJUHIRUPV·2005: 11-14) 
Yet ultimately, third order or profound change needs to be supported by a set of values 
and beliefs consonant with the direction of change. Beland calls for more comparative 
research as a way to validate the importance of ideas across boundaries: 
¶&RQVLGHULQJVLJQLILFDQWLGHDWLRQDODQGLQVWLWXWLRQDOYDULDWLRQVIURPRQHFRXQWU\
to another, comparative analysis is especially useful to showing how and when 
ideas mattHULQSROLWLFV·2005: 15) 
This focus on the interaction between ideas, interests and institutions appears necessary 
in order to understand the policy process.  
6PLWK·V ZRUN RQ WKH ¶LQWHUSOD\ RI LGHDV·  LV DQRWKHU H[DPSOH RI VXFFHVVIXO
integration of existing theoretical tools from a variety of approaches which emphasises 
the role of ideas. It provides a rich and nuanced typology of ideas in relation to 
research. It  
¶GUDZV DWWHQWLRQ WR WKH IDFW SROLF\ LQIRUPV UHVHDUFK DV ZHOO DV WKH RWKHU ZD\
around, and to the fact that both research and policy tend to be shaped by 
broad, overarching ideas that may, in some contexts, be taken for granted 
GLVFRXUVHVIUDPHVSDUDGLJPVRU>«@¶LQVWLWXWLRQDOLVHGLGHDV··2013: 213).  
She compares two case studies in the UK: health inequalities (where significant policy 
change has been unsuccessful thus far) and tobacco policy (often considered a public 
health success).  
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Smith argues that existing definitions of ideas are vague at best. She puts forward a 
three-tiered categorisation of ideas to advance some theoretical clarity: 




DQG 0XOOHU·V QRWLRQ RI ¶WKH UHIHUHQWLDO·· 6PLWK   6KH makes two important 
points: firstly, that at this level there is interplay between ideas, values and causal beliefs. 
Secondly, that this way of conceptualising ideas is akin to both the notion of paradigm 
and that of the referential, as noted by Surel (2000).  
2. ¶SROLF\ IUDPHV· ZKLFK ¶SOD\ D FUXFLDO UROH LQ VKDSLQJ SROLF\ SURFHVVHV DQG
RXWFRPHV·7KHVHDUHVHHQDVVLPLODUWR:HLVV·¶ZHDSRQVRIDGYRFDF\·
(Smith, 2013: 73).  
These types of ideas appear more purposive and instrumental in character, and indeed 
influenced by ideas of the first type.  
3. 3UDJPDWLFLGHDVDV¶VSHFLILFSROLF\LQLWLDWLYHVRUVROXWLRQVZKich range from 
ideas for incremental ways to improve existing policies to ideas involving a 
FRPSOHWHO\QHZDSSURDFKWRDSDUWLFXODUSROLF\LVVXH·ibid) 
This reflects both the ACF three tier divisions (core beliefs; policy core; secondary 
aspects) and Hall·V GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ SDUDGLJP DQG LQVWUXPHQW WRJHWKHU ZLWK WKH
GLUHFW DGRSWLRQ RI IUDPHV ,Q 6PLWK·V YLHZ WKHQ ¶SDUWLFXODU SROLF\ VROXWLRQV DUH
HPEHGGHGZLWKLQSDUWLFXODUSROLF\SDUDGLJPVDQGDUHDOVRIUDPHGE\WKHSROLF\DFWRUV·
(2013: 73). 
She then proposes a four-genre typology of ideas, (institutionalised; chameleonic; 
charismatic; critical) explaining that  
¶Research-informed ideas within public health are often able to move into policy 
either because they already fit within the boundaries of institutionalised ideas 
>«@or because they have chameleonic qualities which facilitate their translation 
in ways which limit the challenge they pose for institutiRQDOLVHG LGHDV· 2013: 
214). 
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,GHDVZLWK¶FKDULVPDWLF·TXDOLWLHVDGYDQFHQHZZD\VRIWKLQNLQJDERXW LVVXHVWKH\¶RIIHU
alternative future scenarios, have the potential to significantly change policy responses 
to a particular issue (at least when combined with public heDOWKDGYRFDF\·2013: 214). 
The recycling of ideas, the re-ordering of importance of ideas is a natural process in 
policy ideation within a cognitive/normative frame perspective (Surel, 2000). 
6PLWK SRVLWV D EULGJLQJ UROH IRU LGHDV LQ WKDW LGHDV DUH DEOH WR EDODQFH ERWK DFWRUV·
material interests and beliefs. She argues that actors are fundamentally knowledge 
deficient in that they often do not necessarily know which options are better suited to 
their interests or objectives and therefore struggle to make a rational choice. Hence,  
¶DQ DQDO\WLFDO IUDPHZRUNSULRULWLVLQJ WKH UROHRI LGHDVXsefully replaces a focus 
on actual material interests with a focus on exploring what actors believe to be in 
their intereVWVDQGZK\·2013: 71) 
She also argues that a focus on ideas does not exclude theoretical eclecticism, because it 
is not in itself incompatible with other approaches, and as such it lends itself to an 
institutionalist focus, because ideational and institutionalist approaches do not need be 
mutually exclusive (and discursive institutionalism proves this point).  
Her central tenet is that, rather than a focus on evidence-based policy, which is an ideal-
type that is neither realistic nor necessarily desirable, one should concentrate on the 
analysis of the way research based ideas might travel into policy and thus debate the 
prevalence, or absence, of research-informed ideas in policy. This is because evidence 
can help form an idea, but it is not its exclusive content. In fact, ¶UHVHDUFKHUVDUHRIWHQ
viewed by policy-makers as one of several sources of ideas, not necessaril\RIHYLGHQFH·
(2013: 108). The relationship between evidence and ideas is better explained through 
interplay, because:  
¶HYLGHQFHFDQSOD\DQLPSRUWDQWUROHLQKHOSLQJSROLF\PDNHUVWR¶VHOO·SDUWLFXODU
LGHDVWRRWKHUV·DQG¶HYLGHQFHFDQDOVRLQIRUPWKHHPHUJHQFHRIQHZLGeas while 
ideas, in turn, inform how actors perceive and inteUSUHWHYLGHQFH·2013: 109).  
Ideational accounts discussed so far grant significant weight to the role of ideas, and 
observe the process by which certain ideas become dominant. As Hall reminds us, 
¶HYHQZKHUHWKHleitmotiv of policy is simply an overarching metaphor, such as the 
´ZDURQGUXJVµ>«@WKHPHWDSKRUDQG LWVDWWHQGDQWHODERUDWLRQVFDQVWUXFWXUH
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many aspects of what is to be done. Policy-making in virtually all fields takes 
place within the context of a particular set of ideas that recognise some social 
interests as more legitimate than others and privilege some lines of policy over 
RWKHUV·+DOO 
In order to move forward theoretically, the interplay between ideas, values and affect 
needs to be further developed. 
3.5 A synthesis for analysis using Normative and Cognitive Frames 
,Q KLV UHYLHZ FRPSDULQJ +DOO·V FRQFHSW RI SROLF\ SDUDGLJP ZLWK 6DEDWLHU·V $GYRFDF\
Coalition Framework, Surel (2000) argues that these approaches primarily emphasise  
¶WKH LQIOXHQFH RI LGHDV JHQHUDO SUHFHSWV DQG UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV RYHU DQG DERYH
VRFLDO HYROXWLRQ DQG VWDWH DFWLRQ >«@ EDVHG RQ WKH EHOLHI WKDW FRJQLWLYH DQG
normative elements play an important role in how actors understand and 
H[SODLQWKHZRUOG·(2000: 495).  
These approaches share ¶UHFRJQLWLRQ RI WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI YDOXHV LGHDV DQG
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV LQ WKH VWXG\ RI SXEOLF SROLF\· LELG 6XUHO·V FRXSOLQJ RI +DOO·V SROLF\
paradigm with the ACF acknowledges that normative and cognitive frames establish 
ERXQGDULHV DQG PHDQLQJ LQ VXFK D ZD\ DV WR GHOLPLW ¶WKH VFRSH RI WKH QHFHVVDU\ DQG
potential instruments and the relative importance of eaFKRIWKHP·2000: 499). 
Table 3: Levels of depth in normative and cognitive frame theories  
(source: adapted from Surel, 2000) 









Forms of action Choice of instruments 
Algorithms 
Instruments Specifications of 
instruments 
Secondary aspects 
Surel groups policy paradigm and deep core beliefs under the catHJRU\ ¶PHWDSK\VLFDO
SULQFLSOHV·$GHHSFRUHLVGHILQHGE\6DEDWLHUDVDQ¶RQWRORJLFDODQGQRUPDWLYHEHOLHIV
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such as the relative valuation of individual freedom versus social equality, which 
operates across virtually all polLF\GRPDLQV·1993: 103). A deep core belief thus involves 
value judgement. It is interesting how a deep core belief contains within it a potential 
value conflict and resolution. Thus, it contains an ordering of values as part of a 
normative/deliberative practice. This is similar to a paradigm, which theoretically 
represents an entire world-view and its boundaries, and is informed by values. Deep 
core belief and paradigm seem to share some important commonalities.  
A dominant paradigm puts one value above another to make sense of the world, and 
some paradigms place more emphasis on certain values rather than others (e.g. social 
equality is stronger in Keynesianism, whereas individual freedom is stronger in neo-
liberal monetarism). A paradigm, although bounded, is by no means exclusive: the non-
H[FOXVLYLW\ RI D SDUDGLJP LV D FUXFLDO DVSHFW WR HQKDQFH LWV H[SODQDWRU\ SRZHU ¶WKH
SDUDGLJP>«@DFWVPRUHDVDERXQGHGVSDFH IRUFRnflict, between the subsystem and 
WKHJOREDO FRPPXQLW\ DV LQVLGH WKH VXEV\VWHP LWVHOI· 6XUHO$FFRUGLQJ WR
6XUHOZKHUHDV+DOO·VFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQ ¶UHVWVRQDKLHUDUFK\RIGHJUHHVRIDEVWUDFWLRQ·
(i.e. a more abstract paradigm and more concrete instrument), Sabatier makes a clear 
GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ GHHS FRUH DQG SROLF\ FRUH EDVHG RQ PDJQLWXGH ¶WKH GHHS FRUH
DIIHFWVWKHZKROHRIVRFLHW\>«@ZKHUHDVWKHSROLF\FRUHUHIHUVRQO\WRDVXEV\VWHPRI
pubOLFSROLF\·2000: 498). For Hall, differences in objectives (at the macro level) define 
the scope of policy prescription; thus, a paradigm ² to a great extent ² determines 
instruments. There are some problems with the sort of determinism existing in both 
models that Surel identifies. Normative and coJQLWLYH IUDPHV DUH D ¶VRXUFH RI
ERXQGDULHV·KRZHYHU WKHUH LVDULVNRIRYHUVWDWLQJDV\VWHP·V ¶LQWHUQDOFRKHUHQFH·DQG
¶KLHUDUFKLFDO RUGHULQJ· WR WKH SRLQW RI HPSKDVLVLQJ WKH ¶QRUPDWLYH HOHPHQWV· RYHU WKH
cognitive ones (2000: 500).  
Although Sabatier recognises power relations and agency, he does not make an explicit 
link between dominant deep core beliefs, power distribution, and the dominance of 
certain actors, given WKH IUDPHZRUN·V SOXUDOLVP +RZHYHU DV 6XUHO QRWHV 6DEDWLHU·V
position comes from an opposition to a rationalist view of power, where power is 
generally equated with interest; this results in emphasis of cognitive and normative 
frames over interests (2000: 501). Sabatier places interest below belief, at the level of 
instrument (or secondar\DVSHFWVEHFDXVH¶DFWRUVDOZD\VSHUFHLYHWKHZRUOGWKURXJKD
lens consisting of their pre-H[LVWLQJEHOLHIV·1998: 109). Surel argues that subordinating 
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interests to values might obscure some important questions, such as the way in which 
interest structures influence the production of normative and cognitive frames, and how 
resources asymmetry favours certain actors over others in surfacing as policy-brokers or 
mediators (2000: 501). Both Sabatier and Hall explain the process by which an:  
¶(QVHPEOH RI Jeneral principles and values defining the relations and the 
identities of actors, in particular through forms of thought which delimit, 
hierarchically rank and legitimate social distinctions, all the while setting 
priorities for action in a given community >«@WROHJLWLPDWHVRPHJURXSVUDWKHU
WKDQRWKHUV·6XUHO 
There are two main areas which remain under-theorised in both these approaches: the 
interplay of values and beliefs as distinct from ideas, and the effects of ideological, 
institutional political structures and existing power asymmetries in shaping policy core 
beliefs.  
3.5.1 Limitations of normative and cognitive frames 
6XUHO·V FRQWHQWLRQ LV WKDWQRUPDWLYH DQG FRJQLWLYH IUDPHVEHWWHU H[SODLQ H[WUDRUGLQDU\
changes in policy than opposing theories do, but notes that these changes are triggered 
E\ H[RJHQRXV IDFWRUV RU H[WHUQDO VKRFNV VXFK DV ¶WUDQVIRUPDWLRQV RI HFRQRPLF
FRQGLWLRQVDQGRUDVHULRXVFULVLVDIIHFWLQJWKHVXEV\VWHPXQGHUFRQVLGHUDWLRQ· 
503). According to Kubler (2001), who uses the advocacy coalition framework to 
explain change in Swiss drug policy, HIV was the necessary external shock which 
promoted a significant policy shift from prohibitionism to harm reduction approaches. 
The idea that external shocks are a necessary condition of policy change is shared by 
most commentators in the field (Kingdon, 2003; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; 
Baumgartner and Jones, 2009; Nohrstedt, 2005). However, there is lack of emphasis of 
potential multiple causal pathways, as well as the degree of impact of external shocks 
over other factors such as agents, institutional structures, evidence, and their interplay. 
The place of incremental change in cognitive and normative frame models also remains 
under-theorised. There is acceptance of incrementalism and slow change in the ACF 
because change in deep core beliefs is hard to achieve. Learning is possible, and change 
is possible at the deep core level, but extremely rare (Surel, 2000: 504-5). However, the 
manner in which change at the deep core level happens remains unclear. The 
articulation of what exactly counts as a deep core belief versus a policy core belief will 
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be dependent on the investigator, which entails individual qualitative assignment and 
categorisation, rather than standard set categories.  
In a review of applications of the ACF, Weible et al (2009) argue that most applications 
do not systematically test the complete framework, but rather borrow concepts and 
translate them for the purpose of the specific study. FoU H[DPSOH .XEOHU·V 
categorisation of deep core belief, policy core beliefs and secondary aspects was both 
case-specific and interpretive. He provides a breakdown of both the prohibitionist and 
the harm reduction positions according to their deep core, policy core and secondary 
aspects (2001: 630-1) noting that descriptions and features of these positions may vary 
GHSHQGLQJRQZKLFKDVSHFWVRQHHPSKDVLVHV,Q.XEOHU·VW\SRORJ\WKHGHHSFRUHEHOLHI
of harm reduction is founded on notions of individual autonomy and integrity over and 
above respect for social norms. However, this could be looked at from a different angle, 
whereby the deep core belief is founded on the principles of public health, and as such 
individual autonomy is side-lined in favour of minimising social and health risks 
associated with drugs, or at least the two core beliefs may be able to operate in tandem 
on issues on which they both agree, without explicitly revealing their underlying 
conflicts. 
6XUHO·V FRQWHQWLRQ LV WKDW DOWKRXJK WKHVH PRGHOV DUH XVHIXO WR Hxplain extraordinary 
change (2000: 506) there remain some key empirical questions to be addressed. The first 
of these concerns how cognitive and normative frames are to be identified. Surel posits 
that the identification and definition of macro frames is a difficult task, which entails the 
risk of misrepresentation and inaccuracy. The process of identification is down to the 
LQYHVWLJDWRU·V FDWHJRULVDWLRQ ZKLFK JLYHV ZD\ WR LQWHUSUHWLYH H[SODQDWLRQV WKDW DUH
difficult to test or replicate. In order to address this, Surel recommends the pursuit of 
FRPSDUDWLYH UHVHDUFK E\ DUJXLQJ WKDW ¶VSDWLDO WHPSRUDO DQG HYHQ LQWHUVHFWRUDO
FRPSDULVRQV·DUHQHHGHG to overcome limitations (2000: 506). Paradigms may not take 
hold in the same way across different countries or policy domains; they are culturally, 
geographically and politically specific. $¶SDUDGLJPFULVLV· whereby  
¶GRPLQDQWUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVQRORQJHUVXFFHHGLQLQWHUSUHWLQJWKHGHYHORSPHQWRI
a social field in a way that satisfies the actors concerned, and can therefore no 
ORQJHUVXFFHVVIXOO\VWUXFWXUHDQGOHJLWLPDWHWKHDFWLRQRIWKH6WDWH· 
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produces change (Muller and Surel, cited in Surel, 2000: 505). This can be likened to 
.XKQ·VQRWLRQRIDQRPDO\ZKLFKGHQRWHVWKHEHJLQQLQJRIDSDUDGLJPFULVLVZKHQWKH
paradigm no longer manages tensions, losing legitimacy. Here, Hall uses the example of 
failing Keynesian strategy of boosting demand, which came under pressure from 
growing unemployment and inflation, allowing the neo-liberal paradigm to gain a 
foothold by identifying the failure of Keynesian policy. But contrary to the structure of 
¶VFLHQWLILFUHYROXWLRQV·LQSROLF\-making: 
¶WKHVSUHDGRIQHZLGHDVSULQFLSOHVRIDFWLRQDQGIRUPVRIDFWLRQGRHVQRWFRPH
DERXW LQ D ¶UHYROXWLRQDU\· ZD\ IURP VFLHQWLILF GHYHORpment, but rather from a 
more or less radical re-evaluation of ways of legitimizing groups and social 
H[FKDQJHV·6XUHO 
Rather than developing through revolutionary discoveries, new paradigms emerge from 
the rearranging of pre-existing hierarchies of values, beliefs, and ideas. Variation 
GHSHQGVRQWZRPDLQIDFWRUV¶WKHH[WHQWDQGWKHQDWXUHRIWKHSUHYLRXVSDUDGLJP·DQG
¶WKH LQVWLWXWLRQDO FRQILJXUDWLRQV VSHFLILF WR HDFK FRXQWU\ ZKLFK DFW DV ILOWHUV WR WKH
GRPLQDQW SDUDGLJP· LELG 7KHVH FDn be addressed within this project given its 
comparative nature.  
A synthesis of the two approaches, making use of their insights and conceptual tools, is 
appropriate for this project. It appears that neither of these approaches provides 
sufficient reflection on the manner in which values and beliefs come together to 
support a given paradigm in a specific policy subsystem, how deep core beliefs can and 
do change, and how the role of affect contributes to support a given paradigm, which 
this thesis proposes to address. However, the tools afforded by these two approaches 
combined appear promising to address issues around the interaction of values and 
beliefs in the making of policy positions and outcomes. 
3.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have provided a brief overview of some of the principal theories and 
frameworks that explain change in the policy process, noting their main contributions 
DQG VKRUWFRPLQJV , KDYH GLVFXVVHG WKH XVHIXOQHVV RI D ¶PXOWLSOH OHQVHV· DSSURDFK
combining insights from different theories, and of synthesis in particular. This is 
important because in later chapters, I use tools and concepts derived from these 
WKHRULHV DQG +DOO·V DQG 6DEDWLHU·V LQ SDUWLFXODU WR DQDO\VH FDVH VWXGLHV ZHOFRPLQJ
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FRPPHQWDWRUV· FDOO WR DGRSW D FRPSDUDWLYH DSSURDch that is both cross country and 
cross sectoral. I discussed the overlaps of existing theories that further stress the role of 
normative and cognitive frames, and acknowledged their potential contributions as 
WRROV IRU DQDO\VLV , DFNQRZOHGJHG VFKRODUV· Fontributions in combining insights from 
existing theories and constructing nuanced accounts of the policy process, particularly 
focusing on the role of ideas. I contend that further analysis of the role of values, 
together with disambiguation between values, beliefs, and ideas, is necessary in order to 
move forward.  
'HVSLWH PDQ\ FRPPHQWDWRUV· HIIRUWV DW FRQFHSWXDO GLVDPELJXDWLRQ WKH FODULW\ RI
distinction between metaphors, narratives, discourse, ideas, frames, values, core beliefs 
and paradigms remains fuzzy. After engaging in some necessary conceptual 
disambiguation, I will argue that ideas and interests become dominant in accordance 
with dominant sets of values and beliefs, which shift over time (Chapter 5). Ideas 
should be observed in terms of their interplay with values and beliefs; ideas and values 
have a symbiotic relationship to the extent that values need to be expressed through 
LGHDVDQGLQWHUQDOLVHGDQGLGHDVQHHGWREHFRQJUXHQWZLWKRQH·VYDOXHVDQGEHOLHIV,WLV
only with the inclusion of values and beliefs into existing frameworks and explanatory 
models that one can move past an overly rationalistic understanding of policy and 
consider instead the role of values and beliefs, which have an affective component 
(Williams, 1979), in shaping policy landscapes and achieve a better understanding of the 
evidence/policy process. 
A focus on values and beliefs may provide a fuller explanation of dominant policy ideas 
and challenging policy alternatives, how they come about, on what basis they are 
constructed, and how evidence comes into play. Ultimately, policy alternatives are 
unlikely to become dominant unless they are supported by underlying dominant values 
and beliefs, alongside existing structures and interests. In the following chapter, I will 
engage in further reflection on the epistemological basis supporting a synthetic 
approach to analysis, discussing the limits of positivism and the advantages of 
disciplined eclecticism alongside a focus on values by deconstructing the fact/value 
dichotomy through a critical approach. 
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Chapter 4  
ƉŝƐƚĞŵŽůŽŐǇ ?ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞĂŶĚǀĂůƵĞƐ 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter reflects on the epistemological issues which a discussion of evidence in 
policy inevitably requires. It begins by posing a problem: namely, that mainstream 
understandings of the use of evidence in policy are underpinned by a positivist 
epistemology despite the fact that positivism has been the subject of mounting critiques 
from competing epistemological positions (Potter, 2013; Bhaskar, 2014). A growing 
scholarly consensus appears to accept and embrace complexity in an attempt to move 
beyond analysis that is seen to be tied down by specific epistemological positions 
(Keating and Della Porta, 2010). By acknowledging the complex, multi-layered and 
messy nature of the social world as given, complexity is often utilised as a buzzword and 
a catch-all phrase (Byrne, 2011; Monaghan, 2011; Smith and Joyce, 2012). The term 
complexity is present in much of the literature on the relationship between evidence and 
policy and drug policy in particular (Stevens and Ritter, 2013; Tieberghien and Decorte, 
2013; Monaghan, 2011). Complexity approaches often combine multiple tools, models 
and theories generated by competing epistemological traditions (Geyer and Cairney, 
2015).  
In what follows, I propose a critical epistemology that combines insights from different 
thought-styles and traditions, primarily influenced by critical realism and critical theory. 
I discuss different traditions in order to tease out their similarities and differences, and 
outline their application in relevant literature. Critical realism, critical theory and science 
and technology studies (STS) put forward cogent critiques of positivism whilst 
developing theories, tools and methodologies specifically targeted at understanding 
knowledge, the process of its production and communication, starting from the premise 
that this very process is not separate and external to its social and cultural context. By 
targeting stiff dualistic notions such as subjectivism/objectivism, positivism/
hermeneutics, science/politics, reason/emotion, fact/value and so on, these critical 
epistemologies investigate what underpins these binaries and expose the limitations of 
polarised conceptions.  
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Existing accounts have recognised the importance of values but have failed to 
systematically investigate their role (Chapters 2 and 3). I argue that an analysis of values 
² and the beliefs which constitute and reinforce them through action ² may enrich 
existing ideational, institutionalist, cultural relativist, critical Marxist and argumentative 
approaches of the relationship between evidence and policy and of the policy process.  
4.2 The epistemology of evidence-based policy: current limitations and ways 
forward 
There are several reasons why positivism is particularly prevalent in approaches to 
evidence and policy. The necessity to impose order and linearity onto an inherently 
complex and uncertain process is politically convenient for both scientists and policy-
makers. In this context, the credibility granted to certain scientific disciplines that are 
more naturally attuned to positivist logic becomes a useful political ally. Many, both in 
academia and in policy circles, equate evidence with scientific evidence, which often 
privileges the findings that originate in the type of research that follows the standards 
set by natural science. A linear model is implied by the very notion of evidence-based 
policy (Black; 2001). This linear thinking originates in the natural sciences and aims to 
pursue research that will feed directly into policy application (Weiss; 1979: 427). This 
approach only tolerates certain types of evidence and specific methods to assess its 
YDOLGLW\ ,W PRVWO\ H[FOXGHV DQ\ W\SH RI ´QDUUDWLYL]HGµ HYLGHQFH DQG VD\V OLWWOH RI WKH
contested nature of evidence both in science and within the policy-making arena and its 
underlying power structures. Its aim is to build an apparent consensus on the best 
evidence generating the best policy (Young et al; 2002: 220). The evidence-based policy 
rhetoric is supported by a certainty that science can resolve policy problems, if only it 
was applied according to the standards set by the evidence hierarchy (Chapter 2). 
¶,·YH VSHQW D ORW RI WLPH DUJXLQJ WKDW JRYHUQPHQW VKRXOG EH PRUH HYLGHQFH-
EDVHG>«@ZHVKRXOGGRUDQdomised trials to find out which policy intervention 
works best. We often have no idea whether the things we do in government 
DFWXDOO\ZRUNRUQRW>«@7KLVLVDGLVDVWHU·%HQ*ROGDFUH-XQHWK 
Byrne (2011), heavily influenced by a realist epistemology, has discussed the gap that 
exists between the gathering of evidence in a laboratory, an artificially closed 
experimental setting, as opposed to a complex social context. Byrne critiques the 
conventional ranking of evidence as set by the standard encouraged by government 
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departments and the Cochrane and Campbell collaborations for their endorsement of 
the evidence hierarchy (2011: 45). He argues that quasi-experiments and randomised 
controlled trials are inappropriate for investigating complex causation. By recognising 
FKDQJHVLQIRUPVRIPDQDJHPHQWRIWKHVWDWHGHVFULELQJWKHPDV¶SRVW-GHPRFUDWLF·DQG
¶SRVW-LGHRORJLFDO·%\UQHDFNQRZOHGJHVWKHVKLIWWRDQHZPDQDJHULDOLVWVWDWH
RQHWKDWLV¶PHGLDWHGWKURXJKV\VWHPVDQGLQVWLWXWLRQVRIWHchnical expertise ² in which 
policy rooted in evidence is central to its strategic practices, and thus to political 
GLVFRXUVH·0D\FLWHGLQ%\UQH7KHmain problem identified by Byrne is that 
WKH¶RQWRORJLFDOIDOODF\XQGHUSLQQLQJWKHSULYLOHJLQg of randomised controlled trials has 
penetrated into the mindset of those who control the funding and resource base for the 
evaluation of comple[ VRFLDO LQWHUYHQWLRQV· 2011: 49). This means that, given their 
purported authoritativeness and validity, RCTs dominate the imagery of evidence-based 
policy as the best method to get to proper policy evaluation. Byrne outlines the 
difference between the probabilistic (positivist) and the relational (realist) approach in 
terms of identifying causality by arguing that:  
¶FRQYHQWLRQDO OLQHDU VWDWLVWLFDO WHFKQLTXHV DUH YHU\ SRRU DW LOOXVWUDWLQJ WKH
character and significance of interaction, which in any event should be 
understood not in terms of reified variables but rather as representing real 
complex causation in comSOH[V\VWHPV·2011: 47).  
What we should keep in mind when approaching epistemological discussions is the 
difference between positive normativity, equating natural and social science in theory 
and method, and critical normativity, which is endowed with a reflexive component that 
allows it to extract the social as a unique and complex field of analysis. Byrne asks two 
LPSRUWDQWTXHVWLRQV¶LQDFRPSOH[VRFLDOZRUOGVKRXOGZHDFFRUGDQ\VRUWRISULYLOHJH
to knowledge generated by procedures which require that world to be intrinsically 
VLPSOH"·$QG¶LVNQRZOHGJHHYHUGLVLQWHUHVWHGDQGVHSDUDWHERWKIURPWKHVRFLDOFRQWH[W
and understandings of those who produce it and the social contexts of those who 
would use ² or ignore ² LW"·   7KH ODWWHU LPSOLHV that knowledge cannot be 
value-free, to the extent that it remains intrinsically embedded in its social and cultural 
context. In realist epistemology, it is the relational aspect which should be the object of 
social scientific inquiry. Thus, it is the emergent relationship between action and 
context, groups and individuals, policy-makers and evidence production, which should 
be the object of social scientific scrutiny.  
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4.3 Critical realism: beyond positivism 
Given the determining role of positivism in sustaining the EBP discourse, it is relevant 
to discuss and critically assess it through the lenses of theories which point to some of 
its limitations. A critical realist assessment of positivism through the writings of Archer, 
Bhaskar and Outhwaite, is supplemented by consideration of the role of science in 
policy. Critical realism is a philosophy of science borne out of a necessity to assess the 
limitations of positivism, and to a lesser extent, hermeneutic methodology. Critical 
realists are partly concerned with evaluating the role of science, in an attempt to move 
DZD\IURPFHUWDLQGLFKRWRPLHVZKLFKOLPLWVRFLDOVFLHQFHV·H[SODQDWRry and exploratory 
potential. Critical realism draws a clear line of development from positivism to 
hermeneutics and identifies their limitations, finding both the former's universality and 
the latter's quasi-absolute relativism as ontologically misconceived and ultimately rife 
with dualisms which limit their scope for formulating useful theories and models for 
social science (Archer et al, 1998). Whilst for positivists there is no difference between 
open and closed systems, and thus experiments in closed systems will hold in open 
systems, for critical realists this is not the case. They identify positivism's epistemic 
fallacy in its faLOXUHWRDFNQRZOHGJHWKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQUHDORU¶GHHS·RQWRORJ\DQG
surface empiricism (Archer et al, 1998: xiii). Critical realism claims to have found 
reconciliation between 'ontological realism, epistemological relativism and judgemental 
rationality' (Archer et al, 1998: xi). This is because it claims that, in identifying generative 
mechanisms (section 4.3.1), one is able to generate causal explanations despite open-
systems' susceptibility to change.  
$UFKHU VWDWHV WKDW ¶FULWLFDO UHDOLVP DFFHSWV WKH challenge of ontological difference 
EHWZHHQ SK\VLFDO DQG VRFLDO UHDOLW\· DQG WKHUHIRUH ¶LW LV not advocating the unity of 
method if WKLVLVWDNHQWREHV\QRQ\PRXVZLWKD¶XQLW\RIPHWKRGRORJ\·LQWKH positivist 
WUDGLWLRQ· 1998: 190). This means that critical realism rejects the application of the 
scientific method to the social world, because it recognizes that a social context is 
fundamentally different from a physical setting. But in what way is it different? 
Outhwaite posits the following differences:  
x ¶VRFLDO VWUXFWXUHV XQOLNH QDWXUDO VWUXFWXUHV GR QRW H[LVW LQGHSHQGHQWO\ RI WKH
DFWLYLWLHVWKH\JRYHUQ· 
x ¶VRFLDO VWUXFWXUHV XQOLNH QDWXUDO VWUXFWXUHV GR QRW H[LVW LQGHSHQGHQWO\ RI WKH
DJHQWV·FRQFHSWLRQVRIZKDWWKH\DUHGRLQJLQWKHLUDFWLYLW\· 
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x ¶VRFLDO VWUXFWXUHV XQOLNH QDWXUDO VWUXFWXUHV PD\ EH RQO\ UHODWLYHO\ HQGXULQJ·
(Outhwaite, 1998: 289). 
These statements recognise defining features of social structures, namely interdependence, 
consciousness and a higher degree of mutability, which may allow us to move beyond a 
positivist epistemology.  
Critical realism proposes 'a qualified, critical and non-reductionist naturalism, based upon 
a transcendental realist account of science and, as such, necessarily respecting the 
specificity and emergent properties of the social realm' (Archer et al, 1998: xiv, emphasis 
added). In recognizing the complexity which the social adds to a system which is to be 
investigated, critical realism allows for its own limitations in that it 'can allow that 
conceptuality is distinctive, without supposing that it is exhaustive of social life' (Archer 
et al, 1998: xv). In so doing, it justifies and extends the role of theories and models for 
explanation in social science without claiming that these are exhaustive or all 
encompassing, or that they can fully account for the complexity of open systems. 
Critical realism recognises that any modelling and experimentation is always necessarily 
simpler than reality. However, it remains essential to advance causal explanations 
(Archer et al, 1998: xi). It is through experimentation, modelling and other means and 
devices that reality can be appraised, keeping in mind the principles of transfactuality, 
which entails that laws of nature exist beyond systems and models, intransitivity, which 
entails that 'the domain of the real is distinct from and greater than the domain of the 
empirical', and stratification, which entails the multiplicity, the plurality, of nature as of 
science, of which recognition is paramount (Archer et al, 1998: xii, xiii).  
A realist approach invites the construction and use of 'mid-range theory' (Pawson, 2002: 
349) as advocated by Merton in 1949. The idea of middle-range theory is both useful 
and desirable at the practical level, to strike a balance between 'working hypotheses' and 
'unified theory' (Merton, cited in Pawson, 2002). This entails a framework that, although 
guided by underlying assumptions, is also open to contestation and change through 
what evidence may be generated by the empirical findings. The realist approach 
encourages a research design that is methodologically balanced between theoretical 
assumptions and the testing and re-testing of these without closing off further 
theoretical development. It is a form of intellectual pragmatism, which allows to 'move 
beyond the territory of instrumental rationality' (Sanderson, 2009: 699). Being a 
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pragmatic theoretical approach, realism is not necessarily opposed to a certain level of 
methodological pragmatism, triangulation, and disciplined eclecticism.  
4.3.1 Generative Mechanisms and the limits of reviews as solutions to policy 
problems 
Pawson's (2002) discussion about methods of evaluation and his original 
methodological framework ² realist synthesis ² can help bridge the gap between an 
abstract discussion of critical realist principles and their practical application in the 
context of evidence use in policy. Pawson applies the concept of generative mechanisms 
garnered from critical realism to an evidence-based policy context. For Pawson, there is 
a 'basic logic of the EBP process' which he investigates by assessing the standard 
methods in use: systematic reviews, meta-analyses and narrative reviews (2002: 341). 
Pawson posits that: 
x 'Meta-analysis performs calculations to reveal 'best buys' 
x 'Narrative review delivers text to understand 'exemplary cases' 
 (Pawson, 2002: 346) 
An EBP logic calls for an understanding of three elements: causation, or what type of 
programme works; ontology, how programmes work; generalization, or how this will 
translate onto other programmes (ibid). Pawson argues that mainstream approaches to 
reviews tend to miss the point because they focus exclusively on one individual 
programme, and not on the communal generative mechanisms of programmes which 
share the same underlying logic. Pawson argues that 'it is not 'programmes' that work: 
rather it is the underlying reasons or resources that they offer subjects that generate 
change' (2002: 342). For instance, instead of concentrating on systematically evaluating 
'payment by result' as a single policy programme, he shifts the focus on the idea of 
incentives in general and sets out to evaluate different policy programmes that make use 
of this technique (2002: 342). The assumption here 'is that the same programme 
theories repeat themselves from initiative to initiative and jump from domain to 
domain' (2002: 357).  
In Boaz and Pawson's work on 'mentoring' programmes in policy, 'counselling', 
'coaching', and 'peer education' are all identified as 'cousins' of mentoring (2005: 176). 
By undertaking the task of reviewing reviews in this field, they come to an important set 
of conclusions. They argue that 'reviews are non-definitive' and not necessarily fit to 
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provide answers to policy questions. Furthermore, the choice of a reviewing method 
should not be founded on an evidence hierarchy, but more accurately, on the types of 
questions asked and the types of problems investigated (Boaz and Pawson, 2005: 177). 
Their conclusion is that reviews should be grouped in portfolios to further explore 
questions, rather than be relied upon to provide incontestable answers (2005: 192). This 
demonstrates a commitment to reviews as a tool for exploration and explanation, rather 
than a more misguided quest for certitude and a search for quick resolutions to policy 
problems distinguishable in positivistic interpretations of EBP.  
Wong et al (2012) extend the realist critique of reviews to other methods that currently 
rest on top of the evidence hierarchy, including RCTs. They find that realist evaluations 
and realist reviews are useful to address the relationship between context and 
mechanisms which shape a particular outcome (C-M-2 E\ DVNLQJ ¶ZKDW ZRUNV IRU
ZKRPLQZKDWFLUFXPVWDQFHVDQGZK\"·7KLs does not entirely depart from 
EBP logic; it implies a normative commitment to making it better. However, it does 
depart from a positivist notion of unity of method, and from a strict hierarchical notion 
of evidence. Wong et al argue that a realist approach can aid in tackling some of the 
theoretical and practical shortcomings of positivist methods via a different set of 
epistemological assumptions and through less narrow and less resource intensive 
evaluations. Thus, it allows for a more horizontal and context-dependent notion of 
what these may be.  
4.3.2 Experimentation and Intellectual Pragmatism 
Ian Sanderson's position applies principles derived from pragmatism to develop a 
normative position on the use of evidence in policy. His ideas are discussed in order to 
demonstrate that disciplined eclecticism, combining insights from different theories and 
epistemological positions in regards to evidence-based policy, is feasible. It is noted that 
his normative position and his strong commitment to the idea of evidence-based policy 
is a limitation to his critique. Sanderson posits that:  
¶policy-making involves much more than reference to evidence of 'what works'; 
the process of formulating and delivering policy takes place in a political context 
and is subject to many legitimate influences from a range of stakeholders and 
interests· (2009: 699).  
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A self-endowed realist pragmatist, Sanderson argues that we must resolve the apparent 
dichotomy between instrumental rationality and social complexity (2009: 700). Taking 
up the development of knowledge of 'complex adaptive systems', Sanderson stresses the 
centrality of the principle of experimentation. He uses Dewey's ideas to argue for the need 
of 'philosophy to engage in practical affairs' (2009: 700).  
According to Sanderson, instrumental rationality is embedded in the technocratic 
discourse of government agencies, such as the National Audit Office. For the latter, the 
resolution of complex policy problems is 'to apply more powerful tools and draw upon 
more specialist knowledge to enhance capacity to design and implement successful 
policies' (cited in Sanderson, 2009: 701). Sanderson's normative emphasis is placed on 
experimentation and evaluation. He finds an intellectual basis to support this in 
philosophical pragmatism; 'the key proposition of pragmatism is that the 'validity' of a 
belief or concept is defined in terms of its practical consequences' (2009: 708). The 
focus on experimentation demonstrates Sanderson's normative position and 
commitment to an ideal-type EBP, one which strives for constant reflection and 
improvement on the basis of 'trial and error', but also one that acknowledges the 
important exchange between theory and practice. For Sanderson, 'policy making is not a 
'technical' exercise in instrumental rationality but rather a domain of 'practical reason' 
(2009: 711). Here, Sanderson is relying on a Habermasian/Deweyan notion. There are 
apparent similarities between Dewey's pragmatism and Habermas' approach. In order to 
defend his theory from relativism, while at the same time taking an anti-foundationalist 
stance, Dewey, similarly to Habermas (Bernstein, 2010), advocated use of the term 
'warranted assertability' instead of 'truth', and argued that we are warranted in asserting 
the validity of knowledge on the basis of principles, rules and procedures of inquiry that 
produce successful experimentation, i.e. knowledge that informs successful problem 
solving' (2009: 709).  
The dialogue and influence between pragmatism, critical realism and critical theory is 
evident. Realism, pragmatism and critical theory share certain important assumptions 
about the nature of theory in relation to social research, but most importantly, they 
share some epistemological and ontological foundations. However, whereas for 
Habermas warranted assertability should be applied to discursive argumentation, in 
pragmatism and realism warranted assertability is about verifiable proof (Braaten, 1991: 
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23). Sanderson (2009) successfully brings together the normative dimensions of 
pragmatism and critical theory against positivist instrumental rationality.  
4.4 Critical theory: Knowledge, interest, ideology  
Realism alone is not sufficient to offer reflection on the social, political and cultural 
environments in which these debates come to life, because realism is a philosophy 
primarily concerned with that which is internal to science, rather than what is external 
to it. The principle of disciplined eclecticism (Geelan, 2001) allows for the combination 
of insights originating in different theoretical and methodological approaches. This is in 
line with accounts that stress complexity and combine multiple theories discussed in 
&KDSWHU 7KUHH $ GLVFXVVLRQ RI +DEHUPDV· FRQWULEXWLRQ LV XVHIXO LQ RUGHU WR
contextualise the realist/positivist epistemological debate within a political context that 
sustains itself through the formal exercise of power (expressed through law) and 
ideology (legitimating world views).  
+DEHUPDV·VFRUHQRUPDWLYHSUHFHSWLVWKHQHHGIRUUHDVRQHGGHEDWH)RU+DEHUPDVLQ
an ideal situation, any political debate, including policy-PDNLQJVKRXOGEH¶DSULYLOHJHG
forum RIUDWLRQDOFULWLFDOGHEDWH·7KRPSVRQ,Q+DEHUPDV·YLHZUDWLRQDO
communication as a criterion to establish truth, and a strong rationale to judge the 
YDOLGLW\RIWUXWKFODLPV LVDQHFHVVDU\IHDWXUHRIVXFFHVVIXOGHPRFUDFLHVZLWK ¶GLDORJXH 
DQGGLVFRXUVH·DVSULQFLSDOLQVWUXPHQWVWRDFKLHYHXQGHUVWDQGLQJ0F&DUWK\
+DEHUPDV· SHUVSHFWLYH LV XVHIXO EHFDXVH ZKLOVW HVSRXVLQJ D FULWLFDO HSLVWHPRORJ\ LW
advances a necessary focus on the processes of communication, legitimation and 
justification which characterise democratic politics and policy-making. According to 
McCarthy,  
¶+DEHUPDV·VGLVFRXUVH WKHRU\RIYDOLGLW\ LVQRWPHDQW WRGHILQHHLWKHU WUXWKRU
PRUDOULJKWQHVVEXWWRRIIHUDQDFFRXQWRIZKDWLV LQYROYHGLQ´UHGHHPLQJµRU
justifying truth and rightness claims [...] it attempts to elucidate the pragmatic 
presuppositions of the critical-reflective discourses in which such claims are 
GHEDWHG· 
This has some important implications in terms of the construction of evidence as an 
argumentative and communicative process (Dunn, 1982; Majone, 1989).  
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,QKLVHDUO\ZRUNRQWKHSXEOLFVSKHUH+DEHUPDVVHHVWKHSXEOLFDV¶GHSROLWLFL]HG·DQG
¶HIIHFWLYHO\ H[FOXGHG IURP SXEOLF GLVFXVVLRQ DQG GHFLVLRQ-PDNLQJ SURFHVVHV·
(Thompson; 1990: 113). Hence, he recognizes the systematic exclusion from public 
debate as a condition of the asymmetric distribution of power and resources in 
supposedly democratic polities. This is relevant in relation to which stakeholders, which 
disciplines, which institutions and which actors are considered credible and are given a 
voice in policy-making. This in turn presupposes awareness of the manner in which 
discourses are dominant and legitimised through ideology. It is through ideology that 
opposition can be kept latent. Habermas (1976: 19) describes how legitimating 
ideologies, in a Marxist sense, can control and integrate opposition: 
'within the framework of a legitimate order of authority, the opposition of 
interests can be kept latent and integrated for a certain time. This is the 
achievement of legitimating world-views or ideologies. They remove the 
counterfactual validity claims of normative structures from the sphere of public 
thematization and testing'.  
Habermas recognises 'the asymmetrical distribution of legitimate chances' (1976: 96). 
Using the concept of legitimacy and legitimation, he explains acceptance of systematic 
and structural exclusion and constraints. This process of legitimation applies in all 
spheres, including the scientific. Certain disciplines, and their preferred epistemologies, 
have more political currency and are less contestable.  
Habermas posits an ideal-W\SH ZKLFK KH ODEHOV ¶GLVFRXUVH WKHRU\ RI YDOLGLW\· WKDW KH
uses as a tool to understand under which conditions democratic communication might 
be achieved (1996: 298). Habermas notes that discourse, in the sense of speech, is an 
exercise of language, and therefore it relies on argument and rationality to get to truth. 
His formal analysis of language and speech leads him to conclude that 'when for all 
participants there is a symmetrical distribution of chances to select and employ speech 
acts', then the dialogue is free from structural constraints, and thus truly democratic 
(McCarthy, 1994: xvii). This 'ideal speech situation' is a direct evolution of Habermas' 
considerations on the public sphere. It is important to note that an ideal speech 
situation is not necessarily intended as an achievable goal, but more as an ideal-type as 
well as a tool for critique.  
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Focusing on communicative rationality, Habermas attempts to posit a theory of real 
democracy in opposition to liberal pluralism, alongside a normative theory of science 
EDVHG RQ VRPH ¶FHQWUDO WKHVHV WKH LQVHSDUDELOLW\ RI WUXWK DQG JRRGQHVV RI IDFWV DQG
values, of theory and practice' (McCarthy, 1994: xviii). Habermas proposes a dialogic 
conception of dualisms. According to Agger,  
¶+DEHUPDVRSSRVHVWKHSRVLWLYLVWGLFKRWRP\RINQRZOHGJHDQGLQWHUHVWDUJXLQJ
that the most valid science recognizes its own guiding in interest, hence 
controlling for the sullying effect of context on RQH·VVFLHQWLILFWH[W·1991: 119).  
This stance against value-freedom in science places Habermas against positivism. 
Although Habermas moves beyond the knowledge/interest, fact/value dualisms, he still 
maintains that rationality is the principal arbiter. Thus, the space for evaluating the role 
of values and their interaction with facts and interests is confined to reason and 
rationality, and does not include sufficient reflection on the role of beliefs and affect. 
4.4.1 Evidence, Communication and Argument 
0DMRQH·VZRUNEULQJV DWWHQWLRQ WR WKH FRQVWUXFWLRQRI HYLGHQFH DVSDUW DQGSDUFHORI
argumentation, and as such as a form of narrative. Majone's work is testament to the 
gap between purported instrumental rationality of evidence use in policy-making, and 
the actuality of this process. In Evidence, Argument and Persuasion (1989), he places 
significant emphasis on the process of communication of evidence, underlining its 
FRQWHQWLRXVQDWXUH7KLVZRUN WRJHWKHUZLWK'XQQ·V LVVLJQLILFDQWDVDVWDUWLQJSRLQW
prefiguring subsequent work that developed an argumentative model of policy decision-
making (Van der Knaap, 1995; Dickinson, 1998; Fisher and Forrester, 1993). Majone 
DUJXHV WKDW 
HYLGHQFH >«@ LV QRW WKH VDPH DV GDWD RU LQIRUPDWLRQ ,W LV UDWKHU
information selected from the available stock and introduced at a specific point in an 
DUJXPHQW´WRSHUVXDGHWKHPLQGWKDWDJLYHQIDFWXDOSURSRVLWLRQLVWUXHRUIDOVHµ
89: 
48). Like Dunn (1982) and Amann and Knorr Cetina (1988) Majone emphasises the 
communicative process over origin, purpose and outcome. He argues that  
'the acceptability of evidence depends on a number of features peculiar to a 
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Evidence, as opposed to data or fact, already comprises argument. It follows that 'the 
assessment of the strength and fit of the evidence is considerably more complicated 
than judgements about the validity and reliability of data' (1989: 48). Considering 
commonsensical notions about communication, Majone highlights one of its most basic 
´UXOHµ WZRSHRSOHPD\ZLWQHVV WKH same event, but their stories about that event will 
differ. Thus, 'policy actors will often give different accounts of some crucial event ² so 
different, in fact, that it is almost inconceivable that everyone was perceiving the same 
event' (1989: 49). Majone argues that all evidence has a narrative basis to the extent that 
LW LV UHODWLYH WRDFWRUV· XQGHUVWDQGLQJ DVZHOO DV WKHZD\ LQZKLFK LW LV FRPPXQLFDWHG
DFFHSWLQJ WKH SUHPLVH WKDW SROLF\ DFWRUV ZLOO UHFHLYH LQWHUSUHW DQG ´WHOOµ HYLGHQFH
differently.  
Majone attempts to address this by placing previously neglected communicative 
craftsmanship at the heart of the process of evidence use in policy. In his view, 
instrumental rationality and positivism are to blame for this neglect: 
¶This bias is related to the positivistic tradition in the philosophy of science. 
Being mainly concerned with the logical and epistemological problems of 
achieved knowledge, this school has paid very little attention to the actual 
processes of the production of scientific knowledge (1989: 50).· 
This goes back to the discussion about selection and presentation, and the process of 
transformation of data into evidence put forward in Chapter Two (Amann and Knorr 
Cetina, 19886WHYHQV7KHUHDUHWHFKQLTXHVXWLOL]HGWR´GUHVV-XSµ evidence when 
it is presented. One is 'using mathematical formalizations on every possible occasion', 
which entails complex and not necessarily intelligible language to dress up fairly simple 
notions (Majone, 1989: 64). This is often accompanied by the use of 'an overtly 
formalized style of presentation' which 'induces a tendency to accept statistical 
information or the results of mathematical calculations as facts rather than as evidence' 
(ibid). This brings us back to the implications of the dominance of the positivist 
paradigm, which leads to the general structuring of the language around evidence in the 
direction of linearity, clarity, simplification and certainty in order to construct more 
persuasive narratives (Stevens, 2011). There is a tendency to view certain evidence, 
especially one derived from the disciplines of mathematics, statistics and economics, as 
more accurate, more realistic, and generally more credible than that derived from other 
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GLVFLSOLQHV 7R XVH +DEHUPDV· ORJLF WKHVH GLVFLSOLQHV DUe ideologically legitimated as 
more certain, more scientific, more accurate than others.  
The approaches discussed so far share a critical dimension which allows them to 
address the shortcomings of positivism, and of dominant modes and conceptualisations 
of evidence use in policy. Yet, these approaches provide better critical assessment and 
reflection of that which is external to them, i.e. politics but not science, or a positivist 
epistemology but not a critical one. Moreover, these approaches share a strong 
normative position, which can limit the scope for critique. It becomes relevant to 
discuss work which specifically targets the relationship between knowledge(s) and 
culture(s) as mutually constitutive, making science itself the object of scrutiny. 
4.5 Knowledge cultures and epistemic cultures 
It was thH ´FXOWXUDO WXUQµ -DPHVRQ ) and post structuralism which prompted 
scientists to move from an external perspective on science which saw culture as 
surrounding it, to an internal observation of science itself which acknowledged interaction 
and mutuality, and saw cultures as being produced by it. Scholars began engaging in direct 
observation of the processes of knowledge formation in the sciences (i.e. Latour, 1987; 
Ziman, 1987; Jasanoff, 2004; Hackett et al,  VWUHVVLQJ WKDW WKHVH ¶SURFHVVHVZHUH
LQYDULDEO\ VRFLDO DQG V\PEROLF DV ZHOO DV WHFKQLFDO· .QRUU &HWLQD   6RFLDO
scientists thus began to combine philosophical insight and ethnographic methods to 
make science and the production of knowledge itself as objects of scientific inquiry. 
This provided the opportunity for critically assessing a conception of scientific 
knowledge as universally valid, endowing a conception of knowledge as intrinsically tied 
LQWR FXOWXUH 7KLV VWDQGV ¶LQ FRQWUDVW Wo philosophers of science, who reflected 
QRUPDWLYHO\ RQ VFLHQWLILF SURFHGXUH· .QRUU &HWLQD   7KXV DV LQ .XKQLDQ
logic:  
¶WUXWK DQG REMHFWLYLW\ >«@ ZHUH WKHPVHOYHV LQ QHHG RI HPSLULFDO LQYHVWLJDWLRQ
they became historically and culturally specLILF¶HIIHFWV·RIRQJRLQJSUDFWLFHVDQG
RIFULWHULDDQGEHOLHIV WKDWYDULHGEHWZHHQJURXSVDQGSHULRGV· .QRUU&HWLQD
2007: 363) 
Social scientists began to move beyond Kuhn by stressing the determinant role of 
cultures (plural), becoming increasingly aware of the range and diversity of contexts of 
knowledge production, alongside the distribution of resources and opportunities which 
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directly impacted upon sciences and research. In this way, Knorr Cetina (2007: 369), 
DUJXHVRQHPD\REVHUYH¶KRZFXOWXUDODQd political differences are reflected in the way 
UHVHDUFKLVVHWXSDQGFRQGXFWHG·ZKLFKHQWDLOVdifferences and asymmetries in the way 
sciences are organised, placed into hierarchies, supported and validated. 
Whereas knowledge appears as a unified conceptDQGDVVXFK¶NQRZOHGJHFXOWXUHV·VWLOO
LPSOLHV XQLW\ WKH WHUP ¶HSLVWHPLF FXOWXUHV· LV XVHIXO KHUH EHFDXVH LW LPSOLHV ERWK
GLYHUVLW\DQGUHODWLYLW\'HILQHGDV¶FXOWXUHVRIFUHDWLQJDQGwarranting NQRZOHGJH·.QRUU
Cetina, 2007: 363, emphasis added), the focus is placed on the creative aspect of 
knowledge production and the warranting aspect of knowledge claims. The idea of 
warranted assertability (aforementioned) is used in a normative fashion by pragmatism 
and critical theory, whereas here the focus is RQWKHSURFHVVRI¶ZDUUDQWLQJNQRZOHGJH·
itself, which entails knowledge justification, asserting the validity of knowledge by 
relying on externally, internally and ideologically validated cultural practices. If, 
following Knorr Cetina, we begin by assuminJ ¶HSLVWHPLF GLYHUVLW\· DV JLYHQ ZH FDQ
WKHQ DFFHSW WKDW WKH ZRUOG RI VFLHQFH LV IUDJPHQWHG DQG FKDUDFWHULVHG E\ ¶FXOWXUDO
GLYLVLRQV·ZKHUH ¶VSHFLDOLVWV >DUH@ VHSDUDWHGRII IURPRWKHU VSHFLDOLVWVE\ ORQJ WUDLQLQJ
periods, intense division of labour, distinctive technological tools, particular financing 
VRXUFHV· 2007: 364). This entails a different understanding of knowledge, one that 
observes process and practice over results and representations. Hence: 
¶WKH GLVWLQFWLRQ >«@ LV QRW VLPSO\ EHWZHHQ WKH NQRZledge processes and their 
UHIHUHQWLDOFXOWXUDOFRQWH[W>«@,WLVUDWKHUEHWZHHQWKHLQWHULRULVHGGHVFULSWLRQ
and conceptualisation of knowledge processes opened up through empirical 
inquiry (the epistemic cultures) and the description of society in knowledge 
WHUPV·.QRUU&HWLQD 
$FFRUGLQJ WR.QRUU&HWLQD ¶NQRZOHGJH WHUPV· DUHHPEHGGHG LQSUDFWLFHVDQGDOUHDG\
institutionalised, so institutions already practice by these terms. She cites the example of 
¶QDWLRQDOVFLHQFH-policy-PDNLQJERGLHV·ZKR¶FRQWH[WXDOLVHDFWXDONQRZOHGJHSURGXFWLRQ
E\EHLQJGLUHFWO\UHOHYDQWWRWKLVSURGXFWLRQ·H[HPSOLI\LQJ¶WKHNQRZOHGJHFXOWXre of a 
FRXQWU\·2007: 370). In this line of reading, evidence-based policy is a knowledge term 
that is institutionalised and epitomises a specific knowledge culture. Knowledge terms 
DUH OLQNHG ZLWK ¶PDFUR-HSLVWHPLFV· ZKLFK PHDQV WKDW LQVWLWXWLRQDO DUUDQJHPHQWV DUH
OLQNHG ZLWK EURDGHU NQRZOHGJH FXOWXUHV HPEHGGHG LQ ¶QDWLRQDO DQG LQWHUQDWLRQDO
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UHJXODWLRQV >«@ WKH PHGLD DQG WKHLU REVHrvation strategies and policies of validating 
HYLGHQFH·.QRUU&HWLQD 
This critique is useful in this context because it warns against a unitary view of 
knowledge and of science. Taken together, these critical epistemological approaches 
complement each other in advancing a discussion which is useful and necessary for the 
purpose of analysis, following the principle of disciplined eclecticism. However, these 
approaches do not provide sufficient tools to assess the formation, role and interplay of 
values internal to science (constitutive) and those external to it (contextual) outside a 
materialist, rationalist or normative fashion. The role of values has been identified as 
crucial in addressing the research question; but what constitutes values? How are values 
defined? How and why do people embrace certain values? How do people reconcile the 
values internal to science, or any other/competing system or activity, with those 
external to them? How does this affect understandings of evidence in policy-making? 
4.6 Values and Science in philosophy and critical realism 
The idea that science is both immune to, and separate from, politics, values, ideology 
and discourse has permeated much scientific literature; this is true of both drug policy 
and evidence-based policy literatures (Nutley et al, 2007; Monaghan, 2011). Some 
FRPPHQWDWRUVKDYHDFNQRZOHGJHGWKDWHYLGHQFHLV¶VXEMHFWWRLWVRZQGLVFRXUVH·5LWWHU
DQG /DQFDVWHU  RIWHQ SUHVHQWHG DV D GLVFRXUVH WKDW LV VHSDUDWH IURP VRFLHW\·V
politics, ideologies and values and located in the realm of science. Commentators have 
stressed the contested and politicised nature of evidence (i.e. Head, 2008; Monaghan; 
2011; Nutley et al, 2007; Stevens, 2007a; Naughton, 2005; Marston and Watts, 2003; 
Marmot, 2004; Packwood, 2002). However, their focus is usually on the way in which 
politics affects and taints evidence, and their view remains rather instrumental. No 
systematic attempt is made to turn the critical eye towards science itself outside of the 
STS tradition (i.e. Knorr Cetina, 1991; Latour, 1987; Hoppe, 1999; 2005; Gieryn, 1983). 
Yet even in STS literature on the relationship between evidence and policy, the impact 
of values and beliefs onto knowledge claims is not fully addressed. With some notable 
exceptions (Valentine, 2009; de Melo-Martín and Intemann, 2012) values are 
acknowledged, yet their source and impact is under-theorised.  
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¶6LPSO\ DVVXPLQJ WKDW VFLHQFH VKRXOG EH DXWRQRPRXV EHFDXVH WKDW LV WKH
supposed source of authority, generates many of the difficulties in 
understanding the relationship between science DQGVRFLHW\·'RXJODV 8).  
The view of science as autonomous is ideologically driven1, and it goes back to 
positivism and the value-free ideal that science was to aspire to (Douglas, 2011; 
Longino, 1990; Gieryn, 1983). This ideal was upheld by positivist philosophers of 
VFLHQFH IRVWHULQJ DQ ¶LGHDOLVHG LPDJH RI WKH LVRODWHG VFLHQWLILF FRPPXQLW\· 'RXJODV
2011: 65). This ideal is powerful because it allows scientists to see themselves as 
separate from the social and political world around them. Scientists can thus see 
WKHPVHOYHVDVH[WHUQDODJHQWV´RUGHULQJWKHFKDRVµ,QGHHGVFLHQWLVWVJHQHUDOO\ZLVKWR
be granted an active role in society (Weiss, 1991). The evidence-based policy discourse 
and movement, despite its critique, has generated increased optimism in this respect. It 
has also given scientists a more overt and prominent role in policy-making, which is 
FXUUHQWO\ UHLQIRUFHG E\ UHVHDUFK FRXQFLOV· IRFXV RQ LPSDFW2 Scientists have been 
adamant about retaining the separation between science and politics intact by relying on 
a purported objectivity.  
¶&onflating facts and values allows scientists to use their authority 
inappropriately³that is, to cloak their effort to make society live by their values 
as a disinterested, objective, and unassailable stance. This may lead the public to 
defer to scientists on the assumption that they know better, but in a democracy 
WKHUHFDQEHQRH[SHUWVRQYDOXH·+XPSKUH\VDQG3LRW 
This statement goes some way in criticising scientists for maintaining the fact/value 
dualism by promoting a positivist view of scientific objectivity. However, it still 
maintains that, in a democracy, values are entirely subjective. Although values are 
culturally relative, they have an objective foundation (Sayer, 2011). Several works from 
realist sociology (Sayer, 2011), to moral philosophy and ethics (Gewirth, 1981), to 
feminist philosophy of science (Longino, 1990) would support that values have an 
objective foundation and should be the focus of analysis. 
                                                 
1 Ideology here intended as a coherent system of concepts, norms, values and beliefs that serves to organise and 
justify a world-view 
2 http://www.esrc.ac.uk/funding-and-guidance/impact-toolkit/ 
http://www.arc.gov.au/research-impact-principles-and-framework 
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4.6.1 Contextual and Constitutive Values 
/RQJLQR·VZRUN(1983; 1990) on values in philosophy of science is interesting because it 
engages directly with the science/values dualism. She proposes an inverse dialectical 
relationship whereby values constitute the boundaries of scientific practice. She argues 
WKDW LW LV ¶QRQVHQVH WRDVVHUW WKHDXWRQRP\RIVFLHQWLILFSUDFWLFH IURPYDOXHV·DQG WKDW
¶VFLHQFHLVJRYHUQHGE\TXLWHUHDOYDOXHVDQGQRUPDWLYHFRQVWUDLQWVWKDWDUHJHQHUDWHGE\
thHJRDOVRIVFLHQWLILFDFWLYLW\·6KHLGHQWLILHVFRQWH[WXDODQGFRQVWLWXWLYHYDOXHV
to distinguish between those values that arise from social and cultural context and those 
that serve as rules and standards within scientific practice itself. She posits that 
judgement of science resides in values, to the extent that a good scientific explanation 
will be validated through a combination of constitutive and contextual values. In the 
FDVHV VKH GLVFXVVHV /RQJLQR ILQGV WKDW ¶SDUWLFXODU >VFLHQWLILF@ SUDFtices have been 
influenced by cultural and social pressures as much as or more than they have been by 
FRQVWLWXWLYH HSLVWHPRORJLFDO YDOXHV·   8VLQJ WKLV VHSDUDWLRQ EHWZHHQ
constitutive and contextual values is useful in dismissing claims of scientific autonomy 
and independence from social and cultural values and establishing the degree of 
interaction between the two ideal-types.  
(OVHZKHUH /RQJLQR  JRHV IXUWKHU LQ DUJXLQJ WKDW DQ\ IRUP RI ¶HYLGHQWLDO
UHDVRQLQJ· IURP WKH OD\ WR WKH VFLHQWLILF ¶LV FRQWH[W GHSHQGHQW· 6LPLODUO\ WR .QRUU
Cetina, yet stressing the relationship between values and scientific practice, Longino 
posits that: 
¶WKH UHVXOW LV D SLFWXUH RI VFLHQWLILF HQTXLU\ DV D JURXS HQGHDYRXU LQ ZKLFK
models and theories are adopted/legitimated through critical processes 
involving the dynamic interplay of observational and experimental data and 
background assumptions. Since contextually located background assumption 
play a role in confirmation as well as in discovery, scientific inquiry is, thus, at 
OHDVW LQSULQFLSOHSHUPHDEOHE\YDOXHVDQG LQWHUHVWV VXSHUILFLDOO\ H[WHUQDO WR LW·
(1990: 13). 
Longino analyses several cases to substantiate this argument, including the influence of 
gender ideologies on research on sex differences. She compares the logical positivism of 
Hempel with the wholism of Kuhn in order to underline an important difference: 
whereas positivism was concerned almost exclusively with the relationship between 
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evidence and hypothesis (probabilistic), a conception supported by a reasoning 
abstracted from its social context, wholism was concerned with what counts as evidence 
in what context (realist/relational) (1990: 26). This shift in thinking which took place 
from the 1970s was significant as a step away from rationally or objectively determined 
evidence and science to a non-rational, value and ideology-laden, contextual scientific 
practice. Longino does not find satisfactory closure in either wholist relativism or 
positivist reasoning, and criticises realism for its failed attempt to provide a middle 
ground that was thus far unable to include any serious reflection on the role of values 
  6LQFH WKHQ 6D\HU·V ZRUN  ZKLFK VWHPV IURP D FULWLFDO UHDOLVW
epistemology, has drawn attention to the underlying role of values in making and 
understanding the social world, and more specifically, on the need to undermine the 
dualisms which still plague social scientific explanations.  
4.6.2 The objective foundation of values 
Sayer (2011) posits that there is a general reluctance to engage in normative, rather than 
SRVLWLYHHPSLULFDOVRFLDOVFLHQFHSUDFWLFH&RQVHTXHQWO\¶VRFLDOVFLHQWLVWVODFNWUDLQLQJLQ
normative thought, and tend to be dismissive of it, regarding it as groundless and 
inferior, a threat to objectivity and uQQHFHVVDU\IRUXQGHUVWDQGLQJVRFLDOOLIH·
This view of social life and social agents as interest-driven individuals is supported by an 
underlying liberal ideology. Values thus become a subjective realm of individual 
judgement. In this landscape, individual value-judgements cannot be subjected to 
scrutiny inasmuch as the realm of values is subjective. The fact/value dualism, where 
fact is objective and value is subjective, is too often implied, while scientists continue to 
be encouraged to aspire to the role of a value-neutral, fact-driven, politics-free group. 
7KHLGHDWKDWYDOXHVDUHHQWLUHO\VXEMHFWLYHLVDIDOODF\EHFDXVHDOWKRXJK¶YDOXHVDUH>«@
FXOWXUDOO\ YDULDEOH >«@ WKH\ DUH QRW FRPSOHWHO\ DUELWUDU\ WKH\ KDYH VRPHWKLQJ WR GR
with well-being and ill-EHLQJ·   6RFLDO VFLHQWLVWV DUHQRW LPPXQH IURPVRFLDO
life, they are culture-bound beings and subject to both ideological and institutionalised 
pressures, all of which affect their ability to think about the social world. Sayer argues 
that the polarisation of dualisms, such as fact/value and reason/emotion, is driven by a 
misunderstanding of universalism stemming from both the enlightenment project and 
its postmodern critique. Universalism was bound with the belief of western European 
cultural superiority, and the extreme relativism and emphasis on difference of the 
postmodernists arose in direct reaction to this. Taking dualisms too far entails an 
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HSLVWHPLF IDOODF\$FFRUGLQJ WR6D\HU ¶GLIIHUHQFH LWVHOISUHVXSSRVHV VLPLODULW\ >«@RXU 
interest in difference and similarity, or particularlism and universalism, are dialectically 
UHODWHG·-100).  
We need dualisms to make sense of things, but there is a risk of polarisation leading to 
misconceptions, such as the compartmentalising of emotions away from reason, and of 
science away from values (Sayer, 2011: 28-29). According to Sayer, the expulsion of 
morality from scientific debates is one instance of the attempt to separate science and 
values (2011: 109). This position could contribute to supporting the belief that evidence 
is value-free, perpetrating the idea that science is separate and above RWKHU ´OHVV SXUHµ
pursuits such as politics. This fails to acknowledge that human beings are fundamentally 
moral beings who engage in evaluative, emotional and deliberative reasoning supported 
by values, beliefs, and value-orientations.  
4.6.3 Moral foundations, values and evidence 
It appears that, because evidence belongs in the realm of science, there is little analysis 
of the contextual and constLWXWLYH YDOXHV WKDW PD\ VKDSH GLIIHUHQW VWDNHKROGHUV·
understanding and positioning of evidence. Indeed, values permeate throughout the 
process of evidence use, from its production, through to its uses and understandings. In 
+DLGW·VZRUN LQPRUDOSV\FKRORJ\  LQ0DMRQH·VZRUNRQSROLF\ DQDO\VLV 
and in much of the work discussed in Chapter Two, evidence use by individuals is often 
seen in instrumental terms. Accordingly, evidence is seen as cherry-picked in order to 
support an opinion or an instrumental policy goal. What Haidt posits is a process of 
cherry-picking supported by existing moral foundations (Chapter 5). In other words, 
what moral psychology adds to existing discursive, ideational and argumentative 
contributions is the moral and affeFWLYHEDVLVZKLFKLQIOXHQFHLQGLYLGXDOV·XQGHUVWDQGLQJ
and positioning. 
An explicit moral commitment to the values of science is likely to depend on 
VWDNHKROGHUV· EDFNJURXQG FXOWXUH DQG DOOHJLDQFHV &KDSWHUs 8 and 9 2QH·V PRUDO
commitment to evidence usH LQ SROLF\ DORQJVLGH RQH·V HSLVWHPRORJLFDO SRVLWLRQ
FRQWULEXWHV WR VKDSLQJ RQH·V SROLWLFDO DQG SROLF\ SRVLWLRQV ([LVWLQJ YDULDWLRQV DPRQJ
policy stakeholders need to be investigated through an understanding of their values 
and their beliefs as part constitutive of their existing moral positions. An understanding 
of relevant and context-specific values, the beliefs which relate to those values and the 
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manner in which they can be achieved in practice is appropriate for the purpose of 
enriching institutionalist, ideational, argumentative and interest-based accounts of the 
policy process, and of the use of evidence in it. The mention of evidence, presupposing 
science, continues to instigate false dichotomies and polarisation. There is a need to 
move away from rationalist and normative explanations, and open up discussions about 
the role of values and beliefs in contributing to form moral, scientific, political and 
policy positions.  
4.7 Values and Beliefs in social psychology: constructing working concepts 
In the literature discussed in Chapters Two and Three, there is a general recognition 
that values are influential, yet there is no explicit attempt to turn them into objects of 
inquiry as well as working concepts in their own right. As will be discussed in Chapter 
Five, social and moral psychology and political science literatures find evidence of 
FRUUHODWLRQ EHWZHHQ YDOXHV EHOLHIV DQG DWWLWXGHV ZKLFK PDNH XS LQGLYLGXDOV· PRUDOLW\
and their political positions. These arguments are acknowledged and further explored. 
I define values as abstract, goal oriented, deliberative and evaluative tools. 
¶YDOXHV VHUYH DV VWDQGDUGV WKDW ZH OHDUQ WR HPSOR\ WUDQVFHQGHQWDOO\ DFURVV
objects and situations in various ways: to guide action; to guide us to the 
positions that we take on various social, ideological, political, and religious 
issues; to guide self-presentations and impression management; to evaluate and 
judge ourselves and others by; to compare ourselves with others not only with 
respect to competence, but also with respHFWWRPRUDOLW\·5RNHDFK 
¶$OO YDOXHV KDYH FRJQLWLYH DIIHFWLYH DQG GLUHFWLRQDO DVSHFWV 9DOXHV VHUYH DV
criteria for selection in action. When most explicit and fully conceptualised, 
values become criteria for judgement, preference, and choice. When implicit and 
XQUHIOHFWLYH YDOXHV QHYHUWKHOHVV SHUIRUP ´DV LIµ WKH\ FRQVWLWXWHG JURXQGV IRU
GHFLVLRQVLQEHKDYLRXU·:LOOLDPV 
I define beliefs as concrete, action-oriented, practice-led evaluative and deliberative 
tools: 
¶DQ\VLPSOHSURSosition, conscious or unconscious, inferred from what a person 
VD\VRUGRHVFDSDEOHRIEHLQJSUHFHGHGE\ WKHSKUDVH´,EHOLHYH WKDW«µ7KH
content of a belief may describe the object of belief as true or false, correct or 
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incorrect; evaluate it as good or bad; or advocate a certain course of action or a 
FHUWDLQVWDWHRIH[LVWHQFHDVGHVLUDEOHRUXQGHVLUDEOH·5RNHDFK 
4.7.1 Values 
Starting with the work of Milton Rokeach, whose pioneering research proposed a 
theory of human values grounded in socio-psychological notions, we can begin to 
disentangle values from beliefs, and arrive at a conceptualisation of beliefs as 
constitutive of valuative considerations and deliberations, and a relationship of values 
and beliefs that is mutually reinforcing. An exercise in distinction is necessary, because 
¶YDOXHVFDQQRWEHDVVLPLODWHGWRHLWKHUH[LVWHQWLDOEHOLHIVRUWRFRQFUHWHHYDOXDWLRQVVXFK
DVLGHRORJLHV·:LOOLDPV,Q:LOOLDPV·YLHZ 
¶WKHWHUP´YDOXHVµKDVEHHQXVHGYDULRXVO\WRUHIHUWRLQWHUHsts, pleasures, likes, 
preferences, duties, moral obligations, desires, wants, goals, needs, aversions and 
attractions, and many other kinds of seleFWLYHRULHQWDWLRQV·1979: 16) 
:LOOLDPVVXJJHVWVWKDW¶WRDYRLGVXFKH[FHVVLYHORRVHQHVVZHKDYHLQVLVWHG that the core 
phenomenon is the presence of FULWHULD RU VWDQGDUGV RI SUHIHUHQFH· (ibid). The purpose of 
values seems to be to guide, evaluate and judge situations on the basis of underlying 
morality and available knowledge (Rokeach, 1968: 160). Crucially IRU:LOOLDPV ¶YDOXHV
merge affect and concept·DQGDVVXFKWKH\DOUHDG\FRQWDLQZLWKLQWKHPDGLDORJXHEHWZHHn 
reason and emotion (1979: 16, emphasis added). Recognising the role of affect and its 
relation to cognition has implications for the way individuals engage in evaluative and 
deliberative practices.  
Although similar values are generally present in the make-XS RI LQGLYLGXDOV· YDOXH
V\VWHPV GLIIHUHQFHV FDQ EH IRXQG LQ ¶WKH DUUDQJHPHQW RI YDOXHV WKHLU KLHUDUFKLHV RU
SULRULWLHV· :LOOLDPV  ). Value systems are organised hierarchically, and 
characterised by conflicting values placed in different orderings. According to 
5RFNHDFK¶DSHUVRQ·VYDOXHV\VWHPPD\WKXVEHVDLGWRUHSUHVHQWDOHDUQHGRUJDQLVDWLRQ
of rules for making choices and for rHVROYLQJFRQIOLFWV·,QKLVYLHZ 
¶VLPLODULWLHVRIFXOWXUHVRFLDOV\VWHPFDVWHDQGFODVVVH[RFFXSDWLRQHGXFDWLRQ
religious upbringing, and political orientation are major variables that are likely 
to shape in more or less similar ways the value systems of large numbers of 
SHRSOH·ibid) 
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Patterns of predominant values differ across societies and across cultures. This line of 
reasoning can be extended to the micro-cultural/epistemic level, such as a specialised 
policy area and/or a particular occupation. 
Understanding the difference between value systems, belief systems and ideologies is 
crucial. Williams argues that values and beliefs are organised into constellations, yet 
rarely are they sufficiently organised and cohesive to support an iGHRORJ\RQO\ ¶ZKHQ
we can identify interconnected sets of values and beliefs which describe a preferred or 
´REOLJDWRU\µ VWDWH RI D VRFLDO V\VWHP ZH VSHDN RI DQ ideology· 79: 21). Similarly to 
Rokeach, Kilburn emphasises the deep, underlying character RI YDOXHV ¶DV DEVWUDFW
PRWLYDWLRQDOEHOLHIVDERXWWKHGHVLUDEOH WKH ¶¶JHQHUDODQGHQGXULQJVWDQGDUGV·· WKDWDUH
FHQWUDO WR FLWL]HQV· EHOLHI V\VWHPV· (2009: 868). He argues that values support mass 
beliefs (2009: 882). Haidt (2012) discusses the moral foundations of opposing political 
SRVLWLRQV RQ WKH EDVLV RI FRPSHWLQJ YDOXHV ZKLFK PDNH XS LQGLYLGXDOV· PRUDOLW\
(Chapter 5). He argues that political and moral positions are connected to the extent 
that certain values appear to be consistently associated with political leanings. 
Thorisdottir et al (2007), find that there is a strong link between right political leaning 
and support for inequality, security and tradition in both eastern and western Europe. 
Similarly, Jost et al (2003) demonstrate that support for inequality is tied with political 
conservatism. The research discussed in Chapter five shows consistent correlations 
between certain values and certain political positions.   
4.7.2 Beliefs 
Whereas much scholarship exists on beliefs in philosophy, and particularly in certain 
schools of thought (Bayesian evidentialism; epistemologism; metaphysics), scholarship 
on belief in social science is often more closely associated with sociology of religion and 
psychology. Theories of beliefs have been advanced in social psychology and, more 
timidly, in political science. Some classic political science literature focuses on belief 
systems and its relationship with ideology (Converse, 1964; Sartori, 1969). According to 
Sartori (1969: 401), 
¶DEHOLHILVQHLWKHUDQRSLQLRQQRU DQLGHD·UDWKHU ¶EHOLHIVDUHLGHD-clusters that 
routinize the cost of decisions precisely because they are taken for granted. 
Beliefs are believed ² not explored, tested and held under the searchlight of 
consciousness.·  
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The assumption that beliefs should be believed rather than explored might have 
LQIOXHQFHGVRFLDOVFLHQFHV·ODFNRIV\VWHPDWLFHQJDJHPHQWZLWKEHOLHIV 
Rokeach distinguishes between three types of beliefs: existential, evaluative and 
SUHVFULSWLYHKRZHYHU¶Zhether or not the content of a belief is to describe, evaluate, or 
exhort, all beliefs are prediVSRVLWLRQVWRDFWLRQ·(DFKEHOLHIKDV¶DFRJQLWLYH
FRPSRQHQW· ZKLFK UHSUHVHQWV DQ LQGLYLGXDO·V NQRZOHGJH DQG FHUWLWXGH IRXQGHG XSRQ
GLVWLQFWLRQRIULJKWIURPZURQJ¶DQDIIHFWLYHFRPSRQHQW·EHFDXVHWKHEHOLHIQHFHVVDULO\
JLYHVULVHWRDQDIIHFWLYHUHDFWLRQSDUWLFXODUO\¶ZKHQLWVYDOLGLW\LVVHULRXVO\TXHVWLRQHG
DV LQ DUJXPHQW· /DVWO\ WKH EHOLHI KDV D ¶EHKDYLRXUDO FRPSRQHQW· EHFDXVH ¶EHLQJ D
response predisposition of varyiQJ WKUHVKROG· LWQHFHVVDULO\SUHFHGHVDFWLRQ 5RNHDFK
1968: 113- )XUWKHUPRUH ¶WKH NLQG RI DFWLRQ LW OHDGV WR LV GLFWDWHG VWULFWO\ E\ WKH
FRQWHQW RI WKH EHOLHI· DV VXFK LQGLYLGXDOV DWWHPSW WR PDLQWDLQ FRKHUHQFH DFURVV WKH
cognitive, affective and behavioural components within a single belief, across beliefs, 
and among all beliefs that make up their belief system (Rokeach, 1968: 114). This has 
significant implications in terms of the formation of particular positions. Beliefs are 
regarded as generative in the sense that they contribute to the formation and sustenance 
of a particular position. The creation of epistemic cultures through scientific practice is 
supported by certain beliefs, i.e. a belief in science as the bearer of truth, and a belief in 
certain kind of evidence to produce better, truer accounts.  
Rokeach tackles the relationship between cognition and affect in belief sustenance, and 





The first conclusion indicates a hierarchical ordering in the belief system, akin to that of 
a value system. The other conclusions echo discussions found in other literatures, 
particularly the Advocacy Coalition Framework (Chapter 3). There are different ways to 
establish the importance or centrality of a belief. Some have linked it to the self (self-
concept) (e.g. Eagly, 1967), others have tied it to membership or non-membership of a 
social group; others still with its ability to further or hinder particular values (e.g. 
Rosenberg, 1960) (Rokeach, 1968: 4). This is relevant in conjunction with the manner in 
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which stakeholders might adopt particular beliefs because of their group membership or 
their sense of purpose.  
5RNHDFK SRVLWV WKDW ¶EHOLHIV ² like motives, genes and neutrons ² cannot be directly 
observed but must be infeUUHGDVEHVWRQHFDQ·1968: 2). HenceLQIHUULQJDERXWRQH·V
beliefs is a feasible method of investigation. Beliefs can be observed as emergent 
properties, which is consonant with a realist approach to analysis.3 Rokeach also argues 
WKDW ¶if we know that a person believes in a particular authority, we should be able to 
deduce many of his other beliefs, those which emanate or derive from the authorities he 
LGHQWLILHVZLWK· -11). As for values, similarities in experiences, belonging, and 
social structures are more likely to produce shared beliefs: 
¶WKHSDUWLFXODU DXWKRULWLHV UHOLHGRQ IRU LQIRUPDWLRQGLIIHU IURPRQHSHUVRQ WR
the next and would depend on learning experiences within the context of the 
SHUVRQ·V VRFLDO VWUXFWXUH ² family, class, peer group, ethnic group, religious or 
SROLWLFDOJURXSVDQGFRXQWU\·5RNHDFK 
This is relevant in the context of competing knowledge authorities and competing 
group allegiances. Contact with authorities expands through life. As the number of 
(potentially conflicting) authorities grows, so does the number of (potentially 
conflicting) beliefs. Acceptance of an authority, such as science, implies negotiating 
beliefs that sustain that authority, yet at the same time it implies negotiating beliefs that 
may conflict with that authority both internal to it (different sciences, epistemologies, 
practices) and external to it (i.e. law, religion).  
4.7.3 Difference between values and beliefs 
Values should be regarded as underlying normative preferences about end-states of 
existence, whereas beliefs should be regarded as more concrete ideas that directly 
address empirical reality (Rokeach, 1968: 160). Beliefs are informed and part-guided by 
values, but are also and crucially affected by exposure to experience and information. 
$FFRUGLQJ WR 6HDULQJ ¶YDOXHV DUH PRUH JHQHUDO WKDQ RWKHU VRUWV RI EHOLHIV DQG WKH\
VKDSHWKHLQGLYLGXDO·VHYDOXDWLYHH[SHULHQFH·Beliefs and values are seen as 
interdependent: 
                                                 
3 Beliefs are indicative of what actors perceive as causal mechanisms. Relevant beliefs can emerge from analysis 
and operationalised as both context relevant and emergent 
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¶&ULWHULD RI HYDOXDWLRQ DUH DOZD\V LQWHUGHSHndent with beliefs, which orient 
actors to the putative realities of their existence. Such beliefs about existential 
UHDOLWLHVDUHQRWDOZD\V´DUELWUDU\µEXWWKH\DUHVXUHO\RSHQWRDZLGHUDQJHRI
YDULDWLRQ·LELG 
A value reaches deeper and wider than a belief, but beliefs are necessary to enact values.  
4.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I argued that evidence-based policy rests on an overly simplistic 
positivist epistemology that has been the subject of mounting critique. Critical realism 
and critical theory provide a more satisfactory epistemological basis for the use of 
evidence; they can be combined as they share some presuppositions. The analytical 
tools provided by critical realism are promising because they deal with relational aspects 
and emergent properties of open (social) systems. Critical theory is useful in 
acknowledging the process of legitimation of certain knowledge, supported by ideology 
and power asymmetries, encouraging the shift in focus toward knowledge 
communication. It is also important to take into account the socially embedded nature 
of knowledge production: the concept of epistemic cultures is useful in highlighting that 
knowledge production and modes of operation from within the sciences are constitutive 
of a diverse range of practices and understandings of knowledge. Too little attention has 
been paid to the role of values in the use of evidence. The interplay between contextual 
and constitutive values and their objective and moral foundation is recognised as a 
starting point to advance understanding of the use of evidence in policy. I propose a 
systematic and targeted analysis of values and their relationship with beliefs.  
In the following chapter, I will go further in discussing how values and beliefs are part 
constitutive of individXDOV·PRUDOSRVLWLRQV7RGRWKLV,ZLOOUHYLHZGLIIHUHQWDUJXPHQWV
derived from various disciplinary perspectives to construct a model that acknowledges 
the role of morality and affect and their interaction with ideology and interests, in the 
making of moral, political and policy positions.  
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Chapter 5  
DŽƌĂůŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚ ?ƉŽůŝĐǇ 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter reflects on the moral dimension of  drug and prostitution policy as 
significant in shaping opportunities within these policy domains. Combining insight 
from the literature on morality policy with classic accounts that focus on morality as an 
instrument of  social order (Douglas, 1966) and as a force on which the law rests 
(Habermas, 1986), it brings attention to the manner in which a dominant morality that 
is ideologically supported becomes enshrined in the law. Thus, rather than an 
instrument of  neutral moral force, the law is regarded as supporting dominant interests. 
However, rather than a simple, linear relationship tying a dominant morality into law in 
support of  a dominant ideology, the existence of  competing moralities that challenge 
the dominant moral-legal status quo is seen as supported in turn by contradictory 
principles found within ideological constructs (Freeden, 1994).  
The concept of  morality policy can offer some insight in studying prostitution and drug 
policy. Both drug and prostitution policies have been labelled as morality policies in 
relevant literature (Meier, 1994; Schmitt, Euchner and Preidel, 2013). The characteristics 
of  morality policy are outlined and considered for both their validity and their 
limitations. Particular attention will be given to the question of  whether morality policy 
as a distinct category presents further difficulty when examining the policy process and 
how change happens within it. Scholars in this field note that the presence of  morality 
affects opportunities for policy change. They utilise elements of  existing theories of  the 
policy process and combine them with the morality policy typology in order to explain 
change in morality policy subsystems. Although much of  the American literature 
presents single case, single country studies, some of  the European literature has 
conducted comparative studies across countries and across different areas of  morality 
policy.1 Interestingly, although morality policy refers to value conflicts as one of  its 
                                                 
1There are some clear advantages to cross country, cross policy area research. Most significantly, it provides 
scope for validating typologies and for generalisation. There are some caveats: the lack of in-depth expertise on a 
single country and/or a single policy area, together with the lack of in-depth qualitative studies, might negatively 
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foundational characteristics, very few studies have attempted to explore the relationship 
between values and morality in this field (or at least not in a systematic manner).  
Presenting evidence from political science literature on societal-level values shifting 
from authoritarian to libertarian (Flanagan and Lee, 2003), underpinned by long-term 
economic change (Inglehart, 1990), this chapter investigates the place of  values in 
morality policy, specifically addressing the question of  competing conservative and 
liberal moralities. Evidence from moral psychology (Haidt, 2012) and cognitive 
linguistics (Lakoff, 1996) demonstrates that there is no one single morality, but rather 
competing moralities which align with conservative and liberal positions sustained 
through affective, cognitive and normative elements.  
Starting from the assumption that morality and law are inevitably married ² because 
morality sets the standards of  right and wrong which are then sustained by the law ² I 
GLVFXVV WKH LPSOLFDWLRQV WKURXJK VRPH RI  +DEHUPDV· (1986) ideas on the subject. I 
SUREOHPDWL]HWKHLGHDWKDWWKHODZ·VSULQFLSDOIXQFWLRQLVV\PEROLFLQ terms of  its hoped 
deterrence effect, by arguing that its instrumental and rational function is increasingly 
regarded as fundamental, particularly in the context of  an evidence-based policy 
discourse.  
'RXJODV·  DUJXPHQW DERXW WKH FDWHJRULVDWLRQ RI  SXULW\ DQG GDQJHU IRU VRFLDO
ordering is discussed and then related to the creation of  social mores that sustain 
hierarchies and shape views and attitudes toward present dangerous categories. The 
moral psychology argument about the origin of  morality in responses to disgust is 
discussed in connection with examples about prostitution. It becomes clear that 
morality serves a socio-political and organisational function and as such cannot be 
H[FOXVLYHO\WLHGWRLQGLYLGXDOV·DWWLWXGHV 
The chapter proposes a framework which allows exploration of  the interplay between 
moralities, ideology, values and affect in the construction of  complex policy positions. 
Ideology is used in its critical Marxist sense, alongside considerations of  its motivational 
character in cognitive and affective terms and considerations on its morphology. 
Morality is variously conceptualised as conservative, liberal, manifest and latent; each of  
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these are recognised as more or less present in the criminal law and science as social 
ordering practices. 
5.2 Defining Morality Policy 
A morality policy is defined as a field of  policy that is characterised by a lack of  
consensus based on conflicting values (Mooney, 1999). Conflict is sustained through 
disagreement on first principles2. Conflict is endemic to debates, arguments and 
opinions in policy fields where morality is in play. In the United States, there is a 
literature on morality policy which mainly surfaced in the mid to late 1990s (Mooney, 
1999; Meier 1994, 1999, Mooney and Lee, 2000; Haider-Markel, 1999; Click and 
Hutchinson, 1999; Pierce and Miller, 1999). This literature has largely been ignored in 
Europe until very recently, when a number of  scholars begun applying the concept (i.e. 
Wagenaar and Altink, 2012; Knill, 2013; Engeli et al, 2013; Heichel et al, 2013).  
The etymology of  morality appears to trace back to the Latin word moralisRU¶SURSHU
EHKDYLRXU RI  D SHUVRQ LQ VRFLHW\·3 KRZHYHU WKH URRW /DWLQ ZRUG ¶mos, moris· DFWXDOO\
PHDQV¶KDELWFXVWRPPDQQHU·4 For Fisher: 
¶Porality is a term used to cover those practices and activities that are 
considered right and wrong; the rules that govern those activities; and the values 
that are embedded, fostered, or pursued by those activities and practices. The 
morality of a society is related to its mores, or the customs that a society or 
group accepts as being right and wrong, as well as those laws of a society that 
add legal prohibitions and sanctions to many activities considered to be 
LPPRUDO·2004: 397). 
Morality involves individual practices, but it is not separate and independent from 
societal practices and the public consideration of  certain rules and behaviours as right 
RUZURQJZKLFKDUHHPEHGGHGLQ¶OHJDOSURKLELWLRQVDQGVDQFWLRQV·LELG7KXVLWVHHPV
fair to argue that morality is not singular but indeed plural, inasmuch as contrasting 
views and practices exist within the social body. It follows that, at any given time, there 
may be a dominant morality and alternative moralities that challenge it. 
                                                 
2Right and wrong 
3http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=moral 
4http://latindictionary.wikidot.com/noun:mos 
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According to Mooney: 
¶WKH GHEDWH· LQ PRUDOLW\ SROLF\ ¶LV DERXW ILUVW SULQFLSOHV DQG QRW LQVWUXPHQWDO
policy impact, almost anyone legitimately can claim to be well informed. 
Banning the death penalty, for example, validates a certain value regarding the 
VDQFWLW\RIKXPDQOLIH>«@2WKHUYDOXHVDOVRPD\EHDIIHFWHGE\VXFKDSROLF\
but this will lead only to clashes of first principle, not to technical debate about 
ZKHWKHUWKHSROLF\ZLOO´ZRUNµRUQRW· 
The morality policy literature opposes morality to instrumental rationality, implying that 
morality is reactionary and unreasoned. The way morality is intended seems closer to 
the idea of  moralism. A morality policy is thus characterised by a debate that privileges 
irrational, value-driven, first-principled positions at the expense of  instrumental reason, 
evaluative, and impact-driven considerations. This is relevant in the context of  the 
evidence-based policy discourse, where policy is supposedly judged on the basis of  what 
works. Evidence-based policy allegedly escapes morality because it is regarded as 
technical/rational. Morality is relevant in relation to drug or prostitution policy, where 
drug taking or sex selling behaviours could be judged simply on first principles.  
It has been argued that the American literature on morality policy, being mostly based 
on US case studies, cannot easily be extended to the European context because US 
politics is often characterised by overtly confessional political parties, rather than secular 
ones as is more often the case in Europe (Engeli et al, 2013). In their study of  policy 
moral permissiveness across four European countries, Engeli et al found that countries 
that underwent earlier secularisation might pass more permissive legislation earlier in 
time on issues like abortion. However, that is not the case for other morality policy 
issues such as euthanasia (2013: 336). Accordingly, there is no set path of  policy change 
for any morality policy to follow; for example, abortion struggles are unique and have 
not necessarily created a precedent for other issues in all countries considered (p. 340; 
Mooney and Lee, 1995; Luker, 1984). It would appear that understanding why certain 
policy debates are overtly moralised or not requires cross-country, cross-issue 
comparisons. For instance, it might be that Protestantism, particularly in its Puritan 
form, has a much stronger effect on certain morality policy issues than Catholicism, 
particularly when Catholicism is combined with historically strong secularism alongside 
other case-specific characteristics (Engeli et al, 2013).  
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Furthermore, one morality policy issue might be underpinned by strong advocacy and 
interest groups, such as women or LGBT in the case of  abortion and same-sex 
marriage; however, the same cannot be said to the same extent for euthanasia, and 
LQGHHG GUXJV ,Q VSLWH RI  WKH SUHVHQFH RI  GUXJ XVHUV· and sex woUNHUV· unions (i.e. 
INPUD, AVIL, ECP, Scarlett Alliance) and the right to die movement (i.e. Dignity in 
Dying), these groups have not received as much support and reached as high numbers 
compared to their abortion and LGBT rights counterparts. Groups such as drug users 
do not necessarily have a strong or legitimised voice, because of  their lower numbers, 
their marginalisation and stigmatisation; it is harder for these groups to contribute to 
agenda setting or policy-framing because they often lack legitimacy, resources and 
representation given social stigma (Lancaster et al, 2014; Ahern et al, 2007). Incidentally, 
those drug users and sex workers who appear to be most stigmatised are those who sit 
at the bottom of  the social and economic hierarchy. Street sex workers and injecting 
drug users, compared to other drug using and sex working groups, tend to be the 
primary objects of  moralisation, stigmatisation, judgement and exclusion (Cusick, 2006; 
Lancaster et al, 2014). Their behaviours and associated choices might be regarded as 
immoral, and given existing asymmetries, they may not be in a position to effectively 
challenge the moral status quo. 
5.3 Change in morality policy 
Morality policy literature makes extensive use of  established concepts and ideas derived 
from the policy process literature (Chapter 3). Heichel et al (2013) directly address the 
nature of  change in morality policy by asking whether the very characteristics of  
morality policy affect the manner in which policy change might occur. They identify 
HaOO·VW\SRORJ\DVDJRRGVWDUWLQJSRLQWLQDVVHVVLQJWKHPHFKDQLVPRI FKDQJHLQ
PRUDOLW\ SROLF\+DOO XVHV D WKUHH WLHUHG VWUXFWXUH IHDWXULQJ ¶SROLF\SDUDGLJPV· ¶SROLF\
LQVWUXPHQWV· DQG ¶WKHSUHFLVH VHWWLQJRUFDOLEUDWLRQRI  WKRVH LQVWUXPHQWV· &Kapter 3). 
For Heichel et al a drastic legislative change, from the total prohibition to the 
decriminalisation or legal regulation of  an activity would fit the bill of  paradigm change. 
2Q D PRUH PRGHUDWH OHYHO LQVWUXPHQWDO FKDQJH ¶UHIHU>V@ WR FKDQJHV LQ WKe means 
undertaken to achieve existing moraliW\SROLF\REMHFWLYHV·2013: 322). Here, they use the 
example of  the introduction of  new interventions in harm reduction in the context of  
drug policy. On the level of  instrument-setting, minor adjustments to policy would 
entail issues of  calibration. In this scenario, Heichel et al use the example of  threshold 
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TXDQWLWLHVRI FDQQDELV WKDWDUH ¶WROHUDWHG IRUSHUVRQDOFRQVXPSWLRQ· 7KH\
argue that morality policy might present a more complex picture in terms of  trajectories 
of  policy change as well as degrees of  change. They also stress that this might depend 
on the policy area and the extent to which value conflicts are dominant in that area. Yet, 
there is a possibility that even small adjustments (i.e. FDOLEUDWLRQV¶PLJKWEHDVVRFLDWHG
ZLWKIXQGDPHQWDOSDUDGLJPDWLFYDOXHGHFLVLRQV·LELG 
The legality/illegality of  activities connected with morality policy presents a further 
conundrum: policy change might only punitively tackle supply and not demand, as is the 
case for decriminalisation of  drug consumption. The reverse might also be true, as in 
the case of  the criminalisation of  the purchase of  sex. This might create a system rife 
with internal contradictions, which does not follow the linear logic of  a single paradigm. 
Using abortion as an example, Heichel et al argue that, in many jurisdictions, there is a 
GLVWLQFWLRQ ¶EHWZHHQ ZRPHQ VHHNLQJ DQ DERUWLRQ DQG WKH SK\VLFLDQV SURYLGLQJ WKH
VHUYLFH >«@ PDQ\ MXULVGLFWLRQV KDYH DEROLVKHG WKH FULPLQDOLW\ RI  DEortion for the 
SUHJQDQWZRPHQZKLOHDERUWLRQDVVXFKUHPDLQHGLOOHJDO·)XUWKHUPRUHDQG
beyond the legal/illegal dichotomy, there is also the targeting of  behaviours and 
activities through sanctioning and regulation, and without criminal prosecution, which 
maintains that those activities are wrong or immoral. 
Much less is written about the relationship between values and morality policy change. 
+HLFKHOHWDOVWDWHWKDW ¶EDVHGRQH[LVWLQJUHVHDUFKZHDUJXHWKDWPRUDOLW\SROLWLFVDUH
more sensitive to social and personal values than other ² regulatory or (re)distributive ² 
SROLFLHV·   7KH\ FRQWLQXH ¶WKHUH LV EURDG FRQVHQVXV WKDW E\ GHILQLWLRQ
PRUDOLW\ SROLFLHV UHVSRQG WR FODVKHVRI  LQFRPSDWLEOH ¶FRUH YDOXHV· EHWZHHQ VXEJURXSV
of  sRFLHW\· \HW WKH UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ VDLG YDOXHV DQGPRUDOLW\ SROLF\KDVQRWEHHQ
systematically observed (2013: 326). The only relevant research within this literature 
looking at the nexus between values and morality policy is US-based, with some 
comparison across American states (Mooney and Lee, 2000). 
5.4 Morality/Non-morality and competing frames 
(XFKQHUHWDODQDO\VHGIRXU(XURSHDQQDWLRQV·UHJXODWLRQVWUDWHJLHVWRZDUGV¶YLFH
SROLFLHV·VXFKDVJDPEOLQJDQGGUXJVWKURXJKRIILFLDOGRFXPHQWVYLFHLs presented as a 
subset of  morality in the morality policy typology. Euchner et al find that the framing 
of  an issue is crucial when it comes to distinguishing between morality and non-
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PRUDOLW\ SROLF\ .QLOO·V  categorisation is interesting in this respect because it 
overcomes the morality/non-morality binary by identifying both manifest and latent 
morality policies and the possible slippage between these. Manifestly moral policies 
LQFOXGH ¶LVVXHV RI  OLIH DQG GHDWK >«@ LQ ZKLFK YDOXH FRQIOLFWV FRQVWLWute the standard 
mode of  political decision-PDNLQJ·LVVXHVVXFKDVDERUWLRQHXWKDQDVLDDQGRWKHULVVXHV
FRQFHUQHGZLWKWKHVDQFWLW\RI OLIHVWURQJO\DIIHFWHGE\¶UHOLJLRXVRULHQWDWLRQV·ILJXUHLQ
this category (2013: 312). In latent morality policies, value conflicts are not as apparent, 
yet they might surface (albeit most likely framed in instrumental terms). Both drug 
policy and prostitution policy are seen to belong to this type of  morality policy, 
although they might, in some cases, be considered manifest (Knill, 2013: 314). Euchner 
et al argue that, 
¶RZLQJ WR VHFXODUL]DWLRQ DQG YDOXH VKLIWV LQ WKH VRFLHW\ SROLF\-makers have 
decreasingly conceived of drug consumption and gambling as sinful behaviour 
and have therefore ceased relying on moral reasoning to justify the regulation of 
WKRVHDFWLYLWLHV·-5) 
As a consequence of  increasing liberalisation, new policy actors, ideas and evidence will 
enter and shape the policy arena away from morality, which will result in more 
permissive regulation, framed in non-moral terms (Euchner et al, 2013: 373). Given the 
shift in societal level values from authoritarian to libertarian (Flanagan and Lee, 2003), 
SUHILJXUHG E\ ,QJOHKDUW·V ZRUN  OLQNLQJ VRFLHWDO YDOXHV VKLIW WR XQGHUO\LQJ
economic change (section 5.5), Euchner et al assume that there has been an overall 
decrease in the number of  people who consider both gambling and drug consumption 
as sinful or immoral; thus, value-based moralistic arguments will no longer appeal to a 
large proportion of  the population but only a minority, which has led traditionally 
conservative parties to opt for alternative framing of  the issue (2013: 375). The 
emergence of  competing frames of  reference in morality policy allows for frames to 
shift from morality to non-morality (2013: 376).  
Framing is regarded as essential because it invokes different policy solutions as well as 
inviting in a different set of  actors and understandings of  the issue. However, by 
DUJXLQJWKDWWKH¶GLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQPRUDOLW\DQGQRQ-morality framing is based on the 
LQYROYHPHQWRI FRUHYDOXHVRU¶ILUVWSULQFLSOHV·LQWKHDUJXPHQWV·(XFKQHUHW
al do not take into account that not all arguments are explicitly made on the basis of  
principles, yet principles may still be present, albeit hidden. Rather than a dichotomous 
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definition of  morality policy ² i.e. morality/non-morality ² based on a negative and 
univocal conception of  morality akin to moralism, it might be more useful to think of  
competing moralities, and latent and manifest moUDOLWLHV DV LQ.QLOO·V  W\SRORJ\
For instance, a scientist arguing for an evidence-based approach to a particular 
intervention in drug policy, such as an argument in favour of  drug consumption rooms, 
might do so on the basis of  several principles including, but not exclusively, scientific 
evidence. Other values and principles on which to base the argument might centre on 
tolerance, compassion, care, and so on. The argument might have strong affective 
components, such as empathy. However, these values, albeit present, might not be made 
explicit in the argument because the scientist wishes to preserve a neutral posture rather 
than be accused of  political partisanship, following the logic of  boundary work. As 
discussed in previous chapters, the evidence-based policy discourse supports a focus on 
technical/instrumental features at the expense of  moral and political considerations in 
order to purport value neutrality; however, the practice of  policy necessarily entails 
value judgements, political and moral considerations.  
Euchner et al distinguish between four types of  frames that appear in varying 
FRPELQDWLRQVRU DORQH LQ WKHGRFXPHQWV WKH\ DQDO\VH ¶WKHPRUDOLW\ IUDPH WKHKHDOWK
and social frame; the security and public order frame; and the economic and fiscal 
IUDPH·7KH\DUJXHWKDW ¶LQFRQWUDVWWRWKHPRUDOLW\IUDPHWKHRWKHUWKUHH
frames identified are less value-EDVHG·ibid). The matter of  hidden principles and latent 
morality problematizes this typology. The security and public order frame is a morality 
frame inasmuch as it originates from a moral dilemma of  what is right and wrong 
behaviour; considerations about public nuisance and who deserves punishment for 
which types of  actions are moral in nature. Similarly, a public health frame might be 
underpinned by considerations about deservingness and balancing the distribution of  
resources so that the largest number of  people might benefit. These frames are 
fundamentally moral, yet their morality is latent rather than overt. 
The next sections attempt to elucidate the connection between studies in morality 
policy and those studies in political science concerned with analysing long-term patterns 
of  change in societal-level values, beliefs and attitudes and their relationship with 
traditional political affiliations. 
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5.5 Shift in Societal-level values 
The shift from conservative toward liberal values in western society is well documented 
(Inglehart, 1990; Flanagan and Lee, 2003; Smith and Tatalovich, 2003). Literature 
looking at value and attitude change in political science identifies increasing 
secularisation in advanced liberal states enacting a long-term shift in societal level values, 
beliefs and attitudes from conservative to liberal, or from authoritarian to libertarian. 
Using the World Value Survey (1992), Flanagan and Lee (2003) describe the shift from 
authoritarian to libertarian values, predominant in western society, as punctuated by 
three anchoring points: theism, modernism (mid-point) and postmodernism. Flanagan 




DQG LQWHOOLJLEOH WKURXJK ¶UHDVRQ DORQH· ZKHUHDV PRUDOLW\ ¶PXVW EH GLVFRYHUHG
through reason and experience in each culture and stage of human 
GHYHORSPHQW· 7KH ¶VHOI LV FHQWUDO· DQG ¶PDQNLQGPXVW OLYH LQ UHODWLRQVKLSV Rf 
PXWXDOEHQHILW· 
x Postmodernist DXWKRULW\ LV ¶LQWHUQDO DQG LQGLYLGXDO· WUXWK LV UHODWLYH PRUDOLW\ LV
UHSODFHGE\¶SHUVRQDOSUHIHUHQFHVDQGIHHOLQJV·WKHVHOILV¶IXOO\DXWRQRPRXVDQG
views others primarily for the self to use in achieving maximum self-
DFWXDOLVDWLRQ· 
These three categories are viewed as unfolding historically; they can be regarded as tied 
to the changes in socio-economic systems from feudalism (theism) to modern 
capitalism (modernist) to advanced capitalism (postmodernism). In Modernization and 
Postmodernization, Inglehart (1997) argues for the congruence between social, cultural and 
economic change. In his later work, he argues that economic development entails 
VRFLHWLHVWKDWDUHLQFUHDVLQJO\¶UDWLRQDOWROHUDQWWUXVWLQJDQGSDUWLFLSDWRU\·EXWWKHUHDUH
cultural distinctions across societies that come from religious values, political history, 
and differences between national cultures (Inglehart and Becker, 2000: 19). In his 
longitudinal analysis of values shift among western publics, Inglehart (2008) argues that 
FXOWXUDOFKDQJHVDUHHYLGHQWJLYHQUHODWLYHO\IDVWSDFHG¶LQWHUJHQHUDWLRQDOFKDQJH·WKDWLV
XQGHUSLQQHG E\ JUHDWHU OHYHOV RI ¶H[LVWHQWLDO VHFXULW\· 7KH SURFHVV RI FKDQJH IURP
production to consumption orientated economies results in increased overall affluence, 
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longer life-span, increased spatial and social mobility, and intensified social and cultural 
exchanges, particularly in densely populated urban settings. Fast-paced change, 
affluence, security and expansionary economies on the one hand and the maintenance 
of social, cultural and economic structures on the other, with their pre-existing 
hierarchies and boundaries, might give way to value conflicts.  
The dichotomy authoritarian/libertarian is used by Flanaghan and Lee (2003) to explain 
value conflicts, with the authoritarian type more closely associated with the 
theist/modernist categories and the libertarian type more closely associated with the 
modernist/postmodernist categories described above. The modernist category is the 
mid-point, both theoretically and temporally speaking, and contains both elements of 
authoritarian and libertarian values. The defining characteristics of authoritarian versus 
libertarian are summarised thus: 
¶$XWKRULWDULDQVVWUHVVYDOXHVRIVHOI-denial, strong group loyalties, serving others, 
DQGSXWWLQJJURXSLQWHUHVWVDKHDGRIRQH·VRZQILQGLQJIXOILOPHQWLQZRUNDQG
doing what is right, and adherence to strict moral codes. Libertarians stress self-
indulgence, pleasure seeking, maximum personal development and self-
realization, using work as a means to other ends, weak group loyalties, and 
SXWWLQJRQH·VRZQLQWHUHVWVDKHDGRIRWKHUV·)ODQDJDQDQG/HH 
When investigating the relationship between authoritarian and libertarian values and 
their association with traditional right/left political leanings, they argue that, 
traditionally, this relationship was linear because economic issues were at the centre of  
political debate, with the right and the left proposing fundamentally different political 
and economic models (i.e. capitalism versus socialism/communism). According to 
Flanagan and Lee, economic issues later became side-lined due to a general increase in 
affluence and a lessening of  differences between the right and the left. These resulted in 
swinging electorates one way or another chiefly depending on economic cycles, i.e. 
growth (left) and recession (right). However crucially, increasing affluence and the 
narrowing of  the left-right gap on economic issues favoured an increased focus on 
social issues as more politically contentious, establishing a stronger link between social 
issues and political leanings. This contributes to explaining why morality policies have 
become amongst the most politically contentious areas of  debate in advanced capitalist 
VWDWHV&RQVHTXHQWO\¶ZHILQGWKDWDXWKRULWDULDQVDQGOLEHUWDULDQVDUHVKDUSO\GLYLGHGRQ
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the issues of  abortion, euthanasia and suicide, drug use, prostitution, homosexuality, 
DQGDOWHUQDWLYHIDPLO\YDOXHV·)ODQDJDQDQG/HH2003: 253). 
The next section delves deeper into authoritarian and libertarian values as tied to 
conservative and liberal typologies, making use of  research from moral and cognitive 
psychology. 
5.6 Morality or Moralities? Or why what is considered moral by some is immoral 
for others 
Lakoff  (1996) makes an explicit connection between moral politics and 
FRQVHUYDWLYHOLEHUDO W\SRORJLHV +H DVVRFLDWHV WKH FRQVHUYDWLYH W\SRORJ\ ZLWK D ¶VWULFW
IDWKHU·PRUDOLW\FKDUDFWHULVHGE\WKHIROORZLQJ1996: 163): 
x ¶6HOI-discipline, responsibility and self-UHOLDQFH· 






Interestingly, a conservative morality as conceptualised by Lakoff  is founded upon the 
PHFKDQLVP RI  UHZDUGV DQG SXQLVKPHQW +H DUJXHV WKDW ¶UHZDUGV IRU REHGLHQFH DQG
punishments for disobedience are crucial to maintaining moral authority; as such, they 
OLHDWWKHKHDUWRI WKLVPRUDOV\VWHPDQGDUHWKXVPRUDO·,I SXQLVKPHQWLV
the principal instrument to uphold moral authority and maintain order in the system, 
then we can make an explicit connection between the security and public order frame, 
(i.e. criminal justice and law enforcement), with strict father/conservative morality. By 
extension, those who believe that a reward/punishment mechanism is moral are more 
likely to support punitive measures against immoral behaviour. There is a clear 
connection between conservative morality and the use of  punishment to preserve 
existing authority and order. 
2Q WKH RWKHU KDQG DFFRUGLQJ WR /DNRII    D OLEHUDO RU ¶QXUWXUDQW SDUHQW·
morality, presents the following characteristics: 







/DNRII  DUJXHV WKDW ¶WKH SULPDF\ RI  PRUDOLW\ DV HPSDWK\ PDNHV HPSDWK\ D SULRULW\·
(1996: 166). Empathy is seen as the fundamental element of  a liberal morality, and as 
tied with fairness, help, protection, and by extension, care (of  the self  and of  others). 
Thus, morality appears as partly rooted in affect. Whereas empathy is central to liberal 
morality, fear, anxiety and response to threats appear more central for conservative 
morality. Lakoff  follows on to argue that  
¶PRUDOLW\ DV IDLUQHVV LV D FRQVHquence; if you empathize with others, you will 
want them to be treated fairly. This makes empathetic actions and actions 
promoting fairness into moral actions. Consequently, a lack of empathetic 
EHKDYLRXURUDFWLRQVJRLQJDJDLQVWIDLUQHVVDUHLPPRUDO·IRr liberals (ibid).  
Empathy, fairness and care as characteristics of  a liberal morality can be associated with 
DFRQFHUQIRUSHRSOH·VKHDOWKDQGZHOOEHLQJZKLFKIDOOVLQWRDKHDOWKDQGVRFLDOIUDPH
This also entails a redistributive economic frame (equality) but not a public order frame 
(punishment). If  a frame is akin to a pair of  glasses, then looking through them is like 
looking through different lenses: certain aspects will appear more salient than others, 
certain features more clearly defined, and certain solutions which tackle those particular 
aspects and features will seem more pressing and righteous. Within the security and 
public order frame, punishment/rewards will seem the most morally righteous tool to 
deter and control behaviour. Conversely, within a health and social frame, treatment and 
harm reduction might take priority because it is morally right to empathise and help 
those who are seen as unable to help themselves. Lakoff  stresses that: 
¶ZKHQ RQH LV IXQFWLRQLQJ SROLWLFDOO\ WKHVH PRUDO FDWegories are primary. The 
categories define opposing moral worldviews, worldviews so different that 
virtually every aspect of public policy looks radically different through these 
OHQVHV·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Later work (Graham et al, 2009; Haidt, 2012) that focuses on the differences between 
conservative and liberal morality provides further evidence of  their apparent 
incommensurability. Liberals and conservatives appear to show consistently different 
characteristics based on how they respond to experience as well as what they tend to 
value most. According to Haidt (2012) ² a moral psychologist ² conservatives respond 
to personal threats more strongly than liberals, who instead are characteristically open to 
experience. In general terms, conservatives appear to be mRUH ¶JURXSLVK· E\ ZKLFK
+DLGWPHDQVDWHQGHQF\WRFRQIRUPWRRQH·VJURXSDQGEHOR\DOWRLWODZDELGLQJDQG
puritan in their morality, whereas liberals appear to be more concerned with harm and 
justice in society as a whole but also more individualistic. This is because liberals buy 
into a Liberal progress narrative (Smith, in Haidt, 2012: 330), which combines concern 
for suffering and oppression with freedom to pursue happiness. These originate from 
WKH ¶&DUHKDUP IRXQGDWLRQ FRQFHUQ IRU VXIIHULQJ RI  YLctims) and the 
Liberty/oppression foundation (a celebration of  liberty as freedom from oppression, as 
well as freedom to pursue self-GHILQHGKDSSLQHVV·+DLGW2012: 331). 
+DLGW·VZRUNORRNVDWOLEHUDOLVPDQGFRQVHUYDWLVPDVLGHDO-types; in reality there is a deep 
level of  complexity which makes these absolute positions untenable. If  taken to 
represent stronger leanings on either side, these ideal-types are useful for understanding 
how values are ordered: respect for authority might score higher for a politically and/or 
socially conservative individual than it might for a liberal, and, vice versa, concern for 
social justice (equality) and harm reduction might score higher for a liberal. This makes 
for a useful tool to assess the extent to which individuals who belong to multiple 
groups, with complex sets of  belonging and allegiances might develop their moral 
positions over time and through experience and, specifically, the way in which they 
relate with evidence in morality policies. 
The long term values shift from authoritarian to libertarian, together with the shift 
toward consumption oriented economies in advanced capitalist countries, should be 
reflected in drug and prostitution policy, giving way to more permissive, tolerant, 
individualistic and pleasure-oriented policies and laws. Yet this is neither linear nor 
straightforward. The presence of  competing moralities gives way to political and value 
conflicts. However, competing moralities should not be seen as equally powerful. A 
dominant morality is formalised into law. The ODZ·VUROHVWRHPEHGDQGFRGLI\GRPLQDQW
PRUDOLW\PXVWEHFRQVLGHUHG,QWKHQH[WVHFWLRQ,UHYLHZ+DEHUPDV·DUJXPHQWDERXW
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how bourgeois morality is formalised into law because the law is supported and 
supports in turn the underlying socio-economic and cultural system. 
5.7 Law and morality 
The role of  law in drug and prostitution policy is crucial: any given regulatory system is 
solidified through the law; any policy change at the level of  paradigm is enshrined 
within it. It is often the law that establishes the boundaries of  possible interventions, 
the law that defines right and wrong. Thus, the relationship between law and morality 
PXVWEHDGGUHVVHG+DEHUPDV· 7DQQHU/HFWXUHRQ+XPDQ9DOXHVHQWLWOHG ¶/DZ
DQG0RUDOLW\·SURYLGHVVRPHneeded reflection on the indivisibility of  law from a moral 
base. Habermas poses an important question: 
¶ZKHWKHUWKHOHJDOV\VWHPLQDQLQFUHDVLQJO\FRPSOH[VRFLHW\FDQDWDOOZLWKVWDQG
D KHLJKWHQHG WHQVLRQ >«@ EHWZHHQ QRUPDWLYH GHPDQGV DQG IXnctional 
requLUHPHQWV·1986: 250) 
By making manifest the link between morality and legitimacy of  the law, Habermas 
argues that: 
¶WKH OHJLWLPDF\ RI OHJDOLW\ FDQQRW EH H[SODLQHG LQ WHUPV RI VRPH LQGHSHQGHQW
rationality which, as it were, inhabits the form of law in a morally neutral 
PDQQHU· 
The implication here is that law is not objectively and neutrally rational, but rather, 
moral. In other words, often behind a rational guise, the law is an instrument of  moral 
force. For Habermas then, 
¶WKH OHJLWLPDF\RIERXUJHRLVIRUPDO ODZUHVXOWVQRWIURPLWVGHFODUHG´UDWLRQDOµ
characteristics but, at best, from certain moral implications that can be derived 
from those properties with the help of additional empirical assumptions 
regarding the structure and function of WKHXQGHUO\LQJHFRQRPLFV\VWHP·
225) 
For Habermas, the legitimacy of  formal law is supported by bourgeois morality that is 
VXSSRUWHG LQ WXUQE\ WKH ¶XQGHUO\LQJ HFRQRPLF V\VWHP· ,Q+DEHUPDV· XQGHUVWDQGLQJ
morality, ideology and the law appear as symbiotic. Principles underpin the rationality 
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of  legal provisions, and these principles may be opposing or conflicting and, as such, 
XQGHUJR¶GLVFXUVLYHWHVWLQJ· 
¶LQGLYLGXDOOHJDOSURYLVLRQVPXVWEHMXVWLILHGDVHOHPHQWVRIDOHJDOV\VWHPZKLFK
as a whole, is viewed as reasonable in the light of principles. These principles 
can come into conflict with one another and be exposed to discursive testing. 
However, the rationality that is brought to bear at this level of normative 
GLVFXVVLRQ>«@LVQRWPRUDOO\QHXWUDO· 
Habermas understands that different principles may come into conflict and these 
conflicts will be sustained rationally and morally. Habermas goes on to argue that 
preferred values are intrinsically tied with culture and traditions and expressed in a 
dominant moral-legal order. They are ¶YDOXHVZKLFK >«@FRPPHQG WKHPVHOYHV VR WR
speaNDVVXSHULRUWRRWKHUYDOXHV·(ibid). 
+DEHUPDVQRWHVWKDWSHQDOODZKDVEHHQDSSOLHGWR¶LQIRUPDO·VRFLDOFRQWUROLHPRUDO
regulation) (1986: 231), and that legal processes are open and subject to moral 
discourses (1986: 230). He highlights a mechanism by which the embeddedness of  
moral principles into their circumstances results in the lack of  a universal, impartial 
standard of  judgement: 
¶VLQFH PRUDl principles are always already immersed in concrete historical 
contexts of action, there can be no justification or assessment of norms 
DFFRUGLQJWRDXQLYHUVDOSURFHGXUHWKDWHQVXUHVLPSDUWLDOLW\· 
,W IROORZV WKDW ¶LQ WKHFODVKRI  YDOXHSUHIerences incapable of  further rationalization, 
the strongest interest will happen to be the RQHDFWXDOO\LPSOHPHQWHG·: 241). This 
point is fundamental, because it implies that values supporting a dominant morality, as 
embedded in the law, reflect existing socio-economic and ideological power structures and coincide 
ZLWK GRPLQDQW LQWHUHVWV 7KH SDVVDJH IURP PRUDOLW\ WR ODZ LV D QHFHVVDU\ VWHS ¶LQ DOO
spheres of  action where conflicts and pressures for regulation call for unambiguous, 
timely, and binding GHFLVLRQV·EHFDXVH¶OHJDOQRUPVPXVWDEVRUEWKHFRQWLQJHQFLHVWKDW
ZRXOG HPHUJH LI  PDWWHUV ZHUH OHIW WR VWULFWO\ PRUDO JXLGDQFH·   0RUDOLW\
embedded in law leaves little space for ambiguity, and shifts matters from the private 
into the public realm, from informal into formal and procedural decision-making.  
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5.7.1 Evidence, Values and Morality in Criminal Law: the case of the death penalty 
The criminal law is supposed to set a moral standard in order to deter people from 
activities that are considered to be wrong in principle; some of  these wrongful activities 
are related to religious morality and its denomination of  sins. The death penalty is one 
instance of  policy rooted in morality and authoritarian values. It is supposed to deter 
people from engaging in serious crime. However, a shift in societal level values from 
authoritarian to libertarian is likely to change perceptions on the death penalty from 
morally right to morally wrong. In order to justify a change in their moral position, 
people might seek alternative frames. What appears as a promising way to support a 
moral shift is to seek evidence to demonstrate that the death penalty fails as a deterrent, 
and therefore it is no longer justifiable as a policy. Tullock (1974) argues that there were 
no US studies investigating whether punishment acted as a crime deterrent up until the 
1950s, perhaps indicating that there were no concerns for establishing, or questioning, 
the instrumental value of  such a policy before then. In 1982, Tyler and Weber 
investigated public attitude to support for capital punishment in instrumental versus 
symbolic terms, and establish that support for punishment as symbolic enjoyed a 
broader consensus; accordingly at that point, the public was less concerned with 
instrumental evidence/function. 
The answers offered by different studies from that point onwards appear to conflict 
depending on the methods and ideas offered by different disciplines, with economists 
arguing for the success of  capital punishment as deterrent on the one hand, and 
sociologists and legal scholars arguing the opposite. There seems to be a consistent split 
in the literature on capital punishment which rests on disciplinary, methodological and 
normative lines. Certain disciplines, chiefly economics, provide evidence of  the success 
of  capital punishment as deterrent (e.g. Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd, 2006). Others argue 
against it on either instrumental or moral grounds (e.g. Steiker, 2005). This difference is 
likely to be at least partly dependent on the epistemological and methodological 
assumptions tied to different disciplines, and whether a given study pursues a particular 
normative stance. Perhaps a move towards concern for the instrumental/functional 
value of  the law as opposed to the symbolic is supported by a shifting moral foundation 
that is gathering consensus. Following Habermas and Inglehart, we may note that 
bourgeois morality is changing together with the socio-economic system that supports 
it, with increasing dominance of  liberal values supported by economic changes in 
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advanced liberal states. Thus, formal law begins to be targeted as it is no longer imbued 
ZLWKJRRGSURSHUGRPLQDQWPRUDOYDOXHV6WDUWLQJIURP,QJOHKDUW·VWKHVLVDERXW
social, cultural and economic patterns of  change concurring to support societal level 
YDOXHV· VKLIW Irom authoritarian to liberal, it becomes clear that any justification for 
extreme punitive approaches such as the death penalty as both symbolically and 
instrumentally necessary might lose consensus. 
Mooney and Lee (2000: 224) stress the importance of  the distinction across morality 
SROLFLHV LQ ¶WKH OHYHORI SXEOLFFRQVHQVXVRQ WKHYDOXHVDWVWDNH·. Their study provides 
some useful insight into the connection between values and morality policy. Specifically, 
they focus RQ ¶ZKRVHYDOXHV DQGZKLFKYDOXHV DUH UHIOHFWHG· )RFXVLQJRQ
public values as reported in national survey data, these authors note how the abolition 
of  the death penalty occurred contrary to majority public opinion. In this case, policy 
change ZDV¶FRXQWHU-PDMRULWDULDQ·7KLVLVSDUWO\H[SODLQHGE\WKHIDFWWKDWUDWKHUWKDQ
UHO\LQJRQFLWL]HQV·YDOXHVSROLF\-makers relied on interest groups as representatives of  
SXEOLF YDOXHV   :KHQ DVNLQJ ¶ZKLFK YDOXHV GR SROLF\-makers reflect in 
SROLF\"·0RRQH\DQG/HHPDNHXVHRI WKHFRQVHUYDWLYHOLEHUDOVFDOHWRVKRZWKDWDOEHLW
imprecise, this political cleavage is more or less predictive of  attitudes towards the death 
penalty, with supportive conservatives and opposing liberals (p. 228). This is particularly 
LQWHUHVWLQJLQUHODWLRQWRWKHIDFWWKDWWKHVWXG\·VK\SRWKHVLVUHVWVRQWKHDVVXPSWLRQWKDW
the mass public, more than either activists or elected officials, impacts morality policy 
(p. 229). Hence, Mooney and Lee set out to measure liberalism and conservatism 
prevalence amongst the mass public in different US states to then understand whose 
values were determinant in changes in death penalty policy. They find that the influence 
of  the public versus activists varies according to whether morality policy is characterised 
by consensus (where the former prevails) or contention (where the latter prevails) (p. 
232). There is no attention given to the policy-PDNHUV·YDOXHVDQGRSLQLRQVWKHPVHOYHV
and how these may shape morality policy outcomes. Mooney and Lee conclude by 
VWDWLQJ WKDW ¶SROLF\-maker responsiveness to public values needs to be explored in a 
PRUH VXEWOH IDVKLRQ·   VLQFH DV LW VWDQGV WKHUH LV QR UHVHDUFK RQ PRUDOLW\
SROLF\ ZKLFK PHDVXUHV WKH LQWHUSOD\ EHWZHHQ ¶VRFLDO DQG SHUVRQDO YDOXHV· DQG ¶WKH
content and direction of  policy-PDNLQJ·+HLFKHOHWDO2013: 237).  
0DU\ 'RXJODV· DUJXPHQW DERXW WKH V\PEROLF DQG IXQFWLRQDO UROHV RI  FXVWRPDU\
practices in primitive societies further elucidates the complex interplay between 
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morality, ideology, values and beliefs which are formalised into purity and danger 
categories.  
5.8 Morality, order and disgust through purity and danger categories 
0DU\'RXJODV·VHPLQDOZRUNPurity and Danger (1966) exposes the connection between 
human ritualistic/religious practices and human need for ordering things and actions 
into categories of  clean and dirty, pure and dangerous, hygienic and unhygienic. 
Douglas notes how the categorisation of  pollution, like the law, works on two levels; 
one instrumental and one expressive (1966: 3). In the absence of  scientific reasoning, 
this process of  categorisation finds its proof  in belief, rather than science. Purity and 
GDQJHUFDWHJRULHVDUH OLNHO\ WRHQWHUDQGVKDSHWKHPRUHVRI DJLYHQVRFLHW\ ¶WKXVZH
find that certain moral values are upheld and certain social rules defined by beliefs in 
GDQJHURXVFRQWDJLRQ·'RXJODV$OWKRXJK'RXJODVLVDQDQWKURSRORJLVWDQGDV
VXFK KHU IRFXV LV RQ ¶SULPLWLYH· VRFLHWLHV KHU FRQWHQWLRQV DUH YDOLG DQG DSSOLFDEOH WR
contemporary attitudes and beliefs about purity and danger. She speaks of  some 
societies where the contact of  sexual fluids is considered to endanger both sexes, and 
yet others where simple bodily contact is dangerous. This idea can be stretched to a 
context where the simple injection of  a fluid, or ingestion of  a liquid can turn the 
SHUVRQIURPSXUH WRSROOXWHGDQG WKHLUPRUDOFKDUDFWHU IURPDQJHOLF WRGHPRQLF ¶VR
DOVRFDQWKHSURFHVVRI LQJHVWLRQSRUWUD\SROLWLFDODEVRUSWLRQ·1966: 4). 
Douglas criticizes medical materialism for reducing and reifying rituals, as if  their only 
basis was pragmatic to the extent that they could not involve multiple objectives. The 
LVVXH RI  PHGLFDO PDWHULDOLVP LV LPSRUWDQW ZKHQ DVVHVVLQJ WKH FRJHQF\ RI  ´HYLGHQFH-
EDVHGµDUJXPHQts in relation to drug and prostitution policy, since their main focus is 
primarily instrumental, at the expense of  consideration of  the symbolic role of  the law 
in upholding the moral order. Douglas posits a difference between hygiene rituals and 
purifying rituals, where one is instrumental and the other symbolic. Accordingly: ¶LW LV
one thing to point out the side benefits of  ritual actions, and another thing to be 
content with using the by-SURGXFWV DV D VXIILFLHQW H[SODQDWLRQ·   'RXJODV
argues that purity and danger categories are necessary to construct a social hierarchy: 
¶PDQ\ LGHDV DERXW VH[XDO GDQJHUV DUH EHWWHU LQWHUSUHWHG DV V\PEROV RI WKH
relation between parts of society, as mirroring designs of hierarchy and 
symmetry which apply in the ODUJHUVRFLDOV\VWHP· 
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7KLVVXVWDLQV+DEHUPDV·DUJXPHQWDERXWWKHV\PELRWLFUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQGRPLQDQW
ideology, morality and law by way of  construction of  interdependent hierarchies that 
are sustained by economic, ideological, legal, scientific and moral bases. For example, if  
the prostitute is regarded as a dangerous category, then belief  about contagion does not 
simply rest on medical/scientific grounds. The prostitute can be regarded as polluting 
because she carries disease, from a medical/scientific standpoint. However, the 
prostitute can be polluting from a moral point of  view; her very existence and visibility 
SROOXWHVWKHPRUDOILEUHRI WKRVHZKRDUHH[SRVHG7KLVLVVXSSRUWHGE\DYLHZRI ¶WKH
prostitute as transgressive, transforming a moral landscape into an immoral landscape 
E\WKHLUSUHVHQFHDORQH·+XEEDUG1998: 65). 
Studies of  prostitution in Victorian England highlight the symbolic meaning assigned to 
WKH ILJXUHRI  WKHSURVWLWXWHQRWRQO\DV DYHFWRU IRUGLVHDVHEXW DOVRDV ¶the immoral 
CPDUJLQ·FUXFLDOIRUGHILQLQJWKHPRUDOCFHQWUH·· (Hubbard, 1998: 58). Science can, and 
does, provide ammunition to sustain policies that are founded upon a certain morality 
because it is socially and culturally embedded. The assumption that, due to the 
supposed higher number of  sexual encounters, prostitutes were diseased was supported 
by the medical establishment, although little evidence about transmission was available 
at the time (Hubbard, 1998: 59). This same assumption continues to figure in the social 
imagery about prostitution, despite the fact that, for example, evidence has dispelled the 
myth of  high incidence of  HIV in the female sex working population (excluding 
injecting drug users) in Australia and the UK (Harcourt et al, 2010; Lee et al, 2004; Platt 
et al, 2013; Ward et al, 1999,Q'RXJODV·FDVHVEHOLHIVDERXWPRUDOSXULW\FROOLGHGZLWK
beliefs about hygiene, as their aim was ensuring a certain social order. As Douglas puts 
it, 
¶LGHDV DERXW VHSDUDWLQJ SXULI\LQJ GHPDUFDWLQJ DQG punishing transgressions 
have as their main function to impose system on an inherently untidy 
experience. It is only by exaggerating the difference between within and without, 
above and below, male and female, with and against, that a semblance of order 
iVFUHDWHG· 
,Q WKH FRQWH[W RI  SURVWLWXWLRQ +XEEDUG DUJXHV WKDW ¶WKH ERXQGDULHV EHWZHHQ
domesticised femininity and the unfettered sexuality of  the street were constructed and 
maintained through the discursive identification of  prostitutes as dirty and dangerous, a 
WKUHDWWRERXUJHRLVVRFLHW\·$FFRUGLQJO\¶FRQWUDGLFWRU\LPDJHVRI GHVLUHDQG
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GLVJXVW·LELGDUHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHRI LQWHUQDOFRQIOLFWEHWZHHQGHVLUHDQGPRUDOLW\%RWK
drugs and prostitution symbolise this very contradiction between pleasure/desire on the 
one hand, and danger/pollution on the other.5 
+DLGW DUJXHV WKDW LPPRUDO EHKDYLRXU WULJJHUV GLVJXVW ¶LPPRUDOLW\ PDNHV XV IHHO
physically dirty, and cleansing ourselves can sometimes make us more concerned about 
guarding our mRUDOSXULW\·2012: 71). This does not provide sufficient explanation as to 
how human beings create and practice ideas of  clean and dirty, reducing these to some 
sort of  animal instinct. Haidt argues that 
¶PRUDO MXGJHPHQW LV QRW D SXUHO\ FHUHEUDO DIIDLU LQ which we weight concerns 
DERXWKDUPVULJKWVDQGMXVWLFH,W·VDNLQGRIUDSLGDXWRPDWLFSURFHVVPRUHDNLQ
to the judgements animals make as they move through the world, feeling 
themselves drawn toward or aZD\IURPYDULRXVWKLQJV·2012: 72). 
Douglas provides a much needed sociological framework to the clean/dirty dichotomy, 
JRLQJEH\RQGPRUDOSV\FKRORJ\·VPHWKRGRORJLFDOLQGLYLGXDOLVP7KHSXULW\DQGGDQJHU
dichotomy neatly fits morality policies because it translates well into dominant moral 
positions of  right/wrong behaviour needed to maintain a given social order. In the 
context of  prostitution, the 
¶HOLVLRQ EHWZHHQ SK\VLFDO DQG PRUDO LPSXULW\ UHLQIRUFHG GHHS-seated anxieties 
and fears about prostitution, as the prostitute came to symbolise the division of 
society into high and low ² the civilised and the grotesque ² through a series of 
PHWDSKRUVRIWKHERG\PRUDOLW\DQGWRSRJUDSK\·+XEEDUG 
Social order is maintained through the formalisation of  rules and the categorisation of  
purity away from danger. In contemporary society, the criminal law is called upon to 
formalise social mores and customs, to distinguish right from wrong, pure from 
dangerous, and to deter dangerous, impure behaviour. Science and medicine are called 
upon to cure, to purify impurity, and to prevent dangerous behaviour. The boundary 
between unhygienic and impure is often blurred, because science and medicine do not 
exist outside of  social mores.  
                                                 
5 Throughout the thesis, I concentrate on female prostitution. I acknowledge that prostitution cuts across gender 
and involves men (homosexual men and transgender people primarily); however, the social imagery of the 
prostitute concentrates almost exclusively on women, often selling sex on the street or in public places. This 
particular category of sex worker attracts the most attention from policy makers, the public, and abolitionist 
feminists, and is thus the main focus of discussion.  
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5.9 A complex framework: the interplay of ideology and morality  
It is only by relating values and beliefs to morality and ideology that we may obtain an 
accurate analytical framework. Having constructed morality as a working concept, and 
having argued that morality and ideology are mutually supportive, we need to pay 
further attention to ideology. In the extended glossary of  working concepts (appendix 
1), ideology is presented according to different traditions: the critical/Marxist; the 
psychology/motivational; and the analytical philosophical approach to its morphology. 
Each of  these interpretations of  ideology is valuable; yet, when using the term, scholars 
often fail to define their particular interpretation consistently and precisely. I have 
acknowledged the usefulness of  the critical Marxist notion of  ideology in the context 
of  the coinciding of  dominant interests with a dominant morality in support of  extant 
socio-economic hierarchies and power asymmetries (Habermas, 1986). Liberalism and 
conservatism have so far been conceptualised as moral and political positions; yet, they 
should also be viewed as ideologies in the sense of  an organised systems of  concepts, 
values, beliefs and attitudes that are institutionalised, shared and purposive (Rokeach, 
1968; Jost, 2006). There are two aspects which should receive further attention: the first 
involves discussion of  how ideologies operate as motivational at both the cognitive and 
the affective level (Jost, 2006; Jost et al, 2009). The second involves discussion of  how 
LGHRORJLHV ¶EHKDYH· WKURXJK D PRUSKRORJLFDO DSSURDFK )UHHGHQ  7KLV 
subsequently enables the construction of  a complex interplay between morality, 
ideology and affect. 
-RVWGHILQHVLGHRORJ\DV¶DEHOLHI V\VWHPRI WKHLQGLYLGXDOWKDWLVW\SLFDOO\VKDUHGZLWKDQ
identifiable group and that organises, motivates, and gives meaning to political 
EHKDYLRXU· 006: 653). Here, the emphasis is placed on the organisational and 
PRWLYDWLRQDO DVSHFWV RI  LGHRORJ\ EHFDXVH ¶HYHU\ GHILQLWLRQ RI  DQ LGHRORJLFDO EHOLHI 
system carries with it certain assumptions concerning its degree of  cognitive 
RUJDQLVDWLRQ DIIHFWLYH DQG PRWLYDWLRQDO TXDOLWLHV DQG FDSDFLW\ IRU LQVWLJDWLQJ DFWLRQ·
(ibid). When thinking about classic political cleavages, Jost et al (2003) find that there 
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Jost et al (2009) argue that ideologies are essential political and organisational 
mechanisms because they offer precise benefits: they provide a sense of  certainty, 
coupled with a sense of  security and shared solidarity, akin to the need for ordering 
categories noted by Douglas. Jost et al design a useful schema to describe the 
motivational substructure that makes ideologies both appealing and necessary for 
individuals. This motivational base includes cognitive and affective components 
alongside socialisation and is detailed in the figure below. 
Figure 3: Motivational substructure, discursive superstructure and consequences of 
political ideology (Source: Jost et al 2009) 
 
It appears as though cognitive, affective and social substructures all contribute to 
making political ideologies not only attractive, but also necessary as sense-making and 
group-binding mechanisms. Among other ILQGLQJV ZKLFK HPHUJH IURP -RVW HW DO·V
review (2009: 327ZKLFK LV LQ OLQHZLWKERWK/DNRII ·VDQG+DLGW·V ILQGLQJV LVWKHVR-
FDOOHGFRQVHUYDWLVPDGYDQWDJHRU WKH ¶SV\FKRORJLFDOKHDG VWDUW·RI  FRQVHUYDWLVP ¶RYHU
LWV PRUH FULWLFDO ULYDOV· $FFRUGLQJO\ ¶FRQVHUYDWLYH VW\OHV DQG RSLQLRQV DUH JHQHUDOO\
VLPSOHUPRUHLQWHUQDOO\FRQVLVWHQWDQGOHVVVXEMHFWWRDPELJXLW\·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¶VWXGLHV VKRZ WKDW MXVWLI\LQJ WKH VWDWXV TXR VHUYHV WKH SDOOLDWLYH IXQFWLRQ RI
increasing positive affect, decreasing negative affect, and making people happier 
in general, but it also undermines support for social change and the 
UHGLVWULEXWLRQRIUHVRXUFHV·2009: 320). 
This basic positive affective function of  maintaining the status quo can be intuitively 
justified as warding off  fear/anxiety about change; yet its logical consequence is the 
continued support of  the status quo. This is significant in the context of  morality 
policy, and begs the question: why has the apparent shift in societal level values from 
authoritarian to libertarian, supported by the underlying socio-economic shift toward 
consumption based economies and dominant neo-liberal ideology not yet fostered a 
definitive break from the moralism of  prohibition? It might be that a morally 
FRQVHUYDWLYH´KXQJRYHUHIIHFWµLVDWOHDVWpartly sustained by the conservative advantage. 
Yet, this seems overly simplistic; there is a need for considering the manner in which 
ideological formations are internally contradictory, changeable entities. 
Both Freeden (2006) and Thomson (1990) highlight how the study of  ideology has 
fallen prey to criticism, as the term ideology becomes imbued with negative 
connotations. Their proposed solutions are different yet both useful. Thompson calls 
for a reinstatement of  ideology in the critical Marxist tradition, as a tool to describe and 
analyse asymmetrical power relations. Freeden (1994) on the other hand adopts a 
morphological approach, making ideological formations the very object of  analysis. 
Both these conceptions of  ideology are useful because, whereas one deals with the 
establishment and validation of  social, cultural and economic hierarchies breeding 
power asymmetry, the other deals with the inner workings of  ideologies as complex 
constructs of  political concepts whose form is both time and group bound. These two 
approaches are complementary, because whereas the former allows identifying how 
¶PHDQLQJ· LV FRQVWUXFWHG DQG XVHG ¶LQ WKH VHUYLFH RI  SRZHU· 7KRPSVRQ  D
morphological approach to ideology allows analysis of  how ideological constructs are 
varied and changeable, how their defining features mirror different individuals and 
JURXSV·FRQVWUXFWVDQGH[SHULHQFHVDVZHOODVKRZEURDGHUVRFLR-cultural and economic 
changes are reflected in ideological morphologies. 
Starting from an analysis of  the morphology of  political concepts and then extending it 
to ideological constructs, Freeden (1994: 155DUJXHVWKDW LGHRORJLHV ¶DUHFRPELQDWLRQV
of  political concepts organisHGLQDSDUWLFXODUZD\·. So for instance, the morphology of  
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liberalism, its content, its core and peripheral concepts change according to individuals, 
groups and contexts. More complex ideological constructs that bring together 
apparently conflicting concepts, such as social liberalism, or libertarian conservatism, 
can be better understood if  these aspects are taken into consideration. Freeden argues 
WKDW¶FHQWUDOWRDQ\DQDO\VLVRI LGHRORJLHVLVWKHSURSRVLWLRQWKDWWKH\DUHFKDUDFWHULVHG
E\ D PRUSKRORJ\ WKDW GLVSOD\V FRUH DGMDFHQW DQG SHULSKHUDO FRQFHSWV·  
Freeden uses the notions of  logical adjacency and cultural adjacency as necessarily distinct in 
order to explain different morphologies. Each political concept will have ineliminable 
components and both logically and culturally adjacent components. Giving the example 
of  liEHUW\ KH LGHQWLILHV LWV LQHOLPLQDEOH FRPSRQHQW DV ¶QRQ-FRQVWUDLQW· KH WKHQ OLVWV
VRPH ORJLFDOO\ DGMDFHQW FRPSRQHQWV ¶DXWRQRP\ VHOI-determination, self-development 
DQG SRZHU· QRWLQJ WKDW WKHVH PD\ RU PD\ QRW EH LQFOXGHG LQ FRQFHSWLRQV RI  OLEHUW\
depending on the context because each of  these concepts are themselves contested 
(1994: 151). 
&RQWUDU\ WR SROLWLFDO FRQFHSWV LGHRORJLHV ¶DUH QRW W\SLILHG E\ RQH FHQWUDO RUJDQLVLQJ
concept; in fact, they can invariably be described as having more than one core 
cRQFHSW·)RUH[DPSOH¶VRPHVRFLDOLVWVZLOOVWUHVVHTXDOLW\DVWKHLUPRVWLPSRUWDQWFRUH
FRQFHSW RWKHUV ZHOIDUH WKH FODVV VWUXJJOH· )UHHGHQ   &RUH FRQFHSWV DUH
non-specific, differently arranged and differently affected by adjacent and peripheral 
concepts. Concepts will necessarily develop according to logical and cultural adjacency, 
forming 
¶RYHUODSSLQJ DQG VKDUHG DUHDV ZKLFK WKHQ UHDFW EDFN RQ WKHLU VHSDUDWH
ineliminable components to constitute full but mutually dependent concepts. 
These mutually influential relationships exist among the manifold concepts that 
PDNHXSDQ LGHRORJLFDO V\VWHPDQG WKHVH ¶VSDFLDO· VWUXFWXUDOQHWZRUNVJLYHWKH
LGHRORJ\LWVGLVWLQJXLVKLQJIHDWXUHV·)UHHGHQ 
Acknowledging this complex internal back and forth is useful to appreciate the 
malleability and changeability of  any given ideological system, and do away with static 
notions which, although useful as ideal types, poorly reflect the reality of  ideological 
formations. 
In terms of  the relationship between concepts, values, beliefs and affect in sustaining 
ideologies, Freeden highlights how an: 
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¶LGHRORJLFDO DUJXPHQW ZKLOH QRW QHFHVVDULO\ LJQRULQJ ORJLFDO DGMDFHQFLHV ZLOO
allow, by relying heavily on the notion of cultural adjacency, a socially situated 
and partisan value-arbitrated choice among adjacent components, and the result 
will display various mixes of rational criteria, emotional inclinations and cultural value-
preferences·HPSKDVLVDGGHG 
This is relevant because it establishes a necessary connection between political concepts, 
values, beliefs and affect for ideological survival, making cultural adjacency its principal 
arbiter. Values and beliefs contain ideational, cognitive and affective components 
(Williams, 1979). Values are abstract-aspirational goals that are always characterised by a 
particular direction (Rokeach; 1979), and beliefs are action-oriented but potentially 
FRQWHVWDEOH7KHVHQHHGWREH¶GHFRQWHVWHG·)UHHGHQDQGSODFHGLQUHODWLRQZLWK
each other in order to form a relatively coherent whole, a constellation, which allows for 
meaning, purpose and at least relative incontestability, which can subsequently support a 
position and a decision.  
Viewing ideology through critical Marxist lenses makes evident the collision of  a 
dominant morality with dominant interests, both of  which are embedded in the law 
(Habermas, 1986). It also provides the tools to recognise how existing power 
asymmetries marginalise certain groups who are considered undeserving and immoral. 
Viewing ideology motivationally brings out the sub-structural cognitive, affective and 
VRFLDOFRPSRQHQWVZKLFKJUDQWLGHRORJLHVWKHLUUDLVRQG·HWUHDWWKHLQGLYLGXDOOHYHO7KLV
also aids the explanation of  distinctions at the level of  classic political cleavages. 
Viewing ideology morphologically brings out its complex, malleable, culture and group 
bound nature. It also clarifies the existence of  hybrid ideological formations that 
contain within them potentially clashing concepts, advancing the possibility of  
exploring seemingly internally contradictory moral and political positions, particularly 
useful in explaining advocacy coalitions. This favours an approach to analysis that takes 
into consideration the connection of  ideology and morality by way of  observing the 
interplay of  values and beliefs. The purpose of  this approach is to move beyond 
accounts that compartmentalise science and evidence away from values, beliefs, 
morality, politics and ideology, engaging in normative judgement founded upon the 
premise that science and evidence are immune to all of  the above. Science itself  has a 
moral basis, a political purpose, and is organised ideologically; it is informed by values 
and enacted through beliefs, like the one in evidence-based policy. 
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5.10 Conclusion 
The role of  perceived shared values in morality policy-making is crucial; values are the 
very things that bind imagined communities together. Meier (1999: 691-2) reminds us 
WKDW ¶SHRSOH OLYH LQ OLNH-communities and are likely to believe that most people share 
theLUYDOXHV9LVLEOHGHPRQVWUDWLRQV WR WKHFRQWUDU\ LPSO\RQH·VYDOXHV DUH WKUHDWHQHG·
,Q'RXJODV·GLVFXVVLRQSULPLWLYHVRFLHWLHVVKRZHGWHQGHQFLHVWRDSSO\FDWHJRULHV
of  purity and danger for both instrumental and symbolic purposes. Impure or 
dangerous behaviour was publicly discouraged, and rules were formally enforced by the 
social body even in the absence of  a formal legal system. Moral psychology would 
contend that there is a strong, emotional/affective component to morality, with 
conservative morality more likely to be mobilised by fear/anxiety, and liberal morality 
more likely to rely on empathy. In the context of  morality policies, when vindicating 
punishment of  dangerous categories, basic emotions such as fear and anxiety are relied 
upon to call for stances that would ensure the protection, safety and security of  pure 
ones: the children, the wives, the families. Emotional empathy provides the foundation 
to a liberal morality, and thus supports stances of  care for those who cannot care for 
themselves. In criminal law, morality is often overt, and categories of  pure and 
dangerous are overtly assigned. Drugs and sex pose an internal conflict between 
desire/pleasure-seeking and danger/pollution. This conflict is not easily resolved, yet it 
seems logical to assume that those who espouse a liberal morality, because of  its 
characteristic features, would be more prone to accept and tolerate these behaviours as 
well as engaging in them, if  compared to their conservative counterparts. 
Overtly moral discourse simplifies complex issues and is often dichotomous and 
FDWHJRULFDO ZKLFK LQ SV\FKRORJ\ LV UHIHUUHG WR DV ¶WKH FRQVHUYDWLYH DGYDQWDJH· LW LV
powerful because of  its simplicity. Certain sciences, and indeed medicine, are supported 
by a moral foundation which is likely to be concerned with the care of  others. Science 
also offers the tools to study the instrumental impact of  law. The evidence-based policy 
discourse supports a shift away from the symbolic and towards the instrumental. 
Science can potentially serve to counter the image of  the prostitute as diseased, and 
impure, or of  the drug user as criminal, sick, or even demonic. This does not mean that 
science is necessarily liberal, or indeed liberating. Science does not exist outside of  social 
mores, and as such it is regarded as both potentially emancipatory and potentially 
moralistic. Scientific evidence supporting a view of  the drug user as diseased and 
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dysfunctional can turn into further justification for prohibition. Two frames can operate 
in tandem. For example, the security and public order frame can coalesce with the 
health and social frame to support a particular moral and legal regime even if  their 
character is not overtly moralised. Scientific arguments can be used to turn manifest 
morality into latent morality, by apparently neutralising inherently moral and emotionally 
charged rhetoric.  
The disambiguation of  the concepts of  morality and ideology and their definition at 
both the analytical and structural levels is a necessary step to construct a theoretical 
framework that emphasises values, beliefs and affect as constitutive of  morality, while 
also acknowledging the continued validity of  existing explanations that emphasise the 
function of  ideology in sustaining power asymmetries. 
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Chapter 6  
ƋƵĂůŝƚĂƚŝǀĞĐŽŵƉĂƌĂƚŝǀĞĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĂŶĚĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I discuss the value of  a qualitative case-based comparative approach. I 
outline the criteria for the choice of  cases, as well as the usefulness of  adaptive theory 
as an approach to data analysis. This thesis focuses on two case studies- drug 
FRQVXPSWLRQURRPVDQGEURWKHOV· ODZVDQGUHJXODWLRQ ² in two policy domains ² drug 
and prostitution policy ² in two regions ² England (UK) and New South Wales 
(Australia). I identify cases as policy interventions. The principle of  relational embeddedness 
of  cases outlined in this chapter justifies the focus on policy interventions as connected 
to overall policy ideas (appendix 1). I argue that, in these policy domains, different 
interventions in different countries and regions at different times may respond to 
opposing logics (decriminalisation and criminalisation).  
I outline the rationale for the data collection strategy and engage in some critical 
reflections on its limitations, as well as the ethical issues anticipated and those 
encountered in the research process. I describe the sample of  participants by focusing 
on some of  their attributes. I note that many participants have multiple professional 
backgrounds and diverse experience; using a diagram as a visualisation tool shows the 
overlaps between professions in the sample.  
Having justified the use of  values and beliefs as working concepts (Chapter 4) and as 
partly constitutive of  morality (Chapter 5), I outline the criteria for analysing values and 
beliefs relevant to the policy areas. Finally, I discuss the usefulness of  visualising 
value/belief  constellations through network analysis tools, by generating networks for 
each comparative dimension.  
6.2 The nature of a case 
In the 1992 edited collection What is a Case? Charles Ragin identified a certain lack of 
theorising around the nature of a case, and more generally, the methodological and 
epistemological implications of case-study research: 
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¶7R WKH TXHVWLRQ ´:KDW LV D FDVH"µ PRVW VRFLDO VFLHQWLVWV ZRXOG have to give 
multiple answers. A case may be theoretical or empirical or both; it may be a 
relatively bounded object or a process; and it may be generic and universal or 
VSHFLILFLQVRPHZD\·1992: 3).  
This versatility of the meaning of case is both its weakness and its strength. This is 
because, whilst its vagueness can make it easy prey to criticism, it can also be 
purposefully and systematically stretched to fit a diverse range of research designs and 
questions. In this project I found it theoretically useful and appropriate to match case 
with policy. 7KLVLVEHFDXVH¶WKHHVVHQFHRIDFDVHVWXG\WKHFHQWUDOWHQGHQF\DPRQJDOO
types of case study, is that it tries to illuminate a decision or a set of decisions: why they 
were taken, how they were implemHQWHGDQGZLWKZKDWUHVXOW·6FKUDPPLQ<LQ
12). Following this definition, it could be argued that a case study fits well with 
investigating policy precisely because, if policy and policy-making is understood, in 
broad terms, as a decision-making process, then the case study is an appropriate 
research tool to understand policy. Not only is a case versatile, lending itself to a wide 
array of applications, it is also relational. Although cases, and policies, can be artificially 
isolated for analytical purposes, the reality is that no case stands alone and in isolation. 
Similarly, policy-making happens within a political environment, and is messy, complex, 
and relational by its very nature. &DVHVDUHGHILQHGDV¶IX]]\UHDOLWLHVZLWKDXWRQRPRXVO\
definHG FRPSOH[ SURSHUWLHV· DQG ¶DV HQJDJHG LQ D SHUSHWXDO GLDORJXH ZLWK WKHLU
HQYLURQPHQW·$EERWW7KLVLPSOLHVWKDWFDVHVDUHQRWVLPSO\´RXWWKHUHµEXW
are in continuous relation with context and theory, as they are chosen, subsequently 
narrativized, and interact with both theory and environment at every step of the 
research process. They are relational and context-dependent. 
Yin uses the metaphor of a scientific experiment to justify the possibility of 
generalization from a single case study in order to counter criticism from quantitatively 
and statistically inclined scholars. This is sustained by White, who himself uses the 
scientific experiment metaphor to assert the validity of cases in terms of their potential 
for generalization (1992: 87). YLQ SRLQWV RXW WKDW ¶FDVH VWXGLHV OLNH H[SHULPHQWV DUH
JHQHUDOL]DEOHWRWKHRUHWLFDOSURSRVLWLRQVDQGQRWWRSRSXODWLRQVRUXQLYHUVHV·
A case study is, in many ways, equivalent to an experiment. Furthermore, Yin argues 
that there is a fundamentDOGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQ¶VWDWLVWLFDOJHQHUDOLVDWLRQ·RUJHQHUDOLVLQJ
WRDSRSXODWLRQDQG¶DQDO\WLFJHQHUDOLVDWLRQ·ZKLFKIRUDFDVHVWXG\ZRXOGWUDQVODWHLQWR
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WKHDFWRIFRPSDULQJWKHRYHUDUFKLQJWKHRU\WRLWV¶HPSLULFDOUHVXOWV·-3). This 
is the type of generalisation that I aim to pursue. It is neither opposed to nor is it 
necessarily invalidating of statistical generalization, but simply better suited to tackle 
certain types of questions. 
Having established the relational nature of a case, and the relative strength of the case-
policy analogy, we can move on to further define the possibility for analytic 
generalisation with particular reference to multiple case study comparison. Multiple case 
designs are preferable for several reasons. They can oIIHU ¶DQDO\WLF EHQHILWV· ¶GLUHFW
UHSOLFDWLRQ·DQG¶H[WHUQDOJHQHULVDELOLW\·<LQ5HSOLFDWLRQVKRXOGQRWEHVHHQ
DVWKHRQO\FULWHULDIRUVHOHFWLRQDV<LQSRLQWVRXW¶\RXPD\KDYHGHOLEHUDWHO\VHOHFWHG
your two cases because they offered contrasting situations, and you were not seeking a 
GLUHFWUHSOLFDWLRQ·7KLVLVEHFDXVHLQ case study research, contrast can offer 
further analytical benefits than similarity as it allows for consideration of contradictory 
or contingent aspects, and therefore does not systematically exclude contrasting 
elements for the purpose of a non-controversial, linear narrative. One may be looking 
explicitly for contrast rather than similarity, and this would be justified in terms of 
theoretical replication, rather than literal replication. The very idea of replication may 
become redundant if the criteria for generalization are purely analytical/theoretical 
rather than literal. In practice, this means that one or more cases that strongly contrast 
with other cases are theoretically significant.  
Looking at different areas, and different embedded levels, in a comparative fashion can 
offer considerable insight on the basis of pre-established criteria. This in turn can open 
up the scope for theory generation, theory testing, and analytic generalisation. It is 
essential to understand cases on all levels as relational, in constant dialogue with their 
´HQYLURQPHQWµ DQG LQ D IHHGEDFN ORRS ZLWK WKH WKHRUHWLFDO DVVXPSWLRQV DQG
propositions posed at the outset. 
Rhioux (2011: 59) asks,  
¶ZKDW LV WKH FRUUHFW OHYHO DWZKLFK WKH FDVHV VKRXOGEHGHILQHGHPSLULFDOO\ IRU
policy oriented comparative analysis? One way to proceed is to articulate the 
local, subnational and national levels. Another way is to move away from 
obvious (or more convenient?) case boundaries ² from obvious administrative 
or political-institutional boundaries (e.g. municipalities, districts, states, 
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countries) to boundaries that are more directly relevant in the policy field in 
TXHVWLRQ· 
Through relational embeddedness, cases might reflect different levels and mechanisms 
of governance while simultaneously being more specifically relevant to the policy areas 
under scrutiny. This is reflected in the following discussion of criteria for case selection.  
6.3 Comparability 
A comparative design is appropriate given the aims and theoretical approach adopted in 
this study because it examines the similarities and differences in the way evidence is 
used, understood, and applied to inform policy interventions within different political 
and institutional settings and in different policy domains. Comparability is defined in 
WHUPV RI FRQWUDVW DQG VLPLODULW\ DV ORJLFDO LQGLFDWRUV IROORZLQJ WKH ORJLF RI -6 0LOOV·
(1843) method of difference. In Varese's study of Mafias on the Move, the author 
systematically selects cases on the basis of whether transplantation (of illicit activities by 
criminal syndicates from one place to another) is successful or unsuccessful in order to 
gauge those factors that facilitate it (2011: 29). This enables analytical generalisation on 
the basis of contrasting successful and unsuccessful stories. In this instance, it is clear 
that both contrast and similarity are foundational to multiple-case comparison.  
As comparison takes place at different levels of  analysis, there is a need to define units 
and sub-XQLWV $Q HPEHGGHG DSSURDFK <LQ  SRSXODWHG E\ ´ODUJHUµ XQLWV DQG
´VPDOOHUµ VXE-units contained within them and in constant relation with them, is the 
most appropriate. Comparability informs this research design at all levels, and serves to 
justify the choice of  countries (AUS/UK), policy sectors (Drugs/Prostitution), as well 
as the policy-cases themselves which are interventions nested within each policy sector 
and considered in relation to both countries. This design allows for the relational realist 
logic to emerge (Chapter 4). The relational embeddedness principle entails D ´QHVWHG-
GROOµ HIIHFWZKHUHE\ FDVHV DUH HPEHGGHG LQ RWKHU FDVHV 7KH SROLF\ DUHDV GUXJV DQG
prostitution, will be represented by a smaller policy unit (a specific intervention). These 
in turn will be embedded in the larger units ² the policy ideas ² decriminalisation and 
criminalisDWLRQ7KHSRWHQWLDOIRUDQDO\WLFJHQHUDOLVDWLRQUHVWVRQWKHUHVHDUFKHU·VDELOLW\
to impose a continuous back and forth between the case and its environment. In this 
way the cases, at all levels, are always seen as relational.  
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6.4 The case studies 
A number of cases were considered for selection according to broad criteria (following 
Gerring and Thomas, 2005, and Gerring, 2006)1: 
Comparability: across countries, across field/policy areas, across cases. This is the key 
criterion, understood in terms of contrast and similarity. Comparability can be 
descriptive, literal, or causal. It is case-centred. Within a case, different levels of change 
FDQ EH FRPSDUHG LH OHJLVODWLYH FKDQJH Y FKDQJH WR DJHQF\·V JXLGHOLQHVstrategy/
implementation) 
Contemporaneity: time limited, could respond to different stages of policy, (i.e. debate, 
planning, monitoring and evaluation) as long as the time-frame is pre-established. 
Comparative-historical is viable as long as time and space are previously defined. It is 
relevant to use non-contemporary cases as a comparative element to the central case.  
The issue of contemporaneity deserves some unpacking; one case can be both 
contemporary and historical. A particular intervention might be proposed at different 
times, it may be piloted and discarded or implemented, and then resurface elsewhere. 
The cases under consideration are both retrospective and prospective, depending on 
time and place. The purpose of the brief narratives about the case studies (below) is to 
offer a dynamic representation which demonstrates that cases are fuzzy entities in 
constant development and that, as much as they can be described for the purpose of 
analysis, their features might change depending on time and place.  
Prospective v Retrospective: addressing different stages of policy (i.e. discussion, 
planning, perceived outcomes v implementation, monitoring, evaluation, assessment of 
outcomes). This entails comparing debates which are currently taking place over the 
feasibility and benefits of potential policies (cannabis decriminalisation, criminalising 
those who buy sex), versus implemented cases (i.e. interventions which have been voted 
by parliament or schemes actively pursued at the local level).  
National/state/local: interventions that interact with all levels of governance 
                                                 
1 (Mill-ean design characteristics): Small N, qualitative, analytic technique: most-similar v most-different, 
comparative, comparative-historical, small N cross-case study. Reliance on 2x2 matrices, simple diagrams, and 
prose.  
*HUULQJ-DQG7KRPDV&:¶&RPSDUDELOLW\$.H\LVVXHLQ5HVHDUFK'HVLJQ·ZRUNLQJSDSHU 
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Below is a list of  cases considered for selection: 































































DCRs/SIFs  x X X X  X  x X A? 
Naloxone x X X X X   x  A? 
IOTs x X X  X   x X  
Outreach provision x X X   X  x   
Tolerance Zones x X X X  X  x  A? 
Violence against womencities x X X X  X  x  A? 
Mephedrone v Ecstasy x X X X X   x  A? 
Methoxetamine x X X  X    X  
Ketamine v Methamphetamine x X X  X   X   
Decriminalisation of Cannabis x X X X X   X X A? 
Recovery Capital  X X  X   X X  
Brothel Laws  x X X  X   X  A? 
Criminalising those who buy sex   X X  X   X X  
The table presents 7 cases that meet the criteria, briefly described below: 
Drug Consumption Rooms 
The debate around the opening of DCRs exists at the intersection between law 
enforcement, public health, town planning and public/private harms and it is evidence 
RI WKHLU VRPHZKDW FRQWUDVWLQJ SXUVXLWV ,W H[HPSOLILHV WLPHO\ GLVFXVVLRQV DERXW FLWLHV·
priorities. The polarisation between private and public health, public nuisance and 
community safety on one side, and crime and law enforcement on the other, is called 
into question by the very existence of DCRs. It could illustrate the debate and the 
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evidence that prompted the opening of a DCR (Medically Supervised Injecting Centre) 
in Sydney and the on-going UK debate. 
Naloxone and/or v buprenorphine/naloxone 
This is an interesting case, offers contrast between independent (peer) administration of 
naloxone (UK) to prevent overdose as opposed to medical administration of 
buprenorphine naloxone (AUS) as treatment towards recovery (successful and failed 
attempts at legalising naloxone distribution), in a context of recovery/abstinence 
rhetoric across both countries. 
Mephedrone v Ecstasy  
This would be a very interesting case. It is contemporary; similar steps have been taken 
in both the UK and Australia to curtail the sales of each of the drugs through 
classification/scheduling at different times. It has been, in comparison with most policy 
responses to emerging drugs, very prompt and rapid. This calls into question the extent 
to which sufficient evidence was provided to prompt criminalisation of the drug, and 
the role played by drug-related deaths, the media and moral panics, as opposed to a 
solid evidence-base which might point towards gradual and carefully crafted solutions 
LQVWHDGRID´TXLFN-IL[µ7KLVFRXOGEHFRPSDUHGZLWKJRYHUQPHQWV·DWWLWXGHWRHFVWDV\
in the 1990s.  
Cannabis Decriminalisation 
This satisfies most criteria. This could be considered either as a long-standing policy 
debate between decriminalisation and depenalization, as the UK and some Australian 
states have adopted the latter approach (considering the short-lived experiments of 
Western Australia and South Australia). This is a current issue in the UK which has 
sparked a lively public and political debate.  
Brothels laws and regulation 
This case could present some very interesting issues in terms of different rationales for 
regulating the indoor sex trade. While in the UK the law has been moving towards a 
harsher stance, with lower tolerance for brothels and increased law enforcement powers 
since 2009 (Policing and Crime Act), some Australian states, including New South 
Wales (land law, town planning), Victoria and Queensland (PLA), have been following 
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entirely different, and diverging, approaches, where brothels are permitted and regulated 
by various state and local authorities. It would be interesting to assess what evidence 
base has informed these differing policy directions and to what extent other factors 
have influenced decision-making around this issue. This would not be an assessment of 
the successes and failures of legalisation as an approach. 
6WUHHWSURVWLWXWLRQFLWLHV·UHVSRQVHVWRYLROHQFHDJDLQVWZRPHQ 
Some level of interplay between different types of evidence i.e. evidence from sex 
workers, advocacy v moral/ideological, nymbism, public consultation. This case 
presents significant contrasts and similarities, with issues of visibility and public 
nuisance cutting across opposing regulatory regimes. Could be compared across fields 
i.e. mortality, morbidity trigger policy responses, naloxone, mephedrone, death of sex 
workers.  
Tolerance zones 
This would be a very interesting point of comparison with DCRs. This is because it 
poses very similar types of problems to local authorities. There are issues such as high 
mortality rates, public nuisance, drug/sex litter, BBVs, law enforcement involvement. 
Furthermore, because of street sex work being relatively less subjected to medicalization 
than DCRs, it could provide for an interesting debate as to what type of evidence comes 
into play in the decision-PDNLQJRIORFDODXWKRULWLHVZKLOHHVWDEOLVKLQJDFLW\·VSROLF\RQ
regulating street prostitution.  
Access 
Time, funding and contacts were three important aspects which affected the possibility 
to include geographically disparate areas. So, whilst the study has broad aims, these 
limitations have translated into a contained scope, taking into consideration a single 
state in Australia, New South Wales. Similarly, in the UK context, it was not feasible to 
include Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales for logistical and practical reasons, so the 
focus is on England. Although this is entirely within the logic of an embedded design, it 
excludes the possibility for comparing cases within countries and across states and 
devolved areas. The data collected in New South Wales and England is considered 
within the broader national context, following the principle of relational embeddedness.  
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The two selected cases are policy interventions existing at national, state and local level 
in both policy areas. The selected cases respond and interact with the logics of  
decriminalisation and criminalisation in different contexts at different times.  
6.4.1 Drug Consumption Rooms (DCRs):  
Criteria met: prospective/current (UK, England, Brighton) and retrospective (Australia, 
NSW, Sydney), local, across countries, logic of decriminalisation/harm reduction, across 
case comparison.  
Drug consumption rooms are defined as: 
¶SURWHFWHGSODFHVIRUWKHK\JLHQLFFRQVXPSWLRQRISUHREWDLQHGGUXJVLQDQRQ-
judgemental environment and under the supervision of trained staff. They 
constitute a highly specialised drugs service within a wider network of services 
for drug users, embedded in comprehensive local strategies to reach and fulfil a 
diverse range of individual and community needs that arise from GUXJ XVH·
(Hedrich, 2004). 
This case contrasts a successful story (the opening of the Medically Supervised Injecting 
Centre in Sydney in 2001), with an unsuccessful one (the lack of this intervention in 
England).  
Whilst the available evidence on DCRs has been used in the UK to make the case for its 
public health benefits, there have been overwhelming concerns related to risks of 
increased drug use, public nuisance, anti-social behaviour and drug market prevalence 
within the designated areas. There is also a strong political opposition to this type of 
intervention at national level in both the UK and Australia. Drug consumption rooms 
currently operate in 8 countries, counting more than 90 facilities (Hedrich et al, 2013). A 
growing body of evidence outlining the positive impact of such an intervention, 
measured according to several indicators, has been accumulated in the form of reviews 
and evaluations being produced in Anglophone countries including Australia, the UK 
and Canada (IWG, 2006; MSIC, 2003).2 The available evidence dismisses some of the 
claims that stress increased criminality, anti-social behaviour and increased drug-use and 
trade around the sites. Yet, there has been continued resistance to the piloting of this 
intervention in the UK and some Australian states, most notably Victoria (for further 
                                                 
2 http://www.cfenet.ubc.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/insight_into_insite.pdf 
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discussion, see Fitzgerald, 2013; Zampini, 2014; Hunt and Lloyd, 2008; Dolan et al, 
2000).  
6.4.2 Brothel Laws and Regulations:  
Criteria met: contrast, within both policy ideas (decriminalisation in NSW and 
criminalisation in UK), Retrospective, national/state, across countries, across case 
This case presents different rationales for regulating indoor sex trade. Currently, 
brothels are decriminalised in New South Wales and criminalised in the UK. In the UK 
the law has been moving towards a harsher stance, with lower tolerance for brothels 
manifested in increased law enforcement powers since 2009 to seize premises (Policing 
and Crime Act) following a long term trend in UK prostitution policy and strategy 
toward tackling demand. This might not necessarily always result in more seizures and 
prosecutions, as in the UK, prostitution has traditionally been conceptualised as a public 
nuisance issue (West, 2000), and investigations normally follow complaints. Given the 
trend towards tackling demand in the UK, tougher responses have been formulated on 
paper (Home Office, 2008; Policing and Crime Act, 2009). Recent debate on 
prostitution policy in Europe and internationally has pushed the agenda further toward 
the so calleG¶6ZHGLVK0RGHO·ZKLFKHQWDLOVWKHFULPLQDOLVDWLRQRIWKHSXUFKDVHRIVH[ 
This model was recommended by the UK All Party Parliamentary Group on 
Prostitution in their report (2014). A Bill to criminalise the purchase of sex was 
proposed in the Scottish parliament in 2013, yet this failed to gather enough votes. 
Conversely in Northern Ireland, the assembly voted to criminalise the purchase of sex 
(Human Trafficking and Exploitation Act 2015).  
Australian states, such as New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria have been 
following diverging approaches, ranging from decriminalisation to legal regulation, 
where brothels are permitted and regulated by various state and local authorities. Other 
states, including South Australia, Western Australia and Northern Territory, retain a 
mostly criminalised model. The difference between the two countries affords the 
opportunity for interesting contrast. In New South Wales, brothels apply for a business 
license which is reviewed by local authorities, who may be more or less likely to approve 
brothel applications depending on several factors (Prior and Crofts, 2012; Chapter 9). If 
an application is rejected, it is subsequently referred to a Land and Environment Court 
(LEC), which implies a rather slow and costly process that many prospective owners 
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cannot afford. The host of laws and regulations that affect the planning and operation 
of these businesses, together with decision-making processes, continue to involve moral 
considerations, primarily centred upon visibility and impact on the local community 
(Prior et al, 2013). Similar concerns are involved when assessing the feasibility of a drug 
consumption room in a given area (Maher, 2007), which makes for a further point of 
comparison across cases.  
6.4.3 Timeline 
Table 5: Timeline of significant events, documents and legislation 
Medically Supervised 
Injecting Centre (MSIC) 
 W Sydney 
Drug Consumption 
Rooms (DCRs)  W England 
Brothel laws and 
regulation  W NSW 
Brothel laws and 
regulation  W England 
1997 Wood Report  ? 
exposes police 
corruption and illegal 
injecting sites operating 
in Kings Cross brothels 
2002 Home Affairs 
Select Committee 
Report  ? recommends 
piloting DCRs 
1986  W Rogan Report  ? 
recommends 
decriminalisation of sex 
work with controls 
2003 Sexual Offences 
Act  ? reinstates 
soliciting, loitering, and 
third party involvement 
for gain offences  ? 
shifting focus on 
demand 
1998 New South Wales 
joint select committee 
into safe injecting 
rooms  ? votes against 
piloting medically 
supervised injecting site 
2006 Independent 
Working Group review  ? 
recommends piloting 
DCRs 
1988 Summary Offences 
Act  ? ĞǆĞŵƉƚƐ ‘ďƌŽƚŚĞů
ŬĞĞƉŝŶŐ ?ĨƌŽŵ ‘ůŝǀŝŶŐŽŶ






2004  W Tackling street 
prostitution  ? evaluates 
Crime Reduction 
Programme and 
Partnership in reducing 
involvement in 
prostitution 
1999 Illegal supervised 
injecting room  ? 
advocacy coalition 
operates safe injecting 
site for a week 
2006 Home Office 
official position against 
piloting of DCRs  ? New 
Labour in crisis, Home 
Office hit by a scandal 
involving Home 
Secretary 
1995  W Disorderly 
Houses Amendment Act 
 ? ĞǆĞŵƉƚƐ ‘ďƌŽƚŚĞů ? ?
rules that a brothel may 
only be prosecuted if 
complaints from 
residents have been 
made, and councils defer 
decisions to the Land 
and Environment Courts 
2004 Paying the Price  ? 
Home Office 
consultation, stressing 
 ‘ǀŝĐƚŝŵŚŽŽĚ ? ?ŐƌŽŽŵŝŶŐ ?
trafficking, coercion of 
sex workers as a result 
of abuse, drug use, 
homelessness identified 
as causes 
1999 Drug Summit  ? 
exposes need for safe 
injecting site in Kings 
Cross area to policy-
makers 
2012 Independent drugs 
commission for Brighton 
and Hove launched 
2000 Brothels Task 
Force  ? to evaluate 
developments since 
legal amendments to 
ďƌŽƚŚĞůƐ ?ƐƚĂƚƵƐ 
2006 A Coordinated 
Prostitution Strategy  ? 
shifts the focus from 
supply to demand and 
challenges prostitution 
as inevitable. main focus 
on street prostitution 
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and trafficking 
2001  W Drugs Misuse 
and Trafficking Act 1985 
Amendment NSW 
parliament votes on trial 
of safe injecting facility  
2012 Home Affairs 
Select Committee 
Report  ? recommends 
experimenting with 
Decriminalisation and 
piloting of drug 
consumption rooms 
2004 Sex Service 
Premises Planning 
guideline  ? to serve as 
best practice for local 
authorities  
2008 Tackling Demand  ? 
further emphasis on 
exploitation and 
trafficking, calls for 
harsher stance on 
punters, recommends 
giving powers to the 
police to seize and 
restrict access to 
Brothels 
2001 opening of the 
Medically Supervised 
Injecting Centre (MSIC) 
2014 Independent Drugs 
Commission for 
Brighton and Hove 
Report  ? dismisses DCR 
pilot 
 ? ? ? ?ƌŽƚŚĞů ?Ɛ
Amendment Act  ? more 
power to Land and 
Environment Courts to 
intervene in seizing 
premises (after a single 
complaint) for non-
authorised brothels and 
use circumstantial 
evidence  ? growing 
number of unauthorised 
brothels due to difficulty 
and cost in obtaining 
planning permission 
2009 Policing and Crime 
Act  ? provided special 
powers to the police to 
seize brothels premises 
for up to three months 
2003 MSIC first 
evaluation 
2010  W coalition 
government, less 
interest in prostitution 
2007 MSIC second 
evaluation/trial 
extension 
2012 Sex Industry in 
NSW report  ? provides 
evidence of good sexual 
health and safe practices 
of NSW sex working 
population compared to 
other states 
2010 Drug Misuse and 
Trafficking Amendment 
ends MSIC trial status 
voted in parliament by 
majority (Labor) 
(Medically Supervised 
Injecting Centre) Bill 
2010 
2012 regulation of 
brothels issue paper  ? 
Better Regulation Office 
 ? concern for illegal 
brothels prompts a 
review of other 
regulatory models 
2014 All Party 
Parliamentary Group on 
prostitution report  ? 
recommended legal 
reform to criminalise the 
purchase of sex 
throughout the UK 
6.5 Data Collection strategies  
The principal data collection strategy involved semi-structured interviews with relevant 
stakeholders corroborated with ethnographic observation of policy debates in both 
countries alongside consideration of relevant documents, reports, and reviews. The data 
collection process began by seeking systematic reviews of the published literature on the 
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case studies under scrutiny, following the logic of the evidence hierarchy, in order to 
establish which type of evidence was available for these specific interventions. If policy 
should be based on systematic reviews of randomized controlled trials, the presence or 
absence of systematic reviews in these particular cases is significant, if only to assess the 
SRWHQWLDO JDS EHWZHHQ ¶UKHWRULF DQG UHDOLW\· 3DFNZRRG  1R V\VWHPDWLF UHYLHZV
were located on either Cochrane or Campbell libraries based on a search of the 
IROORZLQJWHUPV´GUXJFRQVXPSWLRQURRPµ´VDIHLQMHFWLQJVLWHµ´PHGLFDOO\VXSHUYLVHG
LQMHFWLQJµ DQG´VXSHUYLVHG LQMHFWLQJµ 6HDUFKHV IRU ´EURWKHOµ ´SURVWLWXWLRQµ DQG´VH[
ZRUNµ JHQHUDWHG VRPH UHVXlts on the Cochrane collection, though these were not 
related to regulatory approaches, addressing instead HIV and STI prevention, condom 
use, evaluation of behavioural interventions among sex workers for better health 
RXWFRPHV7KHWHUPV´GLVRUGHUO\KRXVHµDQG´EURWKHOUHJXODWLRQµJHQHUDWHG]HURUHVXOWV
in either Cochrane or Campbell.3 Other searches were conducted on databases 
including Web of Knowledge, Scopus, and EBSCO generating some results which 
consisted of grey literature, journal articles and narrative reviews. Whereas the search 
for case 1 (drug consumption rooms) was relatively straightforward, as it denotes a 
precise interventions and the number of synonyms is limited, the search for case 2 
(brothel regulation) was more difficult. A number of narrative reviews were identified 
comparing prostitution regimes across countries; however, very few reviews had brothel 
regulation as their main focus.  
The lack of  systematic reviews in these fields is interesting in itself, as it indicates that, 
in spite of  growing rhetorical efforts and political commitment aimed at the production 
and systematisation of  high quality evidence, these areas suffer from a relative lack of  
evidence. This is particularly true for non-health interventions in prostitution policy 
(Chapter 7). As for drug consumption rooms, a number of  reviews and evaluations 
have been produced (Maher, 2007; IWG, 2006; EMCDDA, 2013), and pilots have been 
carried out (the Sydney MSIC was piloted for 10 years), but no systematic review of  
trial evidence has been carried out.  
                                                 
3 6HDUFKRI´GUXJFRQVXPSWLRQURRPVµRQJRRJOHVFKRODUJHQHUDWHd 468 results 
6HDUFKRI´GUXJ"URRPVµRQJRRJOHVFKRODUUHVXOWV 
6HDUFKRI´GUXJFRQVXPSWLRQURRPµ$1'UHYLHZRQJRRJOHVFKRODUJHQHUDWHd 67 results. 
6HDUFK´GUXJFRQVXPSWLRQURRPµ$1'UHYLHZRQ(%6&2KRVWJHQHUDWHVUHVXOWs 
6HDUFK´GUXJFRQVXPSWLRQURRPµ$1'UHYLHZRQ:HERI.QRZOHGJHJHQHUDWHd 2 results 
6HDUFK´GUXJFRQVXPSWLRQURRPµ$1'UHYLHZRQ6FRSXVJHQHUDWHd 8 results 
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6.5.1 The Interviews 
Any given piece of research should not be seen as a standalone document, but as 
product of the work of a particular set of actors. The principal data collection strategy 
involved carrying out semi-structured interviews with stakeholders, who were involved 
in evidence production, relevant policy discussions, and discussion of implementation 
of relevant policy interventions. I conducted 38 interviews, 19 in New South Wales and 
19 in England (18 because 1 was inaudible). I have categorised the sample into three 
categories to manage it in a systematic way: 
x (YLGHQFH´SURGXFHUVµ ² researchers in academia, think tanks and independent 
organisations 
x (YLGHQFH´PHGLDWRUVµ² civil servants, knowledge brokers 
x (YLGHQFH´FRQVXPHUVµ ² politicians and ministers 
These three separate categories should not be seen as static. The categories should be 
seen as ideal types in that, though they are a useful prototype, they simplify and 
XOWLPDWHO\GRQRWUHIOHFWWKHUHDOLW\RISROLF\DFWRUV·Dctivities, which very often include 
all of the above categories albeit to different extents. Most participants sit across 
different categories and have a broad experience, beyond the cases under scrutiny, 
which served as background. Practitioners, clients and consumers were not included in 
the sample. This was a deliberate choice, given that their role in policy-making is often 
limited and indirect. Although some of the participants might have been, at any given 
time, practitioners, clients or consumers, this was not the primary activity or profession 
of interest for this project. Participants were sought on the basis of their active 
involvement in policy-relevant research production and/or direct involvement in policy-
making of relevant interventions. Observation of policy debate in the public domain, in 
the media, in established policy forums and expert stakeholder groups was carried out 
throughout the research process. I had been involved in drug policy and drug work 
prior to starting the project (as a volunteer at Transform Drug Policy Foundation, and 
later as a volunteer at the Bristol Drugs Project, a harm reduction service). I thus came 
to the project having had direct experience of working in drug services on the one hand, 
and with some degree of understanding of the drug policy debate, on the other.  
Chapter 6 A qualitative comparative approach and analysis 
144 
6.5.2 The sample of participants 
Participants were recruited through referral (purposive) sampling. Initial contacts were 
HVWDEOLVKHG WKURXJK VXSHUYLVRUV· H[LVWLQJ FRQWDFWV. Participants were also identified on 
the basis of grey literature and other relevant documents. A pilot phase, with a total of 
six interviews, was conducted in England to refine the interview schedule and carry out 
some initial reflection on preliminary findings which would inform the main data 
collection phase. When participants were asked to provide names of other relevant 
experts, the same names would often come up. This is partly because the number of 
people whose expertise and experience directly covers the cases in question is relatively 
small in both countries. It is also because of the relative connectedness and size of 
stakeholder groups in these fields. It was at times difficult to secure interviews, and 
some potential key stakeholders expressed no interest in participating. This sample is 
not intended to be representative. Yet the focus on a broad spectrum of stakeholders 
can counter some of the limitations of a non-representative sample. 
6.5.3 Issues in recruitment  
Generally speaking, the most hard-to-reach categories were civil/public servants, 
including the police and current and past ministers. This was to be expected given that 
FLYLOVHUYLFH·VHWKLFVLVYHU\PXFKEXLOWDURXQGQHXWUDOLW\QRQ-partisanship and a certain 
level of secrecy. Therefore, whilst for other categories, having a public voice and 
exposing themselves to dialogue is part and parcel of their profession, and therefore 
ingrained in their practice, this may not necessarily apply to civil service. As Pilkington 
SXWVLW¶WKH&LYLO6HUYLFHKDVDOZD\VEHHQQRWRULRXVIRUEHLQg rather less than open with 
WKHJHQHUDOSXEOLF>«@DQGKDVLQVWHDGGHYHORSHGDUHSXWDWLRQIRUEHLQJDFORVHGV\VWHP
KLGGHQIURPWKHZLGHZRUOGZKLFKOLHVRXWVLGHJRYHUQPHQWFLUFOHV·Whilst 
advocates, politicians (MPs) and researchers are used to public engagement, and have 
generally been outgoing and collaborative, civil servants have been reluctant to come 
forward, and often need internal clearance in order to participate to research, which may 
put them off. To tackle this issue, I approached people who used to work in as civil 
servants but have now retired or moved onto other fields. This made participants more 
likely to come forward as individuals no longer attached to the more structured culture 
of civil service.  
There were similar issues when approaching members of the police; while ex policemen 
were willing to come forward, current involvement with the police always resulted in 
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lack of participation. This was true of all approached ministers, past and present, 
policing and crime commissioners, as well as some MPs. It seems as though, with an 
increasing level of responsibility and a strict hierarchy of priorities alongside the 
commitment to a particular agenda, participating in research will not figure unless it is 
explicitly part of someoQH·VSULRULWLHV or values, or the relevant research issues are at the 
WRSRIWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV·DJHQGDGXULQJWKHWLPHRIFRQWDFW,QJHQHUDOSHRSOHZKRKDYH
made a strong commitment to these policy areas over time, who have dedicated their 
resources to them, and believe in the importance of research were those more likely to 
take part.4 'XH WR WKH VDPSOH·V OLEHUDO-evidence bias (discussed in Chapter 8), against 
considerations of the relevance of classic political cleavages and moralities in shaping 
policy positions (Chapter 5), some analysis of views in the public domain is included in 
Chapter 9 (section 9.6.1). This allowed the researcher to include views from 
stakeholders with substantial public and political profiles who are explicit supporters of 
particular moral, political and policy positions in drug and prostitution policy.  
6.5.4 Ethical Issues  
I received ethical approval from both the University of Kent and the University of New 
South Wales ethics committees. The issue of obtaining approval from separate 
institutions was sufficiently time consuming, and led me to consider not pursuing 
participants in organisations or departments which had their own specific ethics 
requirements. This would have translated into a further, and potentially longer, internal 
application process. As discussed in the previous section, I realised that individuals who 
once belonged to particular professions, organisations or departments and were 
currently retired or had moved on were more likely to come forward and did not 
require internal ethical clearance, which made the prospect of interviewing them more 
attractive. Furthermore, both case studies have relevant historical features which could 
be discussed by these participants.  
All names on documents and transcripts have been changed (pseudonyms are used) and 
LGHQWLILHUV WKDW FDQQRW EH OLQNHG EDFN WR WKH SDUWLFLSDQW·V QDPH DUH DOVR XVHG WR
safeguard anonymity. Consent to record and transcribe interviews was obtained prior to 
the interviews (see sample documents in appendix 2). All data, transcripts and 
                                                 
4 I approached 74 potential respondents and carried out 38 interviews. Some (N= 6) expressed an interest in 
partaking but the interview did not take place for logistical or practical reasons, or because internal ethical 
clearance was required. N=30 did not show interest in the project.  
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information have been stored on a secure online database, in password protected files. 
,QLWLDOVRQO\WRJHWKHUZLWKFDWHJRU\DQGDFURQ\PVIRURUJDQLVDWLRQV·QDPHVKDYHEHHQ
used as identifiers for filing all documents and transcripts. All identifiers have been 
changed to retain minimal information (numbers, country of origin, field of policy, and 
profession). Guaranteeing anonymity is a prerogative; however, it has been explained to 
participants prior to each interview that this may not always be possible due to the 
nature of their work and the close-knit organisations which they may belong to. Policy-
makers who work on particular issues such as drugs and prostitution belong to a fairly 
close-knit community, characterised by some degree of internal communication and 
role intercheangeability. Participants were happy to provide names of potential contacts, 
often suggesting that they could initiate contact themselves and pass on information 
about myself and the project prior to me contacting them. This means that anonymity 
can only be guaranteed in research outputs, rather than in the actual data collection 
process. Some within this community might be able to identify others' views if they 
were to read them, due to experience of direct communication. The possibility that 
participants may be recognised outside and even inside their circles is small, considering 
that all precautions have been taken to guarantee anonymity, including avoiding the use 
of direct quotes if and when necessary. Some participants, particularly those who 
subscribe to feminist/participatory research ethics, have requested to see any intended 
research output prior to publication. This was agreed to by the investigator. Participants 
did not ask to see full transcripts. Some participants asked for a summary of research 
outputs which will be provided upon completion. Participants were asked to specify if 
they did not wish to be quoted directly on particular views or opinions which might be 
regarded as controversial. Some also asked for the timing of research outputs, out of 
concern that their current involvement with a sensitive issue following imminent 
publication might limit their freedom to express their views.  
6.5.5 The interview process 
As aforementioned, an initial interview schedule was used for the pilot phase, which 
consisted of six interviews in England. The nature of semi-structured interviews allows 
for free-flowing conversation as well as data saturation through the use of the same 
questions and probes. The overall reVHDUFKTXHVWLRQIRUWKHSURMHFWLV¶KRZLVHYLGHQFH
XVHGLQSROLF\·"(DFKSDUWLFLSDQWZDVDVNHGWKHVDPHJHQHUDOTXHVWLRQVZKLFKDUHVHHQ
WR UHIOHFW WKH IRFXV RI WKH LQYHVWLJDWLRQ 7KH JHQHUDO TXHVWLRQV IRFXV RQ SDUWLFLSDQWV·
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background, the meaning of evidence and the relationship between evidence and policy. 
They are reported below: 
x Can you tell me what your job is and how it relates with policy-making?  
x What do you think counts as evidence?  
x What type of evidence do you find most useful? 
x What do you believe to be credible evidence?  
x What type of evidence do you tend to produce/look for?  
x What type of evidence is better suited to inform policy? 
These questions were maintained throughout the project. After the pilot phase, the 
interview strategy was reworked to pursue both data saturation and emergence. Specific 
questions for each participant were prepared in advance of the interview as guidelines 
DFFRUGLQJWRSULRUNQRZOHGJHRIHDFKSDUWLFLSDQW·VEDFNJURXQGWKHLULQYROYHPHQWLQWKH
production of specific research, and participation in specific policy forums. This allowed 
for data saturation alongside the emergence of specific themes and individual narratives 
about personal involvement in research processes and policy-relevant discussions. 
Interviews lasted about 60 minutes on average, with the shortest interview at around 20 
minutes and the longest interview at around 140 min. Considerations about data 
saturation might be subjective to some degree, as there are no agreed upon guidelines 
¶IRU GHWHUPLQLQJ QRQ-SUREDELOLVWLF VDPSOH VL]HV· *XHVW HW DO  7KH LQWHUYLHZLQJ
process consisted in noting emerging and matching themes (after each interview) until 
there was few or no new themes emerging. This would be compared to existing coding 
categories (section 6.6.3) and newly emerging categories throughout the interview 
process. Further considerations involved the accumulation of case-specific narratives 
alongside reaching data saturation about the central theme through general questions, 
which was a difficult balance to achieve. 
In the process of carrying out interviews, there are issues worthy of consideration which 
affect interaction, attitudes, communication and understanding. These issues could be 
summarised thus: 
x Differences between stakeholders 
x Formal and informal communication 
x Interviewing advocates and shifting position IURP´LQWHUYLHZHUµWR´SDOµ 
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x Agreeing and disagreeing with participants 
x Personal versus professional involvement of the interviewees in subject matters 
Stakeholders ranged from serving MPs to grassroots level advocates; this not only 
implies diversity in the sample, it also signifies differences of status, degree of formality, 
expectations and degree of involvement in individual issues. For instance, the time and 
attention that could be granted to me and the project by a serving parliamentarian might 
be different from that of an advocate, partly because of the potential difference between 
personal and professional involvement in a given cause. Yet, this was not necessarily 
true of all advocates and parliamentarians; some advocates have a more professionalised 
attitude, choosing formal settings and a set time frame. Some parliamentarians might 
have a strong commitment to the subject matter, and thus come across as more 
enthusiastic, flexible and involved participants. Indeed, the boundary between the 
personal and professional is often blurred, and yet interview settings, length of time, 
enthusiasm in communication, and open declaration of beliefs and commitment were 
seen as suggestive of a strong personal stake in the subject matters. Experiencing 
GLYHUVLW\RIVWDNHKROGHUV·DWWLWXGHV when conducting interviews led me to consider that 
commitment to a specific cause and related beliefs, as opposed to a number of causes, 
was important.  
In interview settings, managing disagreement can be difficult, particularly as a negative 
response from the interviewer might prompt foreclosure and distancing of the 
interviewee. In practice, any friction in terms of differing opinions was managed by 
sticking to a structure, continuing to ask questions in an attempt not to become 
contrary and engage in excessive back and forth discussion which would risk 
antagonising the interlocutor. Of course, it is probable that a level of disagreement may 
always be present in conversation. A certain degree of self-control, minimising the 
upfront expression of contrary opinions, allows for an easier flow and generally a more 
willing interlocutor. At times, one is able to propose a contrary opinion or statement in 
a way that does not directly antagonise the interlocutor, though this is not always 
successful. Generally speaking, people may wish to appeal to science, with statements 
VXFKDV¶WKHHYLGHQFHVXJJHVWs«·LQRUGHUWRDSSHDUOHVVFRQWUDU\DQGPRUHREMHFWLYHLQ
their disagreement.  
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On the other hand, being in agreement with the interlocutor can quickly precipitate the 
interview to an informal conversation between pals, or comrades, thus paying scant 
attention to structure and purpose. Being in agreement can foster a process of mutual 
positive reinforcement which may prolong the time of the interview and may affect the 
interviewer in terms of keeping to a structure as well as being able to challenge the 
interlocutor. At times, the interviewer may find themselves completely out of their 
depth, which can be difficult to manage. This can be dealt with by giving more space to 
the interviewee by letting them lead discussion further, although it limits the ability of 
the interviewer to challenge the interlocutor.  
6.6 Adaptive theory  
The way in which data are analysed implies a dialectical relationship between theory and 
data. This is made possible by applying the logic of Layder's adaptive theory. I will 
concentrate on the question of middle-range theory begun in Chapter Three to extend 
the discussion onto methodological considerations. Layder (1998) discusses this matter 
at length. He is, at heart, a realist, but his ideas are also shaped by Habermas, as well as 
classic social theorists such as Merton, and Glaser and Strauss. It is his discussion of 
middle-range v grounded theory which is particularly useful in this context, as he 
attempts to strike a balance between the two in his own approach. In his account, 
'middle-range theory' is used according to Merton's definition, which entails 
'formulating theoretical hypotheses in advance of the research in order to guide the 
research and to give shape to any subsequent theorizing after the data has been 
gathered' (1998: 15). This is opposed to grounded theory, which 'emphasises the 
importance of starting the research with as little pre-formulated theory as possible in 
order that it may be generated during the research itself' (ibid). For Layder, both these 
approaches make some valid points as well as presenting some limitations.  
Middle-range theory is an attempt to strike a compromise between 'minor working 
hypotheses of everyday life and the 'grand' general theories' (Layder, 1998: 16). 
However middle-range theory presents some limitations: firstly, it values quantitative 
systematic analysis over qualitative approaches (1998: 17). It also excludes any reference 
to general theory, which is in itself a limitation as it precludes that 'two-way borrowing', 
failing to open a dialogue with either wider theoretical and structural/systemic realms, 
and individual subjective 'meanings and experiences' (1998: 19). Grounded theory on 
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the other hand encourages scepticism toward any theoretical assumption at the outset, 
highlighting the risk of a deterministic influence whereby 'data are typically 'forced' to fit 
into categories and concepts which have already been formulated' (p. 17). The emphasis 
is placed on qualitative data's ability to directly produce theory (p. 18). These emerging 
ideas/theories can be tested against the data to be refined, reformulated, interpreted and 
re-interpreted. There are clear limitations to this approach: its rejection of grand theory 
is problematic in that 'it impoverishes its explanatory potential'; it also fails to provide 
an adequate picture of 'systemic/structural aspects of society' by overly focusing on 
individuals' experiences (p. 19). The question remains as to how a grounded theorist can 
begin an investigation while carrying no assumptions whatsoever about the subject 
under scrutiny. 
By acknowledging the strengths and weaknesses of both approaches, adaptive theory 
makes for a method capable of mutual dialogue with grand theories, valuing mid-range 
theory hypotheses and testing, and taking into account both individual experience and 
structural/systemic aspects (Layder, 1998: 27). Its strength lies in acknowledging both 
subjective and objective social elements, as well as its capacity to be continuously 
reformulated in relation to both theory and emerging empirical findings. This approach 
is consonant with the type of analytic generalisation possible in multiple-case study 
research as well as the realist principle of emergence.  
6.6.1 Narrative analysis 
The argumentative turn in policy analysis (Chapter 3) has prompted scholars to use 
narrative analysis and discourse analysis as approaches in the field; these have been 
increasingly validated, whilst the number of studies making use of these tools has 
increased. From manuals (Roe, 1994) to systematic frameworks (Jones and McBeth, 
2010), the use of narrative as a tool for analysis in policy studies is widely accepted. The 
XVDJH RI D ¶UKHWRULFDO SHUVSHFWLYH· )LVFKHU DQG )RUHVWHU  EHJLQV IURP WKH
acceptance of the principle of communication as argument and story-telling. The tools 
of narrative analysis are closely related to techniques of frame analysis and discourse 
analysis, which have been identified as valid in previous chapters (i.e. Hajer in Chapter 
3; Euchner et al in Chapter 5). Conceptualising evidence as argument has given rise to 
some persuasive accounts (i.e. Dunn, 1982 and Majone, 1989); the emphasis on story-
WHOOLQJLQ6WHYHQV·HWKQRJUDSK\VKLQHVOLJKWRQWKHSURFHVVHVRIVLPSOLILFDWLRQDQG
systematic exclusion that policy-makers engage in.  
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The data I was presented with in interviews is necessarily anecdotal; participants 
responded to questions by recalling instances and events which they narrated as stories. 
Making use of narratives as a shared universal tool of communication entails conveying 
meanings through anecdote, symbolism, metaphor, and other narrative devices. 
Recognition of this process as embedded in language, culture and communication has 
engendered a conscious, strategic and even systematic use of narratives as tools for 
investigators. An understanding of the construction of the story, its relation with 
context, the specific culture of participants, and that of the department/work-place 
where participants operate, alongside an understanding of the dynamics between 
structural (exogenous) factors, and how participants respond to and make sense of 
them, is a necessary starting point for analysis. 
6.6.2 The Transcription Process 
The interviews were recorded and transcribed. To begin with, each interview was 
transcribed verbatim. Any specific information about participants was removed from 
the transcript, including name and place of work. The inaudible segments were marked 
on the page, and listened to several times at different stages, i.e. with a fresh listen at a 
different time. This allowed the researcher to make out some of the segments that were 
previously inaudible, though not all. Since conventions are often general standardised 
guidelines, consideration of conventions needs to be addressed in terms of the specific 
project (Lapadat, 2000). For instance, the inclusion of contextual or environmental 
information was not strictly relevant for this project. Conversely, the accurate 
transcription of the historical narratives of participants, and particularly those that 
directly concerned the case studies was necessary. It was equally necessary to note any 
reference to theoretically informed coding categories which stood out upon the first 
read. As the number of interviews intensified, some form of selective transcribing was 
considered. Following Ochs and Bloom, Lapadat (2000) argues that the criteria for 
selective transcribing should be carefully established at the outset and consonant with 
the research design. I undertook selective transcribing if and when the interviewee 
spoke of issues that were deemed as not directly relevant to the research questions, the 
interview questions, the theoretical background and the cases under scrutiny. It is not 
uncommon that, during conversation, someone might go off on a tangent by following 
a train of thought. In semi-structured interviews, the interviewer is tasked with bringing 
attention of the interlocutor back to the issues at hand. However, interrupting 
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participants might risk antagonising them and precluding the conversation from taking 
an interesting and potentially relevant turn. Thus, any consideration about relevance 
should be preserved for the transcription process. The fragments that were deemed not 
strictly relevant were listened to several times, and notes were taken which could be 
later revisited, to leave the option open to transcribe at a later time following the 
iterative process of analysis.  
6.6.3 Coding categories 
,XVHG1YLYRDVWKHRUJDQLVLQJDQGFRGLQJVRIWZDUH)ROORZLQJ/D\GHU·V(1998) adaptive 
coding approach, I started out with a preliminary list of codes based on theoretical 
assumptions. Themes were derived from the documents and interview transcripts and 
categorised into nodes. These were then systematically compared with the pre-existing 
codes. The following is a list of categories derived from theories and literature discussed 
in Chapters Two and Three. It is within the logic of adaptive coding to start off with 
pre-existing categories, subsequently code transcripts to match them, and then create 
new nodes for that which emerges from the data but is not accounted for by existing 
categories. Morality was an emerging theme which was subsequently coded. This 
prompted further literature search to establish a theoretical backdrop to the analysis of 
this emerging theme following the logic of adaptive coding and iteration. Below is a list 
of pre-existing theoretically informed coding categories.  
Conditions for Policy change derived from literature: 
x Incremental change ² explicit reference to nature of change as incremental 
x Paradigm shift ² reference to paradigm shift 
x Policy window ² reference to policy windows or windows of  opportunity 
metaphor 
x Advocacy coalition ² any reference to an established and cohesive network 
operating toward a specific policy goal 
x Constituent support ² reference to evidence of  community support for an 
intervention 
x Evidence base ² reference to solid/strong or lacking 
x Media support ² reference to positive and negative media responses to a 
particular policy intervention 
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x Independent local legislative authority ² ability to legislate at local or 
regional level 
x Law enforcement support ² agreement with the police about a particular 
policy intervention and operational support 
x Health authority support ² agreement with health authorities about the 
usefulness of a particular intervention 
x Religious/moral authority support ² public endorsement of a policy 
intervention by religious authority or lack of support 
x Political support ² support of main political parties, or lack thereof, support of 
independent MPs 
x Policy entrepreneurs ² presence of strong advocates who champion a 
particular policy interventions and manage to orchestrate support from 
authorities 
x Expert participation ² evidence of expert participation in policy forums 
x Advocacy participation and funding ² inclusion of advocacy organisations in 
policy-making and enabling advocacy through funding and resources 
x *RYHUQPHQW DJHQFLHV· FROODERUDWLRQ DQG H[FKDQJH ² established 
partnerships and coordination across different agencies 
x Shared ethos of research into policy practice ² shared value of importance 
of research for policy 
x Established principles of best practice ² presence of guidelines, strategies, 
white papers, grey literature 
x Existence of knowledge transfer organisation ² reference to established and 
respected organisation for knowledge brokering 
x Level of participation of think-tanks ² reference to think tanks as marginal or 
relevant policy actors in informing policy and practice 
Conditions of the use of evidence in policy based on existing models: 
x Linear translation ² implies evidence can be directly applied to policy 
x Percolation ² implies evidence is produced without a specific policy focus and 
some of it might filter through to inform some policies 
x Tactical ² evidence is produced and used strategically for policy 
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x Dependent on will of politics ² evidence is seldom used, or used to political 
ends and post-hoc 
x Dialogue ² refers to established structures to ensure dialogue between evidence 
producers and consumers  
x Consultation ² refers to establish structures that ensure consultation process 
prior to policy implementation 
x Knowledge brokers ² refers to established structure to ensure knowledge 
brokering and translation across policy networks 
x Sponsors/funding ² structure of funding of organisations including advocacy, 
think tanks, and research 
x Power asymmetry ² evidence of asymmetries in the policy network 
x Constrain/open ² refers to relationships between actors in the network and 
the flow of ideas and research 
x Respond to policy needs ² whether evidence is produced or commissioned to 
respond to policy needs, i.e. post hoc justification 
x Farming ² ZKHWKHUHYLGHQFHLV¶IDUPHG·LHFRPPLVVLRQHGDQGVWHHUHG 
x Fishing ² ZKHWKHUHYLGHQFHLV¶ILVKHG·LHFKHUU\-picked post hoc 
x Managed (spin) ² whether evidence is managed to alter its political 
underpinnings 
6.7 Intersections of key informants 
The diagram below helps to visualise WKHVDPSOH·VVWUXFWXUHDQGFRQQHFWLRQV 
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(Advocates= N9, Civil servants = N6, Researchers = N11, Clinicians = N5, Politicians = N4, 
Knowledge brokers = N3) Total= N38 
The figure above outlines the network of participants. The size of the circles is 
indicative of the numbers in each category, whereas the overlaps show the connections 
between these different yet seemingly interrelated professions. Many participants were 
classified as having multiple professional backgrounds. Not only do the overlapping 
areas of the diagram show the more likely professional combinations, they also show 
more likely interactions and collaborations between different professional categories. 
From these overlaps and existing interactions, it appears unlikely that policy actors are 
fixed, single-occupation entities who only exercise within the boundaries of their 
particular area. It is much more likely that, at one point or another, members of a given 
network have been engaged in different stages of the policy development process, and 
that stages should be regarded as iterative rather than linear. This exposes the dynamism 
and dialectic nature of a policy network (Marsh and Smith, 2000). Networks are 
characteriVHG E\ FKDQJHDELOLW\ ZKHUH ¶DJHQWV FDQ DQG GR QHJRWLDWH DQG UHQHJRWLDWH
QHWZRUN VWUXFWXUHV· 0DUVK DQG 6PLWK   7KLV QHWZRUN LV FKDUDFWHULVHG E\ WKH
multiplicity of experiences, both personal and professional, of participants. 
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Classic literature on policy network distinguishes between endogenous and exogenous 
factors affecting networks (Dowding, 1995; Marsh and Rhodes, 1992). This distinction 
is misleading because it separates external factors from the internal dynamics of the 
network. Following 0DUVKDQG6PLWK·VGLDOHFWLFDODSSURDFKZKLFKHQYLVLRQVDPXWXDOO\
forming relationship between structure and agency5, I argue that exogenous factors, 
including ideology, politics, economics and the existing knowledge-bases, are also 
endogenous, and as such they reflect and inform the internal persuasions, resources and 
ideas of the given network (2000: 8). This is in line with the concept of epistemic 
cultures (Chapter 4), where knowledge production is influenced by the culture 
surrounding it (exogenous) but it is also produced by the particular epistemic culture in 
novel ways (endogenous).  
In order to understand the manner in which exogenous factors shape internal network 
dynamics and vice-versa, it is not enough to mention what the ideology, politics, 
economics, and the values and beliefs of  the day are and how they might affect and 
change the network, or suppose that actors will respond to them and affect policy 
change in turn. One must acknowledge how values and beliefs are formed within the 
confines of  politics, ideology, discourses, economics and existing knowledge-bases. The 
interactions between experience, professional formation, and prevailing values and 
EHOLHIVZKLFKPDNHXSLQGLYLGXDOV·PRUDOLW\DQGVKDSHWKHLUFKRLFHVPXVWEHH[SORUHG 
6.8 The logic of QCA, the instruments of network analysis to visualise 
values/beliefs relations 
General definitions of values and beliefs are presented and discussed in Chapter Four.6 
Through narrative analysis of interview data, a list of values and beliefs was derived 
inductively. The values and beliefs represented in the sample are both broad and 
                                                 
5 6WUXFWXUHDJHQF\GLDOHFWLFGHILQHGDV¶three interactive or dialectical relationships involved between: the 
structure of the network and the agents operating within them; the network and the context within which it 
operates; and the network and the policy outcome·0DUVKDQG6PLWK 
6 Values are defined as underlying principles which are both positive and normative in nature and directly affect 
and inform beliefs. Values have affective, cognitive and deliberative components. Values are seen as more fixed 
than beliefs because they relate to some form of universal ethical standard or some end state of existence. It is 
argued that value commitments directly inform commitments to particular beliefs that are seen as 
complementary and capable of both promoting and affecting values.  
Beliefs are defined as action-oriented domains which are both positive and normative in nature. Beliefs are 
motivated by underlying values, though they may interact with values to the point of changing the degree of 
importance of a particular value for an individual because, being action-oriented, beliefs imply reflexivity and are 
informed by a continuous chain of cause and effect, and as such they are changeable (Rokeach, 1968). 
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context-specific. Directly or indirectly, these values and beliefs emerge through 
GLVFXVVLRQV DQG DUH VHHQ WR VKDSH SDUWLFLSDQWV· XQGHUVWDQGLQJV RI LQGLYLGXDO
interventions as well as their commitment to particular paradigms and policy positions. 
Relevant values and beliefs were derived inductively and are presented in Chapter Eight. 
In the following section, I describe the adapted tools of analysis to systematically 
visualise YDOXHVDQGEHOLHIV·SUHYDOHQFHLQWKHVDPSOHLQDFRPSDUDWLYHIDVKLRQ,MRLQHG
the logic of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), with its focus on presence and 
absence, with the relational focus of social network analysis, with its emphasis on 
connection, in order to represent networks of values and beliefs, or values and beliefs 
constellations.  
In qualitative research practice, some degree of data synthesis is achieved through 
discussion of emerging themes. Once identified, each theme is discussed with the aid of 
individual quotes, the raw data arranged in a thematic fashion. This method of 
presentation is well established and can be quite expressive, and is indeed used 
throughout the findings chapters of this thesis.  However, this practice does not lend 
itself to synthesis; the chosen quotes can be judged to be representative by the 
investigator. Yet, they remain the expression of single individuals. The nature of 
interview data is narrative, and therefore, in order to represent it without reporting 
entire individual narratives, it becomes necessary to think of alternative strategies. The 
instruments of social network analysis offer opportunities for carrying out and 
presenting qualitative research synthetically, moving beyond individual narratives and 
toward understanding and presenting relations in narrative data. Scott (2000: 2) argues 
WKDW ¶VRFLDO QHWZRUN DQDO\VLV LV DSSURSULDWH IRU ¶UHODWLRQDO GDWD·· $FFRUGLQJ WR 6FRWW
there are three types of data in social science:  
x Attribute data ² variable analysis (properties of agents) 
x Relational data ² (connections between agents/system of agents) 
x Ideational data ² ideal types, typological analysis (Scott, 2000: 3) 
Historically, network analysis began in the discipline of anthropology, where scholars 
utiliVHG ¶WH[WLOHPHWDSKRUV·VXFKDVVRFLDO IDEULFRUZHE7KHVHWH[WLOHPHWDSKRUVZHUH
subsequently systematised into mathematical formulae (Scott, 2000: 4-5). Networks can 
be visualised as graphs of points and lines that can show distance, direction, and density. 
Network analysis concerns itself with individuals, groups, and their affiliations. Each of 
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these elements can be treated as cases (Scott, 2000: 42). This is discussed by Scott in 
UHODWLRQ WRSDUWLFLSDQWV·RUJDQLVDWLRQDODIILOLDWLRQDQGQRW LQ UHODWLRn to ideational data; 
the treatment of ideational data derived from ideal-typical categories in network analysis 
LV QRW ZHOO GHYHORSHG LELG +RZHYHU SDUWLFLSDQWV· QDUUDWLYHV DQG DWWULEXWHV FDQ EH
observed and analysed, with some degree of inference, and ideational data can be 
derived from them.  
Participants made implicit and explicit references to certain values and beliefs during 
interviews. Analysis of interview data suggested that different life and professional 
H[SHULHQFHVLQIRUPHGSDUWLFLSDQWV·FRPmitment to particular beliefs. 8VLQJSDUWLFLSDQWV·
attributes, information about their background, and narratives, I operationalised value 
and belief categories inductively. %HOLHIVZHUHRSHUDWLRQDOLVHGWRUHSUHVHQWSDUWLFLSDQWV·
professional and other commitments. This is a strategy that allows taking into 
FRQVLGHUDWLRQ WKH UHOHYDQFH RI SDUWLFLSDQWV· PXOWLSOH SURIHVVLRQDO EDFNJURXQG DQG
experiences whilst maintaining their anonymity. Indeed, any specific description of the 
SDUWLFLSDQWV·EDFNJURXQGVZRXOGUisk identifying the participant.  
Although individual narratives served to establish the presence or absence of values and 
beliefs for each individual account, it is the connections between said values and beliefs 
that are analysed. In social network analysis, binary values (1-0) are used to refer to 
participation or non-participation (Scott, 2000: 39). This is compatible with the 
construction of binary data matrices in QCA and indeed other approaches. Here, I 
follow the QCA logic of crisp set analysis (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009) where binary values 
represent presence and absence (of values and beliefs). A table with binary values was 
constructed following the logic of QCA; it detailed the presence or absence of each 
value and belief for each participant (0 for absence and 1 for presence). I proceeded by 
counting the number of times each value and belief (value+value; belief+belief; 
value+belief) occurred together to create a visual network describing the number of 
connections between values and beliefs in the sample. The purpose of this exercise was 
to visualise the number of connections between values and beliefs in the sample of 
participants and comparatively across dimensions (drugs/prostitution; Australia/UK) in 
order to outline relations between values and beliefs. This also allowed systematically 
describing patterns which emerged through participant narratives. Networks were 
generated using social network analysis software UCINET and are discussed in the 
analysis (Chapter 8).  
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6.8.1 Relevant measures for visualising networks 
Frequency 
Frequency is the simplest measure. It refers to the number of times any given 
connection occurs; as such, there is no indication of how central a given connection is 
in the network. The size of the nodes (or squares in the network) is the same for each 
node. Measuring centrality is what allows establishing which values and beliefs are more 
centrally connected in the networks.  
Centrality 
I refer to a values/belief constellation as the visual representation of the network and 
specificDOO\WKHPHDVXUHRIFHQWUDOLW\ZKLFK6FRWWDUJXHV¶RULJLQDWHGLQWKHVRFLRPHWULF
FRQFHSW RI WKH ¶VWDU·   Network diagrams are presented, comparing the 
Australian and UK samples and the drugs and prostitution policy samples.  
x Degree Centrality 
'HILQHGDV¶WKHQXPEHURIRWKHUSRLQWVWRZKLFKWKHSRLQWLVDGMDFHQW·6FRWWGHJUHH
centrality represents the number of ties for each node. Degree centrality does not imply 
that there is one single central point to the network; there may be various points that are 
central. Degree centrality is alternatively defined as local centrality (Borgatti, Everett and 
Freeman, 2002).7 In this case, we are not representing the centrality of  an actor/agent, 
but of  a value or a belief. Diagrams are used exclusively for the purpose of visualisation. 
Networks for closeness (distance between all pairs of  nodes) and betweeness (nodes 
that more often act as bridge between two other nodes) centrality were also produced 
but are not presented in the analysis, given that the principal aim of  this exercise is to 
visualise those values and beliefs that are likely to occur concurrently, and degree 
centrality networks are sufficient for this purpose. 
6.9 Conclusion 
In the following chapters, I apply these tools to organise and make sense of data, first, 
by addressing how evidence is understood and utilised by participants through case 
                                                 
7 8&,1(78VHU·VJXLGH 
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relevant examples; then, by looking at the prevalence of values and beliefs in the sample 
and comparatively across dimensions in an attempt to explain existing 
incommensurability of policy positions; finally, I assess how these affect opportunities 
for policy change and continuity in context. 
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Chapter 7  
KŶǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŝŶƉŽůŝĐǇ 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I explore the way participants define and understand evidence on two 
separate yet interconnected levels. Firstly, I explore how evidence is defined at the 
DEVWUDFWOHYHOIROORZLQJSDUWLFLSDQWV·DQVZHUWRWKHTXHVWLRQ¶ZKDWGR\RXWKLQNFRXQWV
DVHYLGHQFH"·6HFRQGO\,LQWHUURJDWHKRZHYLGHQFHLVGHILQHGLQUHODWLon to policy, and 
specifically how it is defined in relation to its use in drug and prostitution policy, 
through relevant case examples. I will juxtapose these two levels of evidence to the 
established codes of practice adhered to by the scientific community by focusing on the 
notion of an evidence hierarchy. I argue that guidelines represent an ideal that does not 
reflect the practices of evidence use in policy-making in these fields. The reasons for 
this are manifold, yet they are related to the false premise that the evidence hierarchy is 
a relatively fixed, vertical entity, which applies across all fields regardless of their nature 
(Chapter 2). 
The findings presented here suggest that the types of evidence which figure at the 
bottom of the hierarchy, such as expert opinions, are paramount in informing policy-
PDNHUV·XQGHUVWDQGLQJRISROLF\SUREOHPVZLWKWKHDFFRXQWVRISDUWLFLSDQWVSRLQWLQJWR
the fact that information exchange in policy-making is often built around rhetoric and 
oral communication. This is because policy forums follow a legal tradition of 
communication that is subject to the rules of oratory and narration (Dunn, 1982; 
Majone, 1989). The apparent complexity of some scientific research makes it less 
accessible to those who lack specialist training. The likelihood that high-level 
policymakers might engage with research will depend on their will as well as their ability: 
those who lack specialist training, and thus find research less accessible, are more likely 
to prefer learning through a different language.  
Findings from interview data suggest that, despite the fact that some participants 
acknowledged the evidence hierarchy and the higher validity of certain evidence types 
over others, in the real life examples they discussed they often referred to anecdote and 
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experience as influential in VWDNHKROGHUV·XQGHUVWDQGLQJVRIGUXJDQGSURVWLWXWLRQSROLF\
issues. This exposes a gap between the theory and practice of evidence use.  
7KURXJKRXWSDUWLFLSDQWV·TXRWHVDUHLGHQWLILHGE\SDUWLFLSDQWV·FRXntry of origin (A/U) 
field of policy (D/P), a number, and a letter for each professional group (A for 
advocate, P for politician, KB for knowledge broker, CS for civil servant, M for 
doctor/clinician, S for scientist). All quotes from participants will be in italics to 
distinguish them from quotes taken from secondary literature.  
7.2 What counts as Evidence? 
:KHQ UHVSRQGLQJ WR WKH TXHVWLRQ ¶ZKDW GR \RX WKLQN FRXQWV DV HYLGHQFH"· VRPH
participants, particularly politicians, researchers, and those with a primary interest in 
treatment, variously mentioned the evidence hierarchy, the National Institute for 
Clinical Excellence, randomized controlled trials and the Maryland scale as important. 
These participants appeared keen to pay tribute to RCTs even in those cases where they 
might not understand them in detail as they lacked the appropriate scientific or 
disciplinary background. This demonstrates the extent to which RCTs have come to 
dominate the language of evidence in policy (Byrne, 2011; Chapter 4). Not all 
participants mentioned the evidence hierarchy and RCTs. It was more often those in 
UK drug policy who made explicit reference to them.  
:KHQDQVZHULQJWKHTXHVWLRQ¶ZKDWGR \RXWKLQNFRXQWVDVHYLGHQFH"· there was a sense 
that some participants were rehearsing a script by paying tribute to established ideas 
VXFKDV¶WKHJROGVWDQGDUG· 
,JXHVVE\JRRGHYLGHQFH,PHDQ>«@WKHVFLHQWLILFJROGVWDQGDUGELJWULDOVWKDWDUHUHSOLFDEOH
or at least of a size where they do carry real weight. (U D 20 KB) 
Overall, participants with a scientific background in the drugs field in the UK were 
more likely to pay tribute to the standards set by the evidence hierarchy and particularly 
the use of RCTs where appropriate. The fact that they paid tribute to it does not mean 
that these dominated accounts of their practice. These participants had a nuanced view: 
not only were they aware of the difference between evidence-based policy as an ideal 
and the political reality as a practice, they also largely understood the limited feasibility 
of randomised controlled trials in social policy and public health and agreed that other 
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methods are often more suitable in terms of applicability, ethics, generalizability, and 
appropriateness.  
The notion that evidence should be weighted according to its place in the hierarchy was 
emphasised by some participants, perpetuating the idea that the value of different types 
of evidence should be established according to a hierarchy, rather than on a case-by-
case basis, or by weighing up between different types of evidence for each individual 
case. 
The way NICE go about evaluations is probably as good as it gets in terms of what counts as 
evidence (U D 35 KB) 
Referring to standard guidelines allows participants to make sense of what counts as 
evidence at the abstract level. However, most participants emphasised the different 
approaches that they regarded as belonging to particular professions with distinct foci. 
RCTs were almost always associated with evaluating clinical interventions within 
treatment: 
EpidePLRORJLVWVDQGFOLQLFLDQVZRXOGVD\5&7LVWKHRQO\ZD\WRJR>«@,I\RX·UHORRNing at 
a clinical intervention 
But: 
LQ 3XEOLF +HDOWK LV QRW VR HDV\ WR GR 5&7V VR >«@ LQ UHDOLW\ >«@ LW·V QRW DOZD\V
DSSURSULDWH WR GR5&7VZH GRQ·W KDYH D ELJ HYLGHQFH EDVH using robust studies using good 
UHVHDUFKGHVLJQV>«@ZHRIWHQKDYHWRUHO\RQ LQFRPSOHWHHYLGHQFHDQGHYLGHQFHJOHDQHGIURP
less robust research methodologies (U D 21 S) 
Here, the participant highlights that RCTs are often inappropriate in public health, as 
QRWHG LQ WKH OLWHUDWXUH 0DUFKDO HW DO  DQG WKDW UHOLDQFH RQ ´OHVVHUµ UHVHDUFK
methods is commonplace. This supports a hierarchical view of evidence, where the 
most important distinction made is that between the weight, and credibility, of different 
types of evidence, as described below. 
(YHU\WKLQJ IURP5&7VULJKWWKHZD\WKURXJKWRSHUVRQDOH[SHULHQFH IURPSHRSOHZKR·YHKDG
FRQWDFWZLWK WKH V\VWHPDQG REYLRXVO\ \RX QHHG WRZHLJK WKH HYLGHQFH DFFRUGLQJO\ EXW LW·V DOO
relevant. (U D 23 CS) 
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Although weighing the value of different types of evidence was seen as crucial, the 
importance of different types of evidence was acknowledged by most participants. 
When asked whether there was any particular kind of evidence that was more useful or 
credible, a participant answered: 
statistical evidence and in particular randomized, double-blind scientific trials...but I think 
that is probably an ideal rather than a description of political reality. (U D 26 P) 
This quote illustrates the tension between the ideal and the real. It appears that the 
pursuit of a higher type of evidence is an aspiration rather than a reality. A hierarchical 
view is privileged over a more horizontal view that would acknowledge the usefulness 
and credibility of different types of evidence, at least at the abstract level. Conversely, 
other participants give more pragmatic answers by emphasising that: 
Evidence means different things to different people. (U D 32 KB) 
The next sections will focus on what evidence means to different people, but first, it is 
relevant to discuss what evidence is supposed to mean, particularly in the context of 
policy application. The quotes in this section demonstrate that UK participants in drug 
policy, particularly politicians, civil servants, knowledge brokers and some scientists, 
made explicit reference to the evidence hierarchy and RCTs. This is something that 
maybe linked to the prevalence of the evidence-based policy discourse in the UK 
context (Chapter 2).  
7.3 Epistemic Cultures and Evidence-Based Policy 
7.3.1 The limits of RCTs 
,QDSDSHUSURGXFHGE\WKH&DELQHW2IILFH·V%HKDYLRXUDO,QVLJKWV8QLWLQFROODERUDWLRQ
with researchers and politicians, Haynes et al (2012: 4) begin by arguing that: 
¶5DQGRPLVHGFRQWUROOHGWULDOV5&7VDUHWKHEHVWZD\RIGHWHUPLQLQJZKHWKHUa 
policy is working. They are now used extensively in international development, 
medicine, and business to identify which policy, drug or sales method is most 
HIIHFWLYH· 
Here, efficacy appears as the central criterion on which to base this argument. Carrying 
out more RCTs seems like an aspirational goal for many scientists and economists who 
are attempting to promote them in policy-making (Leigh, 2009b; Goldacre, 2013; 
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Deeming, 2013). Whereas some scientists in the sample of participants made explicit 
reference to randomized controlled trials, they also acknowledged that they are not 
always feasible:  
:KHQ\RX FDQGRUDQGRPLVHG FRQWUROOHG WULDOVGR WKHPE\DOOPHDQVEXWZKHQ\RX FDQ·WGR
randomised controlled trials we can still integrate the data available according to the Bradford-
Hill criteria. (A D 2 M) 
Participants make reference to other criteria for assessing the validity and rigor of 
available research, such as the Bradford-Hill criteria, derived from epidemiology, which 
details nine criteria to establish causality. However, there is a difference between validity 
as a criterion to assess evidence quality per se, and the validity of particular evidence 
specifically directed at policy application. There is a risk that in order to subscribe to an 
ideal abstract goal, namely that of carrying out more RCTs to evaluate the efficacy of an 
intervention, one may ignore the need to assess methodological feasibility and 
suitability.  
A growing interest in RCTs outside the medical field is thought to have originated from 
the authoritativeness that such an approach could bring to policy. This ties into the 
positivist notion that better methods produce more certain and reliable results, 
regardless of the context:  
I think because of those great advances [in medicine@>«@WKDWSHRSOHLQRWKHUDUHDVRISROLF\
and practice wanted that similar approach, to give that seal of approval to their decision-
making (U D 21 S) 
The idea that RCTs are less fallible due to their high internal validity is interesting 
because, by making a claim of higher validity, policy-makers can gain credibility, as 
expressed by the participant in the quote above. Yet, there is broad recognition amongst 
participants and in specialist circles that RCTs are often unsuitable when dealing with 
complex social interventions.  
Clinical efficacy, which an RCT can address, is not the only criteria to establish the 
value of a particular intervention. When discussing the example of the randomised 
injectable opioid treatment trial (RIOTT) in the UK, one participant noted that 
DOWKRXJK LW·V UDUH WR FRPH DFURVV VXFK WULDOV LQ WKH GUXJV ILHOG IXUWKHU ZRUN ZDV
subsequently needed. The participant argued that an RCT was carried out: 
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to look at the cost effectiveness of the intervention and also how it would fit in a care pathway  
However, this gave rise to other questions which could not be answered by an RCT, 
because: 
>«WKDW·V@RQHVWXG\DQVZHULQJVRPHTXHVWLRQVEXWWKHQRSHQXSWKHZD\IRUIXUWKHUTXHVWLRQV
to be explored (U D 23 CS) 
Another participant points to the same problem when discussing the example of 
methadone treatment; the available evidence might generate further questions which lie 
outside the efficacy criteria and which are morally and politically contentious: 
0HWKDGRQH LV D UHDOO\ JRRG H[DPSOH >«@2N the science is clear, but how do you balance 
methadone with abstinence treatment? Who do you offer methadone to? Under what 
circumstances? What control you need on dosage? These and other policy questions that come 
out of that become wrapped up in ideology and all that sort of stuff (U D 27 A) 
This participant may be overemphasising the extent to which trial evidence for 
methadone treatment is uncontested and conclusive (Mattick et al, 2003); however, 
other policy questions might emerge, which are difficult to address with an RCT. 
Perhaps this typifies one of the problems of RCTs: too much hope is placed in what 
trials can achieve politically. If RCTs can provide simple, straightforward answers to 
policy questions with a high degree of certainty, then they are bound to be viewed as a 
promising means of tackling complex, controversial and uncertain political problems. 
They may also be regarded as a means for transforming claims from manifestly to 
latently moral (Chapter 5), which in the case of methadone treatment in particular and 
drug policy in general can be regarded as advantageous. 
7KH ´5DQGRPLVWDVµ PRYHPHQW DGYRFDWHV PRUH H[WHQVLYH XVH RI UDQGRPL]HG SROLF\
trials internationally in order to tackle complex political problems through scientific 
solutions centred on one single methodology (Leigh, 2009b; Ravallion, 2009). In 
Australia, there is a sense among some participants that the evidence hierarchy and 
RCTs have not gained popularity on the same scale and at the same pace as in other 
countries. Advocacy for RCTs and for applying the evidence hierarchy is seen as minor, 
particularly outside of health.  
Chapter 7 On evidence in Policy 
167 
we ought to have something of a hierarchy of evidence >«@ WKHUH DUH YHU\ IHZ UDQGRPL]HG
trials conducted in Australia relative to other developed countries, so the randomising 
revolution has yet to hit our shores (A D 13 P) 
7KH HYLGHQFH KLHUDUFK\ DQG WKH ¶UDQGRPLVLQJ UHYROXWLRQ· DUH DGYRFDWHG E\ WKLV
participant as a way toward better public policy. In reality, one participant argued that: 
the politicians have control over the one thing that determines whether evidence gets pulled in the 
PLGVWDQ\ZD\ZKLFKLVWKHUHVRXUFHVDOORFDWLRQ>«@&OLQLFLDQVWHOODGPLQLVWUDWRUVZK\WKLVLVD
good RCT and why they should be doing this, clinicians really drive the administrators in 
terms of getting them to adopt evidence base, because a large amount of what we do is driven by 
resource constraints, not evidence base. (A D 1 P) 
This participant implies a tension between resource constraints and investment in 
evidence production. He also implies that politicians can be driven to invest in evidence, 
particularly if that evidence assists resource allocation. However, there is some 
agreement that this happens primarily in health evaluation, over and above other areas. 
Participants stressed the importance of disciplinary, field-specific and departmental 
research cultures when distinguishing between the types of evidence that might be 
YDOXHGE\GLIIHUHQW VWDNHKROGHUV'LIIHUHQW ´FXOWXUHVRI HYLGHQFHµ DSSHDU WRSHUPHDWH
different areas, and different government departments, in such a way as to influence 
SDUWLFXODU VWDNHKROGHUV· YLHZ RI ZKDW HYLGHQFH VKRXOG EH 7KH PRVW VLJQLILFDQW
differences are found between policy areas and professional backgrounds. The strong 
presence of medical science in drug policy treatment, for example, influences the 
manner in which evidence is perceived and understood by policy actors in the field:  
I think there are different cultures in different departments. The Department of Health is very 
much influenced by medicine and economics increasingly and psychology but there, of course, 
there is an emphasis on something which is scientific and academically respectable evidence. (U 
D 34 S) 
The participant sees evidence respectability as tied to the standards of scientific and 
academic practice in a health context. Other important differences noted by participants 
concerned subject areas and research commissioning, or whether departments carried 
out their own research in-house: 
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you can certainly see differences anGLW·VWRGRZLWKWKHVXEMHFWDUHDDQGWKHUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVRI
each of the departments really and whether they have researchers employed and how much they 
constitute a group to themselves. (U D 34 S) 
External commissioning, good research ethics and governance were seen as potentially 
supporting more rigorous research but at the same time perceived as more time and 
resource-intensive. Conversely, in-house research was seen as more immediate but also 
potentially less rigorous.  
Several UK participants emphasised that departmental approaches to evidence are area-
specific and culture-specific: 
«WKH'HSDUWPHQWRI+HDOWKDQGZKDWFRQVWLWXWHVHYLGHQFHIRUWKHPZLOOEHV\VWHPDWLFUHYLHZV
DQGWULDOHYLGHQFH>«@DORWRISHRSOHLQWKH'HSDUWPHQWRQWKHUHVHDUFKVLGHsee anything else 
DVVOLJKWO\GRGJ\%XWRQWKH+RPH2IILFHVLGHDQGLQWKHFULPHILHOG>«@5&7LVYHU\KDUG
to deliver and pretty much not even attempted, so you are looking at evaluative research of 
different types there (U D 19 S) 
As evidenced in the quote above, a focus on treatment within health policy would 
seemingly prompt more clinical trials, whereas a focus on crime reduction would not 
favour trials as a way of evaluating the effectiveness of interventions. This does not 
mean that government departments, even in health, consider RCTs as the only valid 
approach to evaluation: 
(YHQ ZLWKLQ JRYHUQPHQW GHSDUWPHQWV >«@ WKHUH LV D KHDOWK\ VFHSWLFLVP WRZDUGV WKH 5&7
approach, I very rarely come across calls for tenders which specify an RCT, because the people I 
deal with that work on substance related issues in these departments actually are really clever 
>«@ WKH\·UH DOZD\V WDONLQJ WR UHVHDUFKHUV VR ZKHUHDV WKH\ DSSUHFLDWH WKH ZKROH QRWLRQ RI
hierarchies of evidence I think they are very realistic. (U D 21 S) 
Despite privileging them at the abstract level, participants noted that RCTs are not 
necessarily suited to evaluating drug policy interventions.  
7.3.2 What counts as evidence to whom? 
,Q UHIHUHQFH WR 'HHPLQJ ·V TXHVWLRQ ¶ZKDW Founts as evidence anG WR ZKRP"· 
SDUWLFLSDQWV· DFFRXQWV VXJJHVW D FOHDU GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ GLIIHUHQW VWDNHKROGHUV·
approaches to evidence. UK participants, particularly within the drugs and drug 
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treatment fields, seem altogether supportive of the notion of hierarchies and the pursuit 
of RCTs wherever possible: 
WKHUH DUHQ·WPDQ\5&7V LQ WKH GUXJV ILHOG EXW \RXNQRZ WKHUH LV VFRSH WR GR VRPH5&7
ZRUNDQGZHVKRXOGQ·WDYRLGLWDQGZHVKRXOGDFWLYHO\GRLWZKHUHZHFDQ (U D 23 CS) 
Politicians in the sample appeared supportive of the evidence hierarchy, at least at the 
abstract level.1 Yet, when thinking about political realities, by which I mean established 
discussion and decision-making forums, understanding of political responsibilities, and 
political representation, politicians are likely to use and value evidence that lies outside 
established hierarchies in their practice. So, whereas: 
the best evidence to have is when there's been a decent trial, ideally randomized controlled trial 
(U D 22 P) 
there is also recognition of a long-established political practice of observing and 
evaluating case-VWXGLHV VXFK DV RWKHU FRXQWULHV· SROLFLHV SDUWLFXODUO\ WKRVH FRXQWULHV
whose policies deviate from the prohibition model. Countries that have adopted 
experimental policies and innovative approaches often become the object of discussion 
and observation. This has happened in the UK with the increased attention given to 
Portugal in drug policy debates and forums and to Sweden in prostitution policy 
debates (HASC, 2012; APPG on Prostitution Report, 2014). In the context of the 2012 
Home Affairs Select Committee on drugs, Portugal was referred to by one participant 
as: 
DYHU\JRRGPRGHO>«@LI\RXZHUHWRDGRSWWKH3RUWXJXHVHPRGHOLQWKH8.>«@RIFRXUVH
3RUWXJDOLVGLIIHUHQWIURPWKH8.>«@Eut it's still very valuable evidence, evidence on what is 
currently happening is incredibly valuable, and surprisingly hard to get, there are lots of 
contentious figures about what the current position is, so current evidence and trial types 
evidence are typically the best, but all sorts of evidence is valuable, it's just that some of it is of 
very little value. (U D 22 P) 
No explicit discussion ensued about the types of evidence considered of little value by 
the participant; however, it can be inferred that evidence that is not considered of a high 
standard is deemed less valuable as a result. A clear tension emerges concerning the 
                                                 
1 It should be noted that, by virtue of their participation and interest in the project, the views of these politicians 
might be less than common. 
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differing values ascribed to different types of evidence. The views of scientists, 
politicians, civil servants and knowledge brokers in drug policy seem to point towards a 
vision of evidence in policy that is influenced by some of the precepts of the evidence-
based policy discourse.  
Participants in prostitution policy, alongside advocates and some social scientists, had a 
rather different take on evidence. They largely did not mention RCTs or the evidence 
hierarchy, and if they did, there was an antagonistic note in their responses. They 
emphasised lived experience as a valid form of evidence, yet noted it is marginalised by 
the evidence-based policy discourse: 
Bottom-up evidence and the way the people are talking about things in the real world, is often 
NLQGRI \RX JHWPRUH RI D IHHOLQJDQ LQVWLQFW IRU >«@ WKLQJV LQ UHDO WLPHEHFDXVH UHVHDUFK
often is so far out of date and so sanitized, and you know you have to ask certain questions to 
get funding (U P 29 S).  
There is a tension expressed in this quote between bottom-up evidence and the kind of 
research that might receive funding. The implication is that it is a difficult balance to 
strike, but the current system favours certain questions over others. Another participant 
emphasises lived experience as a form of evidence: 
we have both our lived experiences and the H[SHULHQFHVRIRXU FRPPXQLWLHV >«@So we have 
that knowledge and evidence as the very basis of how we develop policy. (A P 18 A) 
3DUWLFLSDQWVLQSURVWLWXWLRQSROLF\DGGUHVVHGWKHTXHVWLRQ¶ZKDWGR\RXWKLQNFRXQWVDV
HYLGHQFH"· GLIIHUHQWO\ FRPSDUHG WR GUXJ SROLF\ UHVSRQGHQWV ,QVWHDG RI SURYLGLQJ D
general answer or acknowledging abstract principles or guidelines, they often answered 
in reference to a particular context. For example, a participant specifically referred to 
the Rogan inquiry (1986) as evidence for decriminalisation in the context of the New 
South Wales prostitution debate:  
The Rogan LQTXLU\ >«@WKDWZDV WKH HYLGHQFHZHQHHGHG WR VKRZWKDWZKDWZHZHUHGRLQJ
what we could do needed to be recognised and funded so that was the first piece of evidence, the 
gathering of the evidence in the Rogan inquiry, because he spoke to, and the committee, spoke 
to a number of sex workers telling the stories of the repeat arrests, the crime, the corruption, the 
bullshit, the revolving door syndrome (A P 4 A). 
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In this case, the participant noted how a specific official procedure of evidence-
gathering, i.e. the inquiry, set the scene in providing an authoritative voice for the 
affected communities that were trying to bring these issues to the fore (Chapter 9). 
,Q WKH 8. FRQWH[W D SDUWLFLSDQW QRWHG WKH GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ ¶SURSHU UHVHDUFK· E\
which they meant academic research, and the type of research that civil servants might 
engage in, which is more of a synthesis exercise: 
LI\RX·UHDFLYLOVHUYDQW>HYLGHQFH@GRHVQ·WPHDQWKHVDPHDVLWGRHVWRDFDGHPLFVLW·VMXVWXVHG
in a ORRVHWHUPPHDQLQJWRORRNLQWRZKDW·VJRLQJRQDQGILQGRXWDVPXFKDV\RXFDQDERXWLW 
(U P 33 CS) 
This statement seems to further underline that evidence means different things to 
different professionals, and that it is tied with context, policy domain and disciplinary 
background. During a consultation process on prostitution, which culminated in the 
 +RPH 2IILFH UHYLHZ ¶3D\LQJ WKH 3ULFH· WKH SDUWLFLSDQW VSHDNV DERXW KDYLQJ WR
accommodate the demands of various stakeholders and weigh their evidence, whilst 
being at the receiving end of criticism for not acknowledging the validity of 
VWDNHKROGHUV· YLHZV 7KH SDUWLFLSDQW·V IUXVWUDWLRQ HPHUJHG GXH WR WKH YROXPH DQG
inconclusiveness of the evidence gathered: 
,GRQ·WWKLQNZHWUHDWHGDQ\RILWDVHYLGHQce, we treated it all as opinion, to be perfectly honest, 
because for every piece of evidence you had saying this worked, you had another piece of evidence 
VD\LQJQRLWGRHVQ·W (U P 33 CS) 
The contested nature of evidence, alongside the strong polarisation that characterises 
prostitution policy-making, does not necessarily encourage stakeholders to engage with 
the evidence and weigh LW DFFRUGLQJ WR LWV ´TXDOLW\µ ,Q WKH H[DPSOH DERYH WKH
contradictory nature of the evidence led the participant to treat it all equally (i.e. as 
opinion). Indeed, evidence considered of a high quality (according to the hierarchy) 
might be lacking, but it seems that in criminal justice, contrary to public health, this is 
more often the case. Thus, actors who operate in drug and prostitution policy outside of 
health and treatment might have a less prescriptive and generalisable view of what 
evidence should be, or indeed what it is. What is presented as evidence might be treated 
as opinion for different reasons: it might be because of the presence of contradictory 
evidence. It might be because opinion can be regarded as a form of evidence, which, 
even though it does not figure in the hierarchy, plays a significant role in policy-making. 
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It might be because those who feel excluded from the evidence-based policy discourse 
might be trying to widen the notion of evidence to include something broader than the 
hierarchy allows.  
7.4 Re-appropriating anecdote: lived experience 
In prostitution policy, participants either did not acknowledge the evidence hierarchy or 
RCTs, or they were critical of them. When asked about the role of anecdotal evidence in 
policy, one participant had a strong reaction by stating: 
I hate that word. 
GZ: Anecdotal? 




RIWHQVWRULHVDERXWSHRSOH·VOLYHV. (U P 25 S) 
The participant highlights how, whereas anecdote has intrinsic negative connotations, 
particularly as a result of the hierarchy of evidence within the evidence-based policy 
¶UHJLPH·LWLVLQIDFWDQRWKHUZD\RIUHIHUULQJWR¶VWRULHVDERXWSHRSOH·VOLYHV·ZKLFKDUH
seen as valuable evidence. Furthermore, the participant notes that policy shifts are often 
not informed by RCTs. There is a certain frustration among some participants directed 
at the evidence-based policy narrative in both the UK and Australia. This frustration is 
particularly evident among social scientists and advocates in both policy areas, as well as 
policy actors with a non-medical background in the area of prostitution. For them, the 
KLHUDUFK\WKDWLWLPSOLHVFRQVWLWXWHVD¶QHZUHJLPH·ZKLFKGLVUHJDUGVSHRSOH·VH[SHULHQFH
as evidence. This is coupled with an increasing level of scepticism towards RCTs that is 
informed by the idea that big policy shifts are often not evidence-based, or at least not 
based on evidence generated by trials. Some participants share a positive view of 
anecdote, both by weighing it highly in their own evidence ranking, and by arguing that 
anecdote is morHSRZHUIXOWKDQWULDOVZKHQLWFRPHVWRLQGXFLQJ¶ELJVKLIWVLQSROLF\·2  
                                                 
2 For example, the decriminalisation of prostitution, which is viewed as a significant policy paradigm shift in 
NSW, occurred because of non-trial evidence; most of the evidence in the 1986 Rogan Report, which was used 
as the basis for early change in prostitution legislation, was qualitative in character, alongside some demographic 
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In the context of prostitution, both researchers and advocates explicitly value personal 
experience as a form of evidence. This might be underpinned by the adoption of 
feminism and standpoint epistemology coupled with a certain frustration directed at the 
narrow conceptualisation of evidence presented by the hierarchy and endorsed by 
health research. Advocates, knowledge brokers, and politicians across both fields of 
policy do refer to personal experience as a form of evidence, and a particularly strategic 
one for the purposes of emotionally engaging audiences. A hierarchical conception of 
evidence which ascribes more power to certain forms of evidence over others might 
promote power asymmetries by ascribing more power to some policy actors over 
others. The voice of a researcher is seen as more neutral than that of an advocate, and 
similarly, quantitative data is seen as more neutral than qualitative case studies. 
However, the advocate·V HPRWLRQDOO\ HQJDJLQJ VWRULHV PLJKW KDYH PRUH SHUVXDVLYH
SRZHUWKDQDUHVHDUFKHU·VVWDWLVWLFV 
Advocates in both prostitution and drug policy tended to be much more supportive of 
the idea that stories constitute good evidence than any others. Social researchers were 
also more supportive because they understood the complementarity of data and 
narratives: 
<RX·UHXVLQJVWRU\WKHUHWRLOOXVWUDWHVRPHWKLQJELJJHU>«@DOOWKHWLPHV,·YHHYHUJLYHQHYLGHQFH
RUZH·YHJLYHQHYLGHQFHDVDQRUJDQLVDWLRQZH·YHKDGdata but the stories are an illustration (U 
P 25 S) 
/D\SHRSOH·VRSLQLRQGRHVQRW ILJXUH LQ WKH HYLGHQFHKLHUDUFK\ LQ IDFW WKHUHPD\EH
some ambiguity about what constitutes lay opinion as opposed to expert opinion. Does 
one have to be a scientist in order to be an expert, or can personal experience constitute 
as a basis for expertise? The answer to this question again depends on individual and 
JURXSSHUVSHFWLYHV)RUSROLWLFLDQV OD\SHRSOH·VRSLQLRQ LVYHU\ LPSRUWDQWSDUWLFXODUO\
when aggregated through surveys and opinion polls, because:  
                                                                                                                                          
 
and community survey data (Rogan Report, 1986; see Chapter 9). Subsequent evaluations of decriminalisation in 
New South Wales were carried out on the basis of its impact on public health, sometimes following independent 
initiatives (Harcourt et al, 2010). Official evaluations have mostly taken the shape of narrative reviews (Better 
Regulation Office, 2012).  
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the way drugs policy has to work is you have to get 50% plus 1 of the community to agree with 
you (A D 1 P) 
In prostitution debates, advocates support the position that the most valuable, and 
often least respected evidence is that which comes from the experience of people 
involved as sex workers (but not clients):  
)RU XV DV VH[ZRUNHUV >«@ ZH KDYH ERWK RXU OLYHG H[SHULHQFHV DQG WKH H[SHULHQFHV RI RXU
FRPPXQLWLHV WKDW ZH DUH FRQWLQXRXVO\ HQJDJLQJ ZLWK >«@ ZH KDYH WKDW knowledge and 
evidence as the very basis of how we develop policy. (A P 18 A) 
Lived experience as a form of evidence is appreciated by most participants; politicians 
PLJKWUHIHUWRWKHLUFRQVWLWXHQWV·H[SHULHQFHZKLOHGRFWRUVPLJKWUHIHUWRWKHLUSDWLHQWV· 
The weight ascribed to experience as a form of evidence varies, though one important 
difference appears between first-hand experience and lived experience as narrated by a 
third party. 
SHRSOH·VOLYHGH[SHULHQFHLVDQRWKHULPSRUWDQWIRUPRIHYLGHQFHVRfor me, I am, have been and 
remain, a sort of active drug user, I value a lot of what people say about their experiences of 
using drugs because it provides some appreciation and understanding of these issues that is 
different to what you can derive from formal research (U D 28 S). 
Since participants claimed that lived experience is a form of evidence, and claimed that 
personal narratives may significantly aid understanding of complex issues, particularly 
when addressing non-specialist audiences, it is worth considering whether this form of 
evidence can attain sufficient credibility to inform policy and decision-making.  
7.4.1 The Limits of Anecdote: do stories need numbers? 
It is not uncommon for policy actors to cite percentages in order to support their claims 
to gain more credibility for their case, even when the numbers are uncertain. For 
instance, although there is no definitive data on the number of sex workers who work 
from home (Donovan et al, 2012), many estimate that the number might be quite high:  
we believe that in New South Wales at least 40% of the industry is made up of men and 
women who worked privately from home (A P 4 A) 
This expresses a general tendency of using numbers to strengthen claims, often 
unintendedly. +HUHWKHXVHRIWKHWHUP¶EHOLHYH· suggests lack of certainty, coupled with 
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a need to dress up anecdotal evidence with numbers in order to make it more credible 
to the receiver (Majone, 1989; Stevens, 2011). In their meta-analysis comparing the 
persuasiveness of narrative and statistical evidence, Allen and Preiss (1997) find that 
statistical evidence is overall more persuasive. This would suggest that the type of 
evidence which sits at the top of the hierarchy is more persuasive; however, this runs 
FRXQWHU WR SDUWLFLSDQWV· H[SHULHQFHV FRQFerning the use of narratives to foster 
understanding and emotional engagement among audiences. Although Allen and Preiss 
did not study the level of persuasiveness obtained by combining both narrative and 
statistical evidence, the degree of certainty that may be provided by finite numbers 
seems to make for a higher level of trust in the evidence.  
This might be related to the fact that in order to justify valuing anecdotal and 
experiential evidence such as personal stories and peer-to-peer knowledge exchange, 
stakeholders might need to formalise their practices: 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJZKDWZHFDOOD¶SROLF\IHHGEDFNORRS·>«@WKHZRUNRISHHUHGXFDWRUVZKRDUH
sex workers who go out to the workplaces of sex and engage in a two-way exchange of 
information, education and support but in that process, a lot of information ² really valuable 
information and evidence ² is gathered and we see it as critical within our member 
organisations that that information is put to use rather than being gathered or heard about but 
then lying dormant (A P 18 A). 
This process of organisation allows advocates to make the best use of their knowledge 
and put it at the service of others. Formalising processes might also allow advocates to 
gain credibility in the increasingly evidence-based context in which they operate. In 
advocacy, peer-to-peer knowledge exchange is a widespread and valued practice which 
WDNHVERWKRUDODQGZULWWHQIRUP6H[ZRUNHUV·RUJDQLVDWLRQVDUHRIWHQSHHU-based, and 
drug services often successfully rely on peer leaders to deliver public health messages 
(Latkin, 1998) as well as treatment and counselling (Aitkin et al, 2002).3  
Peer review is a long established academic practice: peer-reviewed journals are 
considered to be more valuable sources of knowledge in academia and beyond. 
Notwithstanding criticism of peer-review as a practice and evidence that unrefereed 
journals lower down the hierarchy may publish quality articles (Starbuck, 2005), peer 
review continues to be relied upon as a sound method to ascertain the quality of 
                                                 
3 http://nothing-about-us-without-us.com/contacts/sex-worker-organisations/ 
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academic research, and by extension, the quality of the evidence produced. However, 
peer-to-peer knowledge exchange outside of academia is not granted the same status, 
partly because that knowledge is not necessarily formalised, and partly because this 
happens outside established fora of evidence production and dissemination (Williams 
and Glasby, 2010). As one advocate puts it, 
I have a large range of people within our membership who have that direct experience and 
provide me with briefing and information in order to build together a media statement that 
represents those experiences. 6R,JXHVV«RXUDSSURDFKHVWKH\·UHWKHOHVVIRUPDORQHV (A P 
18 A) 
The lack of formal recognition of this type of evidence collection by advocates, who 
collect informatiRQE\UHODWLQJSHRSOH·V OLYHGH[SHULHQFHJLYHVZD\WRDQDV\PPHWULFDO
treatment of this information. Existing power asymmetries, such as that between 
researchers (objective) and advocates (subjective) further a hierarchical view of evidence 
where experiential evidence is the least valued, at least at the official level. Advocates 
might feel undervalued compared to researchers by the manner in which resources are 
allocated. Accordingly, research receives more funding compared to advocacy: 
the imbalance of money that goes to research as [compared to] everything else really frustrates 
me. ,RQO\KDYHWRORRNDWWKHPHWKDGRQHDQGDOFRKROUHVHDUFKFHQWUHV·ZHEVLWHVDQGWKHSHRSOH
they employ, the salaries they must be paying and think god almighty, if that money was 
DYDLODEOH« You know, we struggle... (A D 14 A) 
The frustration arising from this perceived power asymmetry deeply affects the material 
opportunities and the level of credibility of advocates. This goes back to discussions 
about power asymmetry and the systemic marginalisation of certain groups (Chapters 2 
and 5). In a context where the meaning of evidence is broad and subjective, evidence is 
contested, and policy decisions are sometimes based on poor quality evidence or no 
evidence, it is legitimate for actors to question the manner in which resource allocation 
favours research.  
7.5 Power asymmetries and Boundary work 
In their article on associative pluralism and the governance of drug policy in 
Switzerland, Walti and Kubler (2003) argue that, whereas decision-making processes are 
becoming more accessible to civil society organisations, these remain subject to 
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dominant discourses. As such, many organisations have to decide between compliance 
and exclusion. Those who advocate for radical policy reform, for instance, might be less 
likely to be included in decision-making than those who operate within the boundaries 
of current policy paradigms. Yet crucially, they see evidence as an instrument which 
offers some tangible political advantages. Advocates who do not comply with dominant 
policy narratives, such as evidence-based policy, might be less likely to be considered 
credible by the policy community in which they operate. Indeed, no participant actively 
disagreed that policy should be evidence-based. This is seen as an aspirational goal 
which carries with it the hope of a less moralised and therefore less adversarial policy-
PDNLQJ HQYLURQPHQW &HUWDLQ SDUWLFLSDQWV· IUXVWUDWLRQV FDQ EH XQGHUVWRRG LQ D
hierarchical context where the evidence hierarchy translates into a differential treatment 
of stakeholders, with certain sciences considered more objective than others, and certain 
voices considered more valid. In a sense, if they are to be taken seriously, advocates 
have to claim that their work is evidence-based, even if what they call evidence is not 
necessarily recognised as such in evidence hierarchies.  
Affected communities in these policy areas are likely to face potential exclusion through 
either lack of material resources or ideological and cultural alienation or both: 
,Q WKHDUHD RIGUXJXVHDQG VH[ZRUN >«@ UHSUHVHQWLQJ WKH VRFLDO VWDWXV RI SHRSOHZKRXVH
GUXJVDQGDOFRKRODQGVH[ZRUNHUVLQVRFLHW\LVWKHFRPSOHWHODFNRIWKHLULQYROYHPHQW,W·VMXVW
not right! The complete lack of involvement, in consultDWLRQ FRPSOHWHO\ DW DUP·V OHQJWK EXW
\RX·OO JHW LQ WKHUH LI \RXU H[SHULHQFH RI GUXJXVH RU \RXU H[SHULHQFH RI VH[ZRUN LVSHUKDSV
fit[s] in a particular message. Again the selectivity of evidence in terms of personal experience 
goes on (U P 31 A) 
Here, participants highlight the very process of exclusion or piecemeal inclusion 
described by Walti and Kubler (2003), or tokenistic inclusion, as below: 
,W·VDOODELWSDWURQLVLQJUHDOO\$QGDVDGUXJXVHURUJDQLVDWLRQZHH[SHULHQFH>«@WRNHQLVWLF
sometimes involvement of us. We have to fight really hard to get heard sometimes, but I know 
that the perspective we take to policy is really important, and some people value it and some 
people tolerate it and some people just dismiss it (A D 9 A) 
There is either a lack of involvement or a targeted involvement (if and when drug users 
or sex workers can deliver a message which fits within the dominant paradigm). One 
Chapter 7 On evidence in Policy 
178 
way states can ensure that organisations are steered and managed is through 
governmental funding.  
Whereas in New South Wales, funding for advocacy organisations (both drug users and 
sex workers) has been targeted almost exclusively to HIV, STIs and BBVs prevention in 
both domains, in the UK drug user and sex worker-led organisations have received little 
or no public funding while their other sources of funding are intermittent at best. There 
are many examples of such organisations (i.e. the UK Network of Sex Work Projects, 
WKH (QJOLVK &ROOHFWLYH RI 3URVWLWXWHV 1DWLRQDO 8VHUV· 1HWZRUN The lack of public 
funding, coupled with their exclusion or piecemeal inclusion in policy consultation, 
severely curtails their representative and lobbying capacity, as well as their involvement 
in policy-PDNLQJ&RQYHUVHO\ LQ1HZ6RXWK:DOHVVRPHVH[ZRUNHUVDQGGUXJXVHUV· 
advocacy organisations, such as Scarlett Alliance, NUAA and SWOP, have received 
state and commonwealth funding intermittently yet fairly consistently in order to tackle 
HIV. This, coupled with a federal governmental commitment to involve affected 
communities in response to the HIV crisis (Hulse, 1997), allowed these communities to 
become active, resourceful and involved in policy debates. However, this does not mean 
that power asymmetries have simply disappeared through inclusion. As one participant 
put it, to get:  
«GUXJXVHUVVLWWLQJDWWKHWDEOHZHKDYHWRILJKWWRJHWDWWKRVHWDEOHV>«@HYHQLQVRPHZKHUH
like New South Wales where we have reasonably good partnership and a part of the historical 
affected community partnership that exists in Australia (A D 9 A) 
our profile has enabled us to often... push our way into spaces where people are attempting to 
exclude us. 7KDW KDV SULQFLSDOO\ RFFXUUHG ZKHQ >«@ DFDGHPLFV RU NH\ LQGLYLGXDOV RU
organisations that are abolitionist in nature or in philosophy have had a greater level of 
engagement than us and there has on many, many occasions been attempts to exclude us from 
key spaces, key platforms or key opportunities and so we have regularly had to do very strong 
DGYRFDF\LQRUGHUWRSXVKVH[ZRUNHUV·LQYROYHPHQW (A P 18 A) 
In some cases, groups who received funding to tackle HIV wished to fulfil an advocacy 
IXQFWLRQ VRPHWKLQJ WKDW ZDVQ·W QHFHVVDULO\ VXSSRUWHG E\ WKHLU IXQGHUV $GYRFDF\
groups often have to present themselves as affected community engagement groups, 
because doing advocacy is not officially within their remit and their funding is 
specifically targeted at community engagement and not advocacy. In other cases, 
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participants have perceived exclusion to be motivated by moral, political and ideological 
differences. Whereas in some cases advocacy groups may be overtly excluded and 
denied public resources, in other cases resources could be carefully steered in order to 
exercise some level of control. In New South Wales: 
the funding for the drug user organisDWLRQV >«@ LW·V EORRG ERUQH YLUXVPRQH\ >«@ZKHQ ,
WKLQNDERXWGUXJXVHU RUJDQLVDWLRQV LQ$XVWUDOLD WKH UHDVRQ WKH\ H[LVW LVQ·W EHFDXVHSHRSOH
WKRXJKWWKDWGUXJXVHUVKDGKXPDQULJKWVLWZDVWRVWRSWKHWKLUGZDYHRI+,9WKDW·VZKDW
that was about (A D 9 A). 
For this participant, resourcing is not about empowerment or credibility, but rather, 
damage control. 7KLV VXSSRUWV:DOWL DQG.XEOHU·V  DUJXPHQW DERXWFRQGLWLRQDO
inclusion and steering through resources allocation by the state: although organisations 
can and do step beyond their remit, in practice their opportunities are curtailed by both 
resource allocation and associated requirements, alongside a continuous potential threat 
to be excluded from those decision-making tables. This is not to say that researchers 
cannot also face discrimination or exclusion through their lack of material resources or 
ability to engage with particular discourses.  
The principle of boundary work applies to researchers, because those who are explicitly 
doing advocacy are seen as stepping outside their remit, and thus their credibility is 
questioned. The idea of boundary work contains a cautionary tale: by relying on science 
and accepted scientific principles as the single source of knowledge authority, one can 
hope to overcome the all-too-human tendency to have a personal and emotional 
involvement in the issue at stake. If science is made of dispassionate, detached, 
objective, rigorous and authoritative judgement, then anything that is emotional, 
subjective and irrational is seen as inimical to the development of sound science and 
evidence. However, this is a thwarted view of science. Individuals do not have a 
monolithic identity; scientists, politicians and advocates have multiple identities 
informed by different sets of values (both contextual and constitutive). Individuals are 
largely unable to compartmentalise to the extent that they can separate the values of, 
say, affected or involved subject, from those of researcher. The influence of contextual 
values was found to be greater than that of the constitutive values of science in research 
(Longino, 1990; Chapter 4). People have multiple identities, so they will naturally utilise 
ERWK´YDOXHV\VWHPVµFRQWH[WXDODQGFRQVWLWXWLYH7KH\PD\WKXVHQGXSZLWKFRPSOH[
positions that are informed by a mix of experience and evidence, understood through 
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experience and other filters to different degrees, in different ways for different contexts 
(Chapter 8).  
Researchers have highlighted the frustration of not being able to ask certain questions 
because there is no interest, and funding, to tackle them. In fact, often the very 
processes of tendering and commissioning of research can limit the freedom of 
researchers. For instance, the funding for the evaluations of the Medically Supervised 
Injecting Centre in Sydney was directed toward particular issues at the expense of 
others:  
the trade-RII EHWZHHQ WKH JRYHUQPHQW SULRULWLVLQJ WKH IRXU DUHDV WKH\ GLG >«@ KDYLQJ D
SURVSHFWLYHREVHUYDWLRQDOVWXG\ZKLFKORRNHGDW>«@ORQJHUWHUPKHDOWK outcomes in terms of 
LQIHFWLRQDQGRYHUGRVHDORQJWKHFRKRUWRISHRSOHDWWHQGLQJWKHFHQWUH>«@ZHZHUHQ·WDEOHWRGR
that. (A D 8 S) 
In the second evaluation, the funding was not sufficient to carry out a longitudinal study 
looking at long-term health outcomes for a cohort of clients. Despite the fact that the 
first evaluation had already proven that public and community support for the centre in 
the area was high, the funding for the second evaluation was essentially directed at 
proving the same thing, for political reasons (Meher, 2007). The criterion for evaluating 
this policy intervention was not simply efficacy, in which case funding could probably 
have been provided to study long-term health outcomes of its target group, but also and 
primarily political feasibility, which explains the focus on public support for the facility. 
Researchers whose research is commissioned to evaluate public policy interventions are 
steered and directed through funding and commissioning requirements. Researchers 
might be perceived as disinterested and objective parties in policy debates, contrary to 
advocates, unless they are calling for policy reform that runs contrary to the dominant 




For example, dominant scientific paradigms and hierarchies in science will likely 
influence, if not determine, which discipline and whose research is more valuable. In 
other words, as long as evidence is conceived in a predominantly positivist fashion, the 
power asymmetry between certain researchers (objective) and other groups will likely 
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continue to exist. As Epstein (1996: 3) argued in relation to science and HIV, 
NQRZOHGJHLQWKLVFRQWH[WFDPHRXWRI¶FUHGLELOLW\VWUXJJOHV·ZKHUHE\FHUWDLQFODLPVDQG
claim-makers were deemed more credible than others. Those researchers whose work 
aligns with the evidence hierarchy, who are producing systematic reviews or meta-
analyses of RCTs, might be more likely to be deemed credible. There is an apparent 
asymmetry between certain researchers compared to others. For instance, a social 
researcher using visual methods is less likely to be commissioned research by the 
Department of Health or be called to give evidence to a Home Affairs Select 
Committee on Drugs than an epidemiologist.4 During the HASC consultation (2011-2), 
the expert witnesses who were called to give evidence to the committee were advocates 
with significant public profiles (the likes of Richard Branson and Russell Brand), 
advocates from think tanks, physicians, psychiatrists, epidemiologists, neuroscientists, 
law enforcement and criminal justice representatives, but no social scientists.  
Interview data would suggest that experiential evidence is more valued by those groups 
who tend to be considered less credible, are most marginalised, and generally have the 
least power in policy-making, such as certain advocates, in this case drug users and sex 
ZRUNHUV· JURXSV $OWKRXJK SHRSOH LQ WKHVH JURXSV DUH OHVV OLNHO\ WR KDYH VFLHQWLILF
expertise, they are likely to be experts in their own right because of first-hand, personal 
experience, by being the primary subjects of these policy areas and being at the 
receiving end of interventions. In the quote below, the participant emphasises the 
importance of lived experience against more abstract definitions of models of 
prostitution regulation:  
ZKHQWKH6ZHGLVKPRGHOFRPHVXSDQG>«@LVSURPRWHGKHUHZKLFKGRHVKDSSHQD ORW>«@
people actually have no understanding of the real impact of the model and are just talking 
about it in a theoretical or philosophical seQVH >«@ RXU SRLQW ZDV WR EULQJ WRJHWKHU WKH
H[SHULHQFHVRI6ZHGLVKVH[ZRUNHUVLQ6ZHGHQ>«@DQGWKRVHRIVH[ZRUNHUVLQ$XVWUDOLDWR
develop a series of documents on why the Swedish model was problematic and harmful and why 
LW·VQRWLGHDOIRU$XVWUDOLD And so I guess that lived experience stuff for us... (A P 18 A) 
Not only does experiential evidence figure prominently in informal knowledge exchange 
forums: the formalisation and inclusion of personal narratives as case studies in 
documents produced by both advocates and researchers in prostitution and drug policy 
                                                 
4 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmhaff/184/18415.htm 
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is portrayed as a necessary tool for informing, particularly by those participants whose 
knowledge claims are lessened by the evidence hierarchy. In a sense, the logic of the 
hierarchy, and its associated power asymmetry, is reversed in order to increase the status 
and credibility of anecdotal and experiential evidence, which are regarded by 
participants as more universally intelligible. It is more often those participants who are 
excluded or at least marginalised because of the hierarchy that explicitly argue for the 
value of anecdotal and experiential evidence (section 7.7). 
7.6 The jurisprudential metaphor 
/RRNLQJDWSDUWLFLSDQWV·DFFRXQWVLWZRXOGDSSHDUWKDWWKHERXQGDULHVEHWZHHQGLIIHUHQW
types of evidence are blurred to the extent that all evidence includes a degree of 
anecdotal evidence, particularly in the way it is communicated. In spite of abstract-
aspirational positions supporting the increased use of RCTs, most participants 
recognised that, in the practice of policy making, all sorts of information might be called 
evidence. As Allen and Preiss put it:  
¶VLQFH$ULVWRWOHXVLQJHYLGHQFHWRSHUVXDGHSURYLGHVDSULPDU\PHDQVRIJDLQLQJ
adherence. Many potential forms of evidence exist: expert testimonial assertions, 
eye witness testimony, statistics, examples, etc. Evidence provides the 
supporting material (proof) that asks the message receiver to accept the 
FRQFOXVLRQVRIWKHFRPPXQLFDWRU· 
This acknowledges that evidence exists and can be presented in a range of different 
forms, yet it also crucially points to the primary use of evidence as a tool of persuasion 
(Majone, 1989). The established practices of communication and information exchange 
inside and outside policy-making fora privilege anecdote, or the narrativization of 
evidence, over statistical data. Indeed, no evidence speaks for itself. It all has to be 
narrativized and interpreted in order to be communicated. However, the very concept 
of evidence already encompasses a communicative element, in that evidence without 
VRPH LQWHUSUHWDWLRQDQGQDUUDWLYHZRXOG VLPSO\EH´GDWDµ $PDQQDQG.QRUU&HWLQD
1988). This contention is supported by much scholarship which highlights the 
discursive, interpretive and narrative nature of evidence by placing it in its 
communicative and dialectical context (See Greenhalgh, 1999; Hajer, 1993; Majone, 
1989; Dunn; 1982; Hoppe; 1999). 
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Participants with a political and scientific background who participated in established 
discussion forums of evidence exchange appeared ambivalent about anecdotal evidence. 
They talked about advantages and disadvantages of anecdotal evidence with some 
frustration, stemming from the fact that anecdotal evidence figures quite prominently in 
policy discussions:  
It always IUXVWUDWHVPH>«@WKDWZKHQ\RXKDYHVHOHFWFRPPLWWHHVZHWDONDERXWHYLGHQFHDV
EHLQJ HLWKHU VRPHWKLQJ WKDW VRPHERG\ KDV ZULWWHQ WR XV RU VDLG WR XV >«@ \HV LW LV VWULFWO\




evidence. We call it all evidence! (U D 22 P) 
+HUH WKH UHVSRQGHQW QRWHV WKDW WKH WHUP ¶HYLGHQFH· HQFRPSDVVHV D YHU\ ODUJH DQG
diverse body of information, yet there is no necessary linguistic distinction between one 
and another type of evidence ¶:HFDOOLWDOOHYLGHQFH·).  
)ROORZLQJ'XQQ·VMXULVSUXGHQWLDOPHWDSKRUGLVFXVVHGLQ&KDSWHU7ZRWKHUHLVD
fundamental difference between the construction of evidence (in experiments, RCTs) 
and its reconstruction in arguments and its delivery, as discussed by Amann and Knorr 
Cetina (1988) and Stevens (2011). In scientific fora, evidence can be turned back into 
data when it is subjected to external questioning. However, a scientist can, to some 
extent, make evidence speak for itself, and only a scientific audience possesses the tools 
to deconstruct it. This is not the case for lay audiences. By and large, it is lay audiences 
that occupy political fora, with these fora mimicking the argumentative practices of 
courts with evidence delivered RUDOO\ DV SDUW RI DUJXPHQWV 'XQQ·V jurisprudential 
metaphor refers to the process of argumentation where knowledge is constructed 
competitively through rational advocacy; this is distinct from competitive experimental 
replication in science, because knowledge production and truth do not rely on 
¶GHGXFWLYHFHUWDLQW\·DQG ¶HPSLULFDO FRUUHVSRQGHQFH·EXWRQ ¶DSUDJPDWLFDQGGLDOHFWLF
FRQFHSWLRQRIWUXWK·DQGRQWKHDGHTuacy of socially embedded knowledge claims (1982: 
304). The jurisprudential metaphor draws attention to the way in which evidence 
delivery is often legalistic, rather than scientific, particularly within policy forums. The 
OHJDOXVHVRIWKHWHUP¶HYLGHQFH· possibly predate the scientific. Political forums are very 
similar to legal forums in terms of staging communication and information delivery. 
Evidence is often orally delivered by a witness. Even though this may be judged as 
scientifically inferior, since expert opinion is placed at the bottom of the evidence 
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hierarchy, in policy forums this method of delivery is well established and holds 
significant weight.  
In her essay on the governance of UK drug policy, MacGregor (2012) notes that there 
has been a visible increase in the number of Select Committees that have participated in 
policy auditing and evaluation since the 1980s, and that these committees have a direct 
role in shaping policy debates. These committees are common in all areas of policy, 
typically operating through hearings where members of civil society are invited to 
present evidence and are subsequently asked questions. This process is somewhat akin 
to a court trial. In these settings, evidence is delivered orally. Although written 
information may also be delivered, there is no obligation for participants to read the 
information. Like the UK, Australia also uses committees both at federal and state level 
which operate in a similar manner. Similar to the case of select committees (UK) or 
parliamentary committees (NSW), summits also privilege oral delivery of evidence. For 
example, the 1999 New South Wales drug summit was cited by participants as a prime 
example of effective and transparent evidence exchange across variety range of 
stakeholders, where: 
each individual agency held evidence and brought it forward in the summit, and that was the 
WKLQJDERXWWKHVXPPLWWKDWPDGHLVVRVSHFLDO>«@WKHSROLWLFLDQVZHUHWUDSSHGLQWKDWURRP
and they had to listen to experts, they actually had to listen (A D 12 CS). 
Oral evidence delivery ensures that all policy-makers in a given forum get the same oral 
exposure to evidence without relying on their individual ability and willingness to read 
and understand what they are presented in written form: 
Hearing from experts can also be useful because it gives you a digest of things, it's very hard in 
a number of spaces, it's a huge time commitment to really understand all the literature to go 
through and interpret it, so when you do have particular academic experts you get this great 
digest of things (U D 22 P). 
It is not simply about synthesising, summarising, or even optimising a range of available 
evidence, in the same way as an executive summary would. It is also about 
argumentation, rhetoric, oratory and persuasion, which depend on the speaker and her 
affiliations$Q´H[SHUWKHDULQJµLVDFNQRZOHGJHGWREHXVHIXOEHFDXVHLWPDNHVHYLGHQFH
digestible. It is an efficient, less time-consuming way to deliver evidence to policy-
makers who may not have time to assimilate multiple reports. Since the evidence has 
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already been summarised and narrativized by relevant experts, this makes it more 
accessible without relying on the individual ability of policy-makers to understand 
specialist literature. As such, oral evidence delivery is preferred by some politicians and 
knowledge brokers who regularly partake to political forums because: 
We are there for it. Whereas we get a large amount of written evidence which is read by our 
clerks but not in most cases by members of the committee, although some of it is, and I think 
there's probably a great variety amongst the members of the committee, some of whom will read 
most of what comes in and some of whom will read none (U D 26 P) 
Because there is no guarantee that committee members will i) read the evidence they are 
provided with and ii) understand the evidence they are provided with, one participant 
argues that: 
WKHHDVLHVWZD\WRH[SODLQWRWKHPLQLVWHURUWKHNH\DGYLVRU>«@LVWRVD\KHUHLVSHUVRQ[
and this is what happened to SHUVRQ[DQGWKLVLVZKDWZHFDQGRWRFKDQJHLW>«@,WKLQN
LW·VHDVLHUWRFRPSUHKHQGZKDWZHDUHSURSRVLQJUDWKHUWKDQWDEOHVDQGQXPEHUVDQGJUDSKV
and analysis that they may or may not read. And one of the issues that we have often with 
research is tKDW>«@DORWRIUHVHDUFKLVLQDFFHVVLEOHIRUSHRSOHQRWLQWKHILHOGQRWLPPHUVHGLQ
ZKDW·VJRLQJRQ (A D 5 KB) 
Participants in both countries who were directly involved in delivering evidence to lay, 
non-scientific audiences ² whether as researchers, advocates or knowledge brokers ² 
stressed that anecdotal, narrativized evidence, including personal stories, were effective 
in conveying information because it was accessible, immediate and easily intelligible.  
7.7 Humanising the evidence 
Advocates and knowledge brokers referred to instances of both oral and written 
FRPPXQLFDWLRQZKHUH¶VWRULHV·KDGSOD\HGDVLJQLILFDQWUROHE\IDFLOLWDWLQJXQGHUVWDQGLQJ
WKURXJK WKH´KXPDQLVLQJµRI WKHHYLGHQFH%XLOGLQJVWRULHV WKURXJKYDULRXV WRROVDQG
props is seen as essential to deliver intelligible information. For one participant, 
photographs are deemed an important communication tool because they give a visual 
and emotive dimension to the story. 
:KHQ,DFWXDOO\ WDON WRSHRSOHZKRKDYH VHHQ WKHSUHVHQWDWLRQ >«@ZKDWDIIHFted them the 
PRVW>«@LW·VWKHSLFWXUHRID\RXQJPDQDQGLW·VEHFDXVHLWWDNHVLWEH\RQGWKHVWHUHRW\SHWKDW
people have (A D 14 A). 
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A common practice in all research circles is the writing and delivery of presentations. 
These are often short simple narratives which may be told via the use of tools such as 
PowerPoint and visual props such as tables, photographs, diagrams etc. Stevens (2011) 
DUJXHGWKDWWRROVVXFKDV¶NLOOHUFKDUWV·DUHRIWHQXWLOLVHGWRSXWIRUZDUGDVLPSOHOLQHDU
narrative and eliminate caveats. Such methods inevitably simplify complexity in order to 
offer a coherent narrative. However, they may also be necessary in order to convey clear 
messages and encourage understanding, particularly when addressing lay or non-
specialist audiences.  
A participant discussed one instance where stories have been deliberately crafted on the 
basis of data in order to build a compelling narrative that was intelligible and accessible 
to policy-makers, while at the same time using affect to foster emotional understanding. 
These were not used as representative data, but rather as a communication tool in order 
to foster understanding of the range of policy areas involved in addressing issues 
around prostitution: 
we graded government departments in terms of performance in relation to a set of indicators on 
violence. :HWROG WKHPZKDW WKH\ZHUHDQGZHDVNHG WKHP>«@ WR JLYHXV UHVSRQVHV VR WKH
whole thing was entirely transparent but actually one of the things that worked really well was 
>«@FUHDWLQJVRPHFDVHVWXGLHVWKDWZHUHQ·WDFRXSOHRIWKHPZHUHUHDOFDVHVEXWTXLWHDIHZ
RIWKHPZHUHQ·WWRVKRZKRZVRPHRQH·VH[SHULHQFHWRXFKHGDZKROHORWRISROLF\DUHDV(U P 25 
S). 
This could be classified as bad evidence in terms of both the evidence hierarchy, and 
the TXHVWLRQDEOHHWKLFVRIIDEULFDWLQJVWRULHVWR¶KXPDQLVH·GDWD+RZHYHUWKHTXHVWLRQ
then becomes what counts as bad evidence? Does the evidence hierarchy simply 
determine what bad evidence is, or does it depend on the circumstances, i.e. what is the 
evidence for? In the above case, the evidence from those constructed case studies was 
useful to foster policy-PDNHUV· XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI WKH FRPSOH[LW\ DQG VFRSH RI
prostitution as a policy issue. Perhaps, sticking to a hierarchical or strict notion of 
evidence might limit its potential to foster understanding.  
It would seem as though narratives are powerful because they are simple and universally 
intelligible. The use of case studies and personal narratives was advocated principally by 
those participants who habitually deal with non-specialist audiences outside scientific 
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circles. These participants posited the usefulness of anecdotal evidence for both 
effective and affective communication:  
a lot of it is having to bring it home a little to people, to the heartstrings, to the emotional story, 
UDWKHUWKDQ>«@KHUHLWLVZH·YHGRQHDUHJUHVVLRQDQDO\VLVRQWKLV>«@7KHORFDOQHZVSDSHUV
RU PHGLD DUHQ·W JRQQD UHSRUW RQ >LW@ WKH\ VWUXJJOH ZLWK LW PLQLVWHUV VWUXJJOH ZLWK LW ORFDO
community struggle with it, you show that this has happened to them, that this happened to 
their family and this is the impact it had, then it crystallises it for people (A D 5 KB) 
The fact that non-specialist audiences struggle with understanding data as opposed to 
anecdote is not simply related to their lack of scientific training.  
<RXDVNPRVWSHRSOH LQD FURZGZKDW WKH\ZRXOG WKLQNDKHURLQXVHUZRXOGEHDQG WKH\·G
GHVFULEHVRPHERG\ZKR·VDERXWRIWKHXVLQJSRSXODWLRQDQGWKH\GRQ·WVHHSHRSOHDVSHRSOH
they see them as these junkies who have lost everything but so far from the truth. So, yeah... 
>«@,XVHWKHHPRWLRQ (A D 14 A). 
Evidence that is communicated through personalised narratives appears more likely to 
be understood on an emotional level, which is a more immediate form of understanding 
that does not require prior technical knowledge, effort or willingness to the same degree 
(Slovic, 2004; Nortvedt and Nordhaug, 2008). Whereas for specialist audiences, 
quantitative and statistical evidence can incite an emotional response, for lay audiences 
they may simply have a puzzling effect.  
In their study, Nortvedt and Nordhaug (2008: 160) expose the connection between 
immediacy, proximity, affect and empathy. The difficulty in relating with distant or 
abstract information, as opposed to personal and up-close stories, is, they assert, a 
common human trait. The role of affect, emotions and proximity has been the subject 
of increased interest and scholarship in both moral psychology and moral philosophy 
(Haidt, 2012, Nussbaum, 2000; 2003, Hoffman, 2000). According to Nortvedt and 
Nodrdhaug: 
¶:KDW LV HVVHQWLDO LQ DOO SKLORVRSKLFDOO\ DQG SV\FKRORJLFDOO\ LQVSLUHG WKHRULHV
about emotions is that they take the affective way of relating to the human 
condition of other persons to be fundamental for moral responsibility and for a 
moral partaking in the world. Typically empathic affective responses take place 
ZLWKLQKXPDQDQGUHODWLRQDOSUR[LPLW\· 
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Relational proximity can move something from the abstract to the real, in such a way as 
to trigger an affective response and enhance understanding. Findings from relevant 
literature suggest that the experiential system or mode of thinking occurs more readily 
when relational proximity take places.  
7.8 The role of affect 
As discussed in Chapter FivHDIIHFWLYHUHVSRQVHVKDYHDVWURQJEHDULQJRQLQGLYLGXDOV·
perceptions of particular issues; these have been studied according to classic political 
cleavages, cultures and religion in order to elucidate differences between individuals 
(Graham et al, 2009; Haidt, 2012; Hofmann et al, 2014). Classic political cleavages are 
thought to be sufficient predictors of differences. It is logical to assume that differences 
are to be found not only across opposing political groups, but also across people with 
different cultural, professional and lived experiences. In their work on evaluating risk in 
everyday life, Slovic et al (2004) provide heuristics for two modes of thinking which 
WKH\GHILQHDV¶H[SHULHQWLDO·DQG¶DQDO\WLF· 
Table 6: Experiential and analytic system, adapted from Slovic et al (2004) 
Experiential System Analytic System 
1) Holistic 
2) Affective: pleasure-pain oriented 
3) Associationistic connection 
4) ĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌŵĞĚŝĂƚĞĚďǇ “ǀŝďĞƐ ?ĨƌŽŵƉĂƐƚ
experiences 
5) Encodes reality in concrete images, 
metaphors and narratives 
6) More rapid processing: oriented toward 
immediate action 
7) Self-ĞǀŝĚĞŶƚůǇǀĂůŝĚ P “ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐŝŶŐŝƐ
ďĞůŝĞǀŝŶŐ ? 
1) Analytic 
2) Logical: reason oriented (what is sensible) 
3) Logical connections 
4) Behaviour mediated by conscious appraisal 
of events 
5) Encodes reality in abstract symbols, words, 
and numbers 
6) Slower processing: oriented toward 
delayed action 
7) Requires justification via logic and 
evidence 
 
These modes of thinking are constantly interacting, allowing individuals to make sense 
of information$OWKRXJKERWK V\VWHPVDUHSUHVHQW WRYDU\LQJGHJUHHV LQ LQGLYLGXDOV·
reasoning and the processing of information, the analytic system is arguably more 
heavily relied upon in science, and is indeed encouraged in scientific practice. Several 
studies of the role of the experiential system ² as compared with the analytic system ² in 
VKDSLQJSHRSOH·VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI LQIRUPDWLRQKDYHGHPRQVWUDWHG WKDW LQGLYLGXDOVDUH
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more likely to react to, and cotton onto narratives, rather than data (Slovic et al, 2004: 
317): 
¶,DPGHHSO\PRYHGLI,VHHRQHPDQVXIIHULQJDQGZRXOGULVNP\OLIHIRUKLP
Then I talk impersonally about the possible pulverisation of our big cities, with a 
KXQGUHGPLOOLRQGHDG,DPXQDEOHWRPXOWLSO\RQHPDQ·VVXIIHULQJE\DKXQGUHG
PLOOLRQ·Szent-Gyorgi, cited in Slovic et al, 2004: 319). 
As one participant put it: 
I use the emotion, yeah, and it is effective [...] ,·YHEHHQ LQ FRQIHUHQFHVZKHUH WKHUH·VD ORWRI
statistics and a lot of academic research and even when I go to the academic conferences I get a 
ORWRISHRSOH FRPLQJXS WRPHDQGVD\LQJ´7KDQNVµ\RXNQRZ ´:HJHWDELW VLFNRI WKLV
VWXIIDQGZHGRQ·WXQGHUVWDQGWKHHYLGHQFHDQGLW·VJUHDWWRFRPHEDFNWRUHDOLW\HYHU\VRRIWHQµ 
(A D 14 A). 
This implies that the emotional story brings people back to reality, and that the 
presentation of evidence involves abstract thinking which makes the connection with 
¶UHDOLW\·OHVVLPPHGLDWH$OWKRXJKERWKPRGHVRIWKLQNLQJDUHDWZRUNDQGLQWHUDFWZLWK
one another in individuals, intuitive logic would suggest that the more one is exposed to 
abstract information and encouraged to adopt the analytic system of thinking, the easier 
it becomes to process information analytically, tilting the balance in its favour. It is 
possible that scientists, more than other groups, have a stronger value commitment to 
the analytic system of thinking and try to promote it over the experiential system. This 
might also depend on which epistemological position scientists subscribe to. For 
example, a feminist social researcher is altogether more likely to consciously value the 
H[SHULHQWLDOV\VWHPDWOHDVWDVPXFKDVWKHDQDO\WLF2·1HLOO 
For non-specialist audiences, appealing to their experiential system is necessary in order 
to foster understanding. As participants QRWHG SHUVRQDO QDUUDWLYHV RU ¶WKH HPRWLRQDO
VWRU\·FDQ¶FU\VWDOOLVHLWIRUSHRSOH·7KHXVHRISHUVRQDOQDUUDWLYHVLVQRWRQO\DGYRFDWHG
by those who deal with non-specialist audiences or are themselves non-specialist. Even 
in the practice of medicine, for example, personal narratives and interpretation are 
highly valued. Greenhalgh (1999) argues that evidence-based medicine is built on the 
false premise that the clinical method is objective and non-interpretive, whereas in fact 
clinical agreement is hard to come by and story and interpretation play a crucial role in 
medical diagnosis. As one participant put it:  
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LW·V WKH VWRU\ZKLFK JLYHV \RX DERXWRI WKHGLDJQRVHV WKH FOLQLFDO H[DPLQDWLRQV \RX GR
might add another 5 to 10% and the investigatioQVDVPDOODPRXQWVRDQGWKHWKLQJWKDW·V
KDSSHQLQJLVZH·UH>@WU\LQJWRFRGLI\V\PSWRPVDQGVR-RQDQGZH·UHPLVVLQJWKHSRLQWYHU\
often (A D 6 M) 
Since the principles of evidence-based medicine are often called upon to address social 
policy matters by evidence-based policy advocates, the same logic pervades both fields. 
+RZHYHU WKHUH LV D FOHDU VSHFWUXPZKHQ LW FRPHV WRSDUWLFLSDQWV· YLHZVRI HYLGHQFH
which run the gamut from positivism to interpretivism (Black, 2001; Greenhalgh, 1999). 
According to the latter position, the narratives of individuals should be integrated into 
understanding of social policy problems: 
social policy at an individual level ought to be much more related to the narratives of what 
happened to people. ,W·VPXFK PRUH LPSRUWant for me as a doctor when seeing a patient to 
XQGHUVWDQGZKDW·VKDSSHQHGWRWKHPRYHUWLPHUDWKHUWKDQHYHQZKDW,REVHUYHULJKWQRZ (A 
D 6 M) 
Most participants with a medical background understood the value of personal 
narratives and experiences, and called for the inclusion of both anecdotal and 
experiential evidence in decision-making. Relational proximity has a part to play, as the 
GHJUHH RI SDUWLFLSDQWV· HQJDJHPHQW ZLWK LQGLYLGXDOV· VWRULHV DV RSSRVHG WR JHQHUDO
observation, might impact on their position in relation to evidence. Practicing doctors 
might be able to understand and relate at the interpersonal level (one to one relationship 
with patients) and at the general level (population-wide studies). The same is also true 
for politicians, who must maintain a relationship with their constituents on an individual 
level alongside representing the electorate in such a way as to ensure that they 
empathise with individuals whilst representing the interests of the general public. 
Conversely, advocates work as representatives of a particular group with particular 
demands and interests, and are thus more likely to be concerned with the causes and 
needs of a specific population. 
7.8.1 dŚĞ ?dĂĐŝƚŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨďĞŝŶŐĂĐƌĂĨƚƐŵĂŶ ? 
Many in the medical research community have argued that some of the premises of 
evidence-based medicine are faulty in that they attempt to flatten or virtually eliminate 
subjectivity and individual judgement in favour of standardised methods intended to 
limit human error or bias (Greenhalgh and Russell, 2009; Misak, 2010). In fact, Misak 
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DUJXHVWKDW¶REMHFWLYLW\LQPHGLFLQHPXVWFRPHQRWIURPWKHH[FOXVLRQRIZLGHVZDWKHV
of potentially valuable evidence, but from the careful application of our critical 
SUDFWLFHV·7KHLQFOXVLRQRI ERWK¶VWUDLJKWIRUZDUGDQGHYDOXDWLYHQDUUDWLYHV·
is seen as central to the development of sound medical practice. As one participant puts 
it: 
surgeons by-and-ODUJHGRQ·WOHDUQWKHLUVNLOOVRUGRWKHLUMREVE\UDQGRPLVHGFRQWUROOHGWULDOV I 
mean there are some about whether operating on a joint for this purpose and that purpose is 
ZRUWKZKLOH EXW WKHUH·V D ZKROH VHW RI WKLQJV \RX GR DQG UHVSRQG WR ZKLFK HYROYHG RXW RI
experience and what I call tacit knowledge of being a craftsman (A D 6 M) 
A similar analogy was advanced by C. Wright Mills (2000: 195) as he referred to social 
VFLHQFH DV ¶WKH SUDFWLFH RI D FUDIW· The quote above exposes that, in the context of 
surgery, one type of evidence should not be pursued to the detriment of another, as 
thinking about evidence in a hierarchical manner does not necessarily aid the process of 
making informed decisions. Indeed, the surgery analogy may have limited resonance in 
this context. However, participants tend to utilise analogies from their own personal 
and professional experiences which, albeit limited, shape their understanding of the role 
of evidence in policy. Yet this does not necessarily underpin a harmonious compromise 
between abstract principles and practice. 
As mentioned earlier, some participants with scientific backgrounds demonstrated a 
tendency to view anecdotal evidence, such as expert opinion, with ambivalence. This 
was clear in discussions on the evidence around sex work, where: 
7KHUH·VYDVWQXPEHUVRIHGLWRULDOEXWYHU\OLWWOHGDWDHYHU\WKLQJLVSHRSOH·VRSLQLRQV (A P 3 S) 
There is some scope for frustration when evidence is lacking, and in prostitution policy, 
the consensus is that there is a paucity of evidence. However, interestingly, the 
participant in question has a medical background, which marks a particular 
understanding of evidence. Nevertheless, much of the existing evidence on prostitution 
is inconclusive with statistics more often characterised by estimates ² which can prove 
controversial ² and much attention dedicated to HIV prevalence to the expense of 
other issues such as safety and working conditions (Vanwesenbeeck, 2001; Donovan et 
al, 2012; Harcourt et al, 2010; Ward et al, 1999).  
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7.9 Lack of evidence 
Participants emphasised the presence of highly contested evidence in both policy areas. 
They also referred to instances where evidence was lacking. Systematic reviews in drug 
and prostitution policy are targeted at treatment and health-related evaluations. The 
available evidence mostly consists of narrative reviews. As aforementioned, the 
presence of narrative reviews and evaluations, to the detriment of more robust evidence 
which follows hierarchical standards, was seen as the result of the complex nature of the 
issues to be investigated, which do not lend themselves readily to be the subjects of 
RCTs. Conversely, the dominance of the evidence hierarchy and quantitative methods 
more generally in the area of drug treatment was seen by participants to have resulted in 
a lack of qualitative data about treatment. 
Those sorts of questions have not been picked up very well because they are more difficult 
maybe to study in an RCT-type design, lots we don't know about treatment, descriptive 
research about treatment, what is treatment? What goes on in those rooms, in those agencies, 
between drug-users DQGWKHWKHUDSLVWV">«@WKRVHVRUWRITXHVWLRQVWKDWDUHDQVZHUHGE\TXDO
don't get addressed I don't think. (U D 19 S) 
This not only affects treatment, but drug policy interventions more generally:  
LQGUXJSROLF\WKHUH
VVXFKDSDXFLW\>«@RIIUHHIORZLQJUHVHDUFK>«@PRVWRIWKHUHVHDUFKLV
evaluating interventions (U D 32 KB) 
This lack of non-evaluative, non-intervention focussed research is seen to be partly 
ideologically motivated. The instrumental goal of evaluating interventions goes hand in 
hand with the dominant conception of what evidence is and what kind of evidence 
should be produced.  
The fact that activities associated with drugs and prostitution are generally not legally or 
morally sanctioned by society has made access to research subjects, and objects, more 
difficult (Wagenaar and Altink, 2012). The singling out of drug and prostitution policy 
as special, separate and distinct, morally contentious fields, might limit the possibility of 
¶IUHH-IORZLQJ· UHVHDUFK ,W ZDV RQO\ UHODWLYHO\ UHFHQWO\ that drug-taking was compared 
ZLWK WKH ULVNV RI RWKHU VHHPLQJO\ XQUHODWHG DFWLYLWLHV VXFK DV QRWRULRXVO\ 1XWW·V
provocative piece on ecstasy and horse-riding (Nutt, 2009). Similarly in prostitution 
policy, there is a lack of data to systematically compare s
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on the basis of violence and vulnerability, happiness, work-related stress, or any other 
indicator. The literature on prostitution emphasises violence and vulnerability as 
endemic, yet it does not engage in comparative analysis to investigate this relative to 
other professions (i.e. Classen et al, 2005; Matthews, 2015; Sanders, 2005). One 
participant asked the following question: 
are architects and planners more vulnerable than sex workers? >«@ WKHUH·V QR GDWD RQ
comparison across professions, for example. (A P 7 S) 
This may result, partly, from the difficulty in accessing the target population, but also, 
from an ideological and moral commitment which results in an unwillingness to 
recognise prostitution as legitimate work, or drug use as a leisure activity intrinsically 
linked to pleasure. Though research does deal with these (i.e. Gira-Grant, 2014; 
%HUQVWHLQ9DQZHVHQEHHFN0HDVKDP2·0DOOH\ and Valverde, 2004) 
this is not necessarily the type of research that policy-makers might consider policy-
relevant. Institutionalised ¶NQRZOHGJH WHUPV· .QRUU &HWLQD  VKDSH WKH types of 
questions asked, the types of research funded, and the existing institutional settings 
which in turn support a research focus that is morally, ideologically and interest-driven. 
Free-flowing research is often dependent upon the will of academics and their ability to 
convince institutions that their ideas are worthy of support and funding. However, the 
current focus on research impact which affects institutions and funding might limit the 
scope of free-flowing research in as far as some research is not policy relevant on face 
value, i.e. it is not explicitly and directly addressing dominant policy questions. Yet, this 
does not mean that it has no relevance.  
In drug policy, drug treatment is institutionalised, though some forms of treatment 
remain both morally and ideologically contentious, as noticeable in the recent rhetorical 
shift away from pharmacological treatment toward abstinence and recovery (Duke and 
Thom, 2014; McKeganey, 2014). A certain amount of funding and resource is dedicated 
to treatment research and delivery; however, their limits are established, to some degree, 
upon moral and ideological grounds, while the pursuit of treatment is often justified as a 
pragmatic trade-off in the public domain. Prostitution might be ideologically supported 
(i.e. by a capitalist/patriarchal system) but not morally sanctioned; research in this field 
is unlikely to receive large funding except in relation to health issues. Estimates of drug 
use and prevalence are necessary to maintain justification for drug treatment, so 
investment is made in this area. Estimations of prevalence of HIV and STIs in the sex 
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working populations are also invested in. Conversely, no precise estimates of 
prostitution prevalence are available and no significant investments are made in this 
area, particularly beyond countries where prostitution is legal. The prevalence of disease 
is generally seen to be more important than the prevalence of the activity and other 
aspects associated with it, like the number of clients, and the prevalence of violence in 
the sex trade. This is morally and ideologically motivated. It also implies that the legal 
regulatory framework has impact on data availability and research opportunities 
(Harcourt et al, 2010; Donovan et al, 2012). This is not to equate law and morality, or to 
argue that they are ideologically driven in a linear manner, but to highlight their 
symbiotic relationship in sustaining hierarchies, potentially limiting the scope for free-
flowing research.  
7.10 Conclusion 
While interview data indicates that participants acknowledged the evidence hierarchy, 
and particularly RCTs, this tended to be done in a tokenistic manner. Anecdotal 
evidence appears as more intelligible to more stakeholders than statistics, and at times 
more effective in getting the message across in the necessary act of translation from 
specialist to generalist audiences. Indeed, those participants with a scientific 
background, and particularly those whose work is focused on treatment, appear to place 
more faith in the hierarchy than those who operate outside of it. The evidence hierarchy 
remains mostly unmentioned by participants in the field of prostitution, whereas most 
stakeholders in drug policy, and even those with a medical background, approach it with 
a degree of scepticism. It appears as though faith in the evidence hierarchy is always 
stronger at the abstract level than at the practical level. It also appears that those who 
have more faith in it are also those whose position and work can be validated by it, 
because the hierarchy, by its very nature, supports power asymmetries between 
stakeholders. 
Evidence-based policy is often presented as a belief and an aspirational value (ought) 
and reality is depicted as fraught with politics, antagonism, emotions, opinions, and 
ideology (is). However, there is little conceptualisation of the space in between. This is 
particularly relevant in policy domains that are defined as highly politicised, wicked, and 
emotionally antagonistic, and further complicated by the fact that the available evidence 
is not considered of a high standard, which might contribute to further polarisation of 
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policy positions. There is a paucity of robust evidence, particularly outside of drug 
treatment; where the evidence is considered sufficiently robust, it does not neutralise 
the debate, as disagreement and polarisation continue. Firstly, those who oppose a 
particular intervention can do so on the basis of a paucity of evidence, making way for 
further resistance and entrenchment. Secondly, the types of evidence valued by different 
stakeholders differ, and RQHSHUVRQ·VHYLGHQFHFDQEHDQRWKHUSHUVRQ·VDQHFGRWH<HW
given the hierarchy, the power asymmetries between stakeholders can be sustained and 
even justified. The role of affect as an important filter, interacting with evidence, 
epistemic cultures and differential knowledge-bases, is emphasised as a tool to foster 
understanding, particularly by those who occupy the lower echelons of knowledge 
hierarchies and in relation to lay audiences.  
:KHUHDVWKHTXHVWLRQRI¶ZKDWFRXQWVDVHYLGHQFHDQGWRZKRP·"KDVEHHQDGGUHVVHGLQ
this chapter, the question of the interplay between values and attitudes in relation to the 
role of evidence in policy has remained largely unaddressed here. As Deeming (2013: 
374SXWVLW¶LQPDQ\ZD\VWKHNH\TXHVWLRQWXUQVRQ>«@WKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKZHFDQ
LQFOXGH QRWLRQV RI ¶VRFLDO MXVWLFH· DQG ¶KXPDQ ULJKWV· LQ WKH IUDmework of 
HYDOXDWLRQ«8OWLPDWHO\ WKHGHVLJQRIZHOIDUHSROLF\ LQYRNHVRXUYDOXHVDQGWKHYDOXHV
and attitudes of our fellow citizens, which may conflict and contrast in sophisticated 
ZD\V·7KHPDQQHULQZKLFKSROLF\DFWRUVPDNHVHQVHRIHYLGHQFHLV LQHYLWably filtered 
through their values, their beliefs, and their experience, both personal and professional. 
7KLVLVSDUWLFXODUO\UHOHYDQWLQ¶PRUDOSROLF\·FRQWH[WVZKLFKDUHW\SLFDOO\FKDUDFWHULVHG
by seemingly uncompromising, deeply-held positions.  
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Chapter 8  
ĞƚǁĞĞŶŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇ ?ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĂŶĚƉŽůŝĐǇ PƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶƐ ?ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?
ǀĂůƵĞƐĂŶĚďĞůŝĞĨƐ 
8.1 Introduction 
In previous chapters, I have argued that evidence-based policy is both an empowering 
and limiting discourse. I have argued that values and beliefs are significant in shaping 
views and positions about policies. However, any systematic attempt to understand how 
morality operates through the interplay of values, beliefs and ideas is curtailed by 
predominant perceptions of these as subjective (Sawyer, 2011; Chapter 4). I argue that, 
in order to move forward theoretically, we must turn to values and beliefs, what they are 
in the context of these fields of morality policy, and how they interact with each other 
as well as with other factors.  
This chapter discusses the interaction between the values and beliefs of stakeholders in 
shaping their morality and their attitudes, focusing on the place of evidence in the 
making of drugs and prostitution policy. This follows from the discussion in the 
previous chapter about the nature and uses of evidence as defined by stakeholders. This 
FKDSWHU FRQWH[WXDOLVHV SDUWLFLSDQWV· DFFRXQWV RI ¶HYLGHQFH· E\ KLJKOLJKWLQJ WKH VRFLDO
PRUDO DQG SROLWLFDO GLPHQVLRQV RI VWDNHKROGHUV· DFFRXQWV 0RUDOLW\ LV FRQVWUXFWHG
through a combination of beliefs, YDOXHVDQGSULQFLSOHVWKDWKHOSVKDSHLQGLYLGXDOV·LGHDV
and attitudes toward particular understandings of, and positions held towards, drug and 
prostitution policy. Morality does not merely function as a recipient of laws, rules, 
principles and ideas, internalised and acted upon by individuals. Morality is viewed, in a 
sense, as a ground where a complex set of principles, ideas and emotions come into 
play. If morality is the playground for the interaction of principles, ideas and emotions, 
then values and beliefs are its measure, because values and beliefs contain and manifest 
principles, ideas and emotions. Values and beliefs are regarded as the building bricks of 
morality.  
This chapter provides a breakdown and analysis of values and beliefs emerging from 
SDUWLFLSDQWV· QDUUDWLYHV :KLOH WKH VDPSOH·V OLPLWDWLRQV DQG SDUWLFXODUO\ LWV ¶OLEHUDO-
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HYLGHQFH ELDV· DUH QRWHG LW LV DUJXHG WKDW WKLV VHOHFWLRQ ELDV LV LQGLFDWLYH RI WKH
representativeness of the sample. Values and beliefs were either evident in partLFLSDQWV·
H[SRVLWLRQVRUZHUHLQIHUUHGE\WKHLQYHVWLJDWRUVHH5RNHDFK·VSRLQW&KDSWHURQZK\
LQIHUHQFH LV YLDEOH ZKHQGHDOLQJZLWK EHOLHIVYDOXHV (DFK SDUWLFLSDQW·V QDUUDWLYH ZDV
analysed to tease out the values and beliefs they subscribed to. Whereas predominant 
values relate to more universal ideas that are prevalent in western society and are 
relevant in the context of drugs and prostitution policy, beliefs are directly related to 
individual and professional practice in these fields, and, as such are informed by 
occupation, personal experience, politics and practice. The aim of this Chapter is to 
FRQVWUXFWD¶PDS·VKRZLQJKRZYDOXHVDQGEHOLHIVPXWXDOO\LQIRUPRQHDQRWKHU7KLVLQ
turn establishes whether there are discernible patterns by tracing links between 
professional training, occupation, personal experience and prevailing beliefs and values 
JOHDQHGWKURXJKSDUWLFLSDQWV·QDUUDWLYHVDQGSDUWLFLSDQWV·FRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQRIWKHUROH
of evidence in policy-making. Prevailing value/belief constellations are drawn in a 
comparative fashion, for drugs/prostitution and Australia/UK, to observe potential 
similarities and differences according to the logic of the 2x2 design. 
The chapter presents data both thematically and synthetically. Following the qualitative 
research tradition of data analysis and presentation according to emerging themes, I use 
individual quotes from participants, organised and discussed under each theme. As 
mentioned in Chapter Six, this manner of analysis and presentation limits the scope for 
synthesis whilst fragmenting individual narratives. Indeed, the aim of analysis is to find 
themes, categories and mechanisms that cut across individual narratives. Although 
traditional thematic analysis is a tried and tested method for achieving this aim, I argue 
that tools from social network analysis can go further in presenting data thematically 
and synthetically. SNA tools can aid a more abstract thematic analysis which is 
particularly useful in research designs with multiple comparative dimensions. In this 
thesis, the necessity to account for the emergence of values and beliefs in the sample, 
and their usefulness as analytical categories prompted the use of these tools for 
synthesis and presentation. Realistically, it would be undesirable, unfeasible and 
XQHWKLFDO WR UHSRUW SDUWLFLSDQWV· QDUUDWLYHV LQ IXOO WR H[SRVH WKHLU FRPPLWPHQWV WR
certain values and beliefs, as this might risk identifying participants whilst individualising 
data.  
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8.2 Values and beliefs in the sample of participants 
Values and beliefs were assigned to participants inductively and by way of inference. 
Participants were not explicitly questioned about their values or beliefs; these were 
emergent categories. Participants occasionally made explicit reference to their position 
in relation to particular values or beliefs (as noted in sections 8.4 and 8.5); however, 
more often the references were implicit. Considerations about the way in which their 
professional role and their politics and experience intersected often emerged during 
discussions, prompting reflection on the interplay between personal experiences, 
professional and political practice and commitments. In their article relating causal 
perceptions to models of elite belief systems, Sabatier and Hunter (1989: 253) argue that 
in order to understand the interplay between the normative orientations and causal 
perceptions of policy actors in a given policy area, researchers should pay attention to 
¶VSHFLILF EHOLHIV LQ WKRVH DUHDV RI VSHFLDOLVDWLRQ·. This is supported by Rokeach and 
discussed in Chapter Four. Values and beliefs are understood along the lines proposed 
by moral psychology and political science, in order to combine understanding of 
individual level and societal level values. Particular attention was given to support for 
predominantly conservative and predominantly liberal values identified by relevant 
studies, enriched with policy area-specific values and beliefs.1  
The relationship between values and beliefs is understood as mutually reinforcing. 
There is a certain level of circularity which marks values as constitutive of beliefs and 
beliefs as constitutive of values. Although beliefs tend to be more action-oriented and 
have a narrower focus, and values tend to be more universal and orientated toward 
abstract goals, the boundaries between values and beliefs are often blurred. For 
example, one can make an overt value claim that is conducive to, and constitutive of, 
action; in other words, a value can be turned into a belief in terms of action orientation 
(i.e. I believe LQXQLYHUVDOKXPDQULJKWVDQG,ZRUNIRUKXPDQULJKWV·ZDWFK+RZHYHU
values, compared to beliefs, operate at a higher level of abstraction and generality 
because they do not contain or define a specific action, or a specific set of actions, in 
                                                 
1 Sabatier and Hunter argue that normative orientations can only be considered as prior to causal perceptions if 
one DVVXPHVD¶IRUPDWLYHVRFLDOLVDWLRQ·PRGHOZKLFKVHHVEHOLHIIRUPDWLRQWDNLQJSODFHLQFKLOGKRRGDQGHDUO\
adulthood and resistance to change throughRXWLQGLYLGXDOV·OLIHWLPH,IKRZHYHUD¶OLIHORQJOHDUQLQJ·PRGHOLV
accepted, then the relationship between normative orientations and causal perception is not temporal-linear but 
circular and two-way instead, so beliefs may change on the basis of experience (1989: 254). 
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the way that beliefs do (i.e. universal human rights are the desirable end-point of 
modern civilisation).  
Values and beliefs always operate in concert, in that a particular set of values and beliefs 
LV OLNHO\ WR JXLGH LQGLYLGXDOV· DFWLRQV DQG SUDFWLFHV DV ZHOO Ds informing their world-
views. This is defined as a values/beliefs constellation. This is crucial for the 
construction of individual moralities. However, the focus of the chapter is not 
LQGLYLGXDOV· PRUDOLWLHV EXW WKH YDOXHEHOLHIV FRQVWHOODWLRQV WKDW HPHrge across the 
sample of participants, visualised by country and policy area, which is subsequently 
observed to distinguish patterns. Rather than focusing on the individual, patterns are 
discerned, first, to identify the dominant values and beliefs in the sample; then, to 
establish which values and beliefs are more likely to occur together across the whole 
sample and in relation to each country and policy area.  
8.3 Patterns of dominant values and beliefs 
Before mapping values and beliefs constellations, some description of values and beliefs 
across the sample is presented here. The purpose of this exercise is to establish whether 
there are predominant values and beliefs that are shared by particular stakeholders 
across the sample and then comparatively across dimensions. A list of values is 
provided below. 
8.3.1 List of relevant values 
x Human rights (HR); refers to the conviction that human beings are all equal 
and equally deserving and calls for universal rights that apply to every single 
individual, regardless of their status, age, gender, ethnicity and choices. This 
conception may be controversial when attempting to include people whose 
choices might be morally or legally questionable, such as drug users or sex 
workers.  
x Social justice (SJ); in an egalitarian sense, refers to the conviction that people 
should universally benefit from society and that society exists for the good of all 
people; social justice implies some form of redistribution of goods and services. 
x Respect for authority (RA); refers to the conviction that authority, whether 
legal, political, religious, familial, or scientific provides a much needed balance in 
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society and as such should be abided to because it is necessary for society to 
maintain order. 
x Individual responsibility (IR); refers to the idea that each and every individual 
holds responsibility over their own lives; individuals are conceptualised as agents 
able to make right and wrong choices, but most importantly, individuals take the 
heaviest burden of responsibility in shaping their lives. 
x Social responsibility (SR); refers to the idea that society as a whole, as a 
collective of individuals and institutions, is responsible for ensuring the fruition 
of each individual and their development into functioning and productive 
members of society. Society takes the heaviest burden of responsibility in 
shaping lives. 
x Public health (PH); indicates a concern for population health as a whole 
promoted by the state. Refers to the idea that society, institutions, public and 
private organisations, individuals and communities should operate to prevent 
disease and promote healthy life-styles in order to prolong and improve life and 
ensure the health of the population as a whole.  
x Harm reduction (Hred); refers to a commitment to reducing the harms 
associated with risky behaviours. It is often strongly associated with the history 
of drug policy and particularly as a response to HIV; however, it is also often 
referred to in prostitution policy in relation to the health and safety of sex 
workers. 
x Individual liberty (IL); refers to the idea that individuals are, to a great extent, 
free agents able to make choices about their lives. The extent of their freedom 
might be disputed, but it is often seen as linked with their education, class, social 
status, ethnicity and gender. In advanced-liberal societies, individual liberty is 
highly emphasised as an aspirational value. 
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Figure 5: Predominant values in the sample 
 
Figure 5 shows which values are dominant in the sample of participants. Predictably, 
due to selection bias, values such as respect for authority and individual responsibility 
(identified as predominant in conservative morality by Haidt, 2012) are less prevalent in 
the sample compared to other values. In a predominantly liberal sample, participants are 
less likely to emphasise conservative values. Participants share liberal values to a range 
of degrees, since values such as social responsibility, harm reduction, social justice, 
human rights and public health score highly and these all emphasise collective 
responsibility and some degree of universalism, rather than individual efforts. The 
sample is made up by stakeholders who operate mostly outside of criminal justice and 
law enforcement, where prevalence of some authoritarian values might be found. The 
value of individual responsibility is not as prevalent as that of individual liberty, which 
supports the idea of a shift from authoritarian to libertarian values, as discussed in 
Chapter Five. Similarly, the prevalence of social responsibility and social justice, 
intended in an egalitarian sense, and human rights denote a strong presence of liberal 
values.  
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8.3.2 List of relevant beliefs: 
x Evidence/science (ES): refers to a specific commitment to the principles of 
science, pursuit of knowledge through knowledge accumulation for the sake of 
societal improvement. Associated with pure science. 
x Evidence-based policy (EBP): refers to a strong commitment and belief that 
evidence is the best ingredient for policy to be effective and just. Associated 
with politics, medicine and social science. 
x Evidence informed policy (EIP): refers to a commitment to evidence as one, 
but not the only, factor on which to base policy. Associated with social science. 
x Translation and mediation (T&M): in policy, refers to a belief, and 
commitment to, mediating and translating from one group or community to 
another in order to facilitate communication and the understanding of each 
RWKHU·VQHHGVDQGMDUJRQ$VVRFLDWHGZLWKNQRZOHGJHEURNHULQJ and advocacy. 
x Public representation (PR): refers to a commitment and a belief in politics as a 
public service, entails the pursuit of the good of the majority, understanding 
society as a body with an ever-shifting set of needs and interests. Associated 
with democratic politics. 
x Group representation (GR): refers to a commitment and a belief in group 
representation, or the pursuit of the good of a specific group with a defined set 
of needs and interests. Associated with advocacy and politics. 
x Political allegiance (PolA): refers to a commitment and a belief in a particular 
politics, group, and interests. Associated with advocacy, civil service, politics and 
research.  
x Party allegiance (PA): refers to a specific commitment to a political party. 
Associated with politics. 
x Religion (R): refers to an overt belief and commitment to a particular religion. 
x Drug policy reform (DPR): refers to a belief and a commitment to drug policy 
reforms of varying degree and different natures. 
x Prostitution policy reform (PPR): refers to a belief and a commitment to 
prostitution policy reforms of varying degree and different natures. 
x Liberal feminism (LF): associated with sex-positive feminism, refers to a belief 
and commitment to advancing rights and the liberty of women toward equality; 
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envisions the opportunity for women to emancipate themselves financially and 
culturally through the sex industry. 
x Radical feminism (RF): associated with abolitionism, sees patriarchy and 
FDSLWDOLVP DV WKH PDLQ VRXUFHV RI ZRPHQ·V RSSUHVVLRQ (QWDLOV D EHOLHI DQG
FRPPLWPHQWWRZRPHQ·VHTXDOLW\VHes women as victims of patriarchy, and the 
sex industry as a direct result of the system of domination of men over women. 
Figure 6: Predominant beliefs in the sample 
 
Figure 6 VKRZVFRQVLVWHQF\LQWHUPVRIWKHVDPSOH·V¶OLEHUDO-evLGHQFH·ELDVIRULQVWDQFH 
no participant overtly declared any religious affiliation and no clear inferences can be 
made to establish religious affiliation on the basis of interview data. Yet no direct 
question about religious affiliation was put forward. The belief in evidence and science 
is prevalent, given the relatively large number of participants with scientific training in 
the sample. Evidence was the key focus of interviews, providing scope for direct 
LQIRUPDWLRQDQGQXDQFHDERXWSDUWLFLSDQWV·FRPPitment to evidence.2 Most participants 
share the hope that evidence may substitute for (religious) moralism and political 
ideology as the basis of decision-making. Beliefs were operationalised to reflect practice, 
and thus many of these beliefs are profession-specific. Beliefs such as public 
representation are likely to be espoused mostly by politicians by nature of their work, 
whereas group representation is a belief shared by advocates. The graphs below 
represent the most commonly-occurring values and beliefs across comparative 
dimensions (AUS/UK) (drugs/prostitution). 
                                                 
2 Which allowed operationalisation of EBP as distinct from EIP 
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8.3.3 Predominant values and beliefs in Australia and the UK compared 
Figure 7: Predominant values and beliefs in Australia and the UK compared 
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Figure 7 shows some consistency across the two countries, though some minor 
differences are noticeable, particularly the slightly more marked presence of values such 
as human rights, harm reduction and group representation in the Australian sample, and 
conversely, the stronger presence of individual and social responsibility, and respect for 
authority in the UK sample. This is indicative of the difference between samples in the 
two countries, with the stronger presence of advocates in the Australian sample 
FRPSDUHGWRWKH8.·V$Q\ description is limited by the non-representativeness of the 
sample and the difference in the number of stakeholders who made up each of the 
SURIHVVLRQDOFDWHJRULHVLQWKHWZRFRXQWULHV$Q\IXUWKHUFRQVLGHUDWLRQDERXWFRXQWULHV·
differences is thus more relevant in terms of the connections between values and 
beliefs, rather than their presence alone (section 8.6). However, one significant 
difference is found in the absence of radical feminism in the Australian sample, which, 
due to selection bias, cannot be regarded as representative. It remains interesting 
nonetheless given that New South Wales has a decriminalised prostitution regime, and 
that the UK is veering towards punitively tackling demand for prostitution.  
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8.3.4 Predominant values and beliefs in Drugs and Prostitution compared 
Figure 8: Predominant values and beliefs in Drugs and Prostitution compared 
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Some of the differences across these two policy domains are given by the presence or 
absence of area-specific beliefs. For example, the lack of liberal feminism and radical 
feminism in drug policy is due to the fact that these beliefs relate specifically to 
prostitution. The absence of a strong public health commitment in prostitution policy is 
given by the lack of broad and explicit inclusion of prostitution in public health outside 
of monitoring HIV and STIs. The stronger presence of individual responsibility as a 
value in the prostitution sample can only make sense if observed in its relationship with 
other values and beliefs. One significant feature evident in both domains is the relatively 
strong presence of reformist sentiment. The commitment to drug and prostitution 
policy reform was shared by many in the sample, which was to be expected given the 
sample is strongly liberal, which entails a commitment to progressive views and 
reformist attitudes. Drug policy reformism and prostitution policy reformism were 
distinguished because they are related to different values and beliefs (section 8.6). Belief 
in evidence-based policy appears stronger in the drugs field than in prostitution, as 
discussed in Chapter Seven. Given that the sample of participants in the area of drug 
policy was larger, no further conclusions can be drawn from figure 8.  
Before moving on to observe the connections between values and beliefs across the 
sample and in the two countries and policy areas, it is necessary to engage in further 
UHIOHFWLRQ RQ WKH VDPSOH·V OLEHUDO-evidence nexus, and then discuss relevant data to 
provide evidence of the relevance of values and beliefs which emerged during 
discussions in interviews. 
8.4 The liberal-evidence nexus in the sample of participants 
In Chapter Five, I discussed the societal level shift across the west from authoritarian to 
libertarian values (Flanagan and Lee, 2003; Heath et al, 1994; Tilley, 2005). In my 
analysis, there appears to be a connection between the predominance of liberal values 
and the belief in science and evidence. The presence of certain values in western 
civilisation dates back to at least the Greeks, continuing throughout Christianity. 
Western secular values are, to some degree, a reworking of Christian values, which were 
in turn a reworking of values prevalent in pagan societies, albeit with some significant 
differences. To assess change and continuity in relation to values and beliefs is not 
within the scope of this thesis. Yet it is relevant to note that, before the sanctioning of 
science as a legitimate source of knowledge (Gieryn, 1983; Chapter 2), beliefs could not 
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EH VXEMHFW WR VFLHQWLILF ´WHVWLQJµ Wo the same extent as they might be today. Equally, 
believing in science and the pursuit of evidence as a way to legitimise and corroborate 
moral and political decisions, at least in an overt and systematic fashion, is a relatively 
recent phenomenon. A clear shift from valuing the symbolic to evaluating the 
functional role of laws can be observed in an increasingly secular context (Chapter 5). 
Indeed, there is a long history of formalising political strategy for the purpose of better 
government which dates back to at least Machiavelli if not the Greeks. However, policy-
making is now conducted in a democratic and complex system where the reliance on 
science and evidence as proposed by the evidence-based policy discourse has a dual aim 
of improving government whilst de-moralising and de-politicising policy and politics. 
Liberalism and modern science were born around the same time, and they appear to go 
together well; the very characteristics of liberal attitudes, as identified by Haidt, Lakoff 
and others (i.e. curiosity, openness to experience, more favourable towards change, 
secularism), are supportive of science and the principles of scientific enquiry. In drug 
and prostitution policy, a particular dominant morality, sustained by a dominant moral 
coalition, has long supported more punitive measures towards the sale of drugs and sex, 
as well as the purchase and consumption of drugs, but interestingly not necessarily the 
purchase of sex, which is seen to be ideologically supported by a capitalist/patriarchal 
system. Values such as social justice, human rights, and social responsibility already 
existed in religious doctrine. Liberals have re-framed these for a secular world. Liberals 
generally place much less emphasis than conservatives on religious belief, and display a 
strong belief in science (and evidence) as one route toward the achievement of those 
values. If liberals are characteristically open to experience (Haidt, 2012), then, by 
extension, they are more likely to be open to experimentation, or at least the ability to 
question certainty. Thus, they are more attuned to a secular scientific, rather than a 
religious, mentality. Hence, there will be a stronger connection between liberals and 
evidence use, or believing in evidence as a tool for improvement. This, coupled with the 
emancipatory undertones of the evidence-based policy discourse, provides the 
opportunity to re-frame discourses from manifestly to latently moral (Chapter 5). In the 
next section, I will discuss data in a thematic manner, following a traditional approach 
to qualitative data analysis and presentation.  
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8.4.1 Evidence as belief and the dominance of liberal values 
All participants interviewed shared a belief in evidence, though some talked explicitly 
about evidence-based policy whilst others asserted that evidence is only one of many 
factors to inform policy. Most agreed that policy would be more just if it was evidence-
based, so there is a perceived association between evidence use and level of social 
fairness, or the making of just policies.  
When referring to certain aspects of drug policy such as the consequences of 
prohibition, participants express a sense of moral outrage: 
,VLWIDLUDQGMXVWWKDWWKHPDMRULW\ZKRSUHIHUVD\DOFRKROWRWREDFFR>«@wants to punish 
people who have a different drug preference? (A D 2 M) 
This observation invokes a number of values, including social responsibility, social 
justice, human rights, and equality. For those holding such views, reform is sought on 
the basis of these values and evidence is called upon in support of reform. In the case 
of the Medically Supervised Injecting Centre, participants acknowledged that those who 
initiated the intervention did so:  
RQWKHEDVLVRIDQHWKLFDOEHOLHI>«@LWZDVDFRPSHWLQJSULQFLSOHZKLFKZDVJLYHQPXFKKLJKHU
weight tKDQVRPHERG\HOVH·VVHWRISULQFLSOHVDERXWVRPHXQLYHUVDOLGHD(A D 6 M) 
7KHSDUWLFLSDQWFODLPVWKDWLWZDVDQ¶HWKLFDOEHOLHI· which is value-based, that provided 
justification for those who started the first illegal supervised injecting facility. Indeed, 
this was also a political strategy, to get the injecting centre on the political agenda in 
New South Wales. Yet, ideas and interests are not pursued in a moral vacuum. There is 
recognition that this ethical belief was based on a competing principle (i.e. universal 
access and care), and that harm reduction was a strategically and morally sound basis on 
which to build support.  
Philosophically we work from a position of health for all and a belief that our target 
populations have traditionally had poor accHVV>«@WRKHDOWKFDUHDQGWKDWKHDOWKFDUHQHHGVWR
be equitable (A D 17 M) 
Here, the values of social justice, social responsibility and human rights clearly support 
WKHSDUWLFLSDQW·VFRPPLWPHQWWRKDUPUHGXFWLRQDQGSXEOLFKHDOWKWKLVLVDFRPPRQVHW
of values occurring concurrently across the sample (section 8.6). Another participant 
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notes that most people involved in the drug policy debate share harm minimisation as 
the main objective regardless of political cleavages.  
I think the vast majority of peopOH>«@IURPWKHPRVWUHDFWLRQDU\WRWKHPRVWUHIRUPLVW>«@
would agree that we have a shared objective, which is to minimize the harms from drug use (U 
D 22 P). 
However, this case is probably overstated. Whilst it might allow for diversity of 
positions, the moral and political ambiguity of harm reduction does not necessarily 
allow for shared objectives, because a prohibitionist (reactionary) could not share the 
same objectives as a legaliser (reformist). Although commentators often utilise harm 
reduction and harm minimisation as synonyms (Miller, 2001), some, including 
participants, made a distinction between harm minimisation and harm reduction. 
Accordingly, harm reduction refers to any intervention that actively seeks to reduce the 
harms associated with drug use, whereas harm minimisation refers to the overall goal of 
drug policy to reduce drug-related harms (Weatherburn, 2009). Harm minimisation 
encompasses harm reduction strategies, which results in a shift away from treatment ² 
and specifically concerns for the health and well-being of drug users ² towards a 
broader focus on issues such as overall supply reduction. Harm reduction could be 
regarded by a reformist as reducing the harm done to people who use drugs, or it could 
be regarded by a reactionary as reducing the harm done by people who use drugs. Since 
a value commitment to harm reduction might entail very different perspectives, this 
should be regarded in its relation with other commitments, values and beliefs.  
8.5 Values, beliefs, affect, and commitment to drug and prostitution policy 
:KHQUHIOHFWLQJRQ WKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQSURIHVVLRQDOEDFNJURXQGDQG LQGLYLGXDOV·
values and attitudes, and specifically the differences between advocates and politicians 
and bureaucrats, one participant noted that: 
Most of the people in NGOs are there because of some belief system they have [«@DQGWKH\
are committed to it >«@ZKHUHDVFRQYHUVHO\PRVWSHRSOHLQJRYHUQPHQWDOVWUXFWXUHVDUHE\WKHLU
nature not particularly driven by the subject they are dealing with (U D 27 A). 
This suggests the common-held assumption that advocates are subject-driven and 
value-driven whereas politicians and bureaucrats are not. The literature emphasises that 
politicians and civil servants might be primarily self-interest and career driven, and that 
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in order to be successful, they need to maintain a generalist, rather than specialist, 
approach and consequently steer clear of long-term involvement in contentious policy 
areas (Stevens, 2011; Monaghan et al, 2012). However, interview data suggests that the 
GHJUHHRILQGLYLGXDOV·HQJDJHPHQWZLWKWKHVHLVVXHVZLOOOLNHO\GHSHQGRQWKHLUSHUVRQDO
experiences, or the extent to which they have been personally or emotionally exposed to 
these issues, which would trigger empathy. If that individual is a Minister, a Premier or a 
Prime Minister, the likelihood that drug or prostitution policy will figure highly on the 
SROLWLFDODJHQGD LQFUHDVHV)RUH[DPSOH LQ1HZ6RXWK:DOHV WKHIDFWWKDW%RE&DUU·V
brother died of a drug overdose pushed drug policy higher on the agenda, which 
favoured the 1999 Drug Summit initiative as well as the opening of the Medically 
Supervised Injecting Centre: 
The Premier, who had lost a brother to drug overdose, who was quite ambivalent, he is quite a 
conservative person Bob CDUUEXW >«@KHSXWDVLGHKLVRZQ IHHOLQJVDQG>«@KH OHW LW JR
WKURXJK>«@,IKHKDGVDLGQRWKDWZDVLW*DPHRYHUULJKWIURPWKHVWDUW(A D 12 CS). 
For an individual to dedicate their life work to this area, it appears that there needs to be 
a strong moral commitment based on values, beliefs and affect. People involved will 
approach policy issues in these areas with a mixture of feelings, beliefs, and knowledge. 
As one participant put it, 
People often come to an issue with huge particular feeling and belief based on various levels of 
experience and evidence, so it may literally be from their own personal evidence or one person 
they know, and they realise people need to be clear, honest about [where they are coming from] 
(U P 31 A) 
The participant emphasises feelings and beliefs alongside experience and evidence, and 
sees policy as  
EHLQJ LQIOXHQFHGE\SHRSOH·VDQ[LHW\DQGEHOLHIV«LW·VDERXWSROLF\ LQ WKHDUHDRIGUXJV VH[
ZRUN>«@\RX·UHGHDOLQJZLWKSHRSOHLQQHUFRUHHPRWLRQV (U P 31 A) 
According to Lakoff (1996), whereas conservatives are mobilised by fear and anxiety, 
IRU OLEHUDOV HPSDWK\ LV WKH EDVLV RI PRUDOLW\ LQ KLV ¶QXUWXUDQW SDUHQW· PHWDSKRU KH
highlights how liberals see morality as tied with nurturance, happiness, fairness and 
growth. In this view, moral agents are nurturing parents who tend to those needing 
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help, striving to ensure equal and rights-based distribution to pursue community, social 
and moral growth. Liberals 
¶VHH FHUWDLQ SHRSOH DQG JURXSV RI SHRSOH DV ´GLVDGYDQWDJHGµ )RU KLstorical, 
social and health reasons, which are not faults of their own, such people have 
been prevented from being able to compete fairly in pursuit of their self-
interest·/DNRII 
Participants in the sample share a commitment to values such as social justice, social 
responsibility, harm reduction and improved human rights. Participants recognise that 
the rights and responsibilities of people involved are affected and severely curtailed by 
social, cultural and behavioural norms, current legal frameworks, and structural 
inequalities. In practice, this often translates into some form of professional 
commitment to ameliorating the conditions of those who are worst affected by current 
policies. Scientists in drug and prostitution policy might engage in a form of research 
activism underpinned by a moral commitment to research for change, because: 
,W·V QRW >«@ D ´QLFHµ DUHD WR GR UHVHDUFK LQWHOOHFWXDOO\ FKDOOHQJLQg or even particularly 
engaging. ,PHDQWKHVHDUHSHRSOH·VOLYHV(A D 8 S) 
I want to creDWHNQRZOHGJHRQWKLQJV>«@,ZDQWWRNLQGRIEHDEOHWRGRSUREOHPVROYLQJ
>«@WRFUHDWHFKDQJH(U P 29 S). 
Beneath the commitment to a medical model to run services focusing on drug-using 
clients there is a shared belief that the health needs and rights of these populations are 
generally not well catered for and that harm reduction and public health should 
underpin these services. One participant described their experience as one where: 
it all came together to give me an incredible interest in sex, drugs and the public health issues 
DURXQGWKRVH>«@RXUV\VWHPGLGQ·WFDWHUZHOOWRWKRVHSRSXODWLRQV(A D 11 M). 
Participants ² particularly those whose background is in research and advocacy ² seem 
to have become involved in specific policy fields not only out of interest or training, but 
also out of moral commitments. Although stakeholders with a political or public service 
background are by their nature generalists, and do not get to pick their subject, they will 
still place more or less importance on particular subjects depending on their values, 
beliefs, interests and experience.  
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There appeared to be a broad recognition among participants that neither drugs nor 
prostitution are politically attractive for any government or individual who wants to 
make a career in government, generally remaining low on the political agenda. When 
discussing the drivers which lead politicians to explore prostitution policy reform, one 
participant claims that: 
Politicians tie themselves in a knot, and they tend to be besieged by a fairly fanatical subgroup, 
usually fundamentalist Christians and Muslims, but there are no big drivers of social 
reformism in the area, so usually their only drive is a sense of human rights, social justice (A P 
3 M). 
Here, the participant recognises that the drive for involvement is value-based; it is 
commitment to human rights and social justice which will motivate a politician to run 
the risk of jeopardising their political career by actively pursuing reform. Without that 
strong value commitment, it is less likely that an individual might display a reformist 
DWWLWXGHSDUWLFXODUO\RQHWKDWLVQ·WVXSSRUWHGE\GRPLQDQWPRUDOLW\ 
Participants emphasised that a general period of political reformism, supported by a 
reformist party manifesto, was more likely to trigger reform in these contentious areas. 
In New South Wales, the Australian Labor party dominated politics between 1976 and 
2011, aside from a brief stint by the Liberals in the early 1990s. As one participant 
notes: 
All of our governments tend to bHVPDOO¶O·OLEHUDOVEXWVRFLDOO\SURJUHVVLYHRUDWOHDVWWKH\KDYH
been for about 30 years. (A P 3 M) 
In effect, the majority of significant policy reforms in both prostitution and drug policy 
in New South Wales, including decriminalisation of prostitution, harm reduction and 
the Medically Supervised Injecting Centre, were carried out during this period. This is 
not necessarily the case in England and the UK, where New Labour was much less 
cohesive than its New South Wales counterpart when it comes to reform in these areas. 
In drug policy, it was the drug-crime link which prompted investment in treatment in 
the early years of New Labour (Stevens, 2007b). In the UK in 1997: 
drug treatment was seen by the incoming Blair government as something that was a core issue 
WREH WDFNOHGSDUWLFXODUO\ FULPHEHLQJ WKHELJJHVWGULYHEXWQRW WKH RQO\ RQH%ODLU·V IDPRXV
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¶WRXJKRQFULPHWRXJKRQWKHFDXVHVRIFULPH·DQGGUXJWUHDWPHQWILWWHGWKDWELOOSHUIHFWO\ (U 
D 30 CS). 
Perhaps, the matter of scale is relevant, as the Australian federal government was 
marching to the same tune, with Prime Minister Howard (1996-DGRSWLQJD¶WRXJK
RQGUXJV·UKHWRULF%DFFKL,Q$XVWUDOLDWKHUKHWRULFZDVWKDWRID]HURWROHUDQFH
approach, whereas the practice was still very much harm minimisation focused, yet 
unsupportive of controversial reforms such as supervised injecting centres (Bessant, 
2008; Wodak, 2004). However, a previous Australian prime minister (1983-1991) had 
instigated early commitment to harm reduction because of his personal story:  
Bob Hawke who was the former prime minister, his daughter had a heroin addiction, and he 
broke down on TV and cried, and that was the start of a national campaign against drug 
abuse, based on the personal situation of the prime minister at the time, the one he was facing 
DWKRPHZLWKRQHRIKLVNLGVVRWKDWZDVHQRXJKWRGULYHFKDQJH«7KDWZDVWKHVWDUWRIWKH
QDWLRQDOVWUDWHJ\LWZDVGULYHQRXWWKH30·VRIILFH,WVRUWRIKLWKRPHWKDWLILWKDSSHQHGWR
WKHSULPHPLQLVWHU·VIDmily it could happen to any family (A D 5 KB)  
The emotional trigger, coupled with the AIDS crisis, contributed toward investment in 
drug treatment in Australia and made it easier to justify it politically with the general 
public, given that the latter could empathise with the Prime Minister.  
The UK coalition government (2010-2015) did not show a strong interest in pursuing 
liberal drug or prostitution policy reform. In drug policy, major criticism of harm 
reduction and methadone maintenance was mounted3 in order to justify the shift in 
focus from population specific treatment provision to broader notions of public health 
to protect the general population4, coupled with a shift from harm reduction to 
abstinence and recovery rhetoric and commitment (Duke, 2012). One participant noted 
that: 
by critiquing maintenance prescribing, they tick moral boxes for the authoritarian and religious 
ULJKW>«@LWDOVRZDVSROLWLFDOO\XVHIXOEHFDXVHLWQHXWUDOLVHGVRPHWKLQJWKDWODERXURWKHUZLVH
would have played as a strong card (U D 30 CS). 
                                                 
3 By the Centre for Social Justice, a conservative think tank in 2007 
4 The creation of Public Health England and the dismantling of the National Treatment Agency 
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Here, the participant stresses the political strategy behind the shift toward abstinence 
and recovery had a dual aim of invDOLGDWLQJ/DERXU·VVXFFHVVHVZKLOH satisfying the more 
authoritarian religious currents of the conservative party and voter base. This shift 
should be regarded in the context of austerity politics. The participant argued that, in 
this context, evidence is ignored in order to justify a political and moral position against 
the welfare state.  
:H·OO LJQRUH WKDW WKDW·VZKDW:+2VD\\RXRXJKW WRGRDQG WKDW·VZKDW WKH81VD\\RX
RXJKWWRGRDQGWKDW·VZKDW1,&(VD\\RXRXJKWWRGRWKDW·VZKDWWKHGHSDUWPHQWRIKHDOWK
VD\\RXRXJKWWRGRZH·OOLJQRUHWKDWDQGZH·OOWDFNOHWKLVDVDPRUDOLVVXHQRWDVDWHFKQLFDO
clinicaO LVVXHDQGZH·OO VD\\RX IDLOHG VR LW·VQRWD VXFFHVV LW·VD IDLOXUHDQG WKDWDOVRZDV
quite important for underpinning their whole critique of the welfare state and of welfare 
GHSHQGHQF\EHFDXVH>«@ZHZRXOGDUJXHWKDWSRYHUW\VRFLDOH[FOXVLRQDUH the causes of drug 
addiction. (U D 30 CS) 
Here, there is a strong emphasis on the manner in which politics might taint an issue so 
that, rather than looking at the evidence, and considering the issue from a 
technical/clinical perspective, as the participant believes it should be, the issue becomes 
one of moral and political valence instead. In a context where the support for universal 
welfare is being eroded and resources are stretched, public spending is increasingly 
called into question and categories of moral and immoral, deserving and undeserving 
are used by governments to manage distribution of resources in an increasingly 
competitive and scarce welfare system. This rhetoric is overt in the UK context (Crines, 
2013). In Australia, a similar rhetoric is noted (Gunders, 2012). Drug and prostitution 
policy should be observed in this context of austerity, scarcity and resource 
competition. In relation to resource allocation by government, a participant exposed the 
difference between how politicians might respond to leukaemia as opposed to drug use:  
what drives people is the image of the innocents, the young kid, no choice of their own, through 
IDWHKDVEHHQGHDOW WKLVVFUHZ«XSDJDLQVWDQDGROHVFHQWRUDQDGXOWZKR·VHOHFWLQJWR LQMHFW
themselves with an illHJDOVXEVWDQFHDQG\RXJRWWKHPRQH\RQWKHWDEOHZKR·VJRQQDJHWLW"
$QGWKDW·VWKHGLOHPPD:LWKDOOWKHUHVHDUFKHYLGHQFHLQWKHZRUOGDWVRPHSRLQW\RXNQRZ
ZH·UHVWLOOQHYHUJRQQDZLQWKDWDUJXPHQWDQGWKDW·VMXVWFRPSHWLQJLQWHUHVW (A D 5 KB). 
This exposes the tension between individual responsibility and individual liberty, as well 
as that between individual and social responsibility. Whereas in the first instance, the 
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innocent child has no responsibility for being sick, for the drug user the issue of 
responsibility is more complex and contested. When the two are competing for 
government attention and funding, the first is more likely to win.  
In New South Wales, using health expertise in prostitution policy is seen as a way of 




well it works (A P 3 M). 
Participants were motivated by a value commitment to human rights and public health 
improvement to advance prostitution policy reform elsewhere by using the New South 
Wales case as an example of good practice. Here, the participant relied on health and 
medical expertise as a way of making it credible. It appears as though engagement of 
stakeholders in these areas of policy is motivated by a number of values which include 
social justice, human rights and harm reduction, and that these values together might 
contribute to a reformist attitude. My interviews suggest a professional commitment to 
these areas is likely to be associated with some form of experience or exposure to issues 
associated with drugs and prostitution. Yet, what is also clear is that different 
stakeholders respond to exposure or experience differently, and that their responses 
might be better understood by looking at ideological distinctions, competing moralities 
and classic political cleavages (Chapter 9). 
Having discussed the presence of values and beliefs in the data, the next section 
provides visualisations of value/belief constellations in the sample of participants to 
further observe the manner in which these operate together.  
8.6 Network visualisation: values and beliefs constellations 
The visual networks reproduced in this section detail the connections between values 
and beliefs occurring concurrently in the sample and then in each of the comparative 
dimensions (see Chapter 6). The figure below shows the value-belief constellation for 
the whole sample of participants. Values and beliefs are colour-coded (values in blue, 
beliefs in red).  
Chapter 8 Between morality, evidence and policy: professions, politics, values and beliefs 
217 
Figure 9: Values and beliefs relations (degree centrality) across full sample 
 
 
It is clear from figure 9 that Human Rights, Social Justice, and Social Responsibility are 
values shared by the majority of participants. Evidence informed policy, translation and 
mediation, and political allegiance are the most shared beliefs. Although this was already 
clear from the descriptive figures in the previous section, what this figure adds is proof 
that these values often occur concurrently.  
Figure 10 below highlights, with tick lines, the connections in prostitution policy (on the 
left, with black lines) and drug policy (on the right with blue lines). 
Figure 10: Values and beliefs relations (degree centrality) across full sample with 
distinctions across policy areas 
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This is used to highlight that a specific set of values and beliefs are more connected in 
either domain. The left side of the figure details the relations between values and beliefs 
in prostitution policy (PPR; RF; LF; IL; IR) whereas the right side is predominantly 
showing the drug policy constellation (DPR; PH; ES; EBP). For example, public health 
(PH) is most often associated with evidence and science and evidence-based policy (on 
the right side), and shares little connection with prostitution policy reform or radical 
feminism (on the opposite side). The following pages present networks across 
comparative dimensions, for Australia and the UK and then for drugs and prostitution. 
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8.6.1 Australia and the UK 
Figure 11: Australia Network  
  
Figure 12: UK Network  
 
 
Overall, figures 11 and 12 show some consistency across the two samples. In the 
Australia/NSW sample of participants, respect for authority (RA), religion (R) and 
radical feminism (RF) were lacking. Its commonly associated values, individual 
responsibility (IR) and social responsibility (SR), are less connected compared to the 
UK sample. This does not mean that these values and beliefs are not present since the 
sample is not representative. However, when compared to the UK where some of these 
values and beliefs were weakly present, and in conjunction with the fact that New South 
SJ= Social Just ice
RA= Respect for Authority
IR= Individual  Responsibility
SR= Social Responsibility
PH= Public Health
Hred= Harm Reduct ion
IL= Individual Liberty
ES= Evidence and Science
EBP= Evidence Based Policy
EIP= Evidence Informed Policy
T&M = Translat ion and M ediat ion
PR= Public Representat ion
GR= Group Representat ion
PolA= Polit ical Allegiance
PA= Party Allegiance
R= Religion
DPR= Drug Policy Reform
PPR= Prost itut ion Policy Reform
LF= Liberal Feminism
RF= Radical Feminism
Chapter 8 Between morality, evidence and policy: professions, politics, values and beliefs 
220 
Wales has adopted a decriminalised framework for regulating prostitution, it is an 
interesting indication of the connection between liberal values, liberal feminism, and 
decriminalisation. In figure 11, we find that Human Rights (HR) and Social Justice (SJ) 
are central values to the network. Evidence-informed policy (EIP), Translation and 
Mediation (T&M) and Political Allegiance (PolA) are centrally connected beliefs. This 
indicates the strong presence of advocates and knowledge brokers in the sample, yet it 
also indicates that researchers in the sample made explicit reference to these beliefs 
(EIP and T&M) as an integral part of their work. Political allegiance, centrally 
connected in figure 12, will be a strong belief for advocates, politicians and civil 
servants, but less so for either knowledge brokers or researchers. Radical feminism (RF) 
and respect for authority (RA) are present but peripheral in the UK network. In figure 
12, the value of human rights (HR) appears to be less connected when compared to 
figure 11. Social justice (SJ) and social responsibility (SR) remain central to the UK 
network, the latter to a greater extent when compared to Australia. Translation and 
mediation (T&M) and evidence informed policy (EIP) remain fairly central, though 
T&M as a belief appears less central in the UK, whilst EIP appears more central. 
Interestingly, political allegiance (PolA) is both frequent and centrally connected, 
occupying the core of the UK diagram and in conjunction with evidence informed 
policy (EIP), social responsibility (SR), translation and mediation (T&M) and social 
justice (SJ). In Australia, translation and mediation (T&M) is also central, connected 
with evidence informed policy (EIP) and social responsibility (SR), but also group 
representation (GR), social justice (SJ), evidence and science (ES) and human rights 
(HR). Evidence-based policy (EBP) is consistently connected to evidence and science 
(ES), public health (PH) and drug policy reform (DPR) across the two countries, and 
interestingly in the UK it is linked with political representation (PR). Yet, it remains 
consistently more peripheral than evidence informed policy (EIP) and always on the 
opposite side of prostitution policy reform (PPR).  
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8.6.2 Drugs and Prostitution 
Below are the networks comparing drug and prostitution policy: 
Figure 13: Drugs Network  
 
Figure 14: Prostitution Network 
 
 
All absent beliefs (unattached boxes in the upper left corner) are domain specific. 
Translation and mediation (T&M), social justice (SJ), public health (PH), drug policy 
reform (DPR), social responsibility (SR), evidence and science (ES) and evidence-based 
policy (EBP) occupy the core of the values/belief constellation in the drug policy 
network. However, what differs is the central presence of both evidence-based policy 
SJ= Social Just ice
RA= Respect for Authority
IR= Individual  Responsibility
SR= Social Responsibility
PH= Public Health
Hred= Harm Reduct ion
IL= Individual Liberty
ES= Evidence and Science
EBP= Evidence Based Policy
EIP= Evidence Informed Policy
T&M = Translat ion and M ediat ion
PR= Public Representat ion
GR= Group Representat ion
PolA= Polit ical Allegiance
PA= Party Allegiance
R= Religion
DPR= Drug Policy Reform
PPR= Prost itut ion Policy Reform
LF= Liberal Feminism
RF= Radical Feminism
Chapter 8 Between morality, evidence and policy: professions, politics, values and beliefs 
222 
(EBP) and evidence and science (ES) in figure 13 when compared to figure 14. These 
beliefs have a much more peripheral role in prostitution policy, as does public health 
(PH). In the drugs network, the belief in evidence-based policy (EBP) is connected with 
public health (PH), translation and mediation (T&M), and social responsibility (SR), 
which all speak to the broader commitments of the scientific community in this field 
and support the contention that evidence-based policy is associated with clinical trials 
and treatment, which better apply to drug policy than prostitution. Figure 14 differs 
from figure 13 in that it is characterised by the centrality of different values and beliefs. 
Individual liberty (IL), social responsibility (SR), harm reduction (HRed) and liberal 
feminism (LF) appear to be the most centrally connected values and beliefs in 
prostitution. Albeit social justice (SJ) and human rights (HR) remain predominant 
across domains, they are differently distributed. Evidence-based policy (EBP) has little 
connection to prostitution policy reform (PPR), in contrast to drug policy reform 
(DPR).  
The connections between beliefs and values may support different policy positions. 
Drug policy reform (DPR) shares little connection with respect for authority (RA) and 
individual responsibility (IR), but it is connected with the values of human rights (HR), 
harm reduction (HRed), social justice (SJ) and social responsibility (SR). Those in the 
sample who supported drug policy reform broadly supported decriminalisation if not 
legal regulation. Prostitution policy tells a different story. The values that more often 
occur together with liberal feminism (LF) are individual liberty (IL), human rights (HR), 
harm reduction (HRed), and social justice (SJ). The beliefs that occur together with 
liberal feminism are group representation (GR), prostitution policy reform (PPR), 
translation and mediation (T&M), evidence informed policy (EIP). Conversely, the 
values that most often occur together with radical feminism (RF) are individual 
responsibility (IR), social responsibility (SR), social justice (SJ) and human rights (HR). 
The beliefs that occur together with radical feminism are prostitution policy reform 
(PPR), translation and mediation (T&M), and evidence informed policy (EIP). The two 
positions share some but not all, of the same values and beliefs. The main difference 
between the two positions seems to be the connection between social and individual 
responsibility for radical feminism, and that between social responsibility and individual 
liberty for liberal feminism. 
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8.7 Liberals versus radicals in prostitution policy
5
  
In the sample, liberal feminists placed stronger emphasis on individual liberty alongside 
social responsibility, whereas radical feminists placed more emphasis on both individual 
and social responsibility (figure 14). In fact, radical feminists do not see the individual as 
capable of making a free choice in the context of sex work because of the dominance of 
patriarchal values and liberal ideology (Weitzer, 2005). Though both liberal and radical 
feminists share a commitment to harm reduction, the way they envision this in practice 
differs, with decriminalisation on the one hand and criminalisation of the purchase of 
sex on the other. Both groups share a commitment to prostitution policy reform, but 
the type of reform they call for is underpinned by different values and beliefs, and as 
such they aim for different outcomes. The two positions form two opposing advocacy 
coalitions, because although some of their core beliefs are the same (i.e. Social Justice, 
Human Rights, and Harm Reduction) their policy core beliefs (decriminalisation and 
criminalisation of purchase) and secondary aspects differ (i.e. the type of reform they 
envision).6 
Interview data would appear to suggest that there is some common ground between 
liberal and radical feminists, because: 
Feminists of whatever shade do not think women should be criminalised. We think that there 
should be harm reduction and exit (U P 25 S). 
However, similarly to the discussion about overstating the case that everyone shares a 
commitment to the same outcome in drug policy (i.e. harm minimisation), the ultimate 
policy goal differs, and so do the means to reach that goal. Both abolitionists and 
decriminalisers support harm reduction, though decriminalisers to a greater extent 
(figure 14); however, the primary understanding of harm reduction for abolitionists is 
exiting leading to safety (on the basis that all sex work is victimisation), and not safety 
                                                 
5 This categorisation is not agreed-upon, it is a typology to link together attitudes toward prostitution (sex-
SRVLWLYHYHUVXVDEROLWLRQLVWDQGGLIIHUHQWVKDGHVRIIHPLQLVPV·DWWLWXGHWRZDUGFDSLWDOLVPSDWULDUFK\VH[XDOLW\
and labour. Other definitions include radical feminists versus sex radicals (Sutherland, 2004) or sex positive 
feminism. The VWUHVVRQ¶OLEHUDO·DVDFDWHJRULVDWLRQLVVHHQDVLPSRUWDQWEHFDXVHLWWLHVWRJHWKHUVRPH
fundamental assumption about liberal ideology and its connection with liberal morality and politics in its 
predominant features.  
6 Here, I deliberately use terminoORJ\IURPWKH$&)´YDOXHVµDUHFRPSDWLEOHZLWKFRUHEHOLHIVDQG´EHOLHIVµDUH
comparable to policy core beliefs. However, the proposed relationship between core beliefs and policy core 
beliefs in the ACF is unidirectional, whereas the relationship proposed in this framework is circular. 
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within work, which would be the main objective of decriminalisers. Abolitionists, like 
decriminalisers, believe that harm is not perpetrated by sex workers, but instead done to 
them. Both believe that harm is systemic; however abolitionists see those who purchase 
sex as perpetrators and the sex industry as intrinsically exploitative, whereas 
decriminalisers see prostitution laws and criminalisation in all its forms as harmful.  
One participant speaks of both agreements and disagreements within feminism:  
historically feminists had always supported women in prostitution, what we disagree about is 
>«@ZKHWKHULWLVDQLQVWLWXWLRQWKDW>«@LVURRWHGLQDQGUHSURGXFHVZRPHQ·VLQHTXDOLW\RU
whether [sex work] can be a realm of freedom ² WKDW·VZKDWZHGLVDJUHHDERXW(U P 25 S) 
Crucially, the difference between feminist interpretations is found in the conception of 
freedom (i.e. the pursuit of individual liberty as possible in prostitution). For liberal 
feminists, individual liberty within the confines of a liberal capitalist system is something 
that can be achieved through sex work (Sutherland, 2004). For radical feminists on the 
other hand, individual liberty cannot be achieved through sex work because it is 
repressive by nature, because it is encouraged by a system that commodifies bodies and 
erodes subjectivity. In the quote below, the participant makes an analogy comparing 
prostitution with domestic violence: 
I think we make really weird arguments about prostitution [...] you know, women choose to go 
back to violent men ² does that mean we say that domestic violence is okay? No. Women say 
they want to stay with him despite the violence ² does that make the violence okay? No. So 
LW·VWKLVDUJXPHQWRI\RXNQRZLQGLYLGXDOFKRLFH(U P 25 S) 
7KLV VXVWDLQV WKH DUJXPHQW WKDW ZRPHQ·V DJHQF\ LQ VH[ Zork is compromised by 
structural inequality, patriarchy and capitalism. The participant then claims that an 
opposing view has very little to do with feminism, and all to do with being: 
Libertarian, yeah; Liberal/libertarian. ,W·VJRWQRWKLQJWRGRZLWKWKHIHPLQLVPRIZKLFKWKHUH
are many kinds of shades, which is talking about something more transformative but that is a 
FULWLTXH RI WKH ZD\ JHQGHU LQHTXDOLW\ LV FRQVWUXFWHG DQG FRQWLQXHV WR EH UHSURGXFHG EXW LW·V
[liberal/libertarian position] got nothing to say to that (U P 25 S). 
In fact, a liberal/libertarian position would entail the primacy of individual choice and 
freedom in the private realm over and above state involvement; this position is more 
compatible with liberal feminism (Sloan and Wahab, 2000). Conversely, radical 
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feminism places trust in state institutions to intervene in private matters, to intervene 
punitively towards violent perpetrators, which include those who purchase sex. Some 
VSRNH RI WKLV DWWLWXGH DV D IRUP RI ¶FDUFHUDO IHPLQLVP· EHFDXVH RI LWV VXSSRUW IRU
criminalisation (Bernstein, 2012). 
There appears to be some acknowledgement on both ends of the spectrum of the 
significant number of shared values and beliefs that could potentially build bridges, but 
because of the differences in beliefs and objectives, the incommensurability remains. 
Here, a participant expresses the (liberal moral) view that sex is something personal, 
private: 
YDOXHV DQG SHRSOHV· PRUDOV ZH·UH WU\LQJ WR WUDQVIHU LQWR OHJLVODWLRQ ZKLFK LV D YHU\ WULFN\
thing, \RXNQRZDQG,WKLQNZLWKVH[ZRUNWKDW·VZK\SHRSOHJHWK\VWHULFDOEHFDXVH>«@ZH
WKLQN VH[ LV VRPHWKLQJ WKDW·V SHUVRQDO >«@ I think for any effective argument I try to put 
P\VHOI LQWR WKDWSHUVRQ·V IUDPHRIPLQG>«@WKHVHDEROLWLRQLVWV >«@VLQFHUHO\EHOLHYH WKH\·UH
ULJKW>«@WKH\WKLQNQRZRPDQZRXld ever choose this (A P 15 A) 
7KLV SDUWLFLSDQW DFNQRZOHGJHV WKDW WKH GLIILFXOW\ LQ VKLIWLQJ WKH RSSRVLQJ FRDOLWLRQ·V
position OLHVLQLWV¶YDOXHVDQGPRUDOV·. The question that the participant is hinting at is: 
how can one argue that people have a right and a choice to sell sex? This cannot be 
VDWLVIDFWRULO\H[SODLQHGE\/DNRII·VPRUDOSROLWLFVZKHUHE\FRQVHUYDWLYHVKDYHD ¶VWULFW
IDWKHU·PRUDOLW\DQGOLEHUDOVKDYHD¶QXUWXUDQWSDUHQW·RQHEHFDXVHWKHQXUWXUDQW
parent would not necessarily tell their daughter that being a sex worker was a good 
FDUHHURSWLRQ OLNHZLVH D UDGLFDO IHPLQLVWZRXOGEHKRUULILHG WREH OLNHQHG WR D ¶VWULFW
IDWKHU·+RZHYHUZKDW LV UHOHYDQWKHUH LV WKH LQFRQJUXHQFHRI OLEHUDO LGHRORJ\ZKLFK
provides support for various coDOLWLRQV· DUJXPHQWV WKURXJK LWV YHU\ FRQWUDGLFWLRQV
Radical feminism might ask of liberal feminism: how can you endorse the very 
institution that objectifies and victimises women whilst supporting a patriarchal system? 
Conversely, liberal feminists might ask of radical feminists: how can you endorse the 
power of the state to criminalise people as the very institution that has oppressed 
women for centuries? 
Liberals operate fully within the frameworks of liberal capitalism. They recognise that 
reforms are lLPLWHGE\ DGYDQFHG FDSLWDOLVW V\VWHPV· LQKHUHQW FRQWUDGLFWLRQVZLWK WKHLU
consumption oriented and expansionary market economies on the one hand, and their 
moral prohibitions on the other. They recognise that the demand for drugs or sex, for 
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instance, is extremely unlikely to fade away even in the most punitive of regimes (Meier, 
1994). Liberal morality operates within the very contradictions of liberal ideology and 
capitalism, and as such it is motivated by potentially contrasting individual and collective 
values such as individual liberty alongside social responsibility and justice (figure 14). In 
the realm of prostitution policy, these contradictions come to the fore. Thus, liberals 
have to find a working compromise to satisfy each of their motivating values. On the 
other hand, radicals reject liberal ideology and capitalism as the very basis of injustice 
and inequality, and espouse much more abstract policy goals because they do not 
believe that individual liberty can be achieved under the current system. Yet, they rely 
on the state to deter and punish those whose behaviour is regarded as immoral because 
it perpetuates violence and inequality. In prostitution policy, freedom is differently 
conceptualised by liberals and radicals as freedom to (predominant for liberals) versus 
freedom from SUHGRPLQDQW IRU UDGLFDOV $V 6DQGHUV SXWV LW ¶WKH ZLGHU SKLORVRSKLFDO
QRWLRQVRI OLEHUDO IUHHGRP>«@UHVLVW VWDWH LQWHUYHQWLRQ LQSULYDWHPRUDOLW\· 
Liberal ideology has long been tied with the principle of non-interference in private 
morality, which is challenged by a puritan notion that equates private and public 
morality and by a feminist notion that the private is political. 
Sanders (2005) distinguishes between public and private morality in relation to 
prostitution. The very tension between the two has led to highly contradictory laws 
which on the one hand do not criminalise prostitution per se while on the other hand 
condemn all activities associated with it, so that the act of selling sex becomes 
criminalised by extension. She argues that current attitudes to sex work in the UK are 
informed by Victorian morality, yet there is also a libertarian undercurrent, which dates 
as far back as the 1957 Wolfenden Report, generating significant contradictions. She 
also notes that other countries which are more conservative and less secular, such as 
Turkey or Portugal, have a registration and licensing system (2005: 10). This sustains 
(QJHOL HW DO·V  DUJXPHQW DERXW WKH LQFRQVLVWHQW OLQN EHWZHHQ GHJUHH RI
secularisation and change in morality policy towards permissiveness. Sanders also notes 
KRZFRQWUDU\WRDOORWKHU´IHPLQLVHGµDQGJHQGHUHGLQGXVWULHV 
¶6H[ ZRUN LV QRW FRQVLGHUHG D VHUYLFH LQGXVWU\ EHFDXVH WKH LGHD RI VH[XDO
services is viewed through a different lens due to the inherent Christian, middle-
class morals attached to the act of sex, as something that is only rightly 
H[SUHVVHGLQKHWHURVH[XDOPRQRJDPRXVUHSURGXFWLYHUHODWLRQVKLSV· 
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The maintenance of social, cultural and gender hierarchies (Douglas, 1966) appears to 
be antithetical to liberalising sex work. The lack of evidence systematically comparing 
sex work to other professions was already noted in Chapter Seven. This is largely 
because commercial sex, as a special category, as a danger category, cannot be 
considered as work and likened to other dignified, if gendered, professions. However, 
there is anecdotal evidence to suggest, as Sanders does, that many choose sex work over 
other employment because it offers some advantages, better pay, flexibility and self-
employment to name a few. Focusing on the work, and not the sex, was regarded as a 
strategy to demoralise the debate, to frame the issue from manifestly to latently moral, 
and to place further emphasis on different moral principles, away from sex and towards 
work. Stressing that prostitution involves labour, and that it is the labour that should be 
legitimised allows those who support a liberal feminist position, or at least endorse it as 
a first-step compromise, to move beyond debates on first principles, i.e. selling sex as 
right or wrong, moral or immoral. Moving beyond first-principled debates not only 
requires re-framing, i.e. from prostitution to sex work. It requires the projection of a 
post-moral or amoral positioning supported by evidence as a neutralising tool.  
8.8 Danger categories, values and framing 
Drug policy has become more explicitly a part of public health discourse7, partly 
because of the degree of medical involvement that is a consequence of drugs being 
external sources that physiologically affect users. Prostitution is different because, 
although sex can be presented as a vector for disease, sex, if not traded, is considered to 
EH D ´QRUPDOµ DFWLYLW\ PRUH VR WKDQ WDNLQJ GUXJV 6H[ GRHV QRW QRUPDOO\ LQYROYH DQ
external, psychoactive source. Although arguments to include prostitution within public 
health are increasingly formalised (The Lancet, 2014; WHO, 2014)8, and issues around 
the spread of sexually transmitted infections have been used by conservatives and 
liberals alike for rather opposite aims since Victorian times (Hunt, 1999), the extent to 
which prostitution is considered a public health issue remains relative compared to 
drugs. 
                                                 
7 Inclusion of drug treatment into Public Health England following the dismantling of the National Treatment 
Agency (Specialist UK body) 
8http://www.thelancet.com/series/HIV-and-sex-workers  
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Human rights as a frame figures more overtly in prostitution debates, as liberal 
feminism has explicitly espoused a rights-based discourse in order to reduce the stigma 
associated with prostitution and portray it as a form of work (Chateauvert, 2014). The 
question of agency in the drug debate is often overshadowed by the presence of drug as 
a mediator which clouds human agency and choice through the medical model of 
addiction (though often drugs are given agency by those who support prohibition, as 
discussed in Chapter 9). A similar mechanism is reproduced in the prostitution field, 
wheUHE\ ZRPHQ·V DJHQF\ LV VHHQ DV HQWLUHO\ FRPSURPLVHG E\ V\VWHPLF LQHTXDOLW\
patriarchy, and capitalism. Thus, prostitutes are seen as victims, severely limited in their 
opportunities to make choices, by those who support abolitionism. There is a similar 
downplaying of individual liberty and choice in prohibitionist arguments, particularly 
through an ´DEVWLQHQFHµJXLVH 
A more medicalised discourse in the drugs field, coupled with a relative lack of support 
for a strong rights-based approach (Hunt, 2004) ensures that stakeholders are wearier of 
basing their demands on human rights as a result. Although the value of human rights is 
commonly shared within this domain (figure 8), it is not necessarily overtly utilised in 
issue framing. Rights-based discourses are perhaps more difficult to sustain in the drugs 
field and drug policy advocacy because of potential backlash from the general public. 
Drug users are not working, or providing services like sex workers might be, but rather 
pursuing pleasure, being addicted or medicating. As Hunt (2004) emphasises, there is no 
political appetite to support strong rights of drug users; relying on weak rights is 
consonant with the prevailing moral, political and scientific order. Arguing for drug 
XVHUV·ULJKWWRSOHDVXUHZRXOd be deemed controversial; advocates might stretch as far as 
arguing for a right to health for drug users (weak rights), rather than a right to work, as 
in the case of prostitution (strong right) (Chapter 10).  
Public health is more often invoked by people in the drugs field, as opposed to 
prostitution, which is tied with the more inherently medical nature of this field 
alongside the rise of the public health discourse in discreet opposition to purely 
prohibitionist and moralised models of regulation. Issue framing in public health terms 
enables a less overtly moralised understanding (Korn et al, 2013). Public Health figures 
PRUHSURPLQHQWO\LQWKH1HZ6RXWK:DOHV·SURVWLWXWLRQGHEDWHFRPSDUHGWR(QJODQG9, 
with the decriminalisation model explicitly, although asymmetrically, including sex 
                                                 
9 i.e. In New South Wales, public health goes with prostitution policy reform and liberal feminism (figure 11) 
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workers. Furthermore, health institutions such as the WHO and the Lancet have come 
out in support of the decriminalisation model as the policy with the most 
comprehensive evidence of better public health outcomes. Interestingly, the WHO 
supports decriminalisation across domains, in drug policy as well as prostitution.10 More 
UHFHQWO\DGHEDWHLQWKHSXEOLFGRPDLQZDVVSDUNHGE\$PQHVW\,QWHUQDWLRQDO·VRIILFLDO
endorsement of decriminalisation of prostitution to ensure the rights and safety of sex 
workers. This prompted a campaign spearheaded by anti-trafficking organisations and 
involving celebrities to ask for Amnesty to change its position on decriminalisation and 
to support the criminalisation of purchase instead. SignificaQWO\$PQHVW\·VSURSRVDO LV
framed in terms of human rights, which is their foundational value.11 
The clear advantage of seeking inclusion in public health for advocates in morality 
policy areas is the neutralising potential of a health-based frame, compared to a rights-
based one. Framing drugs and prostitution policy in terms of better health outcomes for 
both target group and general population has further potential benefits, allowing 
advocates to stand upon a more politically and morally neutral ground (Chapter 5). If 
IUDPHGH[SOLFLWO\RUHQWLUHO\ LQ WHUPVRI ¶WKH ULJKWRIGUXJXVHUV WRXVHGUXJV·RU ¶WKH
ULJKWRIVH[ZRUNHUVWRVHOOVH[·WKHOHYHORISXEOLFFRQWURYHUV\WKDWZRXOGHQVXHLVOLNHO\
to be higher while the level of public support for resource allocation would be lower. 
Conversely, if framed in terms of both community benefits and universal benefits, the 
level of public support is likely to be broader. However, the advantages of a public 
health framing are limited to the extent that they can only sustain weak rights, rather 
than strong ones, such as labour or pleasure (Chapter 10).  
Whilst there are differences between drugs and prostitution policy advocates, most 
advocates across policy fields share a commitment to harm reduction as a value 
informing both their ideas and their practice (figures 13 and 14). However, harm is 
differently understood by different participants. In prostitution policy, some will see 
prostitution itself as harmful, whereas others will only regard violence against 
prostitutes as harmful. Similarly, in drug policy, some will regard drug taking as 
necessarily harmful/addictive when unsupervised or outside of medical control, whereas 
others will recognise the potentially beneficial effects of certain drugs in particular 
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circumstances. Politicians seem altogether less likely to refer to harm reduction 
explicitly. Harm reduction has been the subject of increased criticism in both countries. 
A competing coalition whose values and beliefs are supportive of the ideas of 
abstinence and recovery has acquired considerable political sway (Duke, 2012; Lancaster 
et al, 2015); it is therefore increasingly likely that an explicit commitment to harm 
reduction is no longer politically palatable in either Australia or the UK. 
8.9 Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have argued that values and beliefs, as garnered from data analysis and 
operationalised as domain-specific constructs, are partly constitutive of policy positions 
in these fields. Their interplay is significant in shaping coalitions, and detailing their 
combinations is important when attempting to understand the existing 
incommensurability of policy positions. It became clear that opposing coalitions might 
share some, though not all, deep core beliefs, while their policy core beliefs and 
secondary aspects differ (i.e. liberal feminists and radical feminists). Conversely, 
coalitions that share the some of the same policy core beliefs and secondary aspects 
might not share the same deep core beliefs (i.e. radical feminists and abolitionist 
conservatives) (Chapter 9). 'XH WR WKH VDPSOH·V OLPLWDWLRQV DQGSDUWLFXODUO\ LWV OLEHUDO
bias, considerations about conservative value-based coalitions were limited; however, 
the stronger affinity between liberal morality, science and evidence is noted and 
repUHVHQWHGLQWKHVDPSOHDVDFRQVHTXHQFHRIWKHSURMHFW·VIRFXV 
7KH LPSRUWDQFH RI SDUWLFLSDQWV· SURIHVVLRQDO EDFNJURXQG WUDLQLQJ DQG RFFXSDWLRQ
VKRXOG QRW EH XQGHUHVWLPDWHG 3DUWLFLSDQWV· WUDLQLQJ DQG SURIHVVLRQV FRQVWLWXWH WKHLU
¶EHOLHIVYDOXHV ´ODERUDWRU\µ LQ WKH VHQVH WKDW HSLVWHPLF FXOWXUHV ZLOO EH SURGXFHG
through practices which have some bearing on their value/belief constellations (Knorr 
Cetina, 2007; Latour, 1987). This is why professional practices and commitments were 
operationalised as beliefs. It is in these settings that individuals are exposed to particular 
ways of thinking about the social world, where they learn rules about how to understand 
and interact with it, as well as decide what particular field they focus on. It is also in 
these settings that they will learn which knowledge is valuable and produce knowledge 
in accordance with formal and informal rules and established practices. Evidence from 
SDUWLFLSDQWV· QDUUDWLYHV DQG H[SHULHQFH LQGLFDWHG WKDW IRU H[DPSOH D PHGLFDO WUDLQLQJ
alongside work experience in a particular hospital ² exposing an individual to the ill-
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health of drug using populations ² might motivate them to work in community 
medicine, to be an advocate of public health, and to embrace harm reduction as a 
principle in their practice. A similar set of circumstances might motivate an individual to 
choose a career in politics and join the Labour party, to represent those who are 
weakest in society as well as utilising their health expertise to promote political change.  
Chapter 9 reflects on the way in which morality, constructed through values, beliefs, 
experience and principles, and according to classic political cleavages, both enables and 
limits policy change. This is debated through a reflection of the difference, and 
interaction between, policy instruments and policy paradigms.  
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Chapter 9  
ŚĂŶŐĞŝŶŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇƉŽůŝĐǇ 
9.1 Introduction 
In Chapter Eight, I showed that the interplay between values and beliefs contributes to 
VKDSLQJ LQGLYLGXDOV·PRUDO DQGSROLWLFDOSRVLWLRQV WRZDUGGUXJ and prostitution policy, 
and that there are domain specific value/belief constellations which help shape 
coalitions. Specific coalitions, informed by dominant value/belief constellations, 
compete in the policy arena to assert their views. A simple typology of competing 
advocacy coalitions is developed to frame analysis. This is carried out by utilising classic 
political cleavages combined with relevant paradigmatic positions as typologies.  
In this chapter, it will become clear that evidence is a tool that individuals and coalitions 
utilise in order to support their deeply held positions and give authoritativeness to their 
claims. Advocacy coalitions are by no means cohesive and uniform, but rather unstable 
and contradictory (Sabatier, 2011). A certain level of internal contradiction is given by 
the shifting order of values and beliefs. This is not only a result of practice and 
experience, but also and necessarily a response to exogenous factors, the introduction 
and internalising of new frames, ideas and values which are subject to interpretation 
(Surel, 2000).1  
I will use notions derived from models of policy change that rely on cognitive and 
normative frames (Chapter 3) to analyse the case of decriminalisation in both policy 
areas in both countries. Decriminalisation exists in both policy areas, constituting a legal 
and discursive framework informing specific laws and instruments. I will discuss the 
manner in which decriminalisation came to be considered a policy option, and compare 
instances of successful and unsuccessful decriminalisation by country and by policy 
area. I will focus on the specific conditions and external factors, which supported or 
impeded decriminalisation, with particular attention given to the role of evidence.  
                                                 
1 In Chapter 3, I discussed the manner in which normative and cognitive frames are neither cohesive nor 
hierarchically ordered. New paradigms evolve from existing ideas, and as such do not emerge in a revolutionary 
manner but rather through a re-ordering and re-assessment in response to external change alongside the manner 
in which this change is internalised and understood in a dynamic process, which is consistent with the idea of 
agency-structure dialectics advanced in Chapter 6.  
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9.2 Adopting the (Policy) paradigm lens 
Hall (1993: 278) explains the policy-PDNLQJSURFHVVDVRQHWKDW ¶LQYROYHVWKUHHFHQWUDO
variables: the overarching goals that guide policy in a particular field, the techniques or 
policy instruments used to attain those goals, and the precise setting of these 
LQVWUXPHQWV·,QWKHILHOGRIGUXJDQGSURVWLWXWLRQSROLF\DSROLF\SDUDGLJPLVLGHQWLILHG
as an overarching goal that guides the entire policy trajectory. Abolitionism, prohibition, 
and legalisation are all policy paradigms because they establish the boundaries of 
possible actions and desirable goals within a given system. Such policy paradigms are 
informed by ideas, values and beliefs. These vary across paradigms and contribute to 
creating competing positions. A policy instrument is identified as an intervention which 
serves the purpose of achieving a set policy goal. However, in many cases, a policy 
instrument might contribute to achieve more than one policy goal (cross sectoral) and 
might also fit within more than one policy paradigm. It is because of competing views, 
needs, and values, that these instruments are not univocal. A particular instrument may, 
over time, work in opposition to a given dominant paradigm. In this way, instruments 
can be deployed to different policy ends. 
Although DWOHDVWQRUPDWLYHO\HYLGHQFHLVUHJDUGHGDVWKHSULQFLSDOEDVLVIRU¶LQVWUXPHQW
VHWWLQJ· FDOLEUDWLRQHYLGHQFHLVFRQWHVWHGDQGFRQWUDGLFWRU\DEOHWRVXSSRUWDYDULHW\
of views. This is the crux of the problem: the incommensurability of views which 
science - and evidence - cannot seem to bridge. As one participant put it, 
Where the massive split is on how one approaches that, there is a huge divide as to whether the 
best way to achieve that goal, is through a prohibitionist approach or a regulatory approach. 
And that's in some ways different from other fields, where there are normally different goals 
that people have, and that does change the debate. It's also because it's such an emotionally 
charged debate, or has traditionally been so, that there are people who are very, very strongly on 
one side or another and find it very hard to listen to nuanced discussion, and that can be a real 
problem. (U D 22 P) 
,QGHHG+DOO·V.XKQLDQPRGHOLVGHYHORSHGVSHFLILFDOO\RQWKHEDVLVRIDSDUDGLJPVKLIW 
² namely from Keynesianism to monetarism ² and cannot easily stretch to explain 
instances where paradigmatic shifts do not occur. Since one of the characteristics of 
morality policy is that of being failure-prone yet resistant to change (Meier, 1994), the 
Chapter 9 Change in morality policy 
234 
accumulation of anomalies that shake the foundations of a dominant paradigm in 
morality policy might not necessarily lead to policy change.  
9.3 Decriminalisation paradigms and instruments: policy anomalies? 
Taking the example of decriminalisation, the following sections discuss whether a 
paradigm shift has occurred in both countries and policy domains. The focus was firmly 
placed on evidence as the basis for precise setting of (policy) instruments, alongside the 
implementation of particular interventions that, despite symbolising anomalies within 
the existing dominant policy paradigm, did not result in a paradigm shift. In the 
countries under scrutiny, the only case where decriminalisation has become dominant is 
the regulation of the sex industry in New South Wales. In this context, the paradigm 
shift was a top-down decision, and the production of policy instruments ensued. The 
state did not act autonomously: a range of actors, including some affected communities, 
were involved in influencing and shaping decision-making. Yet, it was ultimately the 
state government which, via a series of legislative acts, effectively formalised the 
paradigm shift. This is not to argue that, at the level of instruments, there cannot be 
interventions which effectively respond to the logic of opposing paradigms (i.e. 
depenalisation, partial decriminalisation) as will be demonstrated; however, it does mean 
that their scope is limited to the extent that they may be contested, hard to implement 
and fairly anomalous in such contexts.  
The cases under consideration suggest that it is possible to implement relatively quick 
policy change by shifting the paradigm from above (as in the case of decriminalisation 
of prostitution in New South Wales, for example). However, any shift in the direction 
of decriminalisation is more often a policy anomaly that remains fairly isolated. For 
example, the case of the Medically Supervised Injecting Centre in Sydney demonstrates 
that although drugs were decriminalised within the confines of the facility, this did not 
result in more relaxed attitudes toward injecting drug use, a de facto decriminalisation of 
possession, or the implementation of this intervention elsewhere in New South Wales 
or Australia. Indeed, the extent to which national and state drug policy across the world 
has been subject to pressure, coercing states toward uniformity, is perhaps greater than 
prostitution policy, traditionally a more localised issue. The international system of drug 
control set out by the UN Single Convention on narcotic drugs (1961) is a binding 
agreement for signatories; there is currently no such binding agreement which sets out a 
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prostitution control regime internationally. The level of coercive transfer (Dolowitz and 
Marsh, 2000) that affects drug policy is greater than prostitution, simply because there 
are no international binding agreements, outside of trafficking,2 which force states into 
prohibiting prostitution. International treaties may inhibit diffusion of alternative 
paradigms. However, in drug policy, there have been significant changes in recent years. 
The US and other countries have implemented alternative regimes which vary from the 
legalisation and regulation of cannabis to the decriminalisation of possession (Room, 
2014; Hughes and Stevens, 2010). 
9.3.1  ?>ŽƵĚĂŶĚƉƌŽƵĚ ?Žƌ quiet localised pursuit? Decriminalisation in UK drug 
policy  
According to one participant, in order to accept decriminalisation as a viable drug policy 
option, there needs to be an underlying acceptance that people should not be punished 
for their immoral behaviour alongside a willingness to act at the level of legislation. This 
participant argued that 
decriminalisation does, by its nature, need national attention (U D 27 A). 
However, local authorities can enjoy a large degree of discretion in deciding how to 
implement legislation, and partial decriminalisation exists. 
if police and Criminal Justice committee in any area wants to pursue the principle that this is a 
KHDOWKLVVXHWKHUHLVDQDZIXOORWWKH\FDQGRZLWKLQWKHFXUUHQWODZWKH\GRQ·WKDYHWRDsk for 
a parliamentary change. So you can go quite a long way down the line even within the Misuse 
RI'UXJV$FWWRXVHVHQWHQFLQJJXLGHOLQHV>«@WRKDYHORFDODJUHHPHQWV¶FDXVH\RXQRZKDYH
criminal justice committees where you can say we never send anybody to court for possession 
only, we will always prosecute people on the basis of an assumption of treatment first rather 
than punishment, and build all sorts of procedures and protocols around that. All of that you 
can do without national policy approval. (U D 27 A) 
For example, recently, the police in four English regions (Durham, Derbyshire, Dorset 
and Surrey) declared that they will not pursue or prosecute cannabis users, making a 
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clear statement in favour of decriminalisation of possession of cannabis.3 This move 
ZDV LQLWLDWHG E\ 'XUKDP·V SROLFLQJ DQG FULPH FRPPLVVLRQHU DQ HOHFWHG RIILFLDO4 
However, the same participant argues, 
LI \RXZDQW WRGHFULPLQDOLVHDQGVD\\RXZRQ·W JR WKURXJKDSURVHFXWLRQSURFHVV WKDWQHHGV
national government change.  
A paradigm shift does appear to necessitate a change in legislation.  
LI\RXZDQWHGWREHORXGDQGSURXG>«@\RXSUREDEO\ZRXOGZDQWWRJHWWKHDWWHQWLRQRIWKH
KRPHVHFUHWDU\DQGQDWLRQDOPLQLVWHUVDQGWKHSUHVVVR\RX·GKDYHWREHZLOOLQJWRVD\WKLVLV
why we are taking this view, this is our criminal justice protocols, they are all compliant with 
WKH0LVXVHRI'UXJV$FWDQGWKDW·VZKDWZHGHFLGHGFULWLFLVHXV LI\RXZDQW WR,W WDNHVD
very brave police chief particularly to do that, so you could do an DZIXOORWDFWXDOO\,·PDUJXLQJ
there that it is similar to consumption rooms, you can do an awful lot to apply the principle of 
KHDOWKRIVXSSRUWQRWSXQLVKPHQWEXWLI\RXZDQWHGWRVD\%ULWDLQGHFULPLQDOLVHV\RXFDQ·W
GRWKDWFLW\E\FLW\\RX·YHJRWto do that at national level. (U D 27 A) 
+HUH WKH SDUWLFLSDQW H[SRVHV WKH GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ EHLQJ ¶ORXG DQG SURXG· DERXW
decriminalisation, which effectively means mobilising politically at national level to push 
for a change in legislation, and a more discreet form of decriminalisation, which means 
non-enforcement of laws through local agreements and police initiatives. Whereas the 
former approach has been unsuccessful in the UK, there has been more interest in 
pursuit of the latter, particularly under a localism banner coupled with shrinking police 
budgets, as the initiative of the Durham PCC indicates (Brown, 2014).5 In Brighton, an 
Independent Drugs Commission was set up following the initiative of Caroline Lucas 
MP in 2012 to evaluate the impact of drug policy in the local area and look at alternative 
approaches. The commission was also tasked with evaluating the potential benefits of 
drug consumption rooms for Brighton.  
                                                 
3 http://www.lse.ac.uk/newsAndMedia/news/archives/2015/07/Drug-possession-should-be-removed-from-
police-performance-indicators,-says-new-LSE-study.aspx 
4 The decision to create policing and crime commissioner was put forward by the coalition government (2010-
2015) as part of their localism initiative. 
5 http://www.durham-pcc.gov.uk/Document-Library/Letters/Drug-Policy/Open-letter-from-PCC-Ron-
Hogg-23.07.15.pdf 
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9.3.2 ƌƵŐĐŽŶƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƌŽŽŵƐŝŶŶŐůĂŶĚ P ?ƉĂƐƚŝƚƐƐĞůů-ďǇĚĂƚĞ ? ?ƚŚĞĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŝƐ
never enough, the government is against.  
The possibility of establishing drug consumption rooms in England was discussed at 
several junctures, yet so far none has been piloted, despite the fact that evidence of its 
overall positive function has been accumulated over time. The Home Office had 
rejected the recommendation to run a pilot in 2002, when the Home Affairs Select 
Committee had recommended the piloting of a safe injecting facility, on the basis of 
insufficient evidence (HASC, 2002). While this may have been the case in 2002, which 
made the Home Office position plausible, this was no longer the case in 2006. The 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation sponsored a review of the then current evidence around 
drug consumption rooms (IWG, 2006). This was perhaps the most comprehensive 
review to date, at least in the UK context, detailing case studies of different countries 
where the intervention was in place and measuring the usefulness of the intervention on 
the basis of several indicators. The report highlighted evidence of need alongside 
evidence of effectiveness, so effectiveness was not the only measure of validity. The 
Home Office did not ignore the report, yet it dismissed its recommendations on the 
basis of its potential to encourage crime, a claim which was not evidence-based (Hunt 
and Lloyd, 2008). The claim that drug consumption rooms are criminogenic, or that 
WKH\ SURGXFH D ¶KRQH\-SRW· HIIHFW KDV EHHQ FDOOHG LQWR TXHVWLRQ E\ HYLGHQFH IURP
Europe and Australia (Hedrick, 2004; MISC evaluation, 2003). Commentators argue 
WKDWDWWKHKHLJKWRIWKH¶LQMHFWLQJHSLGHPLF·WKHUHZDVVLJQLILFDQWHYLGHQFHRIQHHGLQ
some parts of the UK; however, the intervention was dismissed because of the political 
heat it would have brought to a New Labour party and a Home Office that were both 
in crisis (Hunt and Lloyd, 2008). During the time of the release of the IWG report, the 
Home office was hit by a political scandal involving the Home Secretary, whilst New 
Labour was losing consensus. 
More recently the city of Brighton was discussing the possibility of such an intervention. 
An independent commission on drugs was set up with the aim to assess the current 
state of affairs; part of its mandate was to evaluate the pros and cons of piloting a drug 
consumption room. The Home Office warned stakeholders against the pilot on the 
basis of contravening drug laws and putting staff at risk of arrest. Below is an extract 
from the commission·VUHSRUW: 
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¶7KHFLW\FRXQFLODQG6XVVH[3ROLFHHVWDEOLVKHGDZRUNLQJJURXSWKDWORRNHGDW
the need, likely impact, legal situation, and practical considerations. Their 
conclusion was that a consumption room was not a priority for Brighton and 
Hove at this time ² the working group was convinced by the international 
evidence on the potential benefit from these facilities, but thought that they 
would have little impact on the types of factors that were contributing to deaths 
in the city. Members of the working group were also concerned at the cost 
implications, in a time of budget pressure, and also advice from the Home 
2IILFH WKDW RSHQLQJ VXFK IDFLOLWLHV ZRXOG FRQWUDYHQH 8. ODZ· ,QGHSHQGHQW
Drugs Commission for Brighton and Hove, 2013) 
It appears that legal and budgetary constraints ultimately pushed the pilot off the 
agenda. Indeed, the absence of great urgency made the intervention seem redundant. A 
participant aptly comments that, as an intervention 
a drug consumption room is perhaps, you know, has passed its sell by date (U D 36 S) 
In Brighton, the number of drug related deaths was higher than average but had been 
decreasing. There is a shrinking, ageing population of entrenched IDUs, whose health 
and use patterns are likely to change further, requiring different types of interventions 
(Independent Drugs Commission, 2013: 4). Caroline Lucas, Brighton and Hove MP, 
was quoted in The Independent newspaper stating: 
¶,I \RX·YH JRW SURIHVVLRQDOV VD\LQJ WKHUH LV HYLGHQFH WKDW WKLQJV OLNH GUXJ
consumption rooms it should have been something that we could have looked 
at further. But because of the prohibition context we siPSO\ FRXOGQ·W· th 
October 2014) 6 
Here, it looks as though the dominant paradigm of prohibition in the UK context 
effectively curtailed the opportunity for this type of intervention. The most recent ONS 
report puts heroin-related overdose deaths in England and Wales at their highest since 
records began.7 This calls for further consideration of whether this kind of intervention 
really has passed its sell by date. 
                                                 
6 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/drug-abuse-is-britainready-to-grow-up-9826908.html 
7 http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_414574.pdf 
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9.3.3 The Sydney Medically Supervised Injecting Centre as policy anomaly 
Drug consumption rooms came onto the agenda in the mid-1990s in Kings Cross, 
Sydney. The first official recommendation to trial a safe injecting centre came from the 
Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service in 1997 (Wood Royal 
Commission: 13-4). At the same time, Prime Minister Howard declared his opposition 
to injecting sites (Dolan et al, 2000). The Sydney Medically Supervised Injecting Centre 
was advocated in response to years of a burgeoning heroin epidemic which gravely 
affected Kings Cross and other inner city areas (van Beek, 2004). After the 1997 Woods 
Royal Commission, a Joint Select Committee into Safe Injecting Rooms voted on the 
issue; the outcome was a majority negative vote. The strong advocacy coalition in Kings 
&URVV ZKLFK ZDV PDGH XS RI ´FUHGLEOHµ Vtakeholders including clinicians, politicians, 
and churchmen, continued to organise and strategize in order to push the issue forward. 
Some members of the coalition established an illegal supervised injecting centre in 
Wayside Chapel, Kings Cross, weeks before the 1999 New South Wales Drug Summit 
(Wodak et al, 2003). During the Summit, support for this intervention was reiterated in 
front of the political establishment and the issue was put to parliament (Swain, 1999). 
The New South Wales parliament voted in favour of a trial of a Medically Supervised 
Injecting Centre, which opened in 2001 (van Beek, 2004).  
It is necessary to make a distinction between one single intervention (instrument) which 
may respond to the decriminalisation logic, and a paradigm shift: the MSIC has been 
referred to by a participant as a policy anomaly.  
LW·VDVWUDQJHDQRPDO\LQWKHVHQVHWKDWLWZDVDWULDOIRU\HDUVZH·YHRQO\JRWRQHDQGZH·UH
XQOLNHO\WRJHWDQ\PRUHDQGWKDW·VVR$XVWUDOLD\RXNQRZ0\XQGHUVWDQGLQJLV WKDW they 
went for the most clinical kind of model to make it more appealing to politicians and the like 
>«@ we have certainly seen enough street base injecting in Redfern to warrant another site but 
QRERG\ZLOOSXWWKDWVLWHWKHUHVRLW·VDOZD\VSHRSOHWKLQN RI$XVWUDOLD¶RK\RXNQRZWKH\·YH
JRWDQ LQMHFWLQJFHQWUH·:HKDYHRQH LQMHFWLQJFHQWUHODXJKV LQDYHU\SDUWLFXODUSODFH,W·V
QRWSROLF\,WJRWSXWLQLWH[LVWVEXWLW·VQRWDVLILW·VJRYHUQPHQWSROLF\(A D 9 A) 
7KHRUHWLFDOO\ LQ+DOO·VIUDPHwork, the increase in anomalies slowly tilts the balance in 
favour of competing paradigms. However, the presence of the injecting centre has not 
resulted into further investment in harm reduction or a move toward permissiveness, or 
decriminalisation beyond the walls of the MSIC. As one participant highlights,  
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We have just got one Act of parliament that allows one injecting centre to operate under very 
VSHFLILF UHTXLUHPHQWV >«@ LI \RX FRXOG UHSHDO VHOI-DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ >«@>ZH@ FRXOG LQGHHG
accommodate injecting without risking being charged with aiding and abetting a crime, which is 
the legal barrier that exists (A D 11 M). 
Here, the participant notes how the legislation allows for this anomaly to operate within 
a system that functions by an opposite logic.  
The factors which allowed for the Medically Supervised Injecting Centre to come into 
existence were both external and specific. The prevalence of cheap heroin was very 
important, but so were the illegal shooting galleries facilitated by police corruption made 
overt by the Wood report in 1997. The number of overdose deaths were increasingly 
publicised by the media, with visible public injecting and drug litter which followed 
community outrage (Fitzgerald, 2013). The presence of an advocacy coalition 
championed by the director of the low-threshold primary care service in the area was 
central to ensuring the credibility and authoritativeness, as well as the actual operational 
feasibility, of the intervention (Wodak et al, 2003; van Beek, 2004). It was as if, had all 
WKHVH IDFWRUV QRW FRPH WRJHWKHU DW WKDW SDUWLFXODU WLPH LQ WKDW FRQWH[W WKH ´SROLF\
DQRPDO\µZRXOGQHYHUKDYHFRPHLQWREHLQJ 
9.3.4 A paradigm anomaly? Prostitution in New South Wales 
Sullivan (2004) argues that many Australian states implemented liberalising laws on 
prostitution in spite of having inherited a British model of prostitution law. She puts 
this down to a number of factors, including feminism, the dominance of the Labor 
SDUW\ LQVWDWHV· MXULVGLFWLRQVDVH[XDOO\ OLEHUWDULDQFXOWXUH LQFLWLHV, visibility, neo-liberal 
regulatory approaches, and responses to HIV (2004: 21). The Labor party was identified 
as important in the initiation of prostitution law reform in several jurisdictions in 
Australia, and in fact the Labor party has dominated politics in New South Wales until 
recently for the best part of thirty years (Chapter 8). The debate in Sydney started as 
early as the late 1960s, and the first Bill concerning the liberalisation of prostitution in 
New South Wales was passed in 1979, with a broader intention of repealing repressive 
laws concerning public order and soliciting, effectively making the act of soliciting not a 
criminal offence, though this was not specifically targeted at soliciting for the purposes 
of prostitution (Sullivan, 2004: 6XOOLYDQVWUHVVHVWKHUROHRIWKHZRPHQ·VPRYHPHQW
in shifting perspectives on the issue.  
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Following the rise of liberal attitudes in urban centres in the 1960s and 70s, the 1980s 
saw the emergence of new problems, which required different responses. In New South 
Wales, prostitution was framed as a problem in conjunction with public nuisance and 
the emergence of HIV and injecting drug use. In 1986, a Select Committee looked at 
the issue of prostitution to produce a report, colloquially known as the Rogan report, 
ZKLFK UHFRPPHQGHG ¶GHFULPLQDOLVDWLRQ ZLWK FRQWUROV·  [[YLLL 7KH HQTXLU\ ZDV
particularly significant because it included extensive evidence in the form of surveys, a 
consultation process as well as the active involvement of affected communities, 
including sex workers (p. xxvii). Early practices of collaboration, together with the HIV 
crisis, planted the seed for later establishment of official, though asymmetric, 
partnerships between government and affected communities.  
it was a bipartisDQDSSURDFK>«@DOOJRYHUQPHQWVDJUHHGZLWKZRUNLQJZLWKWKHSUHYHQWLRQRI
AIDS, and so we were able to work with other, government, non-government bodies, 
institutions, researchers, clinicians, a huge partnership, a multi-sectoral partnership evolved 
through that.(A P 4 A) 
This partnership was maintained in New South Wales in that sex workers were included 
as stakeholders in policy debates. Ever since, sex workers have 
been engaged to provide evidence on what are the impacts of different models. :H·YHEHHn able 
to proviGH >«@UHIHUHQFHG VXEPLVVLRQV >«@ VR WKDW RWKHU HYLGHQFHZKLFK LV FROOHFWHG IURP WKH
experience of other countries and research is then able to be well documented and provided and 
fed into that process as well as the voices of local sex workers on what needs to happen. (A P 
18 A) 
However, there were other factors which facilitated the adoption of decriminalisation, 
including police corruption. According to one participant: 
Decriminalisation then eventually comes about because of the nexus betwHHQFRUUXSWLRQDQG«
police and other corruption but largely police corruption. And in the early 90s we had another 
HQTXLU\ WKH :RRG HQTXLU\ ZKHUH KH LQYHVWLJDWHG SROLFH FRUUXSWLRQ DQG LW·V LQFUHGLEO\
undeniable the association with corruption and the sex industry. And they were left with no 
choice but to remove the police as our regulators. (A P 4 A) 
The Wood report (1997) had highlighted that the police was complacent and profited 
from brothels (where drug use and sometimes dealing was also taking place), which also 
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contributed as a justification to support the recommendation for opening the medically 
supervised injecting centre (p. 13, para 1.39-1.43).  
During discussions, a clear tension emerged between the priorities of law and order 
compared to those of health authorities in this context. The coupling of a rights-based 
discourse alongside a public health concern allowed reformers and advocates to 
implement a unique blend of policy in which regulation and individual rights and 
freedoms manage to coexist in the form of the decriminalisation framework. 
Accordingly: 
there definitely is higher level of potential for health to be well versed and have an evidenced-
based understanding of sex work (A P 18 A). 
However more recently 
LQ$XVWUDOLD«WKHUHKDVEHHQDQabsolute shift away from public health and the protection of 
public health (A P 18 A). 
The agenda is currently 
being driven by something else and regularly that is anti-trafficking prevention, an abolitionist 
agenda, crazy concepts of value of the Swedish model in opposition to any evidence or some 
specific case (A P 18 A). 
7KHGLIIHUHQWSULRULWLHVRIGLIIHUHQWGHSDUWPHQWVPHDQWKDWODZHQIRUFHPHQW·VDSSURDFK
PLJKWEHJHQHUDOO\OHVVUHVSRQVLYHWRVH[ZRUNHUV·ULJKWV-based demands. For example, 
though law enforcement and criminal justice understand the priorities and demands of 
sex workers, particularly in the New South Wales context given partnerships have 
existed for decades,  
they [the Attorney general and the police] naturally have a desire to licence fingerprint and etc. 
a range of approaches which are in exact opposition to what sex workers would find acceptable 
and also what is acceptable from a human rights perspective on sex workers (A P 18 A). 
Given a shift in the political agenda on approaches to prostitution, from public health 
to trafficking, and the increasing popularity of the Swedish model at the international 
level, the New South Wales system of regulation has been internally challenged (Better 
Regulation Office, 2012; Brothel Regulation in NSW, 2015) and has not been replicated 
by any other state in Australia or indeed in other western countries. A similar system 
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only exists in neighbouring New Zealand (Abel et al, 2010). Decriminalisation of 
prostitution could thus be regarded as an anomaly at the international level.  
9.3.5 Prostitution policy in the UK: diversity, contradiction, and tackling demand  
To describe prostitution policy in the UK, one participant said that the lowest common 
denominator was 
local variability, that about sums up sex work policy in the UK, when I started in the 90s 
there was no national strategy, and it was very much localised policy making (U P 31 A). 
Northern Ireland recently voted in favour of criminalising the purchase of sex, whereas 
Scotland voted against. Within England, there are many different and contradictory 
approaches to prostitution at the local level. The scarce resources dedicated to 
prostitution regulation, coupled with the lack of resources invested in organisations that 
deal with sex workers on the grounds, means that responses are often bottom-up and 
poorly funded, and that any further investment is entirely context dependent. 
7KHRQH WKLQJ RQ VH[ZRUNSROLF\ LW·VQHYHUDKLJKSULRULW\DWQDWLRQDORU ORFDO OHYHO6RRI
course we then had the coalition government, tackling paying the price strategy, and it became 
very clear because of course we had Ipswich post the national strategy, you hope for these 
PRPHQWVWKDWPD\FKDQJHWKLQJVLWVKRXOGQ·WWDNHWKHGHDWKRIZRPHQWRWKLQNVRPHWKLQJLV
not right for safety, but after that pans out that way, it reasserted that tackle demand 
[strategy] (U P 31 A) 
The string of murders targeting sex workers in Ipswich resulted in the issue of 
prostitution rising on the local political agenda. The local administration devised a 
prostitution strategy (Suffolk Prostitution and Sexual Exploitation Strategy, 2007). The 
H[WHQW WR ZKLFK ORFDO DXWKRULWLHV LQ WKH 8. GHGLFDWH WLPH DQG UHVRXUFHV WR ¶WDFNOLQJ
SURVWLWXWLRQ·ZLOOGHSHQGRQVWDNHKROGHUV·SHUFHSWLRQRILWDVDSUREOHPDQd the relative 
importance they may place on the issue. The case of Ipswich is somewhat unusual; the 
amount of police time and resources dedicated to eradicating street prostitution was 
unprecedented, but it came as a response to nation-wide media hype around the 
murders, on the back of a prostitution strategy which emphasised certain aspects of the 
trade, and particularly the most visible and easily stigmatised, street prostitution.  
$FFRUGLQJ WR WKH  +RPH 2IILFH UHSRUW ¶5HVSRQGLQJ WR 3URVWLWXWLRQ· DOthough 
there are examples of diverse local initiatives, only a few local authorities in the UK 
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have devised an official local prostitution strategy which, however, remains within the 
discursive boundaries set out by the national prostitution strategy and the national legal 
framework in place. Effectively, it would be unfeasible for local authorities in the UK to 
opt for all out decriminalisation as an approach to prostitution because it would run 
counter to the national legislation, which designates police as regulator and does not 
recognise the sale of sex as a viable commercial enterprise. However, there are instances 
of partial decriminalisation, and indeed the setting out of different priorities by the 
police. The Merseyside model is very different and innovative given that the police and 
the criminal justice system treat crimes against sex workers as hate crimes, and 
prosecute them accordingly. However, the Merseyside approach is an anomaly.  
this is the only city to treat crime against sex workers as hate crimes (U P 31 A) 
This was attributed to the higher number of cases of this sort coming to court, together 
with a well-UXQ´XJO\PXJVµVFKHPHZKLFKDOORZHGLQIRUPDWLRQVKDULQJDVZHOODV WKH
building of trust between sex workers, the police and other agencies.  
The manner in which the police and local authorities make use of their resources is 
entirely variable across England. Operation Sentinel, which took place in Birmingham in 
2013, aimed at tackling human trafficking, saw the raiding of nine suspected brothels, in 
accordance with the special powers given to the police (Policing and Crime Act 2009) to 
seize a property upon suspicion that it was being used as a brothel. This was not 
replicated in other cities.8 The only large scale operation that was carried out throughout 
England, which served as backing for the 2009 change in legislation, was operation 
Pentameter (I and II), which ran between 2007-2008 and reportedly made hundreds of 
arrests (Home Office, 2008: 7).9 It was heralded as a great success by the Home 
Secretary in terms of tackling prostitution and human trafficking. However, an 
investigation by The Guardian newspaper found that the numbers had been grossly 
exaggerated in order to advance a particular agenda. Accordingly,  
¶The analysis reveals that 10 of the 55 police forces never found anyone to 
arrest. And 122 of the 528 arrests announced by police never happened: they 
were wrongly recorded either through honest bureaucratic error or apparent 
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deceit by forces trying to chalk up arrests which they had not made. Among the 
406 real arrests, more than half of those arrested (230) were women, and most 
were never implicated in trafficking at all.·7KH*XDUGLDQth October 2009). 10 
Prior to the 2009 legislation, during consultation, there had been widespread support to 
review the definition of brothel in order to allow for a few workers to work together in 
a small group for the purpose of ensuring their safety. However, the Home Office 
responded along the lines of 
LWGLGQ·WSOD\ZHOOLQWKHPHGLD! (U P 31 A) 
Subsequently, the coalition government, with its localism rhetoric and austerity politics, 
did not show much interest in pursuing nation-wide reform in this area.  
/RFDOLVP LW·V OLNH >«@VKDSLQJ WKLQJV ILJKWLQJ LW RXW ORFDOO\ VR WKDW·V ZKHUH Ze are at, the 
ZRUU\LQJWKLQJLVRIFRXUVHLW·VDWLPHRIFXWVDQGZKHQWKHUH·VQRFHQWUDOGLUHFWLYHVWRLQYHVWLQ
VD\VH[ZRUNVXSSRUWVHUYLFHLW·VDWRXJKWLPHIRUWKHP (U P 31 A) 
The APPG report on prostitution (2014), which recommended the criminalisation of 
the purchase of sex at national level, did not prompt further interest, investment, or 
political appetite for reform in England. The variability of interest and general lack of 
investment in this policy area continues to prevent a unified, coherent response. While 
not directly addressing prostitution, the Anti-social behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 
2014 was deemed as a further mechanism of exclusion of sex work from public spaces, 
which follows the long term British tradition of public nuisance policing within the 
rhetoric of tackling demand (Kingston and Thomas, 2015).  
9.4 Toward decriminalisation? The Limits of incrementalism  
The tension between paradigmatic shift and incremental change is addressed by 
participants, and discussed in this chapter to shine light on certain features of the policy 
SURFHVV LQ WKHVH SROLF\ GRPDLQV WKURXJK SDUWLFLSDQWV· QDUUDWLYHV 6XSSRUW IRU
incremental change and harm reduction as a pragmatic compromise is shared by most 
participants. 
                                                 
10 http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/oct/20/government-trafficking-enquiry-fails 
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:HFKDQJHSHRSOH·VYLHZVRQZKDWLW LVWKH\·UHGHDOLQJZLWKDQGZHJHWWKHPWRXQGHUVWDQGWKDW
WKLV LVDSURFHVV WKDW LW·VD ORQJSURFHVV WKDW LW WDNHV WLPHDQG LW·V LQFUHPHQWDODQG LQ WKH
meantime you have to have harm reduction and keep people safe (A D 14 A) 
Participants feel that, in order to make gains for decriminalisation, the debate should be 
led on strategic ground in order to ensure strategic framing and limit confusion and 
contradiction, particularly among the public and those who do not understand the 
subtleties of the drug policy debate.  
I just think that if we were able to argue it more, just stick to the decriminalisation side of the 
GHEDWHZH·G DFWXDOO\ JHW D ORW IXUWKHU IURP D KHDOWK SRLQW RI YLHZ EXW XQIRUWXQDWHO\ WKHUH·V
others who have a more revolutionary view, whereas I sit on the evolutionary side, I just think 
LW·VLQFUHPHQWDOFKDQJH(A D 11 M) 
Participants appear to endorse incrementalism, by making a distinction between 
evolutionary and revolutionary change. The role of a public health frame is stressed, 
emphasising how this frame can entail gains for decriminalisation. However, the 
political feasibility of decriminalisation is questioned in the face of political pressures 
both internal (from within the political establishment) and external (from the public and 
the press). 
the way drugs policy has to work, is you have to get 50% plus 1 of the community to agree 
with you, and so, just say for example I develop drugs policy, I have to develop a policy, with 
P\SROLF\IRUXP>«@,WKHQQHHGWRFRQYLQFHP\SDUW\RILWand they then need to convince the 
electorate. What that really means is that changes will be incremental, evolutionary rather than 
UHYROXWLRQDU\ >«@:KDW WHQGV WR KDSSHQ LV WKDWPRVW SROLWLFLDQV DUH VR ULVN-averse about 
WKDWWKDWLW·VSUREDEO\QRWJRQQDhappen, but there may be some evolutionary change round the 
sides (A D 1 P) 
Any anticipated pressure from both the media and the public appears to make 
politicians more risk averse, as noted in considerations about the precautionary principle 
(Monaghan et DODQG0HLHU·VDUJXPHQWDERXWSROLWLFLDQV·UHVSRQVHWRVLQ
policies being often harsher than the general public might wish. There is a sense that a 
certain degree of incrementalism necessarily underpins policy change in these areas. 
However, incrementalism cannot explain a swift paradigm shift. Incrementalism might 
better explain change at the level of instruments, though not at the level of paradigm.  
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)ROORZLQJWKHDUJXPHQWVSUHVHQWHGLQ&KDSWHU)LYHDERXWVRFLHWDO OHYHOYDOXHV·FKDQJH
in advanced western democracies, it could be argued that the increasingly dominant 
western (neo)liberal ideology, accompanied by liberal values fostered by advanced 
capitalism and secularisation in western polities, together with the relatively decreasing 
popularity of conservative and religious values, should have had a marked impact on 
attitudes towards drugs and prostitution. In other words, the dominant socio-economic 
and cultural system should support a dominant morality which should in turn inform 
attitudes toward these activities. This is broadly supported by the shift toward 
consumption oriented economies in post-industrial regimes. However, this is neither 
linear nor straightforward. For example, when it comes to Cannabis, survey data 
supports the premise WKDW FLWL]HQV· DWWLWXGHV LQ WKH 8. DQG $XVWUDOLD KDYH VKLIWHG
toward support for decriminalisation of possession (the Observer, 5th October 2014; 
DPMP, 21st May 2012). 11 This is further substantiated by de facto depenalisation of 
cannabis in the UK and some Australian states, the effective decriminalisation of 
possession in certain countries, and the most recent wave of legalisation in three 
American states (two in North America and one in Latin America) (Room, 2014). 
Because of this increasingly liberal attitude towards what was previously regarded as 
sinful or improper, opinions tend to converge on the idea that it is only a matter of time 
before significant policy shifts towards liberalisation will take place. These predicted 
changes have been, perhaps, slower than some would have expected: 
I remember years ago people were thinking, oh, in the next generation because some people were 
VPRNLQJFDQQDELV>«@SHRSOH·VSHUVRQDOYLHZVZLOOEHDORWPRUHOHQLHQWWRZDUGVLWDQGWKH
next generation of politicians ZLOO UHSUHVHQW RXU YLHZVQRZ >«@ \RXNQRZ LWZLOO RQO\ EH D
PDWWHURIWLPHLWKDVQ·WKDSSHQHG7KHDUJXPHQWQRZLVWKDWFDQQDELVXVHGWREHRNWKHQEXW
QRZLW·VWLPHVVWURQJHU«\RXNQRZWKHUH·VDOZD\VDQDUJXPHQWZK\\RXFDQ·WFKDQJH (A 
D 5 KB) 
This pDUWLFLSDQW·V VWDWHPHQWKLJKOLJKWV WKDW LQ VSLWHRIH[SHFWDWLRQVRIDQ LQFUHDVLQJO\
liberal approach to cannabis by a liberal generation of users, the predicted relaxation of 
drug laws, and attitudes, did not happen to the anticipated extent. Contradictory and 
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conflicting positions continue to exist on this issue and on drug and prostitution 
policies more broadly. And these contradictory views are claimed to be evidence-based.  
In Chapter Eight, I argued that the very act of questioning and experimenting is 
intrinsic to science and is supported by liberal values. However, there are both structural 
and generational factors to be taken into consideration which may inject delays and 
further contradiction in positions. In the quote above, perceptions of evidence (of the 
GUXJ·VLQFUHDVHGSXULW\ILJXUHDVDFUXFLDOIDFWRUEHFDXVHWKH\SURYLGHDXWKRULWDWLYHQHVV
in arguments against change. In the case of cannabis, the evidence surrounding cannabis 
potency and its links with schizophrenia has provided ammunition to maintain support 
for a punitive system of control (MacKeganey; 2011). Though the older generation of 
users may have an increasingly liberal attitude, they may also have grown an adult 
responsibility coupled with protective feelings towards (their) children to the point of 
becoming less supportive of reform. Similarly, a liberal attitude toward prostitution does 
QRWPHDQWKDWZLYHVZLOOQRWIHHOXQGHUWKUHDWE\WKH¶RWKHUZRPHQ·*LUD-Grant, 2014: 
77), or that parents may accept that their children become sex workers. As one 
participant put it: 
LI \RXUGDXJKWHUZDVZRXOG\RX VD\´+HUHDUH\RXURSWLRQVKRQH\ Sex worker. <RX·OO
HDUQORWVRIPRQH\µ >«@VRKRZGR\RXJHWRYHUWKDWLQ\RXUPLQGDQGKHDUWDQGEHDEOHWR
transfer it into legislation and say that these people have a right? (A P 15 A) 
This acknowledges the moral difficulty in justifying the enabling of prostitution through 
legislation, which essentially exemplifies issue paralysis: on the one hand, there is an 
ideological, economic, cultural and moral push toward further liberalisation, while on 
the other hand, there is moral, cultural, political and ideological resistance to further 
permissiveness, particularly as this is seen to promote self-degrading, undignifying, 
immoral or harmful practices. As a result, the host of legislation and policy instruments 
that exist across both policy domains are often contradictory (Hubbard, 1998; Self, 
2003; Prior and Crofts, 2012; Tammi and Hurme, 2006).  
The literature on morality policy discussed in Chapter Five suggests that the ease with 
which actors might engage in a morality policy debate will depend on its level of 
abstraction. This in turn suggests that it appears easier to gather support and foster 
agreement over particular policy instruments, regardless of what paradigm informs 
them, than to debate at the level of paradigms. The strong presence of morality in 
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debates makes positions further entrenched and polarised, favouring exaggerated 
narratives (Mooney, 1999). Can evidence in any way favour an end to the current moral 
impasse, or will incommensurability of views continue to dominate debates in drug and 
prostitution policy? To what extent can evidence transform debates from value conflicts 
into constructive communication, possible compromise and ultimately agreement on 
solutions to policy problems? In what follows, I suggest that evidence is often utilised in 
order to support deeply held views, and that exposure to contrary evidence might not 
necessarily shift positions or foster compromise.  
9.5 Selective use of evidence: no mere instrumental cherry-picking 
The production and presentation of evidence was seen by participants as strategically 
and politically necessary in given circumstances, and beyond that, evidence was believed 
to have neutralising properties. However, most participants argued that stakeholders 
treat evidence selectively. Their selective attention is not simply instrumental, it is also 
shaped by their moral values, politics, experience, professional training and occupation. 
Participants mRVWO\ DJUHHG WKDW HYLGHQFH FRXOG RQO\ JR VR IDU LQ LQIRUPLQJ SHRSOH·V
views, because: 
3HRSOHZLOOODWFKRQWRSROLF\UHFRPPHQGDWLRQVDQGFRQFOXVLRQVWKDWILWZLWK>«@WKHLUYLHZRI
WKHZRUOG>«@3HRSOHKDYHDQXQGHUO\LQJHWKRVRIYDOXHVDQGWKH\IUDPHWKHir interpretation of 
the evidence around that. (U D 32 KB) 
Whereas some of the literature discussed in Chapters Two and Five emphasises interest-
based and political-tactical cherry-picking, the participant stresses interpretation and 
framing of evidence as ILOWHUHGWKURXJKRQH·VHWKRVRIYDOXHV,QWKHFDVHRIWKH+RPH
Affairs select committee on drugs, the Home Secretary had a clear agenda to criticise 
Portuguese drug policy, which was identified as: 
selective use of evidence in order to support a prior position, rather than seeking to look at the 
HYLGHQFH>«@ZLWKDSXUSRUWHGREMHFWLYLW\ (U D 26 P) 
Can political-tactical aim be easily distinguished from moral, value-based opposition? 
7KH+RPH6HFUHWDU\·VSRVLWLRQPLJKWEHSROLWLFDO WDFWLFDO WKRXJKLWPLJht at the same 
time be founded upon disagreement on first principles. The Home Secretary uses 
evidence, or lack of evidence, as a justification for dismissal of the Portuguese approach. 
Not many stakeholders are comfortable with overtly stating their moral and political 
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position in policy debates; it appears as though some actors would rather engage in a 
GLDORJXHIRFXVHGRQLQVWUXPHQWDOREMHFWLYHVVRWKDWWKH\GRQ·WKDYHWR´FRPHRXWRIWKH
FORVHWµE\IRUH[DPSOHVWDWLQJWKHLUSUHIHUUHGSDUDGLJP 
Selective use or citation of evidence allows stakeholders to stick with their pre-held view 
whilst justifying it through scientific authoritativeness, or lack thereof. In Chapter 
Seven, I have argued that evidence provides authoritativeness to claims, and as such it is 
not simply selected to support or discourage particular policies, which would be 
political-tactical in aim:  
Where evidence supports a particular policy, great. When it contradicts it, then people would be 
OHVVLQWHUHVWHG>«@6RPHGHJUHHRIVHOHFWLYe attention to what supports our world view (U D 
35 KB) 
The idea of selective attention is useful because it suggests that individuals will order 
and weigh evidence differently, not necessarily according to the evidence quality per se, 
but according to which values and beliefs are dominant in their constellation and which 
paradigm they espouse. Some evidence might be entirely discounted or pass unnoticed. 
For some, the evidence which links cannabis use to schizophrenia will be more 
important than the evidence which links criminalisation of possession to decreased life 
chances, particularly depending on whether they wish to sustain or oppose the current 
system of regulation (MacKeganey, 2011). Similarly, evidence surrounding trafficking 
and victimisation of women often dominates the accounts of those who want to adopt 
a more punitive regulatory framework by targeting those who buy sex (Weitzer, 2007). 
For some still, the weight given to evidence of trafficking and evidence of the cannabis-
schizophrenia nexus should not necessarily endow support for a more punitive 
regulatory framework (van den Brink, 2008).  
9.6 Paradigms, cleavages and coalition typologies 
Modern secular politics implies multiple, rather than single, knowledge authorities, and 
is thus more likely to favour competing coalitions who may emphasise different and 
diverging ideas, values and beliefs. So for instance, conservative coalitions, as opposed 
to liberal coalitions, might emphasise individual responsibility more than individual 
liberty. Likewise, they might emphasise tradition, respect for authority, and preserving 
the status quo, further than they may advocate change, be tolerant toward individual 
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diversity and open to experience. They may emphasise in-group protection further than 
in-out group equality and so on (Haidt, 2012; Graham et al, 2009).  
In drug policy and prostitution policy, the perceived failure of the criminalisation 
paradigm, identified through a functional-instrumental lens, coupled with societal 
YDOXHV· VKLIW FRUURERUDWHG E\ +,V as a focusing event (Kubler, 2001), have all 
contributed to the emergence of competing coalitions informed by alternative 
paradigms. These present a re-arrangement of existing elements, values, beliefs, 
attitudes, ideas and instruments (Surel, 2000). We may note a range of competing 
positions in these areas of policy: 
1) decriminalisation  
2) legalisation and regulation  
3) abolitionism/prohibition 
Competing coalitions supporting the above paradigms make use of evidence to gather 
support for change by exploiting the credibility of science, its status and its supposed 
neutrality. They do not necessarily do so knowingly; they believe in science and 
HYLGHQFHDQGEHOLHYHLQLWVQHXWUDOLW\DW OHDVWLQUHODWLYHWHUPV,IWKH\GRQ·WEHOLHYHLQ
neutrality, they might believe that science, and evidence, are a higher source of 
knowledge authority compared to other sources of knowledge authority. Evidence is 
more likely to be called upon in support of competing paradigms; however, it can also 
sustain dominant paradigms. The supporter of each camp will claim that their evidence 
is objective and the opposing evidence is weak, cherry-picked, selectively used etc.  
Three typologies can be distinguished through the joining up of coalitions with their 
moral base as: (i) liberal (i.e. to relax punitive frameworks to increase tolerance and 
SURWHFW LQGLYLGXDOV· ULJKWV DQG IUHHGRP LL UDGLFDO LH WR VXEYHUW VRFLDO RU V\VWHPLF
rules and pursue some form of abstract and idealistic goal), or (iii) extreme or puritan 
conservative (i.e. to toughen punitive frameworks to bring back an idealised past of 
morally righteous behaviour and/or establish a purer future). In general terms:  
(i) Liberal reformists are associated with decriminalisation (represented in the 
sample) 
(ii) Radical reformists are associated with abolitionism (represented in the 
sample) 
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(iii) Puritan conservatives are associated with both tougher criminalisation and 
prohibitionism/abolitionism (not represented in the sample but exemplified 
through sampling debates in the public domain, section 9.6.1) 
In prostitution policy, an accidental value coalition between the radical reformists and 
the puritan conservatives can be observed. This coalition has been debated in the 
OLWHUDWXUH DQG DWWULEXWHG WR IDFWRUV ZKLFK JR EH\RQG WKH WZR SRVLWLRQV· shared 
conservatism, emphasising a general ideological trend away from redistributive social 
justice and toward punitive measures imposed by the state (i.e. carceral feminism, 
Bernstein, 2014). The difference proposed here is the accidental nature of the coalition. 
Although there is a degree of shared policy objectives, and a shared hope for the same 
policy outcomes, the values and beliefs that inform radical feminists as opposed to 
Christian fundamentalists somewhat differ. They share the same policy objectives and 
share some of the same beliefs but are moved by different values. This is different from 
the traditional notion of an advocacy coalition, which implies the same deep core 
beliefs; in this case, the two groups share policy core beliefs and secondary aspects but 
have different core beliefs.  
,Q+XQW·VZRUNRQJRYHUQLQJPRUDOVKHQRWHVKRZDOWKRXJKWKHUHLVDWHQGHQF\
to associate moral regulation efforts with conservative politics, and groups, this is in fact 
misleading. He posits that: 
¶$longside the moral traditionalism of religious fundamentalism, with its appeal 
to family values and sexual austerity, moral campaigns were promoted by social 
forces with self-consciously transformative agendas. Radical feminism attacked 
pornography, sexual abuse and harassment in the name of progressive goals of 
WUDQVIRUPHGJHQGHUUHODWLRQV· 
This quote highlights how groups with different values and beliefs can share similar 
SROLF\ REMHFWLYHV +XQW JRHV RQ WR VWUHVV WKDW ¶WKH FKDOOHQJH LV WR DWWHnd to the 
FRQVWUXFWLRQ RI ¶SXEOLF SUREOHPV· E\ VRFLDO FXUUHQWV HPDQDWLQJ IURP GLIIHUHQW
LGHRORJLFDODQGSROLWLFDOSRVLWLRQV·ZKLFKLVSDUWO\WKHVXEMHFWRIWKLVFKDSWHU
The first common misapprehension one should address is that morality is always 
FRQVHUYDWLYH$OWKRXJK+XQW·VIRFXV LVRQPRUDOUHJXODWLRQ WKLV LVGLUHFWO\ WLHGWRWKH
construction and negotiations of moralities; he argues that: 
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¶LWLVFUXFLDOWRLQVLVWWKDWPRUDOUHJXODWLRQKDVQRQHFHVVDU\political valence. There 
is, however, an affinity between a conservative social imagery and moral 
regulation projects, but this can be transcended in order to promote 
WUDQVIRUPDWLYHSURMHFWV·HPSKDVLVDGGHG 
This goes some way in overcoming certain myths about morality. Moral reformism has 
no single political valence. So how does this relate with classic political cleavages and 
evidence use in these domains?  
9.6.1 Do liberals and conservatives do it differently? Sampling debates in the 
public domain 
It appears as though both liberals and conservatives will select evidence, or stress 
evidence, to support their pre-held views. In the media and in the public domain, there 
are many examples of openly conservative and openly liberal personalities who engage 
LQ PRUH RU OHVV RSHQ ¶PRUDO FUXVDGHV· DGGUHVVLQJ GUXJV DQG SURVWLWXWLRQ SROLF\ )RU
example, Kathy Gyngell, co-editor of The Conservative Woman blog, has a keen 
interest in drug policy. Her arguments are centred on two basic premises: that the cost 
of legalising drugs is impossible to estimate, and that the impact of such a move on 
children and future generations would be disastrous, ultimately normalising drug use 
and making it socially acceptable. She deems the drug policy debate as a culture war 
ZDJHGE\WKH´OHJDOLVHUVµ 
Whether intentional or not, they have aligned themselves in a culture war which pits the liberal 
against traditionalist, cosmopolitan against parochial and old against young. This is what 
GUXJV· OHJDOL]DWLRQ LVDERXW² a war over fundamental values. It is not a battle about basic 
freedoms ² far from it. Drugs enslave. (Gyngell, 24th February 2014) 12 
The notion of exposing innocent children to irresponsible and wrong policy choices is 
stressed throughout her blog posts. This presentation of the innocent child is, as Meier 
(1994) noted, a typical trait of morality policy debate. The interesting feature of this 
approach is that it is openly moral and value-based, and is expressed very clearly in 
value-laden terms. This differs from liberal approaches, which generally utilise health 
based or science based arguments in order to support liberal stances toward drugs. In 
IDFW*\QJHOO·VZRUGVDSSHDUWREHDLPHGDWXQPDVNLQJWKHVRFDOOHG¶OHJDOLVDWLRQOREE\·
which disguises itself through evidence and science, and does not openly engage with 
                                                 
12 http://conservativewoman.co.uk/supporters-of-drugs-legalisation-ignorant-of-the-facts/ 
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PRUDOLW\SROLWLFVRUYDOXHV*\QJHOO·VFKRVHQDSSURDFK LV WREHJLQZLWKDGLUHFWYDOXH-
claim and then to cherry-pick evidence in support of her argument. Conversely, she 
accuses her adversaries of hiding behind scientific objectivity in order to advance their 
legalising cause. 13 Some, though not all, of those involved in arguing for liberal drug 
policy reform make strong value-claims, based on values such as protecting human 
rights and implementing public health.14  
Richard Branson, CEO of Virgin, chosen to represent the other side of the debate, is a 
strong advocate of drug policy reform with a significant public profile. In a recent blog 
post, Branson calls for a re-humanisation of the drug policy debate: 
,·YHDOZD\VEHHQDVWURQJSURSRQHQWRIHvidence-based policies that are rooted in sound science, 
VR VWDWLVWLFV DQG WKHLU FRUUHFW LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ DUH YHU\ LPSRUWDQW%XW DW WKH VDPH WLPH ,·YH
long felt that the discourse, especially the big policy debate, is lacking a tone of compassion, 
empathy and care. (Branson, 19th November 2014) 15 
This implies an initial move away from the neutral language of science towards a more 
emotionally invested, morally and ethically informed position. It is relevant to note how, 
as a liberal, Branson emphasises empathy, care and compassion as foundational to his 
PRUDOSRVLWLRQ,QDVWDWHPHQWZKLFKUHVRQDWHVZLWK0HLHU·VDUJXPHQWDERXWWKH
use of overt morality by proponents of prohibition, Branson continues: 
Ironically, it is often the opponents of drug policy reform who use emotion to their benefit, 
appealing to policy makers and pundits alike to protect their children from the danger of 
drugs. (Branson, 19th November 2014) 16 
Here, he notes how conservatives use morality and values to their advantage. In 
reVSRQVHWRWKHPHGLDIUHQ]\JHQHUDWHGE\:D\QH+DOO·V1+05&-funded review 
of the health effects of cannabis use, Branson argues for an end to the war on drugs, 
HPSKDVLVLQJ WKH IDLOXUH RI WKH FXUUHQW V\VWHP 7KH LGHQWLILFDWLRQ RI IDLOXUH LQ +DOO·V
Kuhnian model, is the first step toward a paradigm crisis (Surel, 2000). The word failure 
commonly features in much of the drug policy reform literature (i.e. TDPF, 2011; 
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:RGDN  2QH RI WKH LQWHUHVWLQJ SRLQWV KLJKOLJKWHG LQ %UDQVRQ·V SRVW LV WKH
emphasLVRQWKHTXDOLW\RIWKHHYLGHQFHSUHVHQWHGLQ:D\QH+DOO·VVWXG\ 
/HW·V EH FOHDU ZH DUH DOO FRQFHUQHG DERXW WKH SRWHQWLDO KDUPV FDXVHG E\ GUXJV LQFOXGLQJ
alcohol and tobacco. But the appropriate responses are evidence-based public health 
interventions and sensible regulation, not dramatic headlines. As NHS Choices pointed out, 
this particular study was carried out by a single researcher and was a narrative rather than a 
systematic review. (Branson, 8th October 2014) 17 
+HUHWKHKLHUDUFK\RIHYLGHQFHKHOSVWRVWUHQJWKHQ%UDQVRQ·VDUJXPHQWE\HPSKDVLVLQJ
WKH UHODWLYLW\ RI +DOO·V UHVHDUFK ILQGLQJV LQ VXFK D ZD\ DV WR GLPLQLVK WKHLr 
authoritativeness. The liberal-evidence nexus (Chapter 8) holds in this example, where 
the liberal is more explicitly advocating evidence-based policy alongside other values 
and beliefs. Most of the arguments presented by Branson on his blog are heavily reliant 
on advocating for an evidence-based approach (his belief) while supporting particular 
YDOXHV VXFKDVXQLYHUVDOKHDOWKKXPDQ ULJKWV DQG VRFLDO MXVWLFH ,QFRQWUDVW*\QJHOO·V
blog posts place more emphasis on individual and social (state and parental) 
responsibility. In a recent post, Dr Neil McKeganey argued that: 
Individuals not politicians or drugs pushers take the decision to use or refuse to use illegal 
drugs. At the heart of the drugs problem are not social causes or government policies, not even 
government inaction, but individual choice. (McKeganey, 14th October 2014)18 
Here, McKeganey argues that individual choice is the crux of the problem in relation to 
drug use. He believes in the autonomous agency of individuals in the context of their 
drug use, stressing individual responsibility over social responsibility, which is a typically 
conservative stance. However, in the quote below, a clear tension between individual 
and social responsibility emerges, supported by an apparent contradiction between free 
choice and suppression of choice (important in the context of drugs because of their 
perceived enslaving properties). 
Our politicians tell us that the war on drugs will never be won, hinting that decriminalisation 
or legalisation is now the only sensible option. These politicians could not be more wrong in 
their characterisation of a failed war on drugs. There is a war involving drugs, but it is not war 
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against drugs, it is the war on families and young lives being waged by the drugs epidemic itself. 
(McKeganey, 14th October 2014) 19 
In this statement, McKeganey attempts to turn the failure narrative on its head, giving 
the government responsibility of having failed its young people and families for giving 
up the war on drugs, whilst giving agency to drugs themselves, via a typical(ly 
prohibitionist/conservative) representation of drugs as inherently evil. This 
combination between individual and social responsibility can be contradictory in terms 
of the weight he ascribes to each: is it individual choice or is it government failure 
coupled with the enslaving properties of drugs? 
$FFRUGLQJ WR /DNRII·V  FKDUDFWHULVDWLRQ RI ERWK FRQVHUYDWLYH DQG OLEHUDO
moralities, conservatives tend to have a view of morality that is centred upon self-
discipline, and as such are more likely to put emphasis on individual responsibility and 
less emphasis on individual liberty and choice. Indeed, conservative positions are 
complex and contradictory. When McKeganey (2011) calls for a re-moralisation of 
attitudes towards drug taking with the goal of an abstaining society, he hopes to instil a 
sense of both social and individual responsibility supported by self-discipline and 
respect for authority, whereby people would choose family, community and societal 
welfare over their own egotistical pursuits. To place the blame on an external agent (the 
drugs themselves) alongside individual choice, although seemingly contradictory, allows 
commentators to simplify an otherwise complex relationship between rights and 
responsibilities, public and private, choice and addiction, structure and agency.  
A very similar dynamic was observed in the context of the prostitution debate in the 
public domain. The tendency to represent most women involved in prostitution as 
victims and to overemphasise or misrepresent the extent of trafficking and involuntary 
involvement in the industry, of which there are no precise estimates (Weitzer, 2007; 
Gozdziak and Collett, 2005) allows some commentators to create a simple narrative and 
place the blame entirely upon an external agent (usually an exploitative male pimp or 
trafficker supported by a capitalist patriarchal structure). Advocates from opposing sides 
of the prostitution debate often accuse each other of improper reporting of evidence, 
incorrect interpretations, and narrative exaggeration. Fiona MacTaggart MP, a long-term 
advocate of prostitution policy reform and secretary of the UK All Party Parliamentary 
                                                 
19 Opp.cit. 
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Group on Prostitution (2014), has oftentimes argued for the criminalisation of the 
purchase of sex by portraying a simple picture of victimisation and exploitation of 
women supported by misrepresented research evidence: 
If prostitution is about choice we need to start by asking "who chooses". Few prostituted 
women have chosen it as a career. Research shows that some 80% start as children, groomed 
into prostitution often by a man. (MacTaggart, 19th November 2008)20 
In this statement, MacTaggart utilises the 80% figure in order to strengthen her 
argument about lack of choice and agency via the victimisation of men over women. As 
discussed in Chapter Seven, the use of numbers to convey certainty is common practice, 
even where, as in many cases, certainty does not exist. This (80%) figure was questioned 
by several media sources including the Daily Telegraph and the BBC. One piece in 
particular highlighted the fact that both MacTaggart MP and Jaqui Smith MP had 
utilised figures whose meaning had been transposed and misrepresented. The 80% 
figure comes from a Poppy Project report which surveyed a certain number of sex 
establishments in London to find that 81% of working women were foreign, though 
not necessarily trafficked. During her time as Home Secretary, Jaqui Smith claimed that 
the number of prostitutes in the UK was 80,000, which comes from research that Hilary 
Kinnel had carried out 10 years prior, the results of which were questioned by the 
author herself.21 Individual choice and agency is denied by advocates of abolitionism, in 
a similar way that it is in the context of drug addiction by prohibitionists, to favour a 
linear, unidirectional narrative through the gendering of prostitution and the 
perpetuation of simple binaries (i.e. women/victims v men/perpetrators).  
As the debate on prostitution moves away from media, politics and campaigning, and 
toward the academic realm, the nuance and complexity with which the issue is 
portrayed increases. For Laura Agustin, an anthropologist and blogger, the abolitionist 
discourse reifies, moralises, and trivialises sex workers. Agustin, a long-term advocate of 
re-establishing the agency of sex workers in discourses around the sex industry, 
attempts to construct a completely different image of trafficked women or women who 
sell sex.  
                                                 
20 http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/nov/19/prostitution-home-office 
21 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/7819984.stm 
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Although much of this goes on under a feminist banner, colonialist maternalism describes it 
better. In classic abolitionism, whore stigma is considered a consequence of patriarchy, a system 
in which men subjugate women and divide them into the good, who are marriageable, and the 
bad, who are promiscuous or sell sex. If prostitution were abolished, whore stigma would 
disappear, it is claimed. But contemporary movements against slut-shaming, victim-blaming 
and rape culture clearly show how whore stigma is applied to women who do not sell sex at all, 
VRWKHFODLPLVIHHEOH,QVWHDGDEROLWLRQLVP·VDYHUVLRQWRSURVWLWXWLRQSUREDEO\VWUHQJWKHQVWKH
VWLJPDGHVSLWHWKHSURVWLWXWH·VGHPRWLRQWRWKHVWDWXVRIYLFWLPUDWKHUWKDQWKHWUDQVJUHVVRUVKH
once was. (Augustin, 15th August 2013). 22 
6KHGHVFULEHVWKHPDQQHULQZKLFKWKHSURVWLWXWH·VLPDJHKDVFKDQJHGIURPWUDQVJUHVVRU
(agent) to victim (non-DJHQW WKURXJK WKH PRUDOLVHG LQWHUYHQWLRQ RI D ¶FRORQLDOLVW·
mother, and instead adopts the lens of migration and self-empowerment to counter the 
language of trafficking and victimhood. This exposes the complexity of the structural 
limits that exist, including poverty, migration, legal restrictions for accessing labour 
markets, constrained life chances etc. emphasising thH VWUXFWXUH ZKLFK VKDSHV DJHQWV·
opportunities and decisions in relation to entering the sex industry. The conflation of 
prostitution and trafficking serves to justify a view of prostitution as morally 
reprehensible while at the same time shifting the burden of choice and responsibility 
away from the prostitutes.  
9.7 You are moralists, we are evidence-based 
Both commentators in academia and participants observed the manner in which 
evidence is sometimes crushed through overtly moralised value claims that construct 
issues in a one-dimensional manner. They portray morality as single, univocal and 
XQHTXLYRFDO 7KLV ´PRUDOLVPµ LV countered by evidence, or the pursuit of evidence-
based/informed policy as an ideal which contains within it an emancipatory power. In 
other words, evidence is given the power to render debates amoral and thus rational 
(Chapter 5), to reach a Habermasian ideal-type communication (Chapter 4). 
At a public consultation meeting in parliament in response to the release of the APPG 
on prostitution report (2014), Nic Mai, an academic, argued that we have science and 
peer review to provide us with evidence that migrant sex workers are in a small 
                                                 
22 https://www.jacobinmag.com/2013/08/prostitution-law-and-the-death-of-whores/ 
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minority: however, Christian fundamentalists and radical feminists build their entire 
argument on the prevalence of trafficking because they are moralists, and thus we end 
up with immoral legislation. Mai made a similar argument in relation to government 
portrayals of sexual exploitation during a consultation prior to amendments of the 2009 
Policing and Crime Act. After being positively surprised by the fact that the report had 
included evidence from his research, he wrote: 
¶DW WKH5HSRUWSDUOLDPHQWDU\GHEDWHRQ1RYHPEHU WKHH[DPLQDWLRQRI
evidence against criminalisation was overwhelmed by a pro-government rhetoric 
based on a gory collection of cases of sexual exploitation, rape and child abuse. 
These dramatic cases were presented with apocalyptic tones and drenched in 
DIILUPDWLRQVDERXW ¶WKHFRUHYDOXHV·RI ¶RXUVRFLHW\·1RQHRIWKHPFRQVWLWXWHG
relevant evidence on the impact of the proposed legislation on the specific 
issues at stake. The possibility of not criminalising the sex industry was equated 
with the moral approval of gory cases of exploitation and child abuse, in whose 
face the proposed ameQGPHQWVZHUHZLWKGUDZQ·2013: 108) 
It appears that, when evidence is called upon in defence of liberal attitudes, there is an 
attempt to present an amoral position; in this way, morality is only recognised on the 
side of the argument that is opposed to that backed by evidence, as moralism. The 
moral element of liberal claims remains latent seemingly in order to gain political 
support. The idea that adversarial claims are made on the basis of moralistic attitudes 
rather than evidence allows advocates, and particularly liberal ones, to justify their own 
moral positions in rational terms. 7KLV VWDQFH LV EURDGO\ VXSSRUWHG LQ SDUWLFLSDQWV·
accounts, in relation to both drug and prostitution policy.  
Participants broadly recognise that human beings, including researchers, are subject to 
the limitations brought about by their values, beliefs and morals. 
,WKLQNWKDW>«@WKHUHVHDUFKFRPPXQLW\>«@SRUWUD\VLWVHOIDVNQRZLQJPRUHWKDQLWGRHV
>«@ 7KHUH DUH VRPH WKLQJV WKDW \RX ZRQ·W QHFHVVDULO\ FKDQJH ZKLFK PD\ EH \RXU >«@
personal beliefs and morals and they do influence how you perceive evidence or react to it. (U D 
36 S)  
This is not only the product of politics or ideology, but also the result of emotional 
biases, which, despite being recognised, continue to be portrayed as negative and 
irrational.  
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The human mind is perhaps not as rational as we might wish and is subject to various biases 
and preconceptions and different ways of being influenced by data and linking those to 
consistency with an existing view of the world (U D 22 P) 
3DUWLFLSDQWV·DFFRXQWVstress that moralism dominates understandings of drug users and 
responses to them.  
'UXJVDUH WKH ORZHVW RI WKH ORZ >«@EHFDXVH LW·VQRWD YRWHZLQQHU IRUDQ\SROLWLFLDQ >«@
because drug use and drug users are not FRQVLGHUHG ZRUWK\ >«@ EHFDXVH >«@ RI DOO WKH
QHJDWLYHSXEOLFDWWLWXGHVWKDWDUHGULYHQ>«@E\ULGLFXORXVDQGPRUDOLVWLFLGHDV(A D 9 A). 
In prostitution policy, it was felt that moralism and evidence belonged to separate and 
opposite worlds; 
there is a lot written and a lot of contribution made based usually on moral objection and we 
DUHDWWHPSWLQJWREULQJWKHHYLGHQFH>«@LQWRSROLF\DQGGHFLVLRQ-making (A P 18 A) 
Most participants separated morality and moralism from evidence and coupled it with 
politiFVLGHRORJ\DQG´DOOWKHGLUW\ZRUGVµLQVXFKDZD\WKDWWKHYLHZVRIDQRSSRVLQJ
or different group became depicted as based on morality: 
There is so much around the drugs debate that is morally and ideologically driven, that often I 
feel that politiciDQVDFWXDOO\GRQ·WFDUHZKDWWKHHYLGHQFHEDVHLV(U D 35 KB) 
In this way, participants recognised that drug policy is often framed as a morality policy, 
yet the evidence base has the potential to lift it above its current status. The case of 
expert opposition to the Medically Supervised Injecting Centre in Sydney provides an 
example. In the quote below, the participant doubts the credibility of those experts who 
RSSRVHGWKHLQWHUYHQWLRQVXJJHVWLQJWKDWKDGWKH\EHHQ´WUXHµH[SHUWVWKH\FRXOGQRW
possibly have opposed it, so they might be using their scientific expertise to disguise 
their moral opposition7KLVDOVRKLJKOLJKWVWKHSDUWLFLSDQW·VRZQPRUDOVXSSRUW:  
We also had so-FDOOHGH[SHUWVZKRRSSRVHGWKHLQMHFWLQJFHQWUH>«@,VD\VR-called because I 
would doubt the validity of some of the experts that criticised the injecting centre (A D 12 CS) 
In the case of Brothels regulation, participants make a distinction between disparate 
geographical areas, some of which are more religious than others (Prior and Crofts, 
2012). One participant stated that: 
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:KDWGRHVRFFXULVLQPRUH>@¶UHOLJLRXV·DUHDVWKH\PDNHLWYHU\GLIILFXOWIRUEURWKHOVWRJHW
DSSURYDO DQG WKH\·OO UHIXVH WKHP VR RFFDVLRQDOO\ ZKDW KDSSHQV LV EURWKHOV ZLOO SRS XS
unauthorised. Then what will happen is the local paper and a couple of residents will get 
WRJHWKHU DQG JR ´7KHUH·V DQ LOOHJDO EURWKHOµ \RX NQRZ DQG WKH\ ZLOO PD\EH VHH $VLDQ
ZRUNHUVZDONLQJLQDQGWKH\LQVWDQWO\JR´2KP\JRGWKH\PXVWEHWUDIILFNHGµ(A P 15 A) 
There is a connection between prevalence of religion (and the values that it entails) and 
opposition to brothels. Another connection that the participant highlights is that 
between illegality, migration, sex work, and trafficking. The foreign/migrant/trafficked 
nexus further supports opposition to brothels from local residents; brothels 
subsequently seek approval from authorities that can override the local councils (Land 
and Environment Courts), yet many simply cannot afford the costs involved.  
LW·V H[WUHPHO\ H[SHQsive to go to an environment court and they refuse them on very whimsy 
EDVHVZKLFKLVHVVHQWLDOO\PRUDOLVWLF>«@$Q\ZD\LW·VWKHPRUDOSDQLF ,W·VWKH\RXNQRZ
LW·VWKH´$DDDJKWKHFKLOGUHQ :KDWDERXWWKHFKLOGUHQ"µ(A P 15 A) 
There is a clear trajectory from moral objection to political opposition of both residents 
and local authorities. The innocence of children seems to be a recurring theme in these 
scenarios, as argued in Meier (1994). The inherent immorality of prostitution prompts 
regulatory efforts which generally seek to numerically limit, geographically curtail, and 
physically hide sex workers regardless of which legal framework is dominant. This 
prompts further reflection on the extent to which legal frameworks are indicative of 
deep, fundamental changes of values and beliefs that manifest in changes in attitudes, or 
whether the contradictions which exist within dominant ideological and moral systems 
are simply expressed in different ways by different legal frameworks (Chapter 10). 
9.8 Conclusion:  
In this chapter, I argued that decriminalisation in both domains is effectively a policy 
anomaly, and that a paradigm shift in the direction of decriminalisation has been slow 
coming despite the presence of contradictory policy instruments which respond to the 
logic of decriminalisation and despite long term values shift which would support 
liberalisation across both policy domains. I exposed the limits of incrementalism in 
relation to both morality and evidence. There is a level of ambiguity which hinders 
moral support for decriminalisation across both policy domains, and this is tied with 
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drugs and prostitution as dangerous categories, constituting a potential threat to social 
order (Chapter 10).  
Because evidence is treated selectively by stakeholders and individuals, the weight and 
credibility of evidence is not only dependent on its place in the hierarchy, disciplinary 
and professional background, and allegiances. It is also dependent on pre-held moral 
and political views which may be understood according to traditional political cleavages 
and existing advocacy coalitions, which are in turn supported by predominant values 
and beliefs. Incommensurability of views among stakeholders continues to exist 
regardless of greater evidence availability and consumption.  
In the following discussion chapter, I will further reflect on the findings which emerge 
from the analysis and broader questions of ideology, framing, current political rhetoric 
and reality in advanced liberal states, and the implications of these in terms of possible 
developments in drug and prostitution policy. I will then reflect on the lessons that can 
be drawn from this comparative exercise, noting similarities and differences between 
countries and policy areas, and on the usefulness of morality as a working concept. 
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Chapter 10  
KŶƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌƉůĂǇďĞƚǁĞĞŶ/ĚĞŽůŽŐǇ ?ŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇ ?ĨƌĂŵŝŶŐĂŶĚ
ĂĨĨĞĐƚ 
10.1 Introduction  
Evidence-based policy has been identified by participants as an apparently promising 
platform for rights-based gains. However, it was shown how ultimately evidence-based 
policy as an aspirational position might turn against its intended purpose, because 
evidence is not a sufficiently objective basis to sustain claims. Despite increased reliance 
on evidence to neutralise moral debates, morality necessarily surfaces. 
Political and moral positions will be ever present in mechanisms of selection and 
weighting of the evidence. Experiences, epistemic cultures, past and existing 
commitments will form a complex web which impacts the presence and ordering of 
certain values and beliefs by stakeholders. The differential affective components of 
moralities (i.e. empathy, fear) might result in different views even in people who have 
witnessed similar experiences or have been exposed to the same evidence, resulting in 
polarisation.  
This final discussion is an attempt to bring together some of these insights with all the 
conceptual tools employed so far and contextualise them both in a general sense and in 
relation to the findings. In particular, the use of framing and ideology is integrated into 
reflections about advocacy coalitions, morality, and values, following on from 
discussion in the findings chapters.  
The central premise is that a rights-based framing is antithetical to current neo-liberal 
LGHRORJ\LQERWKLWV¶ODERXU·LQFDUQDWLRQDQGLWV¶SOHDVXUH·LQFDUQDWLRQHDFKRIZKLFKDUH
relevant in the context of drug and prostitution policy. A strong rights-based frame does 
not currently dominate discussions in these fields 
x because of a generalised anti-labour political and ideological climate in advanced 
liberal states 
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x because of the inherent contradictions of neo-liberal ideology (in its 
morphology) between rational moral agents and the expansion of compulsive 
desire fulfilment in advanced capitalism (critical Marxist). 
This has deep theoretical and practical implications. It tells us something about changes 
in late modern capitalism, whereby the process of individualisation is accompanied by 
increasing consumption, both of which are sanctioned by the state. Individualisation of 
labour eschews shared responsibility between the state and the individual and among 
groups with shared interests. If those groups are also regarded as immoral and are thus 
criminalised (as the demands of dominant moral forces are translated into prohibitive 
laws), they are subject to a double burden (moral and political). The state, in its 
conservative neo-liberal incarnation, relies on scapegoating and individualisation of 
responsibility to cover up mounting inequality bred by advanced capitalism, stressing 
individual responsibility as the sole cause of immoral choices (which stretch beyond 
selling sex or taking drugs to encompass poverty and migration).  
10.2 Immoral categories and their ideological basis 
0DUTXHVXVHV%DXPDQ·VQRWLRQRIOLTXLGmodernity to understand sex work as an 
unacceptable practice: in a world where rational choice and entrepreneurship are 
encouraged and rewarded, sex work, which epitomises the pursuit of economic 
rationality, entrepreneurship and free market exchange, is not recognised as a viable 
pursuit because of morality. She notes that: 
¶HYHU\GHFLVLRQWKDWLVWREHPDGHLQOLTXLGPRGHUQVRFLHW\LVERXQGE\QRWLRQV
of morality >«@The moral discourse underlying neo-liberal conceptualizations 
of risk arise in tandem with the re-emergence of neo-FRQVHUYDWLYLVP>«@WKHUH
has been a movement in favour of conservative approaches towards politics, 
economy and society, premised on notions of culture, tradition, order, hierarchy 
DQG DXWKRULW\ >«@7KLVKDV UHVXOWHG LQ ]HUR-tolerance policies and approaches 
JHDUHGDW¶JHWWLQJWRXJK·RQFULPHLQRUGHUWRSURWHFWWKHSUXGHQWHQWUHSUHQeurs 
IURPWKH¶2WKHU·2010: 322). 
Here, there is a clear distinction made between moral and immoral entrepreneurs. More 
widely in neo-liberal rhetoric, the distinction between moral and immoral is well 
documented, including categories such as deserving and undeserving, strivers and 
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skivers, which construct the link between immorality and class, with the poor being 
increasingly portrayed as immoral and therefore underserving (Valentine and Harris, 
2014). This is especially the case in a context of austerity, where the poor are blamed for 
their own circumstances (stressing individual responsibility) and deemed immoral for 
relying on welfare. In spite of the self-entrepreneurship that prostitution often involves, 
prostitutes are not classed as strivers because they are regarded as immoral.  
But is there a single discourse underlying neo-liberal conceptualisations of morality or 
are there competing discourses, one of which dominates over the others? Marques asks 
an important question about the fixity of gender and morality against a background of 
fluidity, flexibilisation, and individualism: 
¶KRZLVLWWKDWLQDVRFLHW\LQZKLFKDOOLGHQWLWLHVDUHVHHQDVIUDJmented, flexible 
and fluid, identities still appear to be bound by fixed notions of gender and 
PRUDOLW\"· 
The binary proposed by Marques is valid to a large extent; however, mainstream, 
dominant notions of gender and morality are problematised by queer identities that 
resist or parody dominant paradigms (e.g. through post-feminist, sex-positive and post-
pornographic parody, etc.). Furthermore, there are competing and contested 
representations of the sex worker which, though mostly caricatured, range from cool 
and glamourous to undesirable and immoral (Coy et al, 2011). Marques describes a 
demoralising process for sex workers as a category of the underclass, whereby: 
¶LQGLYLGXDOV DUH H[FOXGHG IURP WKH FDWHJRU\ RI UDWLRQDO FKRice-making moral 
entrHSUHQHXUV >«@ Cast to the margins of society, the underclass are 
responsibilized for choosing to enter the underclass but then stripped of any 
PRUDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\· 
7KH XQGHUFODVV DQG WKH VH[ ZRUNHU DUH RQH DQG WKH VDPH LQ 0DUTXHV· DFFRXQW ERth 
seen to be immoral lifestyles chosen. Entrepreneurship is only supported in as far as it 
reproduces, without question, existing moral codes:  
¶'HVSLWHWKHIDFWWKDWPDQ\FKRLFHVPDGHE\VXFKLQGLYLGXDOVFDQEHUHJDUGHGDV
prudent and calculated, as is the case for sex workers, they are not recognized as 
such. Stripped of moral judgement, the underclass appears to lose a 
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fundamental aspect of their humanity ² the ability to have their choices 
UHFRJQL]HGDVOHJLWLPDWH· 
This is a substantial argument detailing the manner in which dominant morality, 
ideology and class are mutually reinforcing. Furthermore, it stresses contradiction 
between the values of individual responsibility and individual liberty and choice: those 
who engage in sex work are responsible for making an immoral choice, yet their choice 
is not considered a legitimate one, and thus it is not recognised. 
There is little mention in dominant discourses of sex work of the necessary distinction 
between different kinds of sex work. This is not to say that escorting might not be the 
object of moral outrage, yet its association with upper class consumption and its lack of 
visibility allows for it to exist, perhaps, in a less abject space than, say, street 
prostitution. Considerations on the relationship between class and different kinds of sex 
work and related degree of acceptability are relevant in this context (Bernstein, 2007). 
Decreasing visibility as a result of mobile and internet technology might make 
prostitution a lesser priority in public policy-making. Yet it remains puzzling that, in an 
era where sex is used to sell food or cars, the consumption of pornography is growing 
and made easier by mobile internet technology, and sexual entertainment venues are 
increasingly visible (Hubbard and Colosi, 2015), prostitution is still regarded as 
fundamentally morally reprehensible. Indeed, campaigns of moral outrage are led 
against all types of commodification of female bodies, from advertising, to 
pornography, to prostitution. Realistically, however, according to Sanders: 
¶LQ D FDSLWDOLVW PDUNHW LQ ZKLFK ERGLHV SDUWLFXODUO\ IHPDOH ERGLHV DUH
commodified in every way, prostitution will continue to exist as a crude result of 
demand and of the unequal social conditions of women. Non-legal remedies, 
such as advocating for the increased professionalisation of prostitution, do not 
DSSHDUWREHZLWKLQWKHVFRSHRISRVVLEOHIXWXUHFKDQJHV· 
The institutionalised hypocrisy of neoliberal economies which continue to commodify 
sex yet disempower those who wish to be the entrepreneurs of their sexual labour by 
deeming them immoral, criminalising and controlling them, is consonant with current 
SROLWLFV DQG LGHRORJ\ DV DUJXHGE\6DQFKH]  WKURXJK WKHQRWLRQRI ¶GLIIHUHQWLDO
H[FOXVLRQ·7KHcapitalist push toward expanding leisure and consumption underpins the 
continuous creation of desires and the pursuit of self-fulfilment.  
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A general long-term increase in the consumption of drugs has been supported by 
increasingly leisure oriented economies, and the rise of a NTE in which drug use is 
normalised (Aldridge et al, 2013; Parker, 2005; Duff, 2005); however, drug use may still 
EHUHJDUGHGDVLPPRUDOIURPD¶OHJDOPRUDOLVW·SHUVSHFWLYH0DF&RXQDQG5HXWHU
4). Like sex work, the consumption of drugs can range from cool, middle-class, 
UHFUHDWLRQDO DQG VHHPLQJO\ ´SUREOHP-IUHHµ WR LPPRUDO XQGHUFODVV SUREOHPDWLF DQG
deviant. The types of drugs consumed and the cultural and social connotations are 
class-based, morally and ideologically justified. If the dominant ideology is understood 
as a form of neo-liberal conservatism (Hall, 2011), then the degree of internal 
contradiction is likely to be relatively high (Freeden, 1994), considering that, 
traditionally, liberalism and conservatism sat at opposite sides of the ideological 
spectrum.  
It is difficult to reconcile a culture of abstinence and moral righteousness, respect for 
authority, family and community with globalisation, unfettered consumption, 
individualism, experimentation, self-fulfilment and desire-fulfilment. This does not 
mean that contradictions cannot be resolved through the ordering and organisation of 
all the elements. If neo-liberal conservatism is complex and contradictory, each moral 
and advocacy coalition finds some ideological support for its demands within it. 
Each existing coalition might challenge elements of the status quo around drug use or 
prostitution, whilst also re-adapting or maintaining existing elements: radical feminists 
challenge capitalist patriarchy yet call for the powers of the state to punish the 
perpetrators, relieving victims of responsibility and continuing to rely on the criminal 
justice system, which historically has been an instrument of oppression for the 
disempowered. Liberal feminists demand recognition of their rights and freedoms, an 
end to stigma, discrimination and criminalisation by relying on legal reforms, the 
XQGHQLDEOHH[LVWHQFHRIDPDUNHWIRUVH[DQGDVVRFLDWHGJDLQVIRUODERXUDQGZRPHQ·V
rights. Similarly to liberal feminists, drug decriminalisers demand the end of punishment 
and stigma toward drug users and legal reform. Christian fundamentalists, on the other 
hand, wish for a process of re-moralisation to establish a righteous, abstaining society in 
both policy domains, relying on politically sustained moral and immoral categories. 
Each of these positions can compete and potentially make gains because it finds some 
supporting elements within the current economic and ideological structure. 
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10.3 Competing and coalescing frames 
In Chapter Five, I discussed the usefulness of frame analysis in relation to morality; 
contrary to arguments in the literature, it was stressed that frames are necessarily moral 
and not merely instrumental. Each frame stresses particular aspects and offers an 
ordered view to achieve a set goal, though certain frames are more overtly moral than 
others. As much as we can identify and single out frames, these are always multiple 
(Hajer, 1993); they may compete, and they may coalesce.  
Following considerations of latent and manifest morality within frames identified in 
Chapter Five, the following frames could be identified as relevant: 
x The law and order/public nuisance frame 
x The economic frame 
x The public health frame 
x The moralistic frame 
x The idealist frame 
x The rights-based frame 
A public nuisance frame might become increasingly redundant given the move of 
prostitution and injecting drug use away from the street; however, it can be called upon 
successfully or indeed partner with the moralistic or idealist frames when action is taken 
WR WDFNOHGHPDQG LQYHVW LQ´H[LWLQJµRUDEVWDLQLQJHIIRUWV DQGJHQHUDOO\PRYH WRZDUG
the criminalisation of the purchase of sex and abstinence and recovery. In drug policy, 
the law and order/public nuisance frame can be used to justify punitive measures 
toward drug use, by stressing the link between drugs and crime, and can be coupled 
with the moralistic frame in terms of supporting abstinence and the idealist frame in 
terms of pursuing a drug-free world. However, it could also be used in support of 
advocacy for a drug consumption room, and could thus partner up with a rights-based 
frame and a public health frame. Although frames have a moral foundation, they do not 
necessarily have a single moral valence. Their elements can be differentially organised to 
suit different goals and to harmoniously coalesce with other apparently competing 
frames.  
The rights-based frame in the sex work discourse currently enjoys relatively little 
popularity as any politics stressing labour and labour rights does not bode well with the 
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dominant political economic and ideological status quo. To the contrary, concessions 
made to the sex work movement have been, at least rhetorically, primarily motivated by 
health concerns (weak rights) and justified through a public health frame (Chapter 9). 
Findings suggest that current supporters of decriminalisation appear more likely to rely 
on a public health frame, either alongside or to the exclusion of a rights-based frame, 
partly in order to make their positions more politically palatable. A rights-based 
discourse is negatively affected by its overt morality and its emphasis on labour (strong 
rights). A public health frame can make gains on the basis of a more latent morality and 
scientific standing, and its promise of benefiting broader communities and society. 
There are similarities in drug policy: a rights-based frame is regarded as a controversial 
platform, reliant on arguments relating to the right to use drugs. Given the ambiguous 
status of drugs as on the cusp of danger and pleasure, it is not politically advantageous. 
A public health frame, arguing for the health rights of drug users (weak rights) without 
emphasising pleasure, individualism and self-fulfilment (strong rights), is seen as a more 
solid platform.  
In prostitution policy, do the moralistic frame, ² supported by a Christian 
Fundamentalist coalition ²  which would stress prostitution as immoral, and the idealist 
frame ² supported by a Radical Feminist coalition ²  which would stress the desire for a 
prostitution-free world, coalesce and gain popularity in the current climate? These two 
apparently diverging frames call for the same end goal, i.e. abolition. They rely on the 
same policy core belief, i.e. criminalisation. The ideas and beliefs these frames are 
supported by might be different, but their policy goals VLPLODU*RLQJEDFN WR+XQW·V
(1999) work Governing Morals, there is a clear line of argument that puts some 
WUDQVIRUPDWLYHHIIRUWVLQWKHPRUDOLVLQJFDWHJRU\:KDW·VPRUHJURXSVZKRHVSRXVHWKH
moralistic frame might be motivated by in-group protection and strict-father morality 
(with its emphasis on punishment) just as much as those who support and use the 
idealistic frame. Hence, the two frames can coalesce in arguing for the criminalisation of 
purchase as the best policy option.  
Is it different in drug policy? The public health frame has brought considerable gains to 
drug users by creating sufficient consensus to counter, or at least to rival, the law and 
order frame, attracting a certain degree of political support, which has meant investment 
in a plethora of harm reduction initiatives. Support of harm reduction was initially 
justified by the political establishment through a combination of fear (of crime and of 
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contagion) and pragmatism, rather than making overt value claims based on tolerance, a 
sense of inclusive social justice, or universal deservingness. Indeed, now that the 
number of injecting drug users is shrinking or has remained stable (Scott et al, 2015),1 
HIV is largely under control in Australia and the UK, crime is down (van Dijik et al, 
2012) and heroin is less popular in western countries than it used to be (Barrio et al, 
2013) with fairly stable numbers of injecting drug users in Australia2 and the UK,3 the 
necessity for harm reduction interventions such as drug consumption rooms is currently 
questioned. A relatively narrow conceptualisation of harm reduction, with its primary 
emphasis on IDUs, does not translate well in the current climate, where patterns of 
drug use and drugs of choice are changing (Aldridge et al, 2013). As a concept relying 
on weak rather than strong rights, harm reduction appears tired in the face of new 
challenges, and the reformist coalition is struggling to readapt its meaning to current 
circumstances while insisting upon its value neutrality (Hathaway, 2001). Although drug 
consumption rooms are effectively about decriminalising drugs, no such intervention 
has set a precedent for decriminalisation beyond these spaces (Chapter 9). Resorting to 
drug consumption rooms was a pragmatic compromise, which fits within a prohibition 
paradigm.  
The economic frame, with its emphasis on expanding consumption and markets, 
stressing gain, pleasure and economic benefits, should theoretically gain increasing 
ground given dominant neo-liberal ideology, rendering prohibition redundant.4 
However, the economic frame is countered by the moralistic frame. The economic 
frame in prostitution can only appeal so long as it does not rely on old-style labour 
politics, with an emphasis on class unity, solidariW\DQGZRUNHUV·ULJKWVVWUHVVLQJLQVWHDG
individualism, (and individual responsibility in labour isolation), glamour, the 
objectifying of (female) bodies, and money. The moralising efforts of policy actors and 
DGYRFDF\ FRDOLWLRQV PLJKW QRW DGGUHVV ´FDOO JLUOVµ RU ´HVFRUWVµ DV FRQGHVFHQGLQJO\ DV
                                                 
1 http://www.nta.nhs.uk/uploads/injectingreportnov2010finala.pdf 
http://www.aids2014.org/webcontent/file/AIDS2014_Fact_sheet_Australia.pdf 
2 http://ndarc.cms04.med.unsw.edu.au/sites/default/files/ndarc/resources/IDRSDTS2008.pdf, pp. 27-29.  
3 http://www.nta.nhs.uk/uploads/injectingreportnov2010finala.pdf 
4 This arguably worked in the US context in those states which have legalised Cannabis (Room, 2014). However, 
US style democracy, federalism and capitalism operates very differently compared to both the UK (welfare) and 
Australia (mixed). At a time of economic recession, grassroots politics combined with an individualistic 
entrepreneurial spirit, alongside a privatised health service and a long term trend toward legalising medical 
cannabis, all contributed to strengthen arguments which were successfully framed in economic terms in certain 
US states.  
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they do other sex workers. This is not only an issue of class and hierarchy, but also an 
issue of framing, i.e. the successful neo-liberal escort versus the bad labour-rights-
demanding prostitute. The escort is a prime exemplar of successful neo-liberal labourer: 
alone, working from an agency independently, or advertising on the internet; flexible; 
self-advertising, self-reliant; self-employed. This is diametrically opposed to street 
workers, who are seen as risky, a liability, a nuisance, and a potential threat. This is not 
WR LQYDOLGDWH 0DUTXHV· DUJXPHQW DERXW WKH LPPRUDOLW\ RI WKH VH[ ZRUNHU DV DQ
entrepreneur, but to highlight the difference between different classes of sex workers. 
Social and cultural hierarchies remain morally and ideologically produced and can be 
sustained through framing.  
10.4 Why decriminalisation arguments have failed so far: late modern capitalism 
and its internal contradictions  
The current political economic context can be seen as broadly resistant to any rights-
based discourse which deviates from the accepted paradigm. The economic dogma in 
the west is adverse to labour, in the traditional sense of labour politics, with its emphasis 
on unions, labour rights and bargaining power. The sex work discourse is not only 
marginalised in the UK, as West (2000) argued. The sex work discourse is antithetical to 
dominant patterns of political economy, with its emphasis on individualisation and 
flexibilisation of labour (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002). As Ward (2015: 66) puts it, 
¶FULWLFDOGLVFRXUVHVHPSKDVLVHWKHHURVLRQRIVWDEOHVHFXUHHPSOR\PHQWDQGWUDGHXQLRQ
SRZHUDQGDWUDQVIHUUDORIUHVSRQVLELOLW\IURPWKHVWDWHDQG¶WUDGLWLRQDO·VRFLDOVWUXFWXUHV
RQWRWKH LQGLYLGXDO· ,QWKLVFRQWH[WDPRYHPHQW that is founded on the principles of 
labour rights and labour politics cannot currently achieve a paradigm shift. As 
aforementioned, advocates are better off by relying on a public health frame in order to 
make their claims morally and politically acceptable and receive funding and resources 
to dedicate to services which, at least, ensure the weak rights of sex workers and drug 
users. However, and simultaneously, the increasing dominance of liberal/libertarian 
YDOXHV FRXSOHGZLWK DGYDQFHG FDSLWDOLVP·V LGHROogical pressures toward individualistic, 
leisure oriented and consumeristic identities encourage drug use and sex work. Drug 
use, particularly in its recreational guise, could be regarded as the ultimate celebration of 
individualist consumption, expanding liminal spaces and leisure time. Whereas in its 
problematic guise, drug use reflects the failures of the current system: it dramatizes the 
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underlying effects of poverty mixed with a constant push for desire fulfilment on 
disadvantaged people.  
If the current political economic system rests on the individualisation and flexibilisation 
of labour, then prostitution could be regarded as a textbook example of the application 
of neo-liberal political economic principles. However, prostitution remains immoral or 
at least morally ambiguous, because of the presence of different moralities, but also and 
crucially because of the inherent contradictions of neo-liberal ideology. Would 
decriminalisation of prostitution still be possible today, when the global consensus has 
seemingly shifted towards the criminalisation of purchase? In a globalised context, 
trafficking and migration are privileged compared to domestic labour rights and state 
responsibilities, often used as political scapegoats to justify the relentless erosion of the 
latter. The political opportunity for a decriminalisation approach to become dominant 
has certainly lessened. Incidentally, the popularity of the Swedish model has grown 
steadily, in spite the fact that the evidence of its success is inconclusive (Levi and 
Jakobsson, 2014). The shift in focus from domestic to globalised markets in prostitution 
has entailed an emphasis on migration and trafficking which bodes well with a political 
rhetoric of control, together with a conflation of prostitution with trafficking and sexual 
exploitation (Bernstein, 2014). It seems unlikely that, in the current political climate, 
more countries will turn to the decriminalisation of sex work. The international 
consensus around the Swedish model is growing sufficiently to prompt respondents 
who support decriminalisation to highlight that their position is precarious and that 
strong advocacy is constantly needed in order to maintain consensus on 
decriminalisation in New South Wales (Chapter 9).5 
The current abolitionist movement associated with radical feminism entirely distances 
itself from labour politics, starting by not recognising prostitution as labour. Although 
the foundations of radical feminism see capitalism and patriarchy as symbiotic (Walby, 
1989), its arguments have moved away from labour politics and toward punitive stances 
against expressions of patriarchy (Bernstein, 2012). In ACF terms, the elective affinity 
between radical feminists and conservatives in an austerity context is supported not by 
the same core beliefs, but by the same policy core beliefs and secondary aspects. 
                                                 
5 The recent controversy in Canada in 2014, where a Supreme Court ruling in favour of decriminalisation was 
almost immediately followed by the passing of federal bill C-36 which effectively criminalised the purchase of 
sex, epitomises the dominance of this approach. 
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Similarly, it is not incidental that, in drug policy, the abstinence rhetoric, which was 
always more popular in the US and well-supported by political and religious institutions 
and the presence of openly confessional parties (Chapter 5), has recently resurfaced in 
the UK and Australia (Chapter 8). Austerity and abstinence are extremely compatible. 
An abstaining outlook fares better within a neo-liberal state of political economic 
austerity (Peters, 2012; UKDPC, 2012). It is expressed in the abstinence/recovery 
message underlying UK drug policy, which downplays pleasure, tolerance and harm 
reduction, whilst hindering participation of affected communities and user 
communities. This is pronounced in UK political rhetoric as part of the long-term 
annihilation of the welfare state (Chapter 8).  
The right to use drugs is a very marginal discourse which does not currently attract 
widespread support. Decriminalisation of drug possession can be justified by stressing 
victimhood, taking agency away from users, emphasising social responsibility and justice 
over and above individual responsibility. Yet decriminalisation necessarily entails a 
certain kind of compassion, a basic tolerance and acceptance of individuals as both 
pleasure-seeking and failure-prone agents, alongside an emphasis on individual rights 
and liberties (see appendix 1 for moral political foundation of decriminalisation), aspects 
which are not necessarily commensurable in this political ideological climate. Indeed, 
compassion may take different forms: prohibitionism could be regarded as a 
compassionate stance because it might entail transformative aims, a hope toward 
rehabilitation, self-UHOLDQFH DQG LQGHSHQGHQFH +RZHYHU WKLV ´FUXHO WR EH NLQGµ
approach fits better with conservative morality, a strict father approach where 
SXQLVKPHQW LV GHSOR\HG LQ WKHKRSHRI WHDFKLQJD OHVVRQ DQG WREH ¶WRXJKRQGUXJV·
means to know better (than those who engage in wrong behaviour), to protect them 
(from the drugs) and to protect others (from the drugs and their users). Conservative 
perceptions of drug users may stress victimhood (to drugs themselves, to temptation, to 
peer pressure, to socio-political failures) and immoral choice at once (Chapter 9). 
Similarly, sex workers are perceived as victims (of men, of patriarchy and capitalism) or 
as immoral choice makers. Liberal values entail a degree of contradiction between 
individual freedom and social responsibility and justice, whereas conservative values 
cannot fully reconcile individual responsibility and social responsibility (Chapters 8 and 
9).  
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The decriminalisation of drugs possession does not require reliance on labour rights in 
the same way as prostitution, given that drug users are consumers, not producers. 
Although they may be regarded as undeserving, they can fit into a weak rights narrative. 
Stressing their victimhood in relation to drugs works in favour of prohibition; stressing 
their victimhood in relation to a punitive legal system works in favour of 
decriminalisation. Stressing victimhood can work in favour of decriminalisation and 
prohibition. The decriminalisation of drug possession is consonant with increasing neo-
liberal push toward consumption and pleasure seeking; however, it can be argued 
exclusively through a public health frame to the exemption of a rights-based one. 
Conversely, for the decriminalisation of prostitution, a rights-based frame cannot be 
excluded given labour and the imagined degree of choice involved in sex work (outside 
of trafficking) compared to that involved in drug use (given addiction). Although relying 
on strong rights such as pleasure might be inimical to interest, calls for decriminalisation 
of drug use can be framed in terms of right to health and questioning whether drug 
users deserve punishment. Stressing their victimhood and their lack of agency, as it is 
done by the advocacy coalition for criminalisation of the purchase of sex in relation to 
prostitution, might be a more successful political strategy. Victimhood rhetoric does not 
endanger dominant hierarchies that currently prevent drug users or sex workers from 
partaking in policy making. Decriminalisation does not necessarily question drug XVHUV·
positioning as victims, but only that of drug users as immoral choice makers.  
By focusing on drugs and criminalisation of users as problems, and individuals as 
victims, there is no requirement to address the underlying causes of drug use and 
addiction, (such as structural inequality, urbanisation, individualism, consumption and 
leisure), or to fully address the failings of prohibition. In the current climate, 
decriminalisation of drug use might be more politically palatable than decriminalisation 
of sex work in the terms laid by political and ideological forces. Decriminalisation of sex 
work might be threatening not only because its roots are found in labour politics and 
rights, but also and crucially because it might be seen to subvert gender norms and 
KLHUDUFKLHV LQFOXGLQJ KHWHURQRUPDWLYLW\ PRQRJDP\ DQG ZRPHQ·s submissive and 
subdued sexual nature. The power asymmetry between the buyer and the seller, the 
producer and the consumer, is reversed in relation to sex work: when in any other trade 
and transaction, more power is accorded to the seller, in the imagery around 
prostitution it is the buyer who is accorded more power. This is not to argue that there 
are no situations where sexual labour is exploited and sexual labourers victimised. It is 
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to highlight that exploitation is a normal occurrence in a capitalist economy that affects 
all trades, not just prostitution. In other trades labourers are generally protected from 
exploitative conditions by nature of the legality of their work, which grants them health 
and occupational rights. However, increasing precariat and the weakening of labour 
rights affect all workers, and the trend is certainly set in the direction that favours 
capital and is opposed to labour.  
10.5 On the strengths and limitations of morality policy as a typology 
The morality policy typology, in spite of its limitations, has allowed categorising drug 
policy and prostitution policy under one label, following the logic of a most similar 
comparative design. Critics of morality policy have noted how, at the most basic level, 
every policy is a morality policy; however some policies are further affected by morality, 
and prostitution and drug policy are at least equally so (Waagenar and Altink, 2012; 
Mooney and Schuldt, 2008; Knill, 2013). Portraying a view of morality as singular, the 
morality policy literature offers better tools to analyse moralism (or a given dominant 
morality) than the competing moralities that may challenge it. Beyond the reflections 
provided by the morality policy literature, and the relevant tools afforded by theoretical 
synthesis between established theories of the policy process and the morality policy 
typology, the focus on morality and its use as a working concept has resulted in an 
original contribution. Not only has morality allowed reflection on the interplay between 
normative (first) principles and emotions, it also provided scope for the adaptation of 
insights and findings from other literatures that have not traditionally been included in 
either accounts of the policy process or studies of the use of evidence within it. Given 
that, as discussed in Chapters Two, Three and Four, there is a strong reliance on 
rationalist explanations which do not fully engage with the interaction between reason 
and emotion, morality can function as an entry point. It can serve as a counterpart to 
evidence, if indeed evidence is understood or even wished as predominantly objective, 
hierarchical and value-free. Morality can also serve as an element to add to materialist 
and/or rationalist notions of ideology and ideas (though conceptualisations of ideas 
have recently been enriched to include valence, which implies politics and emotion, as 
in Cox and Beland, 2013). The process of unpacking of morality has led to questioning 
exactly what makes morality, which prompted reflection on the necessity of morality for 
social order (Douglas, 1966), on the synergy between morality, the law and ideology 
(Habermas, 1986), on competing political moralities, and on how a morality is 
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constructed and sustained through the interaction of values and beliefs alongside 
principles, ideas and affect.  
10.6 On the similarities and differences between drug and prostitution policy in 
relation to evidence 
In both policy domains, participants situate evidence-based policy as an aspirational 
goal. As highlighted in the findings Chapters, coalitions in both policy areas use 
evidence to justify their claims, and in this context, opposing coalitions are accused of 
being morally or ideologically driven, which effectively means that evidence is not a 
sufficiently robust or objective platform to rely upon when arguing for a particular 
policy position. 
The data suggests that drug policy is more explicitly subject to hierarchical notions of 
evidence given its closer proximity to health. This does not mean that prostitution 
policy is not subject to the evidence hierarchy, though it does mean that its presence 
mostly affects the evaluation of sexual health and related interventions. There is a 
substantial body of medical research that studies STI and HIV incidence in the sex 
working population and the efficacy of interventions to reduce it (Baral et al, 2012; 
Ward et al, 2004). The evidence hierarchy is well established in sex work in relation to 
KHDOWK\HW LWKDVQRWSHQHWUDWHGVWDNHKROGHUV· LPDJHU\DURXQGHYLGHQFH LQSURVWLWXWLRQ
policy in the same way or to the same extent that it has for drugs (Chapter 7). I argue 
that the tie between drugs and medicine, and drugs and science, and the closer 
proximity of drugs to the medical and scientific establishment results in the prominence 
of medical/scientific discourses on drug issues, compared with prostitution. 
Medical/scientific focus in prostitution is limited to issues of contagion, of disease 
control. This might well originate in the lack of societal and cultural engagement with 
the issue: hiding prostitution in plain sight is much more consonant with dominant 
morality, ideology and interest. Similarly in drug policy, researching disease control and 
treatment efficacy has been prioritised, particularly for the purpose of crime reduction 
and broader public health aims.  
In both policy areas, there are power asymmetries between stakeholders, with target 
populations/service users/affected communities having comparatively little power in 
policy-making (though there are differences between the two countries). This is 
established through formal distribution of power and resources by the state and 
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reinforced through the presence of hierarchical notions of evidence which establish 
more and less legitimate sources and types of knowledge. This does not mean however 
that researchers, and even those within the medical scientific establishment, have 
unfettered power and resources; their power is curtailed by dominant discourses, 
institutions, morality, ideology, and the structuring of research priorities around these. 
As agents, researchers can and do pursue research that lies outside institutional and 
political imperatives, yet by stepping outside their boundaries, they risk losing credibility 
and legitimacy. When researchers criticise the status quo and are labelled political, rather 
than objective, and ideologically, morally or interest-driven, their morality goes from 
latent to manifest. They are thus placed on a par with other commentators, in such a 
way that their truth claims are no longer privileged to the same degree. Any evidence-
based claim, and particularly those claims that call for change, necessarily enter the 
political arena, and are scrutinised as political, moral and ideological.  
The diversity of science, of its disciplinary and epistemological make-up, its epistemic 
cultures, the politics of its agents, translates into a high degree of contestation, where 
evidence is always plural, and there is sufficient disagreement, and sufficient evidence, 
to support a variety of positions. The evidence hierarchy was supposed to act as a 
benchmark in order to prevent bogus evidence-based claims, or positions based on 
poor evidence. However, the evidence hierarchy is poorly understood in the public 
GRPDLQZKHUHGHEDWHVRIWHQ UHO\RQ VWDWHPHQWV VXFKDV ¶WKHHYLGHQFHVKRZV·RU ¶WKDW
claim is not evidence-based·\HWQRGLVFXVVLRQIROORZVDERXWZKLFKHYLGHQFHDQGWKHUH
is little or no public assessment of its quality. The evidence hierarchy also necessarily 
produces hierarchies of credibility, where certain researchers and their research are 
perceived as more objective, which leaves others with fewer resources and less 
credibility. Unless we advance a more horizontal, multiple and sophisticated view of 
evidence, founded in a different view of science, knowledge about both these policy 
domains will continue to be skewed and limited, and the people affected will continue 
to be marginalised and their knowledge belittled. It appears as though the inclusion of 
affected communities is one step toward institutionalising their knowledge and 
participation. This might allow for the establishment of less asymmetric partnerships 
and more empowerment, as was shown through the comparison between England and 
New South Wales.  
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10.7 On the similarities and differences between the UK and Australia (England 
and New South Wales) 
On paper, both Australia and the UK appeared to subscribe to the notion of evidence-
based policy; successive UK labour governments made a strong public commitment to 
it, yet the term has been out of fashion in national political rhetoric since the coalition 
government in 2010. In Australia, there have been some statements urging the adoption 
of evidence-based policy as a practice, yet evidence-based policy was not adopted as a 
political platform to the same extent as it was in the UK. The official endorsement of 
this practice was discussed throughout the thesis as both a formalising effort and a 
neutralising political tool. Both countries have long established networks of knowledge 
sharing, proliferation of policy forums (Chapter 7), multi-agency partnerships and 
generally have engaged in the systematisation of knowledge for the purpose of better, 
more efficient government (Chapter 2). The most salient aspect of the evidence-based 
policy rhetoric is its reception by the scientific communities in both countries. The 
potential power this rhetoric gives to the scientific community might be regarded as 
unprecedented. The result has been a proliferation of studies which made the 
relationship between evidence and policy the subject of scrutiny.  
There are striking similarities between the two countries in the manner in which 
evidence is understood and discussed by stakeholders. The most significant differences 
ZHUHIRXQGLQWKHZD\WKHFRXQWULHV·LQVWLWXWLRQDODUUDQJHPHQWVDQGSROLWLFDl structures 
DIIHFWHG VWDNHKROGHUV· RSSRUWXQLWLHV $XVWUDOLD·V SROLF\ RI LQFOXVLRQ RI DIIHFWHG
communities, lacking in the UK, compels governments to resource and include 
communities in health partnerships. This is both empowering and limiting, given that 
funding is targeted towards health advocacy, and not rights advocacy (Chapter 7). With 
advocacy being institutionalised, its potential to operate in an oppositional manner is 
curtailed; however, the availability of resources allows for strategic action. Organisations 
may decide to use their resources for research purposes, or for purposes that lie beyond 
their remit; yet this might mean that they struggle to stretch their resources, then fight 
to obtain credibility as evidence producers, and then fight for inclusion in policy 
forums.  
In the UK, the lack of funding and resources for affected communities, and particularly 
those that engage in advocacy and not service provision, coupled with the lack of 
official partnerships, has meant a generally more marginalised role for affected 
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communities in both policy domains. This means that advocacy organisations can place 
themselves in opposition and be critical voices in debates; however, it means that the 
more oppositional and critical they may be, the less they are resourced and included. 
Affected community organisations in the UK in these policy domains have a lesser role 
in both policy forums and research compared to their Australian counterparts. 
However, the number of think tanks and research charities that are privately funded in 
the UK is greater than Australia, where most funding has come from states and 
commonwealth. In the UK, much research and policy enterprise undertaken by affected 
communities relies on independent agency, and policy inclusion happens in a piecemeal 
manner. Conversely, the attention granted to think tanks and other research charities 
might be more significant in this context.6 
In New South Wales, the presence of an independent legislative authority at the state 
level has allowed implementation of controversial policy reforms which was contrary to 
the wishes of the Australian federal government (Chapter 9). The decriminalisation of 
sex work and the introduction of the Medically Supervised Injecting Centre were 
enabled through state legislation. However, the necessity to legislate might constitute a 
hindrance, because it does not allow for flexibility, grey areas, or diversity at the local 
level. The legal introduction of controversial policy reforms in both policy domains was 
not replicated elsewhere. Decriminalisation in New South Wales is thus identified as an 
anomaly both at the level of paradigm and instrument.  
The lack of independent legislative authority in England has meant that any momentum 
for controversial policy change in both policy domains did not lead to its 
implementation. However a greater degree of flexibility exists, whereby regional 
authorities have invested their resources differently and made different decisions. 
Increased devolution has led to some interesting and controversial initiatives, including 
partial decriminalisation across both policy domains. The ability to implement 
interventions informally in England, which is not present in New South Wales given 
necessity for legislation, might result into more informal practices which follow the 
logic of decriminalisation (Chapter 9).  
                                                 
6 Examples include the impact of the 2007 report by the Centre for Social Justice on the 2010 coalition drug 
strategy; the inclusion of reformist organisations such as Release and Transform Drug Policy Foundation to policy 
forums; the piecemeal inclusion of the UK network of sex work projects and the English Collective of Prostitutes 
during consultation and strategic advice. Yet none of these organisations receive public funding.  
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Radical feminism appears to be well rooted in the UK, and in the UK Labour party. 
Both the UK and Australia are affected by the growing consensus toward the 
criminalisation of the purchase of sex at the international level. The UK seems to be 
further affected by this trend given the rootedness of radical feminism coupled with the 
growing popularity of the Swedish model at the EU level, compared to Australia, which 
has seen the successful implementation of alternative models. The political dominance 
of liberal feminism in New South Wales has greatly contributed to institutionalise the 
decriminalisation of prostitution. This also influenced the institutionalisation of sex 
work advocacy, which in the UK remains marginalised.  
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Chapter 11  
ŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƐ 
In conclusion, I will address each of the research questions in turn, to reflect on 
emergent findings, the contributions and limitations of the project, and ways forward.  
11.1 What counts as evidence? 
To the question ¶ZKDWFRXQWVDVHYLGHQFH·SDUWLFLSDQWVKDGDQVZHUVZKLFKZHUHHLWKHU
consonant with, or opposed to, established notions of evidence as embedded in the 
evidence-based policy narrative. These answers differed depending on policy area, 
disciplinary and professional background. Views of evidence appear both practice and 
knowledge-GHSHQGHQW DQG UHODWHG WR SDUWLFLSDQWV· H[SHULHQFHV DQG EDFNJURXQG 7KH
VXSSOHPHQWDU\ TXHVWLRQ ZDV UDLVHG ¶ZKDW FRXQWV DV HYLGHQFH WR ZKRP·" 3DUWLFLSDQWV
with a science or medical background, civil servants and knowledge brokers in drug 
policy were altogether more likely to acknowledge the evidence hierarchy and to adhere 
to an ideal of rigour purported by it, at least at the abstract level. However, achieving 
better evidence according to the standards set by the hierarchy is an abstract-
aspirational position, distinct from the practice of evidence making and use. Advocates 
across domains, and most participants in prostitution policy, including social scientists, 
had an altogether more sceptical view of EBP, antagonistic of hierarchical notions. 
Though all participants understood that evidence is broad, inclusive, context-dependent 
and subjective, some participants were more sympathetic to this view than others. The 
evidence hierarchy produces a hierarchy among stakeholders, placing those with 
scientific knowledge on a higher plane and validating their claims to credibility. Other 
stakeholders who hold to the value of anecdotal or experiential evidence remain lower 
down the hierarchy, their credibility lessened.  
11.2 How is evidence deployed in policy arguments? 
The contested nature of evidence becomes apparent when evidence is discussed in 
UHODWLRQWRSROLF\ LQWHUYHQWLRQV,Q OLQHZLWKRWKHUVWXGLHV· ILQGLQJVHYLGHQFHZDVRQO\
one of the many elements relied upon to construct political positions, as policy-makers 
needed to consider other elements, including political feasibility, resource constraints, 
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media and public opinion (i.e. Ritter, 2009; Burnett and Duncan, 2008). Evidence was 
discussed by participants in support of, or in opposition to, particular policy 
interventions as part of political arguments. By discussing examples of evidence use in 
policy forums, it became clear that evidence in these settings is generally deployed 
orally, and as such rhetoric and argumentation are central to this method of delivery. 
Though written submissions precede hearings, the ability and willingness of policy-
makers might determine whether these are considered. Participants referred to selective 
attention, which implied filtering according to existing views, as a hindrance to any 
balanced consideration of the evidence. They also noted that justifications not to pursue 
a particular policy might be based on the lack of sufficiently exhaustive evidence, and 
that any claim that evidence is lacking can be used as a political tool. Evidence is 
deployed selectively, in support of pre-held views, which is motivated by both interest 
and values. The weight and emphasis that stakeholders may place on certain types of 
evidence is usually related to their morality, and which values and beliefs are 
predominant and concurring in their constellation. Although the evidence hierarchy is 
supposed to enable individuals to distinguish good evidence from bad evidence, this is 
not reflected in the practice of evidence understanding and utilisation. If evidence 
FODVKHVZLWK LQGLYLGXDOV· ILUVWSULQFLSOHV LW LV XQOLNHO\ WKDW WKH\ZLOO HQGRUVH LW RU WKDW
they will place significant weight on it in the framing of their position on a given policy 
LVVXH,WLVDOVRFOHDUIURPSDUWLFLSDQWV·DFFRXQWVWKDWWKHW\SHRIHYLGHQFHVWDNHKROGHUV
might value most is not simply that which is more consonant with their values and 
other beliefs, but also that which they are able to understand and practice.  
11.3 Which of the existing models of the use of evidence in policy best explains 
this process? Is it necessary and/or possible to test existing models and or create 
new models? 
Existing models of the use of evidence in policy can be regarded as valid to the extent 
that they may be utilised, alone or in conjunction with other theories and models, to fit 
a particular case study and/or to highlight and explain different aspects of the process 
of evidence utilisation. In the literature reviewed in Chapter Two, models were used 
individually to frame a particular case study, or else they were used as a basis for 
development of new models which were seen to better represent and frame a given 
case. However, a more recent emphasis on interpretation and meaning-making has 
shifted attention away from modelling, towards emergent categories that are proper to 
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the particular investigation and case studies. Many valid models have stressed the 
rational and interest-driven aspects of evidence utilisation, often starting from a strong 
normative position that regards evidence-based policy as a desirable end goal. However, 
there is a danger in espousing this view: if evidence-based policy is seen as the principal 
desirable outcome, then it becomes more difficult to analyse it critically. In other words, 
a normative view of evidence may encourage the production of rationalistic accounts of 
the use of evidence in policy.  
I argued that what is missing in current models on the use of evidence in policy is an 
emphasis on the interplay between evidence and morality, and more generally that 
between science and values. There are no models of the use of evidence in policy to 
date which place sufficient and explicit emphasis on values and beliefs as central in 
understandings and uses of evidence. The only existing theoretical frameworks of the 
policy process and policy change which place some emphasis on the role of beliefs and 
values are those that emphasise cognitive and normative frames, as identified by Surel 
(2000) and discussed in Chapter Three. However, these do not pay sufficient attention 
to the role of science and evidence within the policy process. 
Using a synthesis approach, combining theoretical and conceptual tools principally 
derived from theories that stress cognitive and QRUPDWLYH IUDPHV  +DOO·V SROLF\
paradigm and the advocacy coalition framework), together with further development of 
the morality policy typology has proved a useful  heuristic to frame analysis. Despite its 
limitations, outlined by Cairney (2013) and discussed in Chapter Three, a synthetic 
approach has significant advantages: it allows for emergence and creativity in the 
research process, and as such does not limit the investigation to testing and replication. 
It is only through a process of borrowing concepts and synthesising frameworks that 
case specific features and emergent categories can be accounted for, providing 
opportunities for theory generation.  
11.4 How does morality affect understandings and uses of evidence? Can 
evidence neutralise morality? 
In the context of this thesis, this approach has contributed to showing that a belief in 
evidence can be both emancipatory and limiting. Specifically in relation to the case 
studies under scrutiny, the evidence-based policy paradigm has provided the 
opportunity to challenge moral taboos; it has given liberals a tool to effect policy change 
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(through creating an advocacy coalition) by challenging moral prohibitions, creating an 
alternative morality based on the values of social justice, social responsibility, human 
rights and harm reduction. However, among my respondents there was a great level of 
cynicism in regards to the possibility of effecting a policy paradigm shift through use of 
evidence, and this was often put down to politics and ideology rather than the contested 
nature of evidence itself. There was a tendency among respondents to portray evidence 
and politics as oppositional forces, rather than viewing evidence-making and 
understanding as a necessarily moral and political undertaking. I argued that moral and 
political positions are primary when it comes to the production, understandings and 
uses of evidence. 
11.5  How are the values and beliefs of stakeholders operating to filter policy 
ĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƐĂŶĚƵƐĞƐŽĨĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĐůĂƐƐŝĐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĐůĞĂǀages aid 
understandings of evidence use in policy? 
In Chapters Eight and Nine, I have shown that values and beliefs are primary 
determinants in the selection, understanding and weighting of evidence. Further, it is 
often existing value commitments which inIRUP LQGLYLGXDOV·EHOLHIV WKDWDUH WUDQVODWHG
into moral, political and professional attitudes, choices and practices in these domains. 
6WDNHKROGHUV· YDOXHV DQG EHOLHIV DUH FRQWH[W DQG GRPDLQ GHSHQGHQW DQG have been 
defined inductively. They are also intimately tied with classic political cleavages. Analysis 
of liberal and conservative moral and policy positions was carried out to demonstrate 
that the values and beliefs which dominate liberal coalitions are different and sometimes 
opposite to those predominant in conservative coalitions. A very important distinction 
is noted in the emphasis that liberals place on social responsibility, which runs contrary 
WRFRQVHUYDWLYHV·HPSKDVLVRQLQGLYLGXDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\7KLVLVUHJDUGHGDVIXQGDPHQWDO
in creating and justifying arguments for and against prohibition in both policy domains.  
11.6 What are the similarities and differences in the use of evidence between 
government departments, stakeholder culture, and policy areas?  
Some key differences were identified in the use of evidence between different 
government departments, and in particular between those involved with health and 
those with criminal justice. This extended to differences between different stakeholders 
and policy areas. Different cultures of evidence were identified by participants, whereby 
D ¶KHDOWK FXOWXUH RI HYLGHQFH· ZLWK DQ HPSKDVLV RQ KLHUDUFKLFDO QRWLRQV ULJRXU DQG
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TXDQWLWDWLYH UHVHDUFK ZDV GLVWLQJXLVKHG IURP D ¶FULPLQDO MXVWLFH FXOWXUH RI HYLGHQFH·
which was seen as altogether more inclusive of different forms of evidence, but also as 
generally less rigorous in its assessment of evidence. The general trend across these 
policy domains indicated that the dominance of a health culture and medical sciences, 
and their associated evidence hierarchy, resulted in a view of evidence which respected 
hierarchical notions, at least rhetorically if not in practice. Consequently, the stronger 
association between a given stakeholder or policy domain to health and medical science 
resulted in stronger allegiance and commitment to a hierarchical understanding of 
evidence and a normative commitment to evidence-based policy as an ideal type. In 
drug policy, the closer proximity to treatment, falling within the responsibility of health 
authorities, resulted in greater reference and use of a vertical conception of evidence. In 
prostitution policy, this was only the case in relation to public health and associated 
interventions. In drug policy, the evidence culture from health has diffused into criminal 
justice, generating some controversy in terms of the gap between theory and practice. In 
both policy domains, those stakeholders who are excluded, or have comparatively less 
power compared to other policy actors, have been struggling in order to achieve 
credibility as evidence-producers, despite proposing a view of evidence that is practice-
based and grounded in experience, both anecdotal and personal.  
11.7 What are the similarities and differences between the UK and Australia?  
The UK and Australia showed consistent similarities in the way evidence was 
understood and utilised. The crucial differences were found in terms of the impact of 
different political and institutional structures. The necessity for legislation in New South 
Wales was understood as both an advantage and a hindrance. On the one hand, state 
legislation allows for controversial and novel policy interventions to be implemented, 
sheltering domestic policies from federal and international pressure and consenting for 
a degree of policy experimentation. On the other hand, the necessity to legislate 
potentially curtails opportunities for experimentation and unofficial initiatives because it 
does not tolerate grey areas. In England, it was noted how the process of devolution 
and localism has given rise to some interesting initiatives in individual cities and 
counties. A degree of diversity exists, with instances of partial decriminalisation in both 
policy domains which depart from national rhetoric and legislation. However, national 
laws and policies are ultimately difficult to challenge, and the level of rhetorical, political 
and legal impact of national directives is relatively high on localities. Whereas in both 
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countries policy forums have proliferated and consultation processes ensure wider 
participation by civil society and the scientific community, the inclusion of affected 
communities in policy and health partnerships in Australia, as part of a federal 
government initiative, together with their resourcing, allowed for further legitimation of 
their views compared to their UK counterparts. Affected communities in the UK are 
not publically funded or officially included in partnerships, and consultation is 
FRQGXFWHG DW DUP·V OHQJWK ZKLOVW WKHLU DELOLW\ WR REWDLQ SULYDWH IXQGLQJ DQG VXSSRUW
conditions their participatory and advocacy potential. However, it should be noted that 
in New South Wales, though partnerships continue to exist, the resourcing of 
organiVDWLRQV KDV JRQH IURP ´GROODU IRU GROODU PDWFKµ RI state and commonwealth 
funding to tendering and commissioning, which may affect their capabilities in the 
future, and reflects a more general trend in dominant modes of governance in advanced 
liberal states.  
11.8 How does the use of evidence in policy relate to sociological theories on the 
nature of the state in late modern capitalism? How do political/moral cleavages 
underpinned by values and beliefs support consumption-based economies on the 
one hand, and moral and legal prohibitions on the other? 
As noted in Chapters One and Four, the evidence-based policy discourse reveals some 
of the characteristics of current modes of governance in advanced neo-liberal states, 
LQFOXGLQJ WKH WHQVLRQVEHWZHHQGHPRFUDF\ DQG WHFKQRFUDF\ WKH ULVHRI D ¶QHZSXEOLF
PDQDJHPHQW·DQGSRVW-ideological politics. This discourse can be read as an attempt to 
FDSLWDOLVHRQWKHGHVLUH WR ¶GHSROLWLFLVH·SROLWLFV WKURXJKSXUSRUWHGVFLHQWLILFREMHFWLYLW\
and neutrality. This is regarded as both ideological and epistemologically misconceived. 
It is ideological in that it pertains to an unsophisticated liberal world view, where science 
is regarded as a neutral instrument of progress and demystification. It is 
epistemologically misconceived inasmuch as it predominantly relies on a positivist view 
of science. Findings confirm that science is itself a political arena, borne out of political 
necessity and moral outrage.  In this context, evidence is contested and negotiated 
through complex sets of belonging, whereby values, beliefs and morality play an 
important part via the production and filtering of knowledge. Values, beliefs, morality 
and ideology have been used as working concepts for analysis because their interplay is 
crucial in understanding the process of knowledge and evidence production, 
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understanding, use and acceptance. The role of values and beliefs was observed at both 
societal level and individual level.  
The underlying shift in societal level values from authoritarian to liberal discussed in 
Chapter Five is consonant with economic, social and cultural changes in advanced 
liberal states and is ideologically supported (Inglehart, 1997; Habermas, 1986). 
Consumption, individualism, and freedom of choice are fundamental traits of neo-
liberal ideology. The dominance of neo-liberal ideology should result in a shift in values, 
beliefs and attitudes away from prohibition and toward liberalisation in these policy 
domains. However, ideologies are morphologically complex and internally 
contradictory, and as such they may provide support for a variety of moral positions 
(Freeden, 1994). Neo-liberal ideology can be regarded as informed by concepts that 
arise from both the liberal and the conservative ideological and political traditions (Hall, 
2011).  
The presence of competing moralities, which range on a spectrum from conservative to 
liberal, interact with dominant ideology and foster incommensurability of views, 
resulting in complex and internally contradictory policies, where elements of 
authoritarian and liberal values coexist to different degrees in different countries and 
policy domains, and are applied differentially by different groups and coalitions. The 
interaction between dominant ideology, political economy and national politics gives 
way to contradiction by tying morality to certain behaviours, subsequently linked with 
class and respectability, enshrined in notions of deserving and undeserving citizens used 
to dismantle the principles and resources of the welfare state in an age of austerity 
(Chapter 10). In this context, drugs and prostitution continue to be portrayed as 
¶GDQJHURXV·PRUDOFDWHJRULHVHntailing distinctions centred on class, gender and cultural 
hierarchies. These are evident in the stigma particularly associated with certain types of 
drug use and sex work which continue to be regarded as more immoral than others.  
Currently, the neo-liberal aversion to labour politics does not favour liberalisation of 
prostitution in the form of a decriminalised regime that recognises prostitution as sex 
work, particularly in the UK context. In New South Wales, neo-liberal ideology and 
morality have a dual effect: whilst contributing to legalise the space for the sex industry, 
satisfying consumption, leisure expansion and patriarchal norms, prostitution continues 
to be the subject of stigma and moralisation even in this decriminalisation context, 
pushed away from visible spaces (Prior et al, 2013). The ambiguity towards strong rights 
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associated with pleasure and self-determination, together with class-based stigma and 
the prohibitive regime which has been a relatively constant feature of drug policies in 
both countries and beyond, hinders any shift toward liberalisation in drug policy. 
However, decriminalisation in drug policy, particularly targeting those substances that 
are seen as recreational and therefore more socially and morally acceptable, is 
increasingly regarded as a likely scenario, because decriminalisation can sustain 
contradictions between prohibitionism and legalisation, and because it can be justified 
on the basis of weak rights (Chapter 10). Rather than an instrument of 
decriminalisation, the Medically Supervised Injecting Centre in Sydney constitutes a 
policy anomaly which reflects some of the contradictions of neo-liberal ideology and 
accommodates the clash of competing moralities, only satisfying the weak rights of drug 
users.  
11.9 Limitations and ways forward 
The focus on paradigms and instruments has proven to be very useful in terms of 
studying policy-making; however, this encourages a tendency to overly concentrate on 
the manner in which national laws and top-down policy discourses shape opportunities 
and construct boundaries, rather than looking at bottom-up initiatives, resistance and 
local policy-making and implementation, which is increasingly identified as a 
fundamental level of analysis. Despite the conceptual and methodological usefulness of 
the morality policy typology, this has been problematized by asking whether a given 
policy can in fact be a non-morality domain; this assumption should be tested through 
comparison with policies that have not been included under the morality label. The 
many labels used to characterise issues regarded as particularly difficult political subjects 
(i.e. wicked, unstructured, highly politicised, moral) entail different yet complementary 
understandings and analyses. Future comparative studies could be designed to address 
WKHVH W\SRORJLHV· VWUHQJWKV DQG OLPLWDWLRQV DQG WKHLU SRWHQWLDO FRPSOHPHQWDULW\ E\
using them concurrently. Given the small number of case studies in this project, a 
systematic approach to test theories and models deductively could not be pursued. Yet, 
WKHUHLVYDOXHLQV\VWHPDWLFDOO\DQGGHGXFWLYHO\WHVWLQJWKHRULHVDQGPRGHOV·DVVXPSWLRQV
by extending the number of case studies and countries under scrutiny, and using other 
methods, and particularly QCA. This might also allow moving beyond synthetic 
heuristics justified on the basis of dominant narratives and provide some scope for 
testing approaches in a contradictory or complementary fashion.  
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In examining the use of evidence in two policy domains across two countries, this thesis 
has found that, despite difference in national contexts and in the specific attributes of 
each policy domain, evidence tended to be filtered through morality and ideology, and 




This appendix provides definitions of all relevant working concepts utilised throughout 
the thesis. Some concepts have a single definition because they are used in a single, non-
ambiguous manner. Other concepts may have more than one definition. The precise 
meaning and definition was noted each time a variation of the concept was used in the 
thesis.  
Some of these concepts are seen as central because referred to in relevant literature, 
sometimes without any specification about their intended meaning. Other concepts are 
seen as specifically relevant to this thesis, and are defined accordingly.  
Evidence: 
(Scientific) Evidence 1: characterised by the standards set by broad scientific 
consensus, which is also discipline-bound; influenced by hierarchical notions, 
albeit not exclusively defined by the evidence hierarchy, because context and 
discipline dependent. It is narrativized yet it does not aim to be intelligible to a 
non-scientific audience; can be quantitative or qualitative. 
(Jurisprudential) Evidence 2: knowledge or information that is presented in a 
legalistic fashion, and is validated by expert claims, usually delivered by an 
expert witness, may include both anecdotal and scientific evidence, but is 
narrativized so as to become convincing and intelligible to a lay audience.  
(Anecdotal) Evidence 3: narrativised; usually referred to in a negative manner, 
it can also be utilised by groups in a positive sense to strengthen their position 
as legitimate sources of knowledge. It aims to be universally intelligible through 
the use of stories which actors can relate to, if not personally, at least affectively 
and rationally. It involves communication and story-telling. 
(Experiential) Evidence 4: only relates to personal experience, usually 





Instrumental rationality: mode of action whereby a problem is identified and 
a solution sought in a functional instrumental manner; in so doing, it excludes 
normativity (Sanderson, 2002); positivist 
Bounded rationality: opposed to instrumental rationality, conception of 
rationality as limited by time, cognition, culture, knowledge available; referred to 
explicitly by Sabatier and Baumgartner and Jones as preferred understanding of 
rationality. 
Frames (disambiguation): 
Issue framing: an instrumental way of structuring and presenting an issue or 
problem, usually aimed at engaging a particular audience, their more likely 
modes of understanding, beliefs, and knowledge culture.  
Discursive framing: a way of structuring and presenting problems that 
presupposes structural, ideological, cultural and knowledge constraints and 
boundaries which reflect and are reflected in turn in beliefs, attitudes, practices 
and preferences.  
Morality (working concept):  
¶0RUDOLW\ELQGVDQGEOLQGV·+DLGW366) 
,Q)LVKHU·VZRUGV 
¶0RUDOLW\ LV D WHUP XVHG WR FRYHU WKRVH SUDFWLFHV DQG DFWLYLWLHV WKDW DUH
considered right and wrong; the rules that govern those activities; and the values 
that are embedded, fostered, or pursued by those activities and practices. The 
morality of a society is related to its mores, or the customs that a society or 
group accepts as being right and wrong, as well as those laws of a society that 
add legal prohibitions and sanctions to many activities considered to be 
LPPRUDO·397). 
To summarise, morality is about distinguishing right from wrong (first principles) and it 
LVUHODWHGZLWKVRFLHW\·VPRUHVDFFHSWHGQRWLRQVRIULJKWDQGZURQJPRUDOLW\LVRIWHQ
formalised into law (Habermas, 1986). However, morality is contested, and thus, what is 
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wrong for some might be right for others. There exist a variety of moral positions; 
hence, further disambiguation is necessary. The existence of moralities (plural) more 
accurately portrays the diversity and complexity of social reality; however, some general 
categories, or ideal-types, need to be outlined in order to avoid falling into 
individualising explanations. The literature in moral and social psychology (Lakoff, 
1996; Haidt, 2012) distinguishes between two types of morality according to classic 
political cleavages.  
Liberal morality: features optimistic view of human nature; openness to experience; 
openness to change; more concerned with issues of harm and fairness; more 
individualistLF FRQFHUQHG ZLWK EDODQFLQJ LQWHUHVWV DQG PD[LPLVLQJ LQVWLWXWLRQV· VRFLDO
XWLOLW\*UDKDPHWDOFRQFHUQIRUWROHUDQFHGHIHQFHRIWKHZHDN¶FDUHIRUYLFWLPV
RI RSSUHVVLRQ· +DLGW  LQFOXVLRQ /DNRII·V  PHWDSKRU ¶QXUWXUDQW SDUHQW
morDOLW\·RSHQDXWKRULW\OHJLWLPDWLRQVWURQJHUDIIHFWLYHIRXQGDWLRQHPSDWK\ 
Conservative morality: features pessimistic view of human nature; preference for 
familiarity, stability and predictability; stronger sensitivity to threats; resistance to 
change; acceptance of inequality; more concerned with issues of in-group, authority and 
purity; more rule-DELGLQJ FRQFHUQ IRU OR\DOW\ /DNRII·V  PHWDSKRU ¶VWULFW IDWKHU
PRUDOLW\· FORVHG DXWKRULW\ JLYHQ VWURQJHU DIIHFWLYH IRXQGDWLRQ IHDU1 (Graham et al, 
2009; Haidt, 2012; Lakoff, 1996) 
Morality policy: LV¶QROHVVWKDQWKHOHJDOVDQFWLRQRIULJKWDQGZURQJWKHYDOLGDWLRQRI
a particular set of EDVLF YDOXHV· 0RRQH\  675); area of policy characterised by 
heightened lack of consensus originating from disagreement on values and first-
principles. 
,I ¶PRUDO V\VWHPV DUH LQWHUORFNLQJ VHWV RI YDOXHV SUDFWLFHV LQVWLWXWLRQV DQG HYROYHG
psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and 
make social OLIHSRVVLEOH·+DLGW, 2008: 70) 
Values and beliefs, together with ideas, practices and institutions, as building bricks of 
moral systems 
Values: abstract, goal oriented, deliberative and evaluative tools. 
                                                 
1 These are ideal-types; thH\GRQ·WLQFOXGHVSHFLILFDWLRQRIOLEHUWDULDQSRVLWLRQVRUVRFLDOO\FRQVHUYDWLYHSRVLWLRQV
which can coalesce with either liberal or conservative moralities; the combination of insights from morality and 
ideological morphology can account for more complex positions. 
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¶YDOXHV VHUYH DV VWDQGDUGV WKDW ZH OHDUQ WR HPSOR\ WUDQVFHQGHQWDOO\ DFUoss 
objects and situations in various ways: to guide action; to guide us to the 
positions that we take on various social, ideological, political, and religious 
issues; to guide self-presentations and impression management; to evaluate and 
judge ourselves and others by; to compare ourselves with others not only with 
respect to competence, but also with respect WRPRUDOLW\·5RNHDFK48) 
¶$OO YDOXHV KDYH FRJQLWLYH DIIHFWLYH DQG GLUHFWLRQDO DVSHFWV 9DOXHV VHUYH DV
criteria for selection in action. When most explicit and fully conceptualised, 
values become criteria for judgement, preference, and choice. When implicit and 
XQUHIOHFWLYH YDOXHV QHYHUWKHOHVV SHUIRUP ´DV LIµ WKH\ FRQVWLWXWHG JURXQGV IRU
decisions in EHKDYLRXU·:LOOLDPV17) 
Values should be distinguished from beliefs, attitudes, and ideologies 
¶$V ZH H[DPLQH HYLGHQFHV RI values, we find them appearing in various 
admixtures with knowledge and beliefs. For our judgement of what should be are 
always related to our judgement of what LV· 
¶YDlues cannot be assimilated to either existential beliefs or to concrete 
evaluations (such as iGHRORJLHV·:LOOLDPV17) 
Beliefs: concrete, action-oriented, practice-led evaluative and deliberative tools 
¶DQ\VLPSOHSURSRVLWLRQFRQVFLRXVRUXQFRQVFLous, inferred from what a person 
VD\VRUGRHVFDSDEOHRIEHLQJSUHFHGHGE\ WKHSKUDVH´,EHOLHYH WKDW«µ7KH
content of a belief may describe the object of belief as true or false, correct or 
incorrect; evaluate it as good or bad; or advocate a certain course of action or a 
certain state of existence as desirable or uQGHVLUDEOH·5RNHDFK113) 
Values (ought); beliefs (is) 
¶YDOXHVPD\EHWKRXJKWRIDVJOREDOEHOLHIVDERXWGHVLUDEOHHQG-states underlying 
DWWLWXGLQDODQGEHKDYLRXUDOSURFHVVHV·&RQQRUand Becker, 1979: 72) 
¶ZKHQZHFDQLGHQWLI\LQWHUFRQQHFWHGVHWVRIYDOXHVDQGEHOLHIVZKLFKGHVFULEHD
SUHIHUUHG RU ´REOLJDWRU\µ VWDWH RI D VRFLDO V\VWHP ZH VSHDN RI DQ ideology·




,GHRORJ\ FULWLFDO0DU[LVW ¶meaning in the VHUYLFH RI SRZHU· 7KRPSVRQ
1990).  
Ideology (morphology): the conceptual structure of an ideology; ideologies are 
VHHQ DV ¶FRPELQDWLRQV RI SROLWLFDO FRQFHSWV RUJDQLVHG LQ D SDUWLFXODU ZD\·
LGHRORJLFDO DUJXPHQWV UHO\ RQ ¶D VRFLDOO\ VLWXDWHG DQG YDOXH-arbitrated choice 
among adjacent components, and the result will display various mixes of 
rational criteria, emotional inclinations and cultural value pUHIHUHQFHV·)UHHGHQ
1994: 155-156). 
Political Ideology (psychology/motivational): ¶LGHRORJ\ UHIOHFWV DQG 
UHLQIRUFHV >«@UHODWLRQDOHSLVWHPLFDQGH[LVWHQWLDOQHHGVRUPRWLYHV· ¶6SHFLILF
ideologies crystallise and communicate the widely (but not unanimously) shared 
beliefs, opinions, and values of an identifiable group, class, constituency or 
VRFLHW\· ¶GLIferent ideologies should both elicit and express at least somewhat 
different social, cognitive and motivational styles or tendencies on the part of their 
adKHUHQWV·-RVWHWDO309-310, emphasis added). 
Policy:  
¶$FRXUVHRIDFWLRQIROORZLQJDGHFLVLRQWDNHQE\DERG\RUJDQLVDWLRQRUDXWKRULW\· 
Ideas: FRQFXUUHQW WR LQWHUHVWV UDWKHU WKDQ FDXVHG E\ LQWHUHVWV :HEHU·V UHDFWLRQ WR
Marx), used as core concept in constructing theories (ideational approaches) for 
understanding the policy process; ideas embody causal beliefs, so beliefs are constitutive 
of ideas; ideas provide roadmaps, making goals clearer (Goldstein, 1993). 
Policy ideas and Policy paradigms: VRPHWLPHVXVHGDVV\QRQ\PV)ROORZLQJ+DOO·V
(1993) notion, a policy paradigm is defined as 
¶D YLHw of human nature, a definition of basic and proper forms of social 
relations among equals and among those in relationships of hierarchy, and a 
specification of relations among institutions as well as a stipulation of the role of 
such institutions. Thus, a societal paradigm is a meaning system as well as a set 
RISUDFWLFHV·Jenson, cited in Surel, 2000: 499) 




Generative mechanisms: (literal) 
¶LWLVWKHJHQHUDWLYe mechanism that supplies the real basis foUFDXVDOODZV·$UFKHU 
3) 
¶PRVW RI XV UHJDUG WKH VRFLDO RUGHU DV D UHODWLRQDOO\ FRQWHVWHG RUJDQLVDWLRQ VKDSHG
between those supporting and opposing the working of particular mechanisms within a 
generative FRPSOH[· 
¶QRJHQHUDWLYHPHFKDQLVPLVHYHUKHOGWREHRWKHUWKDQDFWLYLW\GHSHQGHQW· 
¶JHQHULF FRQFHSWV WKDW PXVW EH DSSOLHG ZLWK GLUHFW UHIHUHQFH WR WKH VSHFLILF VRFLDO
process(eVLQTXHVWLRQ·$UFKHU 4) 
Policy instrument: programme or intervention  
A designed programme and a course of action pursued within a specific field and a 
given time period, including planning, discussion, perceived outcomes, implementation, 
observation, monitoring, evaluation, assessment of outcomes in a continuous feedback 
cycle. 
,QFOXGHVGHFLVLRQV DQG ¶QRQ-GHFLVLRQV· +LOO  FKDQJH DQG FRQWLQXLW\ SROLF\ DV D
neutral instrument, giving the appearance of neutrality to disguise politics.  
Legalisation  
Implies legal reform with the aim to legalise supply and demand of drugs and 
prostitution; approaches may vary from the strict state regulation to minimal regulation 
and commercialisation of the trades; the central tenet is the end of criminal penalties 
inflicted upon producers, dealers, consumers and clients. 
 
Prohibitionism  
implies the maintenance of criminal penalties within a given legal regime with the aim to 
prohibit a particular trade. In drug policy, it aims to deter any aspect of the trade by 
criminalising the production, distribution and consumption of currently illegal 
substances. In prostitution policy, it aims to deter the trade by criminalising the supply, 
demand and any form of commercialisation or related gain. In prostitution policy, 
Appendix 1 
296 
partial prohibitionism exists, where the supply is not criminalised yet other aspects of 
the trade, including demand and third party profit, are criminalised.  
Abolitionism 
It is a normative position calling for the complete abolishment of prostitution and drugs 
with the ultimate aim of ridding society from such practices. In drug policy, this can be 
distinguished in the support of abstinence.   
 
Criminalisation and decriminalisation  
The literature on criminalisation and decriminalisation ranges from instrumental to 
ethical considerations, covering drug and prostitution policy specifically (e.g. Sheerer, 
1978; Lutnick and Cohan, 2009; Sher, 2003; Husak, 2003; Bayer, 1991; Frances and 
Gray, 2007) as well as a more generally utilising the concepts to describe overall changes 
that are either permissive or repressive and linking them with broad changes such as 
secularisation, democratisation, economic changes, and social and cultural value-shifts 
(Engeli et al, 2013; Chapter 5). For some, they are legal shorthand for working 
compromises: criminalisation could be regarded as symbolic deterrence (because non-
universally enforceable), and decriminalisation could be regarded as a functional option, 
entailing set of reforms to prevent some of the worse effects of punitive laws on 
individuals, potentially diminishing stigma and improving life chances (Cheney, 1988; 
Goodyear and Cusik, 2007; Chand, 2007).  
Applying realist reasoning, can decriminalisation and criminalisation be regarded as 
generative mechanisms? Their logic is shared across both policy domains and beyond. 
In drugs and prostitution policy, either criminalisation or decriminalisation shape, or at 
least greatly inform the host of policy interventions applied in the field. Criminalisation 
entails a prohibition system in drug and prostitution policy, thus applying to both policy 
domains. Decriminalisation on the other hand entails at least a degree of liberalisation 
and legalisation, on a spectrum that ranges from tackling only one aspect of the trade 
(i.e. the possession of drugs) all the way to the supply (of sex). The dominance of either 
establishes tangible legal boundaries, which largely curtail opportunities, in terms of 
what is and is not permitted. For example, within paradigm criminalised system, the 
police and the criminal justice system act as the principal regulators. Decriminalisation 
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effectively entails a transfer of authority and responsibility from the police and the 
criminal justice system to other authorities, including health departments and agencies, 
and administrative local authorities. The type and degree of involvement and 
responsibility of different authorities result in a host of different policy interventions in 
a given policy domain. 
Considerations on the moral and ethical dimensions of criminalisation and 
criminalisation have been overtly discussed by philosophers and legal scholars. Sher 
(2003) argues that there are different ethical arguments for criminalisation, which he 
categorises as paternalistic, protective and perfectionist. Each of them makes a 
correlation between drugs and harms, supporting criminalisation as deterrent 
(symbolic). Each of them has a moral basis. In his critique about criminalisation, Husak 
(2003) maintains that the evidence that criminalisation works as a deterrent is weak 
(functional), and that drug use per se is not a sufficient ground for punishment, thus he 
opposes criminalisation. He argues that no variable correlates more strongly with 
support for criminalisation than religion, and particularly protestant Christians (p. 25). 
In law, some commentators have constructed arguments on a moral basis. Richards 
(1981) made a case for decriminalisation on the basis of the rights of the person, using a 
liberal/rights moral foundation.  
I outline certain moral and political features of criminalisation and decriminalisation, 
implying that the types of opportunities and interventions they entail are inherently 
different. I then discuss the extent to which harm reduction can be regarded as a 
different paradigm (Roe, 2005; Ezard, 2001), a middle-ground, or whether it can in fact 
be an instrument of either criminalisation or decriminalisation.  
Criminalisation logic: 
x Punishment works as deterrent (symbolic) 
x Drug use and prostitution are immoral 
x Society needs Punishment for wrong/immoral behaviour 
x Site of struggle and conflict mostly within individual 
x Strong distinction between right and wrong, semi-absolute 
x Conservative morality 




x Punishment fails as a deterrent (functional/empathy) 
x Individuals needs rehabilitation, treatment and opportunities for sick/wrong 
behaviour 
x Reduces stigma and marginalisation 
x Individuals have rights and make choices, and should not be punished for them 
x Site of struggle and conflict mostly outside individual ²individual needs 
treatment, not punishment 
x Weak or blurred distinction between right and wrong, context-dependent 
x Liberal morality 
x Libertarian values 
The figure below represents the manner in which the two paradigms operate as 
opposites, pushing in opposite directions.  
 
Principal Epistemological approaches (disambiguation) 
Positivism: philosophy of science, first proponent Auguste Comte, French 
philosopher, an exponent of the enlightenment; main precept: truth can be ascertained 
empirically (contra religion and metaphysics) through the application of the scientific 
method. 
Decriminalisation logic: 
Punishment fails as a deterrent 
Society needs rehabilitation and treatment 
for wrong behaviour 
Site of struggle and conflict mostly outside 
individual 
Weak or blurred distinction between right 




Law works as Deterrent 
Society needs Punishment for wrong 
behaviour 
Site of struggle and conflict mostly within 
individual 






Critical Realism: philosophy of science whose main exponents are Roy Bhaskar and 
Margaret Archer; proposes to find a middle ground between positivism and 
interpretivism; rejects naturalism and the unity of the scientific method; main concepts: 
emergence; generative mechanisms; context-mechanism-outcome; realist synthesis. 
Critical Theory: school of philosophy, political and social theory; includes the 
Frankfurt School and Jürgen Habermas; neo-Marxist approach; main concepts include 
praxis, the culture industry (first wave); public sphere, discourse theory of validity, ideal 
speech situation (second wave) 
Affect: emotional response;  
¶DIIHFWPHDQVWKHVSHFLILFTXDOLW\RI¶JRRGQHVV·RU¶EDGQHVV·H[SHULHQFHGDVDIHHOLQJ
state (with or without consciousness) and (2) demarcating a positive or negative quality 
RIDVWLPXOXV·6ORYLFHWDOS 
Affect heuristic (Slovic et al, 2004); (linked with experiential system of thinking) 
¶UHDGLO\DYDLODEOHDIIHFWLYHLPSUHVVLRQ·GHFLVLRQ-PDNLQJ¶VKRUWFXW·DSSOLHGWR ¶GUHDGDQG
RXWUDJH·¶ULVNDQGEHQHILW·¶SUREDELOLW\IUHTXHQF\DQGULVN· 
Valence used to refer to the emotional attractiveness, i.e. of an idea (Cox and Beland, 
2013), or as political valence, as in Hunt (1999). 
Boundary work (Gieryn, 1983): the process of demarcation of science from non-
science; it is interest-led to start with, but entails the construction of ideological and 
epistemological boundaries which encourage particular values and beliefs. 
Knowledge cultures/Epistemic cultures (Knorr Cetina, 2007) understanding 
knowledge production through cultural lenses and ethnographic methods; implies 
diversity of knowledges and of sciences with boundaries established through ontology, 
epistemology, terminology, and methodology.  
Model; Theory; Framework (disambiguation) 
The difference between models, theories and frameworks (Ostrom, 2011) 
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Models Theories Frameworks 
/ŶǀŽůǀĞ ‘ƉƌĞĐŝƐĞĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƐ
about a limited set of variables 
ĂŶĚƉĂƌĂŵĞƚĞƌƐ ? 
Are contained by both theory 
and framework 
 
Select elements of frameworks 




Can be contained within 
frameworks 
Are bound to research 
questions 
Identify elements and 
relationships among them 
Provide set of variables to 
analyse formal arrangements 
Are metatheoretical 
Help guide analysis 
Identify universal elements 
which relevant theories must 
include 
May contain multiple theories 
¶2QH QHHGV D FRPPRQ IUDPHZRUN DQG IDPLO\ RI WKHRULHV LQ RUGHU WR DGGUHVV
questions of reform and transition. Particular models then help the analyst to 
deduce specific predictions about likely outcomes of highly simplified 
structures. Models are useful in policy analysis when they are well tailored to the 
particular problem at hand. Models can be used inappropriately when applied to 
the study of situations that do not closely fit the assumptions RI WKH PRGHO·
(Ostrom, 2011: 9) 
 
 
Frameworks  ?Identify elements and relationships among them  ?Provide set of variables to analyse formal 
arrangements 
 ?Are metatheoretical 
 ?Help guide analysis 
 ?Identify universal elements which relevant theories 
must include 
 ?May contain multiple theories 
 
Theories  ?Select elements of frameworks to form working assumptions 
 ?Are diagnostic 
 ?ƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ 
 ?Can be contained within frameworks 
 ?Are bound to research questions 
Models 
 ? /ŶǀŽůǀĞ ‘ƉƌĞĐŝƐĞĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚĂůŝŵŝƚĞĚƐĞƚŽĨǀĂƌŝĂďůĞƐĂŶĚƉĂƌĂŵĞƚĞƌƐ ? 
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